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ABSTRACT

This proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society contain two presidential addresses: "Separating School and State: An Analytical Polemic" (D. G. Smith); and "'Whither Now, Alfonse?': Beyond the Polemic (A Response to Smith)" (J. M. Fennell). The Proceedings contains the following papers from the 1999 meeting: "Tragedy, Security, Liberty" (L. Silverstein); "Where Are the Teachers of Virtue?" (J. D. Wallace); "Tacit Knowledge and Moral Education" (R. Zigler); "Home Is Where One Starts From: Loyalty and the Schools" (W. P. Krolikowski); "Reader Response and Its Discontents" (A. Johnston); "Dewey Played on the Bongo Drums of Education" (M. McDermott); "Technology, Community, and Marginalized Youth" (D. Pascavage); "J. F. Herbart and Moral Education" (M. Murphy); "Learning and Reciprocity" (J. Carson); "Court Defined Philosophy: Rehnquist, Minimalism, and Access" (J. Borek); "Holistic Multicultural Education" (R. P. Craig); "Can Democratic Education Still Inspire?" (D. Blacker); "Making Manifest: Viewing Wittgenstein's Philosophy" (T. Bowell); "Cultivating Philosophical Skills and Virtues" (N. Nobis); "The Dream of Superman" (R. Schiller); "Dewey, the Arts, and Popular Culture" (L. Satanovsky); "Reality Bytes: How Images of Reality in Modern Films Affect Adolescent Perceptions" (R. Givens); "John Dewey and Traditional Education" (W. R. Zhang); and "On the Possibility of Aesthetic Experience: Dewey, Dickie, and the Context of Art" (J. Swenson). Papers from the 2000 meeting are: "Teaching and Experiencing Hardy's 'Tess of the D'Urbervilles': A Deweyan Approach" (A. Efron); "Expression, Imagination, and Organic Unity" (D. A. Granger); "The Education of Stephen Dedalus" (A. Johnston); "Educating the Self: Archetypal and Fairy Tale Patterns in 'Emile'" (G. Johnston); "The Fragility of Teaching" (L. O'Neill); "Doxic Assumptions, Eurocentrism, and the Afrocentric Educational Idea" (C. Winters); "Dewey: The Aesthetics of Pedagogy" (S. Barnes); "Community Virtue, Social Justice, and Education" (J. S. Johnston); "Flora J. Cooke: An Early Communitarian" (G. L. Kroepel); "Hannah Arendt, Moral Education and the Subject(s) of Politics" (N. Levinson); "The Freedom to Learn: Socio-Political Currents and W. E. B. DuBois's Views on Education" (P. L. Moore); "Curricular Theorizing for Democratic Learning: Multiple and Contending Viewpoints" (J. Westerhof-Shultz); "The Reconstruction of Cultural Experience in Dewey and Winnicott: Notes for Further Investigation" (J. Webber); "Off with Masks: A. MacIntyre on Morality" (W. P. Krolikowski); "An Epistemological Argument for

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the Inclusion of Religion in Public Schools" (S. Rosenblith); "Deweying It Together" (C. Olsen; A. Kaufman); "J. A. Comenius: Moral Education through Age Appropriate Virtue Formation" (M. M. Murphy); "A Correspondence Course in Education and Distance" (S. Schroeder); "Responses to School Violence" (I. M. Harris); "The Aesthetics of Dangerous Style: Curriculum and Culture" (M. McDermott); "Rethinking the Ground of Pragmatic Aesthetics: Dewey and Heidegger" (B. Engel); "Fairy Tale as Literature, Fairy Tale as Psychological Document" (G. Johnston); "Why Art Education Mattered: Ernest F. Fennollosa's Philosophy of Art Education and Its Impact on Meji Japan" (Y. Ito); "Ogbu's Cultural Ecology Theory and the Case of Vietnamese Students" (D. T. Nguyen, S. D. Lamborn, H. Q. Trinh); "A Week with the Philosopher-Kings" (G. Kizer); "Presence as Pedagogical Possibility" (D. Hufford); "Procedural Reconceptualization of Standardized Assessment" (D. Pascavage); and "Humanities without Apologies: Miller's Outlook on What We Teach" (D. R. Anderson). Included are three related papers: "Memorial Essay for the Late Professor Foster McMurray" (M. A. Oliker); "A Philosophical Perspective on Debates about the Purpose of the Social Foundations Field" (P. Goldstone); and "Popular Culture and the Philosophy of John Dewey" (J. A. Stieb). Contains the 1999-2000 membership directory and an article index to previous MPES Proceedings. (BT)

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Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society: 1999–2000

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Preface and Acknowledgments

Michael A. Oliker

Executive Director, MPES

From 1987 to 2000 the annual meeting of the MPES took place every year on the Water Tower Campus of Loyola University of Chicago which is located near the intersection of Michigan Avenue and Chicago Avenue on the "Near North Side" of downtown Chicago. The Meeting Arrangements at Loyola were made every year by Father Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J. of Loyola University: a Jesuit Priest who has a Ph.D. in philosophy of education from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and has taught a variety of Foundations of Education courses at Loyola. But in recent years Loyola's College of Education was moved to the campus in the Chicago suburb of Wilmette, Illinois that used to be called Mallinckrodt College and Father Krolikowski is going to retire this year. The former MPES Executive Committee member Prof. Louis Silverstein of Columbia College Chicago has agreed to replace Father Krolikowski for doing meeting arrangements and has made arrangements to have the 2001 meeting on the campus of Columbia College Chicago which is located in the part of downtown Chicago called "The Loop" near the corner of Michigan Avenue and Congress Parkway. I am grateful to Father Krolikowski and Professor Silverstein for the work that they have done for the MPES.

The two meetings that have their papers printed in this volume took place during the presidency of Professor Don G. Smith of Eastern Illinois University. Our new President is Prof. Charlesetta M. Ellis of Chicago State University who served as Vice President during the presidency of Prof. Smith and was a member of the Program Committee for the 1999 meeting. Our former Secretary-Treasurer Richard Pipan is now our Vice President and Percy Moore who was both members of the Executive Committee and Program Committee in 1999 is now our Secretary-Treasurer.

The 2000 Presidential Address was delivered by President Don G. Smith at the Presidential Banquet in the Weston Hotel which is only a couple of blocks away from the Water Tower Campus of Loyola. The Presidential Banquet was

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made for us by the restaurant in the Weston called "Iron Mike's Grille." I had had some good food there a while ago and when I met the owner of "Iron Mike's Grille": the outstanding professional football player with the Chicago Bears (1961-1966), the Philadelphia Eagles (1967-1968), and the Dallas Cowboys(1969-1972) and the former Chicago Bears' head coach (1982-1992): Mike Ditka. (Weinstein, 1993: pp. 97-98). He seemed pleased to meet me because he had known my late Uncle Albert E. Oliker (1905-1999) who had co-owned a men's clothing store called "Oliker Brothers'" with my other deceased Uncle Jerry Oliker in Mike Ditka's home town of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. When I met Mike Ditka at that restaurant here in Chicago a couple of years ago I told him that back in 1959 my Uncle Al had urged me to go to see him play football at the University of Pittsburgh and Uncle Al had also predicted to me that Ditka was going to become one of the best football players of all time! Although the University of Pittsburgh "Panthers" football team lost the game that I attended in 1959 all the "Pitt Panthers" scoring in that game was done by Mike Ditka! I acknowledge that Uncle Al was correct and many members of the MPES seemed pleased to be able to attend a banquet that had been cooked by the people in "Iron Mike's Grille." Dr. Jon M. B. Fennell who was a member of the Program Committee along with Prof. Madonna Murphy in 2000 also served as the commentator on President Smith's Presidential Address.

Although President Don Smith and I have attended professional sports events together we both have studied literature and taught high school English and have done research on aspects of both "high culture" and "popular culture." Jon Fennell and I have also attended sports events together. Our past President. Prof. Phil Smith of Ohio State University has served as a referee in college sports and has taught a course in philosophy of sport. In the paper that Prof. Smith published in the 1995-1996 edition of our conference proceedings Prof. Smith makes an argument that the learning of "rule-governed behavior" to properly participate in sports can be regarded as a form of moral education and not just a form of play.

And both Vice President Charlesetta Ellis and I have interests in controveries about racism in education. So this edition of the MPES Proceedings contains a number of papers about philosophical reflections on aesthetic education, education about popular culture, and the impact on education of racial and ethnic controversies.

The 1999 meeting of the MPES began with a session on "Aesthetics, Communication, and Education" and also included sessions on "Education and Literature," "Philosophy and Film," "Popular Culture and Education," and the branch of philosophy called "Aesthetics." I also initiated a Special

Interest Group called "The George Reeves Society" in 1999 for philosophical presentations on education and popular culture. George Reeves was the actor who played the part of Superman in the 1950s television series called "The Adventures of Superman." The word "superman" is of significance in both philosophy and popular culture. That word originated in English as a translation of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's German word "ubermensch" which is also translated as "overman." At our 1998 meeting there were two presentations on Nietzsche's philosophy of education by Maughn Gregory and Kirk Wolf. So I have formed the opinion that "superman" is an important topic for work in philosophy of education.

Two of the three members of the 1999 Program Committee (Charlesetta Ellis and Percy Moore) are African-Americans. So they and I accepted a number of submissions on racial and ethnic controversies. The sessions on "Family, Community, and Education," "Literature and Education," "The Ethics of Access I," "Society and Education," "The Ethics of Access II" and "Dewey and History and Philosophy of Education," all addressed issues about racial and ethnic controversies. I assure the reader that philosophy of education scholars who are members of racial and ethnic minority groups are welcome to join the Midwest P.E.S. and deliver presentations at our meeting on the views on philosophy of education of past and present writers on philosophy of education who are members of racial and ethnic minority groups or who do their work in countries where they are members of a majority.

President Don G. Smith has done a lot of scholarly writing on aspects of both "high culture" and "popular culture." His doctoral dissertation was on the philosopher Ernst Cassirer whose writings emphasize the forms of symbolism in human culture. Cassirer seems to identify science, religion, language, and art as the key sources of symbolic meanings (Korner, 44-46). Don Smith's book on the horror film star Lon Chaney, Jr. seems to take the position that the horror film character played by Chaney that was called "The Wolf Man" is a symbol of human beings loss of self-control. Yet there seems to be a hint in that book that "The Wolf Man's" other identity as Larry Talbot is not clearly a "bad guy." My recollection of the horror movies that contain "The Wolf Man" is that Larry Talbot cannot prevent himself from becoming "The Wolf Man." President Don Smith also regards the writings of Edgar Allan Poe as originating both detective fiction and science fiction in films. His Presidential Address did not deal with controversies about "high culture" and "popular culture." Instead it addressed the controversy about whether "public schools" should be regarded as "government schools." He takes the position that "public schools" ARE "government schools." President Smith

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opposes control of education by a state because he regards education as having similar functions as religion and is strongly supportive of what is frequently called "the separation of church and state." He also argues that both the concepts "religion" and "education" lack universal meanings that a government could endorse. The commentator on President Smith's lecture Dr. Jon Fennell takes the position that President Smith's rejection of the claim that there are universal meanings of those concepts reflects an endorsement of what Dr. Fennell calls "relativism."

I would hold that both "relativism" and "universalism" can be regarded as dogmas and they both can function as reasonable positions. "Relativism" may simply be advocacy that the meaning of a form of discourse is influenced by its social context. So the study of the sociological foundation of both education and religion is a subject that is a valuable element of coursework in education or religion. Also the concepts of "religion" and "education" may have universal meanings in the English language. So it is possible that conflicting educational ideologies may have commitments in common. I would suggest that it is possible that the meaning of "education" may universally advocate what kids and elementary school teachers often call "The Three Rs." That phrase means "reading, writing, and arithmetic." I would suggest that "The Three Rs" should universally be studied in elementary schools and that a student in high school or college who lacks some skills in those area should universally be provided with provided with help. I agree with the paper that Don Smith published in the MPES Proceedings in the 1991-1992 edition that popular culture studies can be a valuable element of education.

There are a number of papers in this edition of the MPES Proceedings that address aspects of what can be termed either "aesthetic education" or "humanities education." The scholars who have done work on John Dewey's views on those two topics do not seem to be inclined to ridicule Dewey as a "relativist" or to ridicule the doing of teaching and research about popular culture. I was delighted that the State University of New York at Buffalo English Professor Arthur Efron came to our 2000 meeting as a guest speaker. Prof. Efron is also well known for his writing about the philosophy of John Dewey. His paper makes a case for a Deweyan interpretation of the classic British novel by Thomas Hardy: Tess of the D'Urbervilles. Prof. Efron argues that Dewey regards emotion and sociological contexts as essentialto aesthetic experience. He also alludes to the differences between Dewey and his contemporary Stephen C. Pepper on aesthetics. Prof. Efron also points out that Thomas Hardy's literature was influenced by the 19th Century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer whose pessimistic metaphysics is often regarded as a doctrinaire contrast to John Dewey's so-called "Progressivism." In his commentary on Prof. Efron's paper Prof. David Granger argues that Dewey's viewpoint on literature was influenced the classic British writers William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. What Dewey had in common with Wordsworth and Coleridge was interest in the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and George W. F. Hegel. Dewey's version of "Romanticism" agrees with Wordsworth that a key element in poetry is its expression of the poet's emotions.

The session on Humanities Education done by Prof. Douglas R. Anderson of Pennsylvania State University and our past President Philip L. Smith of Ohio State University and his student Art Bollman adresses some of the same controversies. Prof. Anderson seems to agree with the harsh criticism of Deweyan "instrumentalism" that treats Dewey as having held that Humanities education is nothing but a teaching of "subjectivity." That sort of interpretation seems to hold that if poetry is influenced by the expression of emotions poetry should be regarded as *nothing but* the expression of emotions. Evidently there is a view these days that Humanities cannot teach universal truth and is only a deterministic expression of emotions. Smith and Bollman also hold that these days Humanities education tends to be dominated by "culture wars." They argue that the viewpoint called "Postmodernism" opposes the ideals of truth, rationality, and objectivity.

If philosophy of education these days is becoming dominated by the kind of pessimism advocated by Arthur Schopenhauer back in the early 19th Century there is a need these days for educators to endorse the sort of optimism about education that was advocated by Horace Mann in the 19th Century and by John Dewey in the 20th Century. Although there were a few episodes of the popular television series of the 1950s called The Adventures of Superman in which Superman discovered that a teacher was a criminal there were also several episodes in which Superman was willing to protect teachers from criminals. Superman never gave the impression that he believed that all members of a profession or an ethnic group were criminals. He used his superpowers to capture a person only when there was evidence that the person had committed a crime.

The appendixes to this volume contain a memorial essay, an index to all the previous volumes of the MPES Proceedings, and a paper on John Dewey's views on "popular culture" that was presented at the 2001 annual meeting of the Popular Culture Association by James Stieb who is a doctoral student in philosophy at Temple University. I arranged a session at that conference on "Education, Philosophy, and Popular Culture" which included presentations by me and the former Professor of Philosophy of Education at Temple University Alan Soffin. My paper and Alan's paper will be published in the book entitled Images of

Youth: Popular Culture as Educational Ideology that is being edited by me and Father Walter Krolikowski and will be published by the Peter Lang Publisher. The memorial essay is a tribute to the late Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Foster McMurray. Father Walter Krolikowski, Dr. Jon Fennell and I all had doctoral level courses in philosophy of education with Prof. McMurray. He died in his retirement home in Apple Valley, California on October 20, 2000 at the age of 86. Prof. McMurray was one of the few people living these days who had known John Dewey. He was also on my dissertation committee and was very kind and helpful to me.

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Separating School and State: An Analytical Polemic

Don G. Smith
Eastern Illinois University

More attention is being given now to the abolition of government schooling, usually known as public schooling, than at any time since its inception during the early and mid-nineteenth century. The purpose of this Presidential Address is to argue for a separation of school and State for the same reasons that we constitutionally separate religion and State. I will begin by analyzing the meaning of the words "religion" and "education."

Education and religion are nouns. Religion and education are, therefore, things. Deriving from the noun "religion," is the adjective "religious," which implies something current and/or ongoing (e.g. "He is a religious person.") In an article titled "The Very Idea of Religion," Paul J. Griffiths notes that there are "many [impassioned arguments] about whether something is or is not a religion and even more about whether some action, event, or belief does or does not merit the label 'religious'."[1] Furthermore, "the idea that there is a genus called 'religion' of which there are many species did not gain much currency until the seventeenth century. It is, by and large, a modern invention." Parson Thwackum, an Anglican priest in Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749) represents the pre-seventeenth century view when he says: "When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England." Parson Thwackum thought it easy to clearly distinguish religion from non-religion; however; not only are there different religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, but there are competing denominations within all of these religions.

Now, what is this thing called "education?" Like religion, it is a genus of which there are many species, namely liberal, physical, moral, professional, and religious. Unlike religion, however, education has no corresponding adjective that implies something current and/or ongoing. We can speak of religious people who are practicing religion or living religious lives, but we cannot speak of "educatious" people who are living lives devoted to their own continuing education. I say "their own" because priests, ministers, rabbis, or gurus may guide others in a religion while not practicing the religion themselves. Likewise, teachers can instruct others without continuing their own educational development.

We do have the verb "educated," which implies an already accomplished goal or finished process. Some would say, for example, that I was educated at Southern Illinois University, meaning that I took degrees there. But we have no similar term regarding religion. We do not speak of anyone being "religioned." People can be confirmed, baptized, churched, etc., without implying that they are living religious lives or that they are religious. "Religious" implies an existing state and/or an ongoing process, while "educated" implies an accomplished state or an achieved end. We speak of people being educated, but we do not speak of people being" religioned." People can live religious lives, and people can, if you will permit me to coin a new word, live "educatious" lives. People can involve themselves willingly in these ongoing processes, but no one can force people to seriously engage in these processes against their will.

Just as people can be churched, people can be schooled, indicating only that the people in question have had some formal intercourse with the institutions of church and school. It does not mean that they are or ever were religious or educatious. People can be religious if they live lives in accordance with the principles of their religion. People can be educatious if they live lives in accordance with the principles of education. But, there are few agreements about what constitutes real religion or real education. So, should the State mandate something it cannot define?

Though the meaning of religion is surrounded by controversy, I suggest that there is one aspect of religion with which we can all agree. As Geoffrey Parrinder explains in his book *World Religions from Ancient History to the Present,* "The study of religion reveals that an important feature of it is a longing for the value in life, a belief that life is not accidental and meaningless."[2] Of course, different religions explain the meaning of life in different ways. Liberal (or general) education is similar to religion in that it is a process of finding meaning in life, of making sense of things. Like religion, general or liberal education purports to provide foundations for answering the most important and ultimate questions of life, and it, too, addresses life in its totality. As Philip Phenix writes: "General education is the process of engendering essential meanings. . . . The meanings that constitute the proper content of human experience do not appear automatically by a process of natural growth and development. The singular quality of human life is a product of deliberate nurture. It is not a gift of nature; it is a creation of culture."[3] (p 5, 30) Phenix is broadly defining liberal education, which consists of the study of the disciplines by which people have over time pursued, created, or attained meaning.

Since there is little agreement about the answers to life's ultimate questions, religion and education are too important for the State to control. The State can speak and act as though religion and education are important, or even necessary, but the State should not establish a religion. Nor should the State mandate, even if it were possible to do so, that people be religious. This makes sense because while the State can establish a religion, the State cannot make people religious; it cannot make people embrace the established religion in their own lives. The State can make people profess a religion, give lip service to it, and attend churches promoting it, but the State cannot make the established religion meaningful to people.

Education is similar. Before the seventeenth century, when Western culture spoke of education, it usually meant liberal education (usually with a heavy dose of theology). Education, however, differs from religion in one important way: the different species of education are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, a person can fully pursue liberal education and physical education without conflict. A person can pursue moral education and professional education without conflict. Fortunately, I suppose, there is general agreement today about what liberal, physical, professional, religious, and moral education are. For example, if a person is receiving general instruction in language, the natural and social sciences, the arts, and other liberal disciplines, most would agree that that person is engaged in liberal education. We might, however, differ in our conclusions about the meanings generated for different individuals within those disciplines. If a person is receiving specific instruction in the performance of a particular job, we would agree that that person is engaged in professional or vocational education. We might differ, however, in our assessments about how those jobs can best be done. The trouble is that different educational theories treat all types of education differently. For example, essentialists argue for a skill and subject-centered core curriculum that all students must master in order to be liberally educated, but not all essentialists will agree on which disciplines, if any, should receive priority. Existentialists, on the other hand, while generally valuing liberal education, would argue for no such common curriculum and would define the educational process and/product differently. So, we simply cannot define religion and education with any accuracy. Again I ask, should the State mandate what it cannot adequately define?

Interestingly, though we cannot accurately define religion and education, most Americans claim to value both. Let us examine how the founding fathers approached religion and education. We can assume from their writings and pronouncements that the founding fathers viewed religion as both desirable and necessary. Many who emigrated to the colonies did so for their own religious freedom. Nearly every important early American document praises and/or recognizes the importance of God.[4] In his First Inaugural Address, George Washington says that "the propitious smiles of Heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right which Heaven itself has ordained." In his Farewell Address, he warned against any expectation "that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." Regardless of their own personal beliefs, Hamilton, Jefferson, and others agreed that religion is necessary for the preservation of a civilized state.

The founding fathers never suggested that churching be mandatory. As we all know, the Constitution is clear that while the State shall not establish a religion, neither shall it prohibit the free practice *of* religion. In other words, The State should neither mandate churching nor prevent people from attending church. Even if, as the founding fathers believed, the nation needs religion to survive, the choice to be religious or non-religious is left with the people themselves. Why? Because religion is viewed differently by different people. In their wisdom, the founders, through the Constitution, managed to limit the power of government by excluding this important part of human life from governmental control.

The matter of education closely parallels that of religion. Thomas Jefferson opined that "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."[5] Yet, with the survival of the nation supposedly at stake, Jefferson argued against compulsory schooling, saying that "It is better to tolerate the rare instance of a parent refusing to let his child be educated, than to shock the common feelings and ideas by the forcible transportation and education of the infant against the will of the father."[6] In most American colonies, free public schooling was available only for those parents unable to pay for it. Even then, it was non-compulsory. New England was the exception, and it was there that the collectivist notion of government schools took root in America. In 1852, Massachussets established the first modern, comprehensive, statewide, mandatory schooling system in the United States. ù The "Common School" movement grew until the early twentieth century when every state had mandated schooling and imposed property taxes to pay for it. Horace Mann argued for government schools largely along moral and economic lines. Schools were primarily for character training. Though his rhetoric is often lofty, he basically argued that schooled workers would be more sanitary and more compliant in the workplace than unschooled workers and that government schools would give every child an equal opportunity to succeed economically. So, the laws that first required schooling required socialization and a particular capitalist/protestant moral indoctrination. Recent Supreme Court decisions jettisoned protestant moral indoctrination, leaving basic socialization and capitalist indoctrination to carry the day.

Today, while most people argue for education, they do not agree on what forms of education are appropriate for whom. This is like mandating churching without identifying the kind of religion to be practiced. If religion means different things to different people, what benefit is achieved by mandating churching? In other words, if there is no agreement about what should be affirmed and practiced in churches, who can finally say that churching serves any positive religious purpose at all?

The same problem exists with education. Why mandate schooling without identifying what kinds of education or curriculum should be pursued? If education means different things to different people, what benefit is achieved by mandating schooling? If there is no agreement about what schools should do, who can finally say that schooling serves any positive educational purpose at all?

Today, people argue for the necessity of government schooling on the following lines.[7] Government schools

1. prepare people to become responsible citizens;
2. improve social conditions;
3. promote cultural unity;
4. help people become economically self-sufficient;
5. enhance individual happiness and enrich individual lives;
6. dispel inequities in education; and
7. ensure a basic level of quality among schools.

Now, if we want government schools to help people become responsible citizens, we can do so only if we define "responsible citizen" as the State defines it. A responsible citizen in ancient Athens was not the same as a responsible citizen in ancient Sparta. A responsible citizen in communist China is not the same as a responsible citizen in capitalist America. In America, a responsible citizen is one who follows the laws of the land and contributes to the capitalist economy. American history records little else as responsible citizenship. In fact, American citizens have never been very informed about their own government. Since social scientists began measuring American political ignorance, they have always found it quite high. In 1943, for example, a *New York Times* survey of college freshmen found "a striking ignorance of even the most elementary aspects of United States history." Today survey results remain uniformly disappointing. Harvard's Vanishing Voter Project conducted a poll shortly before the 2000 Republican convention and found that three out of four Americans didn't know when the convention would be held. One in four didn't know the name of their governor, fewer than half could name their congressman or state senator, and half could not explain the function of the Supreme Court.[8] In my own junior/senior level philosophy of education classes, quizzes on the first day of class reveal that over 50% cannot identify the year that America declared independence from England or place the Civil War within a 50 year period. Some of my future teachers place that landmark war between 1600 and 1650. Three percent cannot identify the first president of the United States. Two years ago, a student admitted in class that she had no idea how law s are made in America. Her first guess was that people had to overthrow the government! So, if college students are as ignorant as this, what about the rest of the population? Since people cannot value what they do not know or understand, government schools are not helping people become responsible citizens, unless we define responsible citizens simply as materialistic consumers.

If we want government schools to improve social conditions, we are courting disappointment. Credentialling does improve social conditions for those who become credentialled, but the price of the credential is acquiescence in the culture of materialistic consumerism , or at least a show of acquiescence. Students must attend public schools until the age of sixteen, at which time the economy will not pay them a living wage, and if they spend a full twelve years in the system, they must then usually attend "higher education," which is really only "prolonged schooling," in order to qualify for good jobs. Why must we force people into the role of pseudo-scholars when their real goals do not entail scholarship? Unless our real goal is to subsidize colleges and universities, we should not.

Let me propose an analogy involving religion. What if the American economic establishment arbitrarily required that every employee attend church and tithe. In such times, I would predict a massive growth in churchgoing. But, would all of these churchgoers be committed to the church? Some would be, but many would not. Many would be committed only to their own economic and social mobility. The same is true regarding education. People seek more and more schooling simply because the economic establishment demands it. This does not mean that increasing numbers of students want "higher education," or even high school? It *does* mean that increasing numbers of students, often conforming to parental demand, are enrolling in college simply to qualify for some job. If church membership were required, they would pursue that, the result being that churches and their coffers would be full every Sunday. Think of the frustration, however, as devout churchgoers and ministers struggle with congregations refusing to tithe to a particular church unless things go their own way, or unless the church devises ways to entertain disgruntled and resistant churchgoers. Ministers would have to cater to the desires of their reluctant congregations in order to pay for the large churches constructed in the wake of mass conversions. Ministers who stood their ground would be re-assigned or released from the ministry for economic reasons. If the minister refused to comply, the church would lose money and have to close, and some other church would reap the benefit. The economic tail would wag the religious dog just as the tail of student demands is wagging the higher education dog today as students pay their fees and feel entitled to credits.[9]

If we expect government schools to promote cultural unity, our trust is misplaced because schools at present openly and enthusiastically invite cultural disunity. In the name of pluralism, schools try to foster toleration or celebration of differences, but toleration and celebration of differences do not produce cultural unity. At best, they simply aid us in tolerating differences. At worst, they encourage hostility and resentment.

If we want government schools to foster economic self-sufficiency, we can allow them to do so only at a price. Economic self-sufficiency depends on credentialling, which has little dire 9ct relationship today with educational achievement. Since a healthy economy depends on student economic success, and since economic success depends on credentialling, few students can be allowed to fail. Therefore, schools set standards such that almost anyone who cooperates can succeed. Since academic standards are almost non-existent today, students' success depends on their adoption of materialism, con-

sumerism, conformity, etc. If students cooperate, they might be successful. Otherwise, their chances of economic success are slim.

If we want government schools to enhance individual happiness and enrich individual lives, we must immediately despair. Unless individual happiness is defined as materialistic consumerism , government schools do little for the vast majority of students for whom the system is a twelve to sixteen-year prison sentence. Government schools enforce and reward conformity. They sometimes teach the cultural tradition, but they forget that no human being can educate another without that person's cooperation, and many, if not most, students cooperate only physically.

If we want government schools to dispel inequities in education, we must again despair. Except for their emphasis on conformity, materialism and consumerism, government schools are wildly diverse due to the wildly unequal property taxes that support them, and due to the different ideologies that different schools adopt.[10] The history of government schooling in twentieth century America is a story of declining standards and of an establishment attempt to convince the public otherwise.[11] The solution to this decline and conspiracy is not reform; the solution is abolition of the current system.

If we want government schools to ensure a basic equality among schools, we must abandon hope because there has never been and there never will be a basic level of equality among schools as we understand those terms. By equality, do we mean that all teachers in government schools are credentialled? Yes, we do, at least most of the time, though that expectation is being eroded. But such credentialling is absolutely meaningless. Because many teachers themselves are neither liberally educated nor liberally educatious, they are unable to lead anyone else toward liberal education.[12] In fact, 14% of the future teachers in my foundations classes did not know that the earth revolves around the sun. In spite of their low salaries, teachers can and do cheerlead for consumerism and materialism, but little else.

The point of the above discussion has been to suggest that government schooling has not, is not, and will not fulfill its purposes as government school proponents define them. Just as mandated churching will not raise the religious commitment of Americans, mandated schooling will not raise their educational level.

To suggest an analogy, suppose the government mandated that we pay taxes to the State for feeding our children because it is good that all children have enough to eat and because not all parents feed their children at the same nutrition levels. The State would send children to mandated designated feeding centers. Even parents who did not want their children to patronize the centers would be required to pay for those who did. Now suppose that after a century and a half of such State interference with parental responsibility, we found a decline in student health traceable in part to poor nutrition? Or what if people disagreed about the kinds of meals to be served (e.g. meat or meatless) Some people would obviously start calling for the abolition of the food tax and for the resurrection of parental responsibility. However, proponents of the established system would ask, "How can we abolish the food tax? Don't you know that we cannot trust all parents to adequately feed their children? So what if government food isn't the best, and so what if we don't agree on what food should be served? The alternative is worse, and after all, every child has a right to eat." Analogous arguments are made now for perpetuating government schools. For a century and a half, the government has controlled schooling, and only parents with the money and the desire can offer their children alternatives. And even those parents must continue to support the government system with their taxes on the unproven assumption that everyone benefits indirectly from the work of government schools. But we don't make success in society dependent on church membership, and we shouldn't make success in society dependent on credentialling that has no real relationship to educational success or to actual job preparation.

So, here are my recommendations regarding American schooling.

1. Every five years, one year of mandatory schooling should be subtracted from the current mandate. For example, secondary school today consists of four years. We should immediately reduce that number to three, and reduce the mandatory attendance age to fifteen. In five years we should reduce secondary school to two years and the mandatory attendance age to fourteen, etc. In twenty years, high school attendance will be optional and will exist in the private sector on a demand basis.

2. As we eliminate state mandated secondary school at the upper end, greater care than ever must be taken K-6 that the proper educational foundation is laid. Because the liberal arts of reading, writing, speaking, thinking, and mathematical computation are necessary for the well-being of both the individual and the State, the State shall mandate proficiency in the basic skills. Because of the economic repercussions of illiteracy, American citizens have no right right to be illiterate. Exceptions will be granted only on the basis of evaluations by trained professionals. An outside agency (unbeholden to teacher unions) will construct State-administered skills tests.

3. Because means must be found for indoctrinating young people into the American political and economic system, which is indeed part of the hidden curriculum of today's government schools, the State should create and

fund via taxpayer's dollars institutions designed to teach a rudimentary understanding of our Constitution, a rudimentary knowledge of our history, and a fundamental sense of patriotism. Until thirty years pass and we eliminate state financed K-6 schools, government schools should concentrate on teaching basic skills and subject matter aimed at indoctrinating students into t Δhe American Way. When K-6 reverts to the private sector, half-day citizenship schools should exist in their own right. Otherwise, parents can see to their childrens' liberal or general education in whatever ways they please.

4. As years of State-financed mandatory schooling are eliminated, the State shall correspondingly reduce property taxes. The State will then tax and oversee only K-6 citizenship schools The State shall collect property taxes to be distributed to families demonstrably unable to afford basic skills instruction for their children. These parents may use such money to send their children to the schools of their choice or to home school them. Unused money will be returned to tax payers on a percentage basis. The bureaucracy needed to oversee such an operation will be much smaller than the one currently overseeing government schools.

5. The State shall require periodic testing of students to determine if the basic skills are being learned. In negative cases, the State shall hold parents responsible if they are the primary education providers. Parents can in turn hold teachers or schools responsible if they can prove incompetence or conspiratorial grade inflation.

6. Just as the State shall directly fund no churches, the State shall directly fund no schools, except for citizenship centers. A problem arises if parents receiving tax dollars for their childrens' educations decide to send their children to religiously sponsored schools. While I believe that supreme court decisions based on original intent would allow such an action, activist courts have not agreed. The courts may decide that parents receiving taxpayer's dollars can send their children only to secular private schools.

7. Just as the State shall establish no requirements for the training of ministers, priests, rabbis and gurus, the State shall establish no requirements for the training of school teachers. Individual schools should establish the qualifications for the teachers they hire. On the other hand, the State can and should oversee the training and certification of citizenship center teachers. The State might turn over this task to institutions of higher learning or they might directly establish schools for the express purpose of training citizenship teachers.

8. The State shall neither mandate education beyond the basic skills and citizenship nor prevent people from pursuing learning in the form of liberal, physical, professional, religious, and moral education.

9. The State should closely monitor the piecemeal introduction of this new system by analyzing data from existing agencies that now collect cultural, political, and economic data. This will allow us to keep abreast of whether or not factors cited by supporters of State-financed schooling as necessary f or our nation's well-being are deteriorating in ways unexplained by similar changes in years past.

10. If the State decides for reasons of national security that more people need to be trained in certain professions, the State may provide tax supported incentives to recruit such trainees. The State may therefore intervene on behalf of professional education only. It may not intervene on behalf of liberal, moral, religious, or physical education, all of which should exist beyond the auspices of the State.

By way of example and explanation, permit me to offer my pedaggogic creed. I do so with no intention of defending my creed. I simply state it to make a point.

What Education Is

I believe that liberal education is the most fundamentally human of all educations because the search for meaning is the most Ëfundamental of all human pursuits. As a critical Idealist, I believe that reality, truth, and value are discovered and interpreted on the basis of how our minds order and shape the things our senses detect (things in themselves). I believe that only a small portion of people are gifted with the desire and ability to pursue reality, truth, and value through liberal education and the disciplined study of organized knowledge . For most, popular culture provides the substitute. For some or for most, a combination of the liberal disciplines and popular culture shapes their take on reality, truth, and values. What goes on in schools has little impact on how people assign meaning to their world. Therefore, my work in educational philosophy should be restricted to identifying what education is and should be, not with what schools should or should not do.

What the School Is

There should be no such thing as THE school. In regard to liberal education, the school should be a freely chosen institution in which people pursue and interpret meaning, an institution offering liberal education *for those desiring it.* Because everything else is an offshoot of liberal education, school, in a secondary sense, should be a freely chosen institution in which people are provided religious, professional, physical and mental health, and moral instruction. In other words, in this secondary sense, people are instructed in particulars with or without regard to the general.

The Subject Matter of Education

In a primary sense, the subject matter of liberal education consists of language (including mathematics), natural and social science, the fine arts, ethics, self-knowledge, ƒhistory, philosophy, and religion. These studies are general and of importance to seekers of meaning. Since the search for ultimate meanings should not be controlled by the State, school in the primary sense should be unregulated by the State. In a secondary sense, the subject matter of education consists narrowly of physical, moral, professional, and religious instruction. The only one of these that should be subject to State interference is professional education, and only then if the State must offer incentives for people to enter certain professions for reasons of national security. Otherwise, the family should control physical and moral education, and the church and family should control religious education—all uncoersed.

The Nature of Method

If one seeks liberal education, one must master the liberal arts. These are taught through didactics, coaching, and questioning. Students must apply themselves to learning the history and methodology of the disciplines via reflective and rational inquiry. One must read, think, and study; and study is hard work. One must want what study has to offer. Disciplines cannot be understood or mastered by the undisciplined. Since most people cannot or will not master the disciplines, liberal education will naturally be the pursuit of the few. In regard to physical, moral, religious, and professional education, methodology should consist of didactics, coaching, and questioning.

The School and Social Progress

There is no direct relationship between liberal education and social progress. Today, the relationship between schooling and social progress is non-existent except for society's demand for credentialling. The survival of the State does not depend on our quality of schooling any more than it depends on the quality of our religion. Practically speaking, America is a secular state. What people do in the privacy of their churches has no ∑relationship to the survival of the Republic. America is also, in practice, an anti-intellectual state, and what it does in its schools has no relationship to the survival of the Republic. I believe that a " talented tenth" will always emerge. This talented tenth will achieve quality education because it will pursue it in cooperation with or in spite of what our schooling institutions demand. Abraham Lincoln and Malcolm X are two such examples. The rest of the population will get its education mainly from popular culture, regardless of what our schools demand.

In the past, the course of empire has embodied a cycle of growth and decay. According to historian Anthony Froude: "Virtue and truth produced strength, strength dominance, dominance riches, riches luxury, and luxury weakness and collapse—fatal sequence repeated so often."[15] America became strong because her citizens thought they governed their lives and their nation on the basis of virtue and truth. This moral certitude led us to victory in two world wars and helped us weather the Great Depression. After that, we emerged as the dominant world power. This dominance led to riches, and riches to luxury. Luxury has now led to decadence, but not to weakness. Today, postmodern America does not claim to govern itself on the basis of virtue and truth. Today, except for a robust economy, nearly every indicator of a vital culture is missing, but that does not mean that collapse will follow. We are the first nation in the history of the world with the armament power to maintain itself regardless of how much we divorce ourselves from virtue and truth. We are the first nation in history that can be completely evil and largely ignorant in traditional terms and still thrive economically and politically. Mandatory schooling will have no effect on whether we survive or fall. The government must give people a reason to fight and die if major conflicts should arise, and today, people will not fight and die for outmoded and fuzzily understood concepts of truth or virtue. Perhaps they will still fight and die for that thing called "freedom," but freedom to do what and freedom from what? Perhaps people will fight for freedom of entertainment. If some foreign force should want to restrict what we could watch on television, I believe we would fight . Would we fight and die for economics? If some foreign force should, on the basis of oil prices, restrict our right to unlimited travel, I believe we would fight . On the other hand, people have always fought for causes they did not understand. On that basis, America is quite safe. "

In all probability, few people in this audience agree with my pedagogic creed, just as I do not agree with John Dewey's —and that is exactly the point! Many of us here are Ph.Ds in educational philosophy, and even we cannot agree on what education is, what the school should be, what curriculum is preferable, what methods are most effective, or what the school's relationship to the state should be. I invite interested parties to examine my pedagogic creed and familiarize themselves with arguments supporting it and attacking it. I repeat, however, that the State has no business mandating what even Ph.Ds in the field cannot define.

So let me summarize my conclusions regarding separation of school and State. Since we cannot define what real religion and education are, the State has no business mandating either. Since both religion and education are deeply personal, no one can mandate that another achieve them, accept them, or practice them. We can only allow people to pursue them freely. Either way, America depends on neither education nor religion for her economic and political survival. If the private sector builds high schools and universities, some will come. Enough will come. Let the rest prepare for the vocations they want without having to masquerade as scholars.

NOTES

1. Paul Griffiths. "The Very Idea of Religion," *First Things*, no.101 (2000): p. 39.

2. Geoffrey Parrinder (ed.). *World Religions From Ancient History to the Present* (New York: Facts on File, 1971) p. 10.

3. Philip Phenix. *Realms of Meaning* (Ventura: Ventura County Superintendent of Schools Office, 1986) pp. 3, 30.

4. For a glimpse of the ubiquity of religion in early American documents see Volumes 1-3 of *The Annals of America* (Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1976).

5. Saul K. Padover. *Thomas Jefferson and the Foundations of Freedom* (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1965) p. 3.

6. Saul K. Padover. *Jefferson* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942) p. 169.

7. For a longer and more detailed discussion of how American government schools have failed to meet their supporters' expectations, see my "Do We Still Need Government Schools," *Social Justice Review* 89, C no. 11-12 (1998).

8. Jonah Goldberg. "The Undeciding Factor," *National Review*, vol. 52, no. 21 (2000) p. 31.

8. For eye-opening accounts of how the idea of "student as consumer" is eroding standards in higher education, see Peter Sacks, *Generation X Goes To College* (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court, 1996) and David Riesman, *On Higher Education: The Academic Enterprise in an Era of Rising Student Consumerism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998).

9. For an examination of how schools assign differential schoolwork to students from different socioeconomic backgrounds, see Jean Anyon, "Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work," *Journal of Education* 162, no. 1 (Winter 1980).

10. See Martin L. Gross, *The Conspiracy of Ignorance: The Failure of American Public Schools* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

11. Four of the] most recent well-documented accounts of the miseducation of American teachers are Reginald G. Damerell, *Education's Smoking Gun* (New York: Freundlich Books, undated), Rita Kramer, *Ed School Follies: The Miseducation of Teachers* (New York: Free Press, 1991), Thomas Sowell, *Inside American Education: The Decline, the Deceptions, the Dogmas* (New York: Free Press, 1993) and Martin L. Gross, *The Conspiracy of Ignorance: The Failure of American Public Schools* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

12. Arthur Herman. *The Idea of Decline in Western History* (New York: Free Press, 1997) p. 27.

"Whither Now, Alfonse?": Beyond the Polemic (A response to Smith's Address)

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Perhaps the most appropriate response—the only appropriate response—to President Smith's paper is "Wow!" But, as I have a few minutes to say something more elaborate, allow me to clarify his thesis and to touch on one or two troubling questions that arise from it. Before doing that, however, let us review the truths, sometimes unwelcome, that are contained in his address tonight.

TRUTHS

Sprinkled throughout Professor Smith's paper are several important observations, some of which understandably give rise to his anger and perhaps account for his despair. Let us list these, followed in each case by a brief commentary:

1) There is conflict regarding the aims of education. This has always been the case, of course. But it is worse now than in much of the past as we observe postmodernism, ethnocentrism, radical feminism, and various other forms of irrationalism gain influence and play their part in what some believe to be the death throes of Western civilization.

2) This nation, and the civilization from which it grew, presuppose the authority of God. Our founders never envisioned that we go it alone and, if asked, would have said that the experiment could not possibly succeed in the absence of religion. As philosophers and teachers it is our professional duty to know why.

3) What Professor Smith calls "government schooling" is of relatively recent origins. The institution has during the last century evolved into a voracious behemoth that is defended vehemently, despite its outcomes, by a wide variety of powerful and highly appetitive constituencies. Professor Smith, given more time, might have added that this attitude toward and defense of

government schooling itself betrays a kind of worship.

4) Most young people go to college for the wrong reasons. This also is not new. What is particularly pronounced in our time, however, is the pathetic desperation of parents who undergo servitude so that every offspring will receive a degree. Tuitions continue to rise, less and less is learned, and increasingly the degree (Professor Smith's "credential") is viewed simply as the necessary ticket to economic success. In terms of education, college has become a huge con and one wishes parents would at last wise up.

5) Higher education today is ruled by a consumerist mentality. Given the reasons people go to college and given, within the universities themselves, the widespread skepticism toward and disrespect for what was once known as the "higher things," this is scarcely a surprise.

6) Academic standards have nearly disappeared. Indeed. I would only add that it has become fashionable to regard standards as a threat to both individuality and equality of opportunity. The predictability of this development makes it no less bizarre.

We could go on. But enough has been mentioned to demonstrate that Professor Smith is hardly imagining things.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE PAPER

Let us take a moment to outline Professor Smith's argument. Penetrating to the fundamentals, we discover the following logic: People do not agree on the definition of education; therefore, the government should not mandate schooling. In making his case, Professor Smith employs an analogy to religion. I find this analogy to be flawed and believe that it introduces many more problems than it helps to resolve. Fortunately, Professor Smith's argument does not depend on his analogy to religion. We will proceed accordingly.

After devoting the early section of the paper to developing the above logic, Professor Smith then employs a second strategy. He lists seven defenses of government schooling and then claims that each of them fails. In assessing tonight's address, therefore, we must attend to both the opening argument and the subsequent strategy.

TROUBLING QUESTIONS

At the outset of these remarks I acknowledged that there is in fact substantial conflict today regarding the aims of education. But that people do not agree about the aims of education does not entail that they cannot agree about them. Furthermore, we know that there was a greater degree of consensus on this matter during certain periods of our history than there is today. So it is at least possible that we could agree again—unless we begin from the deterministic assumption of irreversible moral and cultural decline. (And there you have my dose of polemic for the night!)

But this is perhaps a quibble. Let us instead inquire into the meaning of disagreement about the aims of education. Most of us would concur, I think, that disagreement about the aims of education is at heart a dispute about morality and justice, i.e., about what is good and right for mankind. Thoughtful people have always been fascinated by the variety of beliefs and practices found among our fellow humans. But there are two very different ways to respond to these differences. The first was taken by the ancient Greeks, most notably by Aristotle. When informed that other people acted in such odd and sometimes offensive ways, the thoughtful Greek looked at his own beliefs and practices and wondered which of them were natural as opposed to accidental or merely ancestral. The challenge of diversity, in other words, sparked a search for the truly good. In stark and momentous contrast, the most influential of our recent intellectual predecessors have concluded from the same or similar data that there is in fact nothing beyond the beliefs and practices themselves! This is questionable logic to be sure, but that it has won the day is undeniable.

I suspect that you know where this is going. Professor Smith's logic, I am sorry to say, depends on the truth of relativism. Instead of taking the wide disagreement about the aims of education as a sign that many people are ignorant, misinformed, in the grips of the devil, or whatever, he regards the disagreement as fundamental and ineradicable. It is because he cannot conceive of a truth beyond the disagreement, what we might call the "natural" aims for education, that he cannot identify any legitimate ground for government to mandate schooling.

Indeed, given the stature in Professor Smith's paper of disagreement about educational (and, by extension, moral) ends, I wonder how he is able to make recommendations or sanction authority of any sort. To be clearer on this point, and to address any among us tonight who may be under the spell of relativism, allow me to review two of the classic objections to it. First, without the possibility of a standard beyond the various practices, there is no way logically to defend or criticize those practices. As descendants of Dewey I know that most of you would object that I am shipwrecked here on the shoals of a dualism, and would say that there is another possibility, viz., a third ground upon which we can have standards without old-fashioned authority. We lack the time tonight to examine this suggestion in any depth. Permit me simply to say that after purporting to occupy the third ground for more than twenty years I became convinced that it is a mirage born of confusion that leaves us defenseless against evil. The third ground in the end reduces to the first ground of objective authority, or it is nothing. And such nothing is a big problem indeed.

The second objection to relativism I would mention is that any defense of it is ultimately self-contradictory. To say that something (including relativism) is true or good requires an authority that relativism fundamentally denies. This problem arises several times in Professor Smith's address. Do recall, for example, that he would indoctrinate young people "into the American way." Now, Professor Smith is in good company here. Even Richard Rorty would guarantee that children first become citizens and moral beings before they are let loose in his university playpen of postmodernism. But given the significance he assigns to the differing views regarding the aims of education, how can Professor Smith propose and defend mandatory basic skills and citizenship training? This problem emerges in an even more fundamental way when we ask why we should be tolerant of differences. Clearly Professor Smith's argument proceeds from the greatest respect for diversity in opinion. I suspect that he would be none too tolerant, however, of those who would not be tolerant. This is significant: For, if the views of one faction are wrong, if there is the possibility of correction here, then it could very well be the case that other views are erroneous too. The Greeks were on to something. There are other possibilities than those imagined by Professor Smith.

What Professor Smith needs, and the element whose absence makes his stand ultimately relativistic, is the appeal to principle. Resolving the confusion and conflict regarding the aims of education is a gargantuan task¯especially in light of the failures in education that have brought us to where we are and promise therefore to be self-perpetuating. But to conclude from the fact of this variety of views that there is no authoritative resolution of conflict in morals and education is not only an illogical concession to ignorance, prejudice, and the ravishes of relativism, it is to undermine the very foundations of professionalism and understanding. It does so, moreover, most pointedly for those forms of professionalism and understanding known as "philosophy" and "philosophy of education." Such a surrender would constitute yet another victory for anti-intellectualism, ressentiment, and hatred of excellence and distinction.

Professor Smith at this point might say, "Well, whether consensus is possible or not, you admit that it does not now exist. So what are we to do? Given the diversity of opinion on educational aims, how are you able to justify government schooling?" In other words, even if we were to stipulate that diversity of opinion indicates error and confusion, what may we justifiably do while waiting for the others to embrace the correct view?

My initial response to this hypothetical objection is to observe that conflict regarding the aims of education is neither so wide nor so deep as indicated by Professor Smith. Yes, you can probably find someone who will defend any conceivable position regarding the purposes of the schools. I think, however, that most people adhere to one or more of a very small number of contrasting but generally compatible educational aims (though, granted, individuals sometimes possess combinations of contradictory views, proudly adhere to a stark and exclusive alternative, or perhaps have no discernible view at all). There will, therefore, continue to be grounds for consensus, probably based on compromise. Some perspectives will not be honored in this process. But not all perspectives should be honored, and there are times when we must regard an alternative as beyond redemption and confidently move forward with our own. In doing so, we will not be paralyzed by conflict over the aims of education, and we have an opportunity to support public education as we attempt to persuade the ignorant and misled to adopt our own view regarding those aims. One might even venture this optimistic thought: The primary purpose of the school is to promote the conditions permitting ongoing intelligent and principled inquiry into the purpose of the school. This is, for me, not enough. I hope that it is not enough for you. But at least this approach avoids the most noxious consequences of assigning equal worth to the various conflicting conceptions of education. And, I might note, additional approaches on this question would suggest themselves were we able to escape the clutches of our democratic prejudices. But once the judges remove their wigs it is next to impossible for them effectively to put them back on again.

I have suggested that Professor Smith's argument arises out of relativism. It might also be said that his conclusion depends on the assumption that government schools violate any conceivable rightful charter when they cease to be neutral (in regard to the aims of education). On this matter I would side with the late Foster McMurray who for many years at the University of Illinois taught that the schools would, *au contraire,* lose their legitimacy should they actually practice neutrality, since in doing so they would have to eschew the commitment to increased knowledge, growth and rationality which constitutes their *raison d'etre.* For Professor McMurray the schools (but not necessarily individual teachers) need to be non-partisan, as opposed to neutral. That is, the schools should not take sides on a legitimately controversial issue, but should instead be committed to presenting all authoritative positions regarding it. Whether schools should promote literacy, moral development, knowledge of the world, etc., however, is not a legitimate controversy. These objectives are entailed by the very concept of education.

The question of what to do in schools regarding particular issues, albeit interesting, cannot be our focus at this time. The instant point, rather, is that a school neutral in its aims is probably impossible and is certainly undesirable. Yet it is the alleged inability of government schools to be neutral (along with an implicit relativism) that provides the foundation for the normative force of Professor Smith's argument.

There is much more to say but, alas, my allotted time has come to an end. In the few moments that remain allow me to comment on Professor Smith's second strategy. He lists seven defenses of "government schooling" and then purports to show each of them to be faulty. This second strategy works, of course, only if his list of defenses is comprehensive and accurately captures the rationale of the defenders of government education. Note also that to show that the schools fail at a strategy does not mean that the strategy ought not to be implemented. To reach such a normative conclusion requires an educationally relevant moral premise. But it is the absence of such authority that is the keystone of Professor Smith's argument.

It is impossible to dwell on these matters now. I would observe, however, that Professor Smith is among the few truly candid voices regarding education, and we have much to learn from him even if in the end his argument should not formally succeed.

Finally, in allegiance to the analytic spirit that marks Professor Smith's address, I would make a few distinctions and thereby raise a concluding question or two. First, Professor Smith would permit parents to use tax dollars to send their children to schools of their choice. But what about the legitimacy of collecting the tax dollars themselves? I would think that if diversity of opinion renders government schooling largely illegitimate, then it would make the coercive collection of taxes unjust as well.

Second, there is no necessary opposition between individual citizens and the state. Indeed, a defining characteristic of our own regime is that the latter exists and acts legitimately only as an expression of the former. Were Professor Smith fully to acknowledge this link, he would then understand that we are permitted, if not in fact enjoined, to employ state authority in carrying out a wide variety of moral and educational measures.

Third, I wish Professor Smith had explicitly recognized that every regime depends on piety. However we define the good life, its legitimacy and viability rest upon a faith whose nurture and preservation must be our primary political and educational concern. I am not sure his "citizenship schools" are up to the job. They certainly will not be if they aim to be strictly neutral.

President Smith's address was most interesting, and it is inspiring to encounter a fresh and honest perspective about our schools and universities. I hope his paper provides inspiration to all of us to think honestly and constructively about education at MPES this year and in the sessions that follow.

Tragedy, Security, and Liberty

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The literature from which western civilization draws its lessons about tragedy, be it the Old Testament, Aristophanes, Shakespeare, Faulkner, Wright, Lorca, Miller, Bellow, or Oates, contains a lesson on the nature of the human condition that bears directly on the Littleton massacre. To wit, tragedy (and, thank god, joy) and humans are here to stay, inextricably linked in a timeless cosmic dance that recognizes neither border nor barrier of any kind, a universal force that cannot be controlled or fully understood, and which shall manifest itself as long as humans exist notwithstanding all efforts to prevent and/or control its occurrence.

To my great dismay,I learned this lesson well on the occasions of the near fatal illness of one of my children at the age of two, and the deaths of my two younger brothers, both in their 40's. Reason and logic described the what(s), why(s) and how(s) of these tragic events, but such did not amount to an explanation of any great worth. And so I was left with to what I now consider to be a basic life truth. Tragedy, like shit, happens.

Given the will and desire of the two young killers of Columbine to inflict pain and misery on others and self, nothing that the schools could have done, including the installation of metal detectors, security video cameras, searches of lockers, backpacks and persons, would have prevented what took place on April 20th. If school were not to be the setting of the shootings, then the madness would have occurred in the parking lot, at an outdoor athletic event, or at a teenage hangout.

Those who have much to gain monetarily from increased security and anti-crime measures, ranging from corporations involved in prison construction, to corporations involved in the installation and maintenance of security devices, to corporations using prisoners as low-cost labor, to police departments and other crime enforcement agencies whose very existence is threatened by the absence of an enemy, are once again selling their wares to a frightened and anxious populace, their anxieties and fears stoked by the mass media. Crime pays not so much for the criminal as for the "legal" profiteer who benefit from the acts of criminals. This is a huge and growing industry in America. Victor Hugo ("Les Miserables") and Clarence Darrow ("An Address to the Inmates of the Cook County Jail") have much of worth to say in this matter. And if only there wasn't that major hindrance to "efficient and effective" crime enforcement--the Bill of Rights.

The 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees to every American the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." And our jurisprudence system is based on the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, with the burden of such proof resting on the prosecution.

Notwithstanding such guarantees, the civil liberties of our youth are violated on a regular basis by security measures in schools based on the premise that everyone is guilty and needs to prove one's innocence, that students' private belongings and persons are at the disposal of those in authority under various guises of search and destroy missions , and that measures taken in the name of security which are more befitting of prisons than schools create optimal educational environments.

What shall young Americans learn from going to "maximum security" schools for up to twelve years?

That what they study in the classroom about the significance and importance of the Bill of Rights to a free society and a freedom loving people, rights that are identified with America, and which are a landmark in the history of human liberty, are nothing more than words on paper, to study, to discuss, to be tested on, and to be disregarded in "real life."

That those in authority, the strong and the powerful, have the right to take whatever measures they deem fit in the name of a good cause against those weaker and the less powerful. Let us remember the "Red Scares" of the 1920's and the 1950's, which did little to reduce whatever "communist menace" threatened America, but did much harm by trampling on basic rights and liberties of Americans in the name of national security.

That the answer to every social problem, to wit, school violence, lies in the realm of those who carry a big stick and/or who propose more varied and more numerous sticks. The modeling of "stick use" by adults, from those to the use of force in international matters, e.g., Vietnam , which only result in larger tragedies, should serve to give us little confidence in the use of such measures to gain greater order and security in schools. After all, the Littleton and other recent outbreaks of school violence occurred while enhanced security measures were in place. Of course, we could institute a fascist state of mind and being in our schools because there is no denying the fact that Eichmann made the trains run on time and Hitler brought order to Germany. But at what price?

And let us keep in mind that making schools part of fortress America and sacrificing the civil liberties of students on the altar of security is occurring while the crime rate has been falling since 1990, and that, in fact, violence in schools is decreasing as made clear in the "Youth Risk Behavior Survey published in the August 4, 1999 Journal of the American Medical Association.

Where does all this leave us?

First, to look for answers other than more "police measures" to prevent and reduce school violence and create schools as secure places to attend and learn in. Teaching youth empathy, self-esteem, valuing differences and respecting diversity,impulse control, how to deal constructively and creatively with their feelings of anger, pain, hopelessness and resentment, prevention of humiliation, insults, harassment and intimidation by peer mediation and conflict resolution, all which are integral parts of school violence prevention curriculums such as those offered by Educators for Social Responsibility and the NEA, would seem to be in order.

Second, due to schools and classes being larger once students enter middle school, it is much harder for adolescents to be seen and treated as individuals, and consequently come to be known as individuals by their teachers and other school personnel. Due to the challenges and frustrations involved in raising adolescents, it is not unusual for parents to be less involved in their children's lives after they leave elementary school. Compounding the problem, resource-strapped school districts have reduced the number of counselors, nurses social workers, and psychologists in the schools--the very people who might help at troubled adolescent when a teacher or parent cannot or will not.

What such a reality calls for are smaller schools, or mini-schools within schools, and smaller classes; a realization that support personnel such as counselors, nurses, social workers and psychologists are not frills but essentially any school that has as its mission the education of the whole person; and the availability of parenting education programs. Needless to say, such measures call for increased funding for schools as a national commitment of the highest priority.

Third, to establish school and community dialogues on the relationship between gender and violence. As Britte Utne has written (Educating For Peace): I wanted to know why, for example, sex is the most reliable predictor of how violent a person will be in all cultures, races and classes in recorded history. And why are 90 per cent of all violent crimes committed by men? Why are males the violent sex?

All his life the American male teenager has been enthralled by fighting and bloodletting. He has absorbed a popular mythology that shows heroes solving problems by killing--from Arnold Schwarzengeger to the video game Mortal Kombat to the "turkey shoot" in Kuwait where thousands of retreating Iraqi soldiers are slaughtered by our military.

Like most Americans, the teenager has internalized the paradigm that violence is manly, that might makes right, that lethal force will overcome all obstacles. How shocking is it, then, when he picks up a gun.

Fourth, to recognize the relationship between a society that has established materialism as its national religion and violence to self and others. Schools constructed in the midst of shopping malls, advertising for goods placed on book covers, contests waged between schools to be the logo bearer for commercial products, and an educational and socialization process that proclaims-- buy until you die! why go to a library when you can go to a mall! watch the screen and dream the mass dream! you are what you own and possess! Such madness lead straight to meaninglessness and the valuing of objects over persons with human life being seen as a means to a material end.

Materialism in this culture is more than the simple acquisition of money and possessions. It is an all embracing world view that values those possessions as an ultimate end. Americans operate in a system permeated by what theologian and social analyst Cornel West has called "market culture." Possessions are the ultimate measure of a man's worth. Exchange of commodities takes precedence over relationships. Advertising and relentless marketing of goods are the predominant norm of social discourse. Shopping malls are our culture's sacred spaces, our houses of worship.

Like the pervasive messages of violence, materialism infuses our culture. We venerate the lives of the rich and famous and that value system "trickles down" to our youth, who are fed the lie that their ultimate worth as human beings depends on having $100 tennis shoes. When a teenager shoots another teenager, he is not an aberration. He is acting out the cruel logic of modern US culture: life is cheap, possessions are the ultimate value, and violence is the way to achieve your ends.

Krishnamurti, the Indian philosopher and educator reminds us: "One teaches because one wants the child to be rich inwardly. . . . when our hearts are empty we collect things. Without inner richness worldly things become extravagantly important leading to various forms or destruction and misery."

Fifth, to deal more openly and constructively with the issue of domestic violence which is widespread irrespective of socioeconomic status, or ethnic, racial and religious affiliation. Violence in the family makes for violence in the schools.

To quote Steve Pickard of the Denver Police department: "Emotional problems with roots in home life—not entertainment—appear to be the biggest factor determining whether children turn to violence." (The Daily Northwestern, 4/30/99)

Sixth, to reduce expenditures for war against others--the armed forces, and war against one's own--the police, the DEA, the FBI—and increase expenditures for prevention and healing of societal, family and personal wounds.

Lastly, to realize and accept that while practical measures to prevent or reduce school violence and other manifestations of the tragic can make a difference in specific instances now and then, the truth of the matter is that humans possess both hearts of gold and, as Joseph Conrad described so well, hearts of darkness, and mortals that we are, we shall always know intimately happiness and tragedy. It is our fate, the human condition, to walk amongst the stars and to descend into hell, and to take others with us on both journeys.

Some years ago, while traveling in the realms of consciousness after imbibing an exotic brew of herbs in a tropical climate and sitting under the light of the sun by the ocean and under the light of the moon in the forest, I was transported to Germany in the 1940's where I found myself standing amidst a group of Jewish women all weeping profusely and dressed in black from head to toe. I approached one of the women, removed her hood from her head, and experienced myself looking at myself. After taking a step backwards, I noticed that off on the side there were some Nazi soldiers guarding the women. I approached one of the guards and tapped him on the soldier. He turned around and I saw myself looking at myself.

Albert Camus, the existentialist philosopher, exhorts humans to be neither victim nor executioner. I once feared and now accept that you and I shall assume both roles in our lifetime. Life's journey is to know that it shall be thus and still choose to live fully and openly.

In closing, I wish to add some words on the nature of adolescence and liberty in the context of being true one's own self and taking a road less traveled. If social progress is seen that any and all adolescents, who are different from the pack, who don't fit in with the crowd, whose questioning of the norms of society are reflected in attire, attitude and behavior as well as words, who have taken a look at what makes Sammy run and decided that that's a race they choose not to participate in, who are, in effect, the Holden Caulfields of their times, need "help" in the form of Prozac & Co., then the events in Littleton and other school campuses that have witnessed teenage alienation gone mad, shall have resulted in tragedy being used to foster the tragic, for the road to hell is, as we well know, paved with good intentions.

If everyone conformed, schools would successfully be made up of "productive" students who effectively stick with traditional studies and perhaps make the honor roll, the truest indicator it would seem of being a well adjusted adolescent. All teenage deviants, be they of an artistic, technological, or social justice bent, would have their maladapted behavior corrected. Everyone would be happy. Pleasantville would be achieved. And we all could go shopping, acquiring and consuming in peace as liberty, dismayed and disheartened by the violation of youth by means of institutionalized violence, flies away from the cuckoo nest, seeking a new home for the brave--those who challenge the status quo, the ways things are.

In our hearts and souls, we know that our children are not the enemy, creatures to be controlled and confined, for they are the wings that shall lift us up into the future. We know this if we only took our blinders off.

NOTE

1. In describing the motivations,values and actions of those who orchestrated and directed the carrying out of the Vietnam war, Halberstam makes it clear to the reader that while the education of America's ruling elite, be it at Harvard or Stanford, was steeped in the rule of reason and ethics, what was created were creatures of the mind out of touch with teachings of the heart--e.g., empathy and compassion, resulting in tragically flawed human beings, minds without hearts, who used the world as their playground for reality based games of violence in which they attempted to work out their tormented inner lives by using others as pawns in a nightmare of their own making. (David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest)

Where Are the Teachers of Virtue?

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The curriculum of any professional school evidences the fact that educators are fully committed to the enterprise of imparting practical knowledge to students. We think of primary and secondary education as, among other things, education for citizenship in a democracy. In teaching such subjects as engineering or civics, the aim is not merely to impart information, but to produce students who practice intelligently and well. When a body of practical knowledge is complex, useful, and socially important, it is likely to find a place in the curriculum.

Where, then, are the teachers of virtue? Social ethics consists of a great many items of practical knowledge—know-how, savoir faire. It is of the first importance that as many members of our community as possible understand and act in accordance with this practical knowledge. Virtue is whatever structured set of concerns, valuings, commitments, and know-how reliably leads a person to act in accordance with ethical norms. Teaching virtue—inculcating virtue in students—would be a matter of successfully imparting, in all its practicality, the practical knowledge that constitutes ethics. So, where are the teachers of virtue? Why aren't ethics and virtue uncontroversial parts of the curriculum? Plato was puzzled by such questions [*Meno,* 86d-96d)], and the questions remain puzzling today.

Plato was obviously right in connecting virtue closely with practical knowledge. An important first step in solving the puzzle is to consider what kind of practical knowledge is involved in virtue. "The question fundamentally at issue," John Dewey said, "is nothing more or less than whether moral values, regulations, principles and objects form a separate and independent domain or whether they are part and parcel of a normal development of a life process." (Dewey 1922: 129) Following Dewey, I am going to opt for the second alternative.

The practical knowledge that is implicated in virtue does not constitute a single practical discipline or domain in the way that politics, medicine, or agriculture does. Rather, positive morality consists in items of practical knowledge that are reiterated across many practical domains. Norms of truthfulness and respect for clients and colleagues, for example, are important in a great many practices; observance of these norms advances the collective purposes of the participants. Such moral norms are properly observed in a particular domain or practice when they are harmonized with the whole body of norms that makes up the practice so that a practitioner can observe all of the norms simultaneously. In order to follow a moral norm properly, one must have mastered one or more practices. Morality itself, then, is not a single practice on all fours with democratic politics, family life, or engineering. Rather it consists in recurring elements of many such practices. If this is right, then the answer to Plato's question is that the teachers of virtue are all around us. They include (at least potentially) those who teach practical disciplines—medicine, law, journalism, politics—and those who prepare children for taking active part in family, school, and community life. Virtue is properly an indispensable part of what they teach.

To make these ideas plausible, I will appeal to certain elegant ideas of Plato about communities and souls. At the same time, I will sketch an un-Platonic naturalistic conception of ethics and virtue. In the *Republic,* Plato uses the *politeia,* the organization of the common life of the citizens of a community, as a model for understanding the psychological organization of an individual human being. The model is extraordinarily fecund. The isomorphism between *politeia* and *psuche* is decidedly no coincidence. Constitutions and souls are revealed as thoroughly and complexly interconnected.

In his account in the *Republic* of the *kallipolis,* the best community, Plato articulated the rationale for a division of labor and specialization in a community and explained the contribution of such an arrangement to the prospects of citizens' living well [369a-374e]. "A *polis* comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient, but we all need many things." An individual human being's needs and desires are generally far more extensive and varied than the individual's abilities to fulfill them. Different individuals, however, have different skills and aptitudes, so in a large enough group, the abilities will be found for meeting a considerable number of the concerns of any particular individual. Not only does the division of labor in a community promise that more rather than fewer of people's needs and interests will be fulfilled through the efforts of others, but it also provides the social circumstances for groups of people with similar aptitudes to share practical knowledge and cultivate together their productive activity.

The social arrangement Plato describes makes it possible for people to participate in practices that require elaborate bodies of cultivated, shared, cumulative practical knowledge. It provides the circumstances necessary for individuals' acquiring and manifesting *technai*—internalized bodies of know-how. Plato did not emphasize the following points, but they are important for our purposes. When an individual in a community manifests or expresses a techne such as being good at healing or being good at music making, the individual is participating in a social practice. The practice itself—medicine or music, for example—is, in fact, a social artifact, a shared body of moving, developing knowledge about what is valuable in a certain domain and how certain valuable things are properly fostered and protected. Such a practice is the result of the practical experience of many people over time, understood by a group of individuals in such a way that they can use it to guide their own activity. The practice itself, in other words, is a complex norm—a guide to proper practice [Will 1988: 30-31]. Different groups of people in a single community cultivate and practice in accordance with different bodies of practical knowledge, and the resulting division of labor generally contributes to fulfilling the myriad needs and interests of the members of the community at large. One way in which a community so organized contributes to the possibility of its members' living well is by its effective provision for these many needs and interests.

At the same time, though, the development of these bodies of practical knowledge and the practices they guide makes it possible for individuals to devote substantial portions of their lives to participating in such practice(s), to cultivating *technai,* and to expressing *technai* by practicing effectively and well. So a practice such as medicine, which originated in response to people's concerns about healing their illnesses and injuries, develops as a social artifact and becomes itself an object of intense interest for those who cultivate it. A community organized in accordance with a division of labor and specialization makes possible the very considerable satisfactions of continually participating successfully in an important complex activity one loves. Such a community enables and fosters this sort of good life.

Aristotle reconstructs the development of community, and remarks, presumably with the account in the *Republic* in mind:

> A complete community constituted out of several villages, once it reaches the limit of total self-sufficiency, practically speaking, is a [polis]. It comes to be for the sake of living, but it remains in existence for the sake of living well. [*Politics* I, 2, 1252b 28-31 in Aristotle 1998: 3]

When community is conceived in the manner of Plato and Aristotle, it becomes clear that technai occupy a central place both in community and in living well. We can articulate a substantive conception of a good human life in a community so organized, a life a major component of which is the continual capable participation in complex social activity that makes an important contribution to the community and to the lives of its practitioners. Neither Plato nor Aristotle developed such an account of good human life. The view was not apt to get a sympathetic consideration from philosophers who shared the ancient Greek aristocrat's disdain for the social class that did the community's work and for the lives this class led.

When bodies of practical knowledge and the practices they guide develop in a community organized in accordance with an effective scheme of division of labor and specialization, the shared understanding of right and wrong ways of practicing are shaped by the cumulative discoveries of practitioners of what conduces to achieving the purposes of their practices. Equally important is harmonizing and coordinating the pursuit of each practice with the other practices and activities that are carried on in the community. The various practices must be pursued simultaneously, often in close proximity with one another. It is obviously important for all that the activities not conflict. If the practices reinforce one another, so much the better. Each practice, then, will be shaped by its practitioners' understanding of the procedures necessary for producing the results of their craft *and* by their understanding of how the practice is to be harmonized with the pursuit of other crafts and with the common life of the whole community.

Such practices require a degree of consensus among practitioners and others about the purposes of the activities and how these purposes are best achieved. This agreement is expressed in the way that people are taught to practice, how they subsequently practice, and in the criticisms they offer of their own and others' practice. At the same time, practices are typically surrounded by controversy. Think of religion, medicine, child rearing, law, inquiry, art, government, education, and so on. Anything about a sophisticated practice, it seems, can be contested. The continual arguments can be tedious, but they are symptomatic of the fact that practitioners have, exercise, and cultivate a critical attitude that is necessary for growth and adaptation of their practice to changing circumstances [Dewey 1922: 55-56]. If the practice is to be vital, It must be possible for participants to disagree; if the practice is to be viable, it must be possible for them to agree. The result, if the practice flourishes, is a moving consensus, often accompanied by a great deal of noise and some confusion.

Among the norms that indicate how such a cultivated activity is properly pursued will be norms that indicate how its practice is to be conducted in a way that is harmonious with other important activities in a community. In a community organized on a principle of division of labor, there will be in its different practices important roles for norms that facilitate coordination, minimize conflict, and promote trust and cooperation among individuals engaged in the same practice. All of these kinds of norms will be found, with variations, in many practices. It is among such norms that we should look for what we classify as ethical norms—norms of trustworthiness, respectful considerateness, faithfulness, forthrightness, fairness, honesty, loyalty, toleration, and so on. Traits of individual character are important and valuable when they dispose and enable people to follow norms of effective practice and to act in accordance with the norms that foster the harmony of their practice with the practice of others in a community. Traits of moral and intellectual character are necessary for the criticism and agreement that is crucial for the intelligent adaptation of practices to changing circumstances. Those engaged in teaching such practices, then, properly concern themselves with inculcating such virtues.

In the *Republic,* Plato treats the *kallipolis* as a model for an individual human being of excellent character and uses what he calls justice-as-a-virtue-of -a -polis to explain justice as an excellence of an individual human being. Justice in a polis, on Plato's account, is expressed in the citizens' doing their own assigned work without interfering in the work of others; it is a quite particular condition of effective practice and social harmony [433a-b]. Justice in a person, he then argues, consists in the condition in which each of the various psychical elements of the individual does its proper work effectively in harmony with the workings of the individual's other psychical elements [443c-e].

Plato famously distinguishes three functioning psychical elements in human beings: the rational, the emotional, and the appetitive. He discovered the existence of these three elements by noting conflicts and oppositions within a single individual among cravings of appetites, promptings of emotions, and desires that are based upon practical knowledge. Plato's procedure can be extended by using other schema for classifying potentially conflicting psychical tendencies, including the structured habits and valuings individuals acquire in learning various practices. Other psychological classifications reveal further relationships between the *politeia* or organization of the common life of a community and the psychological organization of its individual members.

Complex social practices based in shared, cultivated bodies of knowledge exist only when individuals actually have the relevant knowledge and participate in the practice. The knowledge is practical, consisting in knowing how to proceed in order to produce certain results, knowing how to resolve conflicts between the demands of these results, appreciating the importance and values of the purposes of the practice, knowing how to act in concert with fellow practitioners, and appreciating the importance of harmonizing the practice with other practices in the community. The norms or standards that indicate the right way to practice and the purposes that the practice serves are aspects, constituents of the practice themselves. They constitute the practice. Practices have histories; they often change and develop as a result of shared experience of practitioners in response to changes in the physical and social environment. As a practice develops, changes, its constituent norms and purposes change too [Dewey 1922: 57; MacIntyre 1984: 188-9.]. A practice, conceived in this way, is a complex instance of what John Dewey called a "habit." It is a shared habit, a social artifact. Dewey said:

> The word habit may seem twisted somewhat from its customary use . . . But we need a word to express that kind of human activity, which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. [Dewey 1922: 31]

Modern medicine provides a useful example of such a shared habit. It changes extremely rapidly. Participants struggle continually to adjust the components of its practice to one another and to the larger social context. Medicine is shaped by its social context, and it has a reciprocal effect upon its environment. We are currently keenly aware of how far medicine is practiced in ways that foster and in ways that conflict with economic, political, educational, ethical, and religious matters. The psyches of individual physicians reflect this situation in the structured yet conflicting complex of know-how, concerns, valuings, and commitments that constitutes their medical *techne*, the complex social habit that they express in their professional activity.

The life of a community organized in accordance with a principle of division of labor will consist in the simultaneous pursuit of many more or less harmonized cultivated practices. Generally, the more harmonious and mutually reinforcing its constituent practices, the better for the community. Because of changing circumstances, any successful adjustment of practices within a community will be temporary. The need for readjustment is continual. The more resourceful its members when confronted by the conflicts and dislocations that result from change, the better. When an individual masters a particular practice and participates in it effectively, what the individual will have acquired is a complex habit of observing a body of norms, which norms have been shaped in part by the necessity of harmonizing the practice with the other practices of the community. As a result, the individual's psychical structure, the individual's practical and ethical character, will reflect the structure of the practices that are pursued by the individual's community. It is not possible for a single individual to master all of the activities of the community, though each person normally will have mastered domestic, political, cultural, recreational, educational, and religious activities as well as economic activities. The activities that an individual does master, however, are formed partly by the rest of the social environment in which they are pursued. So far, then, any complex cultivated activity will reflect the other important activities of the community, and the psychical structure of the individual who participates in the practice—the structured acquired set of skills, understandings, and valuings that enables the individual to participate in the practice—will similarly reflect the structure of the community.

The virtue that one is taught, then, is taught by all those who instruct one in practices. The community teaches its members virtue. At the same time, a part of the task of continually harmonizing and extending the quite particular collection of social habits that structure the psyche of a given individual is up to the individual. Like a Leibnizian monad, the psyche of a member of a community reflects the social world from that individual's particular perspective. (Of course, unlike a monad, an individual person continually interacts with that world.) So the teaching of virtue to a particular individual is a mutual undertaking in which community, its teachers, and the individual collaborate. Individuals are formed by the social artifacts of their communities, but at the same time each individual is to an important degree self-taught, self-made.

Plato, of course, took the values and norms with which the just person is concerned to form "a separate and independent domain," an eternal, unchanging realm quite apart from the actual lives of human beings. This naturally led Plato to suppose that competent teachers of virtue would have to have more than a practical understanding of the social artifacts, the practices, of a community. Not surprisingly, he could not find such teachers in his community. Plato's influence on this point has tended to blind philosophers to the fact that our practices are our norms, so that if we teach practices properly, we are teaching virtue.

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Tacit Knowledge and Moral Education

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of tacit knowledge may be the central legacy of the scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi. Because of Polanyi's background as a scientist, it may be tempting to assume that he believed tacit knowledge is only relevant to the cognitive processes by which scientific inquiry and problem solving are undertaken. This would be a mistake since Polanyi indicated that tacit knowledge is an important component to all areas of human understanding—including the moral domain. Yet, there appears to have been little effort over the years to further extrapolate the implications of tacit knowledge into a consideration of the origin and growth of moral values. Consequently, the concept of tacit knowledge appears to be an important albeit neglected component of moral education and development. This is unfortunate, since Polanyi not only recognized the significance of the moral, religious, and spiritual domains of inquiry for human welfare, but he also acknowledged the relevance of tacit knowing to their advancement.

This paper's goal is to examine the implications of Polanyi's concept of tacit knowing for our understanding of moral development and moral education—with special reference to the challenges of advancing the broad goals of moral education in a pluralistic, democratic society. The author does not claim that the present foray into the tacit element of moral development and its pedagogical implications represents an accurate extrapolation of Polanyi's concept. Rather, the present inquiry simply hopes to define—in the terms Polanyi proposed—a dimension of moral development and education that is seldom accounted for in contemporary models. The main idea I wish to express is this: there is an emotional, aesthetic element in moral development that is readily neglected in contemporary models of morality and moral education. Such neglect may be attributed to the biases built into our language and culture. Moral reasoning is explicit, conscious and cognitive. Moral conduct, however interpreted, is also observable. It is perhaps, small wonder that we tend to be biased in favor of these two elements of morality: reasoning and conduct. The aesthetic element of morality remains tacit, emotional and easily overlooked. Herein lies the basis upon which we readily attend to some elements of morality while neglecting another. I will argue that the tacit aspect is, nonetheless, foundational to both moral reasoning and conduct.

Before we consider the aesthetic aspect of morality and its bearing on tacit knowledge, it will first be necessary to make a preliminary consideration of the meaning Polanyi gave to the tacit domain in general.

Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge

The concept of tacit knowledge emerged primarily in three of Polanyi's principal philosophical writings: *Personal Knowledge, The Tacit Dimension* and *The Study of Man.*[1] In his seminal work *Personal Knowledge,* Polanyi engaged in his most extensive effort to throw light on the manner in which our emotions as well as our fundamental personal beliefs shape the initiation of scientific inquiry, the direction it undertakes and the knowledge or understanding that emerges as the final outcome. It is important to note that Polanyi did not deny that our emotions and beliefs may distort inquiry, but he argued nonetheless that this does not diminish the extent to which our emotions and beliefs guide and sustain all successful inquiry. They are therefore an indispensable component to research.

Emotions play at least two vital roles in the process of inquiry and our quest for understanding. First of all emotions stir the creative hunches and insights which generate discovery and are consequently the foundation of problem solving and creativity. Secondly, emotions are essential to the sustained effort, enthusiasm and gumption that are necessary to carry any inquiry to its successful resolution (or to rebound from setbacks in order to launch further inquiry). Most importantly, it is this fund of unarticulated, often preconscious, emotionally based personal beliefs which comprise the central element of tacit knowledge.

While it is the tacit element that fuels the passionate pursuit of the resolution of a problem, it also carries within it an implicit, *tacit* assumption that a solution to this problem exists. Furthermore, a special contribution of the tacit domain to the resolution of our inquiries comes through the contribution of what has been termed the *Zeigarnik* effect.[2] Accordingly, unfinished tasks (the problems whose solutions we pursue in earnest) continue to preoccupy us unconsciously when we leave them consciously: that is, their memory persists after finished tasks are forgotten, much like a forgotten name is recalled after a period of quiescence.[3]

Yet, while these characteristics of tacit knowledge form the basis for human judgment, decision making and problem solving in science, it would be, as suggested, a mistake to assume that tacit knowledge has nothing to do with the moral domain. Indeed, I would like to suggest that the tacit component of moral understanding, development and education has been implicitly understood by those theorists who have acknowledged an *aesthetic* dimension of morality. As Lawrence Kohlberg once wrote, "part of the good of morality is not moral, it is aesthetic."[4] This aesthetic component was more fully addressed by John Dewey. For Dewey, the imaginative-aesthetic dimension of human experience plays a key role in morality. He even suggested that "one great defect in what passes as morality is its *anesthetic* quality." (emphasis added).[5] Dewey recognized this aesthetic domain as a component of our moral sense that is largely neglected in most efforts to promote moral development and education. I believe that this neglect, in part, may be attributed to the largely tacit elements which define the aesthetic dimension of moral understanding, as well as moral education. Consequently, before considering the manner in which Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge helps us conceptualize the tacit component of moral understanding, it will be important to briefly consider the aesthetic aspect of morality and moral development.

THE AESTHETIC ELEMENT OF MORALITY

Dewey wrote most succinctly of the aesthetic component of morality in his *Theory of the Moral Life.* As he stated, "the sense of justice , moreover, has a strong ally in the sense of symmetry and proportion. The double meaning of the term 'fair' is no accident." In this respect, Dewey acknowledges the contribution of Aristotle and his identification of virtue with the "proportionate mean." According to Dewey, these references . .

> . . . are indications of an acute estimate of grace, rhythm, and harmony as dominant traits of good conduct. The modern mind has been much less sensitive to esthetic values in general and to these values in conduct in particular. Much has been lost in direct responsiveness to right. The bleakness and harshness often associated with morals is a sign of this loss.[6]

More recently, James Q. Wilson has also sought to capture this aesthetic element of the moral domain. As he has observed, the prevalence of so much criminally immoral behavior is not necessarily a sign of weakness with what he identifies as our innate moral sense. Rather, the problem lies within the conflicts that inevitably emerge among our several moral senses.[7] This may be exemplified by the potential conflict between our disposition for loyalty and subsequent need for affiliation or acceptance, and our otherwise healthy aptitude of compassion for others. When compassion and group loyalty conflict, the consequences often leave much to be desired from a moral point of view. The aesthetic component of our moral sense involves the capacity to establish balance or harmony between these legitimately conflicting sensibilities. What we are attempting to define might best be expressed as an aptitude for *moral symmetry*. However, as Wilson emphasizes this balancing or sense of moral symmetry is "struck without deliberation or reasoned justification."[8] It is in this respect that our moral-aesthetic apprehension of a conflicting situation enables us to "see" or perhaps "feel" the direction in which conduct must be led if the "fair" or proportionate mean is to be preserved. Our aesthetic sensibilities, then, make possible the adjudication of moral problems. This is less a matter of moral reasoning and more of a "feel" for fairness, symmetry and proportion in an *aesthetic* sense.

By identifying the aesthetic element of morality with the tacit domain, I wish to underscore the pre-verbal, emotional sensibilities which define this neglected aspect of moral education. Also, in doing this I believe we can begin to grasp how this component of moral knowledge and understanding is transmitted from teacher to student. For this reason, we must return to our examination of Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge in order to consider how it translates into what might best be described as the tacit dimension of teaching. This will further provide us a conceptual basis upon which to view the tacit, aesthetic element of moral understanding.

From Tacit Knowing to Tacit Teaching

It must be emphasized (as already suggested) that the tacit element of human nature is relevant to all areas of inquiry and understanding, not simply science or morals. While inspecting examples provided by Polanyi, this must be kept in mind since the examples we will examine do not ostensibly appear related to morality. Nonetheless, the examples we will consider well exemplify some of the distinguishing characteristics of the tacit domain that will help us extrapolate the implications of tacit knowledge for a conception of tacit teaching: moral or otherwise.

There are three features of the tacit domain that are particularly relevant to our present inquiry into the tacit element of teaching. The first component involves what Polanyi referred to as our *subsidiary awareness.* The second aspect involves the idea that insights into the meaning of whole objects or systems is not entirely derivable from an isolated, detailed study of the composing parts. All particulars of an object or system become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly constitute. The third component of tacit knowledge involves our conceptualization of it as a *skill*—albeit a skill that cannot be fully captured by our customary appeal to the explicit, verbal domain. Let us consider these three components, their bearing on tacit knowledge in general and then their bearing on the tacit element of moral understanding in particular.

One's subsidiary awareness is a component of human consciousness that is most contiguous with the subliminal, preconscious element with which the tacit domain is concerned. In describing this aspect of human nature, Polanyi gives the example of a pianist who successfully plays a piece of music by virtue of his or her subsidiary awareness.[9] Consequently, a lapse in such awareness while playing the piano and an untimely focus on the particular activity of any or all of his or her fingers may interfere with the pianist's performance. Similarly, no one element of a moral conflict provides a basis upon which the aesthetic element may be seen to be invoked and applied. There is no utilitarian formula or rationalist's categorical imperative that can capture this element of the moral equation; rather, it is the *whole* situation that is perceived *tacitly* within the *subsidiary awareness* of the aesthetically competent, morally mature perceiver. This is also the meaning of the second characteristic of the tacit domain. In the aesthetic aspect of moral symmetry, the *whole* is truly more than the sum of the parts which can be delineated in any given moral problem. Intellectual analysis alone can be used to justify any number of supposedly responsible moral outcomes; an aesthetic appreciation of moral symmetry provides the basis upon which one outcome becomes superior to another.

The third element of the tacit domain of moral understanding is the idea that it involves the application of a skill—a skill for which we all have an aptitude. It is a skill for integrating the emotional and aesthetic dimensions of moral competence into problems that, on the surface, (an *explicit* level) appear solely "moral" and consequently irrelevant to aesthetic considerations. I believe we can begin to gain insight into the tacit dimension of moral understanding as well as its transmission when we consider it a *skill* which must follow the model that Polanyi suggests defines the transmission of any aspect of our fund of tacit knowing and understanding. In other words, we learn the tacit element of morals in the same manner in which we acquire the tacit component of any dimension of human knowledge and understanding; regardless of whether it is scientific inquiry, violin making or moral competence.

As previously suggested, Polanyi provides an example of the transmission of tacit knowing which appears unrelated to moral considerations—namely violin making.[10] Polanyi has written that what is involved in the transmission of this skill is more than simply what is learned through the conscious observation of what a master violin maker says or does—although that must not be neglected. Rather, what is also included is the tacit element with which our *subsidiary* awareness is concerned. The tacit element is essential for mastering any skill or craft, yet it is apparently transmitted *subliminally* to our subsidiary awareness. Consequently it defines a component of any skill that can only be acquired in the presence of a master plying his or her craft. This personal contact is deemed essential to the passing on of elements of a skill and understanding that the violin maker himself may not be able to articulate. That is, it is in contrast with that form of knowledge accompanied by our verbal abilities which defines our explicit knowledge domain—such as that defined by a Kohlbergian model of moral reasoning. Thus personal contact, over generations, is obligatory to successfully transmitting the highest expression of any given craft. This personal contact represents, for Polanyi, one of the most important characteristics of what may be termed a "tradition" of knowledge and understanding. As Polanyi indicated, one must in many respects be bound to a tradition—and a community that sustains it—if one is to extract this element of understanding. Once the tradition is broken, however, recovery is problematic because the personal contact that has sustained it is lost. Hence we even struggle with the challenge of duplicating a violin equal to those routinely produced by the half-literate Stradivarius. (This point alone regarding traditions of moral knowledge opens yet another important area of inquiry. Its fuller consideration, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper.)

The upshot of this discussion is the idea that the cultivation and transmission of the tacit, aesthetic element of moral understanding involves intimate, personal contact or mentoring with a morally competent individual. Furthermore, the form of moral competence that is "modeled" has less to do with explicit forms of moral reasoning and more to do with a host of emotional dispositions and aesthetic sensitivities which are exercised in the act of moral problem solving. This means that the tacit dimension of morality can only be acquired while in the presence of a morally competent individual who demonstrates a full range of moral competencies: from moral courage to moral aversion. It is consequently suggested that a critical feature of moral development is the opportunity to live, think and study in the presence of a morally competent individual. The tacit component of moral competence, then, appears to constitute a host of emotional dispositions and tastes that strongly affect an individual's capacity for appropriately exercised moral courage and moral aversion. What is acquired is a tacit, aesthetic feel for fairness or "oughtness" in human affairs—what we have identified as a sense of moral symmetry. Accordingly, when we take full measure of the tacit element of morality, then moral education (when successful) has less to do with reasoning and the moral dialogue exchanged between student and teacher (or student and student), and more to do with the emotional dispositions the teacher transmits tacitly, subliminally.

More recently, research and theory on the relation between the mind, body, emotions and brain functions may be providing a more explicit clue to this notion of a teacher's vital presence and its relation to the tacit dimension of teaching and learning. For example, as neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has recently pointed out, our emotions, feelings and the processes of biological regulation all play a central role in our mental activity.[11] Indeed, Damasio even suggests there is something of an Aristotelian mean when it comes to the role emotion plays in human decision making and judgment—especially social or moral judgments. That is, too *little* as well as too much emotion undermines the decision making process. Furthermore, on account of the connections that exist between these various systems in the brain as well as in the body—with regard to reasoning, decision making, emotion and conduct—Damasio has pointed out that it is inaccurate to identify the *mind* simply with the brain. Rather, all of the processes traditionally associated with the mind—reasoning, feelings, emotions, mental images—must be understood in terms of a number of specific brain systems interacting with a number of body systems and organs. Polanyi seems to have anticipated this direction of study emerging from the work of researchers like Damasio. Not only did Polanyi note the relevance of "neural traces in the cortex" to the scope of tacit knowing, but he also predicted that by "elucidating the way our bodily processes participate in our perceptions we will throw light on the bodily roots of all thought, including man's highest creative powers".[12] My conjecture is that tacit knowing—and by implication tacit teaching—may involve bodily processes transmitted as a subtle expression of a type of *body language* that is perceived subliminally in our subsidiary awareness.

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

One of the most obvious implications of our foregoing discussion may be the need to focus on what has been an ill-defined feature of the *moral character* of the teacher. In this respect, who the teacher is, and consequently, the tacit element a teacher inadvertently brings into the classroom, is more important than a narrow focus on *what* the teacher knows explicitly—or even the observable pedagogical skills mastered (although those cannot be entirely neglected). This special relation between student and teacher is explicit in Dewey's conception of a progressive school which he outlined in *Experience and Education.* In that volume he wrote that in a progressive school there may be "*more* multiplied and *more* intimate contacts between the mature and the immature than ever existed in the traditional school, and consequently *more,* rather than less guidance by others." (emphasis added).[13] Regular, sustained, intimate contact between the student and an exceptional teacher is the basis for the character growth that is fostered *while* knowledge is acquired. In this way character development is fostered in the manner Dewey envisioned: through the incidental life of the school culture. Among other things, this implies smaller classes and school enrollment than is normally deemed feasible. Clearly, these are not ideas which are easily formatted for curricular developers and standardized tests, but it does suggest that we revisit the study of what it means to be a role model, and its relation to the individuals who are preparing for careers in education.

What is also implicated by our discussion is a special focus in teacher education on the development of appropriate models of self-understanding, self-development and moral growth—models that could readily become part of a teacher preparation program. In this respect, teacher educators, as well as prospective teachers, need to re-examine their own lives in terms of the tacit elements they consciously nurture or neglect. To some extent, this process involves the consideration of a more conscious element of the explicit knowledge domain. Polanyi, once again, provides a clue as to the possible composition of this explicit element of the curriculum. In *Personal Knowledge,* he underscored the importance of an "intellectual desire" to the process of problem solving. In the realm of scientific research, this implies a deep seated commitment to the pursuit of a solution to a problem which, though unresolved, is so compelling that it grips the mind and heart of the researcher and continues to preoccupy him or her unconsciously. As stated earlier, the tension set up by these unfinished tasks continue to make progress unconsciously toward their resolution—much as the forgotten name is invoked.

The upshot of this discussion is the idea that teachers need to have some personal preoccupation with their own moral development. That is, the challenge or *problem* of self-development is one in which teachers must truly be engaged on a personal level. This personal concern may be essential if teachers are to facilitate their own growth and consequently have a positive impact on the moral development of their students.

By viewing a student's moral development and education to *tacitly* involve the teacher's own preoccupation with his or her own moral progress, we are compelled to consider the contribution of a curriculum which allows that concern to periodically manifest itself *explicitly*—at least in the teacher education curriculum. One direct implication for teacher education could involve a conscious effort to nurture models of optimal human functioning among prospective teachers. In this regard, the work of Abraham Maslow may prove particularly relevant[14]. What Maslow's theory provides, is a working model of a healthy—one may even say morally healthy—human being which outlines the goals toward which personal, self development may be seen to advance.

While a focus on models of development may be yet another bothersome concern for the explicit knowledge domain, it nonetheless may be that by ignoring this aspect of a teacher's life, we are inadvertently applying a corollary of the principle of the self-fulfilling prophecy: namely, if we do not consider the possibility of a model of optimum human functioning (e.g. Maslow's conception of self-actualization), we are most unlikely to develop in that direction. Such a conclusion is implicit in Polanyi's observation about the tacit, preconscious element of problem solving. If teachers have little or no concern for a model of personal development (and the direction of growth implied by such a model), and if they are not somewhat preoccupied with resolving the significant challenges involved in leading a good life, then they are unlikely to move in the requisite direction of personal growth. Consequently, while their students may receive solid math instruction, these students are inadvertently, *tacitly* taught, that there is no significant moral symmetry to our lives, and that moral courage and moral aversion have little or no role to play in our society. This was certainly the tacit, implicit lesson my wife once observed in high school. At that time, a teacher failed to speak out while one student mercilessly harassed and teased another girl whose brother she knew had recently committed suicide. The girl left the class in tears with no comment whatsoever by the teacher. Such a lesson in moral cowardice by a teacher should be unimaginable today, especially in the wake of incidents such as those at Columbine High School.

There are many reasons why the ideas discussed here will remain problematic for public schools. For one, it appears that these ideas go against the whole drift of public education today. With the ever increasing demands for (and focus on) explicitly measurable skills, it is unlikely that high priority will be given to the kind of interpersonal relations which appear to define the kind of mentoring central to the tacit dimension of moral development. Furthermore, as Polanyi suggested, tacit knowing and teaching are not only inseparable from a personal relation formed between a teacher and a student, they are also inseparable from a community and a *tradition* that sustains them. It is clear that in a pluralistic society, the population encompasses a number of competing communities and traditions, each of which make claims to preserving a fund of moral knowledge and understanding. Yet, Dewey's vision of education in a pluralistic, democratic society was one in which teachers would be animated by a deep seated faith in the democratic ideals of life. This is the basis for the "common faith" he envisioned. If teachers are not animated by these ideals, then who should be? It may be time to revisit the meaning of Dewey's notion that teachers are the "consecrated servants of the democratic ideal."[15] Only in this way will we begin to transmit to our students important values central to a democratic life and the moral symmetry that sustains it.

NOTES

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2. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, p.

3. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, p.129..

4. Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Theory of Developmental Stages in Moral Judgment" in C.M. Beck, B.S. Crittenden, and E.V. Sullivan (eds.) Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 397.

5. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 39.

6. John Dewey, *Theory of the Moral Life*, (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 130-1.

7. James Q. Wilson, *The Moral Sense*, (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 229.

8. Ibid., p.243.

9. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, p. 56.

10. Ibid., p. 49-65

11. Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York, Grosset/Putman, 1994).

12. Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, p. 15.

13. John Dewey, *Experience and Education*, (New York: Collier Books, 1973), p. 21

14. Abraham Maslow,(1968) *Toward a psychology of being*. (New York, Van Nostrand 1968) and *Religions, Values and Peak Experiences* (New York, Harper & Row, 1970).

15. John Dewey, "Nationalizing Education" in *The Middle Works Of John Dewey, 1899-1924: Volume 10 1916-1917*, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press) pp.202-10.

"Home is Where One Starts From":[1] Loyalty and the Schools

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Three years ago at the meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education I delivered a paper on what it would mean if teachers were friends to their students.[2] This year I want to discuss loyalty and our schools. This is a feature of daily experience and a matter of growing importance as we adapt our educational efforts to the preparation of students for a changing world. Teachers are loyal to their school and to their students; students are loyal to the school, to their teachers, to each other. And we praise both groups for being loyal, for supplying unchanging support for each other. But should we always praise them? And should we judge a seeming lack of loyalty as less than praiseworthy? Should we, perhaps, withhold our approbation or our disapprobation until we more carefully examine the grounds for our judgment?

A case can be made for disapprobation. In a post-Kantian world that tries to be ruthlessly rational, there are many signs of a hankering for the irrational, the affective, the emotional. Loyalty is a case in point. Yet schools are often thought of as institutions trying to promote rationality, to promote it at all costs. In the individualistic climate of today's social world, we are encountering an important counter-trend toward the value of affectivity. And in this common-sense[3] hankering for loyalty in human relationships, we are simply following a phenomenon, common outside the school, one that is world-wide, one that is the case in every culture at any time, but especially today.

Let us look at some of the signs that the promotion of loyalty is omnipresent in our day. Opera companies, hockey teams, rock bands—all pursue audience loyalty. Doctors and lawyers find they do their best work if there is client trust and loyalty. Commercial and industrial companies work to promote workplace loyalty among employees. Institutions in general function better if there is esprit de corps. When we relocate to other neighborhoods or cities are we not asked: Where is your loyalty to family? When we sometimes vote for a candidate from a rival party, are we not asked: Where is your loyalty to your party? Police who have to work together and subject themselves to possible sudden death for their fellow officers are enjoined to be loyal to each other even if it means creating a "blue wall of silence".[4] Jones sausages, Proctor and Gamble soap, the neighborhood bakery court us so that we will have loyalty to them by using their products exclusively. British supermarkets distribute loyalty cards to their steady customers.

If loyalty is asked for in the relationships of every other part of modern life,[5] we should not surprised that schools also ask for our loyalty. We are asked to be loyal to our school and its traditional values, to our teacher, to our students and classmates, to our colleagues. No one thinks it strange that we have a special affection and loyalty to our alma mater, that, as expressions of that loyalty, we think that our teacher is the best in the country, that in a fight between students during a basketball game we fight for our own school and perceive the other school as filled with enemies, even though they may be our neighbors. In the occasional battle between teacher and student, we just presume that our colleagues will support us.[6]

In a way, loyalty has always been seen as an indispensable characteristic for both individual and society relationships. [7] As Ovid warned us many years ago.

> Last comes the Age of Iron,
> And the day of Evil dawns
> Modesty
> Loyalty,
> Truth,
> Go up like a mist—a morning sigh off a graveyard.[8]

Loyalty is put right up there with modesty and truth.

* * *

As an old professor of mine used to say, "It may be true, Buddy, but is it right?" Loyalty may be manifest in all areas of modern life, but is it always right? Let us then look at some of the problems with a blind or unconditional loyalty, with an emotional or affective commitment which is not periodically reviewed.

First, loyalty associated with the school is specific and particularistic and can never be moral. For the very enterprise of morality is characterized by a universal and nonparticular viewpoint. As Bernard Williams says, "For morality the ethical constituency is always the same: the universal constituency."[9] This stance is common to both deontologists and utilitarians: deontologists because what they do has to be whatever they would wish others would do; utilitarians because they must choose that which brings the greatest good to humanity. And surely if we are rational in our loyalty we should not be tempted to think that our friend, our house, our school or our students are the best to be found in the world.[10]

Second, loyalty is *de dicto*.[11] That which makes loyalty identifiable is that we find ourselves faithful to a person as just one of many who have similar attractive characteristics. Those with the same characteristics are by definition interchangeable but also universal.

Third, like love, loyalty must be *de re*, attached to a person,individual or corporate, and not simply to the characteristics of the person.[12] As Robert Nozick says: "love is historical, attaching to persons . . . and not to characteristics."[13]

Fourth, to be a rationally loyal person we would have to be omniscient,so that our loyalty could never misplaced. How can we be loyal to something many of whose characteristics we do not know and therefore cannot assess?

Fifth, if loyalty must be *de dicto,* two of us with differing reasons for being loyal to the same person are not loyal to the same person; there are two objects, though only one subject.

To all of which I want to reply. Are all lovers and friends immoral by definition? If they are not, surely there is a place in the moral universe analogously for people who are loyal to their schools. Easy to say; difficult to find reasonable arguments? Let us see.

* * *

A good first step is to look hard at the words *loyal* and *loyalty* themselves, their cognates and their opposites. Clearly they are used to signify being steadfast in allegiance to one's homeland, country or sovereign. They are also used to signify faithful attachment or adherence to a person, an ideal, a custom, a cause, or a duty. It is duty, the last of these, that ties the concept of loyalty to the idea of law (etymologically loyalty is derived from *lex* or law) and legality. The terms loyal and loyalty both connote being true, constant, steadfast, staunch. Allegiance which comes from the same etymological root sheds additional light on the meaning because it is historically rooted in the ideas of fealty and liege which show its medieval provenance: the faithfulness to which a sovereign is entitled.

If one looks at cognates, loyal and loyalty are not always "hurrah"words but can be "boo" words.[14] So bias, bigotry, chauvinism, favoritism point to the dark side of loyalty. And if one looks at affective responses opposite to loyalty, frequently they are admirable. Impartiality or neutrality often characterize an appropriate and reasonable stance. But more often the opposite of loyalty is betrayal, insolent liberty, mob violence, sabotage, subversion, treachery. In the main, being loyal is portrayed as an admirable characteristic of a person.

Let us be clear about what loyalty entails. As Andrew Oldenquist says, loyalty lies between self-interest and impersonal morality.[15] Which is to say that it is not universalizable.[16] That is to say, loyalty is particularistic; there is always an individual object toward which it is directed. Though particularistic, the same object can attract the loyalty of many. As Oldenquist says, "It is one of the great merits of . . . loyalty that the objects of [loyalty] need not be scarce things or necessities, the possession of which by my community or city diminishes your community or city or subtracts from its fair share."[17]

While we ourselves may have many loyalties, all independent non-instrumental goods, there are other things, possibly like them, with almost the same characteristics that do not elicit our loyalty or, at least, have only instrumental value for us.

Although we can be loyal to something or someone we know little about, we cannot change our loyalties for others easily or lightly, but they can be acquired very easily. Though ostensibly our loyalties are non-hierarchical, because they are non-instrumental, loyalties can and do clash one with another, and choices between them may have to be made.

Ordinarily, a loyalty defines a moral community in terms of a conception of a common good and a special commitment to the members of the group who share this good; loyalty is opposed to a individualistic conception of the self. But the members of the group do not have to like each other or even know each other. Much of what is said about love and friendship can also be said of loyalty.

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But what the actual object of our loyalty is, is frequently disputed. Is loyalty *de dicto* or *de re?* Dictionary meanings allow for both.

In loyalty *de dicto* we are in the last analysis not loyal to someone, some thing or some institution; we are loyal to the characteristics we find in that object; we are loyal because those characteristics give us reasons to value the object. As Roger Lamb says, our loyalty towards the "other" depends on our finding certain characteristics or properties exemplified in that other; they are tokens of types.[18] Loyalty is, then, propositional or cognitive; it depends on reasons that, potentially, can be stated. One of the consequences of so defining loyalty is that, with the inevitable changes in persons, as one or more of these characteristics disappears, so also may our loyalty; at least,we need new grounds for loyalty to that person.

There are further consequences. Reasons constrain us; loyalty is, in the main, freely elicited or chosen. [19] In addition, if we are loyal to someone because of certain characteristics, Kantian universalism says we ought to be loyal to all others who are tokens of that type.[20] On the other hand, loyalty, like love and friendship, involves commitment. This bond involves a type of consequent constraint; without commitment, loyalty, like friendship or love, is defective. If we are to act rationally, as the values of these characteristics becomes problematic, so does commitment, if we are rational. A good question to ask is: are people just place-holders of predicates? As Roger Scruton asks: are we type-persons (who meet the criterion of universalizability) or are we token-persons (who may not meet that same criterion)? Of course, the token-person may insist on holding a more complex view; that is, these characteristics are admired because they are instances of a type. Nevertheless, those whose loyalty is based solely on present properties will have little reason to go to farewell concerts.

William Yeats' poem to Anne Gregory shows some of the complexities of the problem:

> 'Never shall a men,
> Thrown into despair
> By those great honey-coloured
> Ramparts at your ear,
> Love you for yourself alone
> And not your yellow hair.'
>
> But I can get a hair-dye
> And set such colour there,
> Brown, or black, or carrot,
> That young men in despair
> May love me for myself alone
> And not my yellow hair'
>
> 'I heard an old religious man
> But yesterday declare
> That he has found a text to prove

That only God, my dear,
Could love you for yourself alone
And not your yellow hair.'[21]

So much for loyalty *de dicto.*

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What does loyalty *de re* entail? It involves more than the cognitive; it is in some ways opaque to reason. It may involve yellow hair, but in the end we are loyal to the object for itself alone. It involves more than the reasons we have for being loyal. The reasons we may adduce can be untrue; we may refuse to accept rational reasons. The basis for our loyalty may not constitute compelling reasons for others to be loyal to the same person or group. That we are loyal does not entail that others have to be loyal as well. Also, it well may be that we are loyal to someone because of some reasons; it does not entail that we will be loyal to others in whom we find the same features. In *The Nature of Sympathy,* Max Scheler emphasizes this point: "It is . . . noticeable that though other objects may have value-qualities identical to those alleged as reasons . . . no such emotions are addressed them."[22] McTaggart in describing love could be speaking of loyalty: "The emotion is directed to the person, independently of qualities, and . . .the determining qualities are not the justification of that emotion . . . but only the means by which it arises."[23]

At times, loyalty can be constrained, but it can also be freely given. We are loyal to our families and our countries, and these loyalties are constrained.[24] But we are loyal to our school because we have freely chosen it to be *our* school. But we can imagine a counter-factual substitution: As Roger Scruton writes, "Had another school been mine, then it would have been an object of just this interest."[25] Loyalty *de re* allows for replaceability: Changing circumstances may bring about a substitution of one loyalty for another. Loyalty *de re* allows for transfer of affection: we are loyal to Mrs. X until June, and then we transfer our loyalty to Mrs. Y the following September. The contention is that we each have our loyalties; they are ours, and they are both intelligible and nonuniversalizable. We can give reasons which make sense to us for the particularity of our loyalties. They make "sense *to us*" though others may not understand.

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As we can see, there are two theories,offering insight into the loyalty we find in our relationships, de dicto and de re. Neither is completely satisfactory; neither meets all the requirements of rationality. With the first, the theory entails being loyal to any one with the same characteristics as well as entails that two people being loyal for different reasons to the same person may or may not have the same object of their loyalty. So universalizability is not saved; neither is loyalty to a person or institution. With the second, de re, there is the possibility that the person we are loyal to is a "bare" person, that is a person without any identifiable attributes that give some kind of reason for our loyalty. And again the criterion of universalizability is not met.

* * *

When such is the case, perhaps we ought to look for a *tertium quid*. My suggestion is that we look at an educational model. The first thing to go is universalizability[26] and understandably so. Teachers work with individuals, frequently in a group but individually.

Secondly, bare persons without distinguishing attributes are precisely what teachers—and students—encounter on the first day of class. No one knows the other. Loyalty is attributed to the situation rather than found in the relationships which eventually develop. Loyalty may begin by ascription but reasons should come in time. The relationship becomes intelligible through experience over time.

Third, when the person to whom we are loyal has indeed done something so bad, the only alternative for us seems to be that we to break off the relationship, but that is not so. Loyalty survives only if we see the person as *educable*. We should not be surprised at the situation. The world changes, and so do people, Loyalty makes rational sense only if we realize that we are committed to an educational role and an educational process. When we discover that the objects of our loyalty are unworthy, we educate them; we work at making the object more worthy of our loyalty.[27]

Fourth, we know that we may be making mistakes, hopefully mistakes that will be discovered and cleared up in the educative process. Teachers and students are not omniscient.

Fifth, we give up only after much effort, not merely of our own but of the entire staff.

Sixth, we must remember that loyalty takes two to tango.[28] Teachers are related to students; students are related to teachers and school. There has to be a mutual loyalty. Basic loyalty must be at least ascribed to the other party. Just as loyal teachers need to educate their students, loyal students need to educate their teachers when improvements are called for; they should be willing to help the school grow, which may involve whistle-blowing. My suggestion is that constructive criticism is appropriate in every case where real loyalty is involved.

Seventh, the fact that we have different loyalties is enriching. Diversity in our allegiance to different values can beautiful. Even from a utilitarian viewpoint, it is one way to bring about a better world.

Lastly, as we all know, the stakes are high. If we take John Dewey seriously, education depends on communication, which depends on community.[29] Only in community do we experience our world as a home, a place where loyalty is fed and flourishes. Or as T.S. Eliot says: "In my beginning is my end."[30]

NOTES

1. T.S. Eliot, "East Coker," in *Collected Poems 1909–1949* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1971) 189.

2. Walter P. Krolikowski, "That Wonder, Perhaps Deeper Than Love, That Is Friendship," *Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society 1995–1996*, 29–37.

3. In this paper, I assume that there is a difference between a scientific view of the world and a common sense view. One consequence is that non-scientific topics, such as friendship and loyalty, if there are not to be thought of as irrational because non-scientific, call for analysis that makes the case for their rationality. See Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, "The Structures of the Life-World, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) 3–20. See also Antonio Blanch "Señales de transcendencia en la vida cotidiana" in *Cristianismo e Ilustracin*, ed. By Manuel Fraijo and Juan Masîz (Madrid: UPCO, 1995) 377–388. In an 1909 essay,"Nature and Its Good: A Conversation,"John Dewey has one of the characters at tne end remark: "The larger, the more human, the less technical the problem of practice, the more open-eyed and wide-viewing must be the corresponding method." *MW* 4:30.

4. See John Kleinig, "Police Loyalties: A Refuge for Scoundrels," *Professional Ethics* 5 (1996) 29–42.

5. This is not to imply that loyalty is a modern invention. Though some finds its roots in Roman patrons and clients, it antedates that time. The idea of covenant, widespread throughout the ancient world, and its companion word *hesed*, are signs of the omnipresence of loyalty. See, for example, Niels Lemche, "Kings and Clients: On Loyalty between the Ruler and the Ruled in Ancient 'Israel'" *Semeia: Ethics and Politics in the Hebrew Bible, 66* (1995): 119–132.

6. Let me just cite an assortment of articles on loyalty in the schools: Michael Chen, "Between Teaching and Administraton: The Dual Loyalty of Aspiring Teachers," 1991 ERIC ED335339. Gunnel Colnerud, "Loyalty Conflicts in Teacher Ethics," 1994 ERIC ED392738. Christine G. Franklin, "Loyalty vs. Reality," *Currents* 19, 6 (1993) 30–34, 36. Florence Guido-DeBrito, Alicia F. Chavez, James A.Wallace and William F.DeBrito, "Loyalty between Senior Student Affairs Officers and Their Supervisors and Staff Members," *Journal of College Student Development* 38,3 (1997) 244–254. Deidre M. Martin and Jack Lyday, "Feelings of Loyalty among Members of Learning-in-Retirement Programs," *Educational Gerontology* 23, 4 (1997) 315–327. Phillip Overmiller, "Ethnicity and Education: The Intercultural Dimension," 1974. ERIC ED127386. Fred Reiss and Wayne K. Hoy, "Faculty Loyalty: An Important but Neglected Concept in the Study of Schools," *Journal of School Leadership* 8(1998) 4–25. Kenneth Westhues, "Loyalty in a Catholic High School," *Catholic High School Quarterly Bulletin* 27 (1969) 24–27.

7. Cottingham advises us that, if we wish to avoid hypocrisy and incoherence, we have to account for partiality, this "inescapable features of how most of us live." Also how within a impartialist view can we justify self-love? See John Cottingham, "The Ethics of Self-Concern," *Ethics* 101,4 (1991) 798–817.

8. Ovid, "Creation; Four Ages; Lycaon; Flood," In *Tales from Ovid,* tr. By Ted Hughes (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1997) 10. Hughes plays loose with Ovid. The original section of the Metamorphoses I, 127–131 reads:

> "De duro est ultima ferro.
> Protinus inruit venae peioris in aevum
> Omne negas, fugitque pudor verum fideque;
> insidiaeque e vis et amor sceleratus habendi."

9. Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 14. Like Williams there are those who make a distinction between the philosophic and the commonsense view of the world. See Diana Jeske, "Friendship,Virtue,and Impartiality," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 57,1997) 51–72. For a balanced but different view of the universality of the deontologist and the utilitarian, see Thomas Donaldson, "Morally Privileged Relationships," in *Kindred Matters: Rethinking the Philosophy of the Family,* ed. D.T. Meyers et al (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 21–40. The paradox of wanting the universal and the particular is also played out on the level of globalization and native cultures. See Enrique Dussell, "Globalization and the Victims of Exclusion: From a Liberation Ethics Perspective," *Modern Schoolman* 75 (1998) 119–155. Following the lead of Paul Ricouer, Dussell makes the distinction a sub-set of oppressor and oppressed.

10. Walter P. Krolikowski,"Anything in Reason: Rationality in the Schools," *Philosophy of Education 1980. Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society,* 217–237. See also Avishai Margalit, "Ideals and Second Best," in *Philosophy for Education,* ed. Seymour Fox (Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation, 1983) 77–89. This idea is well expressed in a French proverb which is very useful but non-utilitarian: *Le mieux est l'ennemi de bien.*

11. Robert Kraut, "Love *De Re,*" *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 10 (1986) X,13–430. For a dictionary-sized explanation of the distinction between *de dicto* and *de re,* see Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1994) 100.

12. Robert Lamb has a discussion of divided loyalties. Using patriotism as his example, he remarks that divided loyalty is always defective: one cannot be a citizen of more than one country. But are not some USA citizens also citizens of Ireland or Israel or Mexico? They seem to be able to be loyal to both. But this is a serous problem—for example, can we be loyal to a sovereign and the Pope?—one I cannot do anything more than note. It has been and remains a problem for many people. Robert Lamb, "Love and Rationality" in *Love Analyzed* (New York: Westview Press, 1997) 33.

13. Robert Nozick, "Love's Bond," in *The Philosophy of Erotic Love,* eds. R.Solomon and K. Higgins (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991.) See also Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: 1976) 167–168.

14. That loyalty has a good side and a bad is illustrated by two Spanish proverbs: *Mas es hacerse noble que nacer noble* and *De los leales se llenan los hospitales.*

14a. It is worth noting that loyalty is sometimes binary; for instance, loyalty and disloyalty. At other times it is seen as gradable. Between loyalty and disloyalty appears neutrality. See Walter P. Krolikowski, "'I'll teach you differences': Contrast, Opposition, and Antonymy with Special Reference to Multiculturalism," *Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, 1995–1996,* 192–200. For a quite extended analysis of opposites, see John Lyons, *Semantics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) I,270–335.

15. This paragraph owes much to a fine article by Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," *Journal of Philosophy* 74,4 (1982) 173–193.

16. Feminists have argued this point with exceptional force. See Margaret U. Walker, "Moral Particularity," *Metaphilosophy* 18 (1987) 171–185. See also Kory S. Sorrell, "Feminist Ethics and Dewey's Moral Theory," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 35,1 (1999) 89–114.

Sorrell claims that Dewey was a moral particularist. The Italian proverb expresses the obverse of particularism very well: *Chi ama tutti non ama nessuno.*

17. Though many may be loyal to the same thing, they are not necessariy loyal to each other. Loyalty is not transitive. This is analogous to what Aristotle notes about friends in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1171a (tr.W.D.Ross): "Further,they too must be friends of one another,if they are to spend their days together; and it is a hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a large number." My contention is that even two people loyal to the same person may not be loyal to each other, though in the best of all possible worlds they would be.

18. Lamb, 10. I owe the preceeding citation to Lamb as well as several others.

19. It is true, as far as it goes, that our loyalties are freely chosen. But not all of them by any means. As Scruton remarks, "In Hegel's view, man owes his identity as a rational chooser to a process of development that implicates him inescapably in obligations which he did not choose. These obligatons of piety are both pre–contractual and pre–political." Roger Scruton, *The Philosopher on Dover Beach* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) 302.

20. For a discussion of the distinction between token and type, a distinction introduced by C.S.Peirce, see John Lyons, *Semantics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) I,13–18.

21. William Butler Yeats, "For Anne Gregory," in *The Poems* (London: J.M. Dent,1990) 295.

22. Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, tr. P. Heath (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) 149.

23. John McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence* (Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly Press, 1968) II, 153–154.

24. It is worth noting that neither the family or the nation or the ideal of loyalty, whether we hold loyalty *de dicto* or *de re*, would be compatible with a thin theory of the state, Procedural democracy would never be enough. The interests surrounding the family, the nation, and loyalty have to be fostered. None of then is value-free. See Richard Winfield, "Friendship, Family and Ethical Community," *The Philosophical Forum* 28/29 (1997) 300–319.

25. Roger Scruton, *Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic* (New York: Free Press, 1986) 81.

26. This does not mean that universalizability is out *tout court*. In a world peopled only with particulars, in trying to explain why we can generalize, do we have to advocate a "convergence of parallels"?

27. In other words, loyalty is always in a time frame. It is not a one shot deal. What begins in the darkness of reason gropes its way toward the light. One way of seeing this is Philip Pettit's distinction between agent-relative reasons that are context-bound and agent-relative reasons that are context free. Loyalty becomes mindful as the school year continues. See Philip Pettit, "The Paradox of Loyalty," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 25,2 (1988) 166. When does forgiveness have to be withheld? See Trudy Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 36 (1999) 59–75.

28. The very nature of loyalty is transpersonal; we recognize that our own good can be achieved only if another is involved.See Richard White, "Friendship: Ancient and Modern," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 39 (1999) 26.

29. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey has wise things to say about loyalty and transmission. "Loyalty to whatever in the established environment makes a life of excellence possible is the beginning of all progress. The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of decent and refined life." See *MW* 14–19.

30. T.S.Eliot,182.

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Reader Response and its Discontents[1]

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Reader response, which is closely allied with constructivism, has been widely touted as a model for teaching literary works, and its proponents see it as facilitating student understanding, guiding reading and discussion so as to encourage engagement with the text and full class participation. In this model of literary education, students construct meanings from the literary works they read, presumably by relating these works to experiences and affects. According to the theory, this interaction leads to an active rather than a passive engagement with the literary work. Reader response assumes that "when a piece of literature is successful for readers, that success comes from the fact that they bring to the selection all that they are and have experienced," so that "[a] merger, a mingling of reader and work occurs" (Small, 1992, p. 18).

Central to the reader-response position is the idea that the literary work comes into being as such only in the context of reading. According to L. Rosenblatt, whose book *Literature as exploration* supplied the basic tenets of the reader-response approach, "[t]he process of understanding a [literary] work implies a recreation of it, an attempt to grasp completely all the sensations and concepts through which the author seeks to convey the qualities of his sense of life. Each of us must make a new synthesis of these elements with his own nature" (1983 [1938], p. 133).[2] Several factors therefore go into the invention of a reading of a literary text. Initially the production of an author, the text at one level exists as a 'trace' of the author's "experience and imagination." However, as soon as the text has been removed from the author's immediate control through publication, the author "is outside the immediate, intimate reading circle. A body of words exists, the author's intentions threaded within them, waiting for a reader to respond to them to enliven them. The words, in effect, have no symbolic meaning—are only marks on the page—until the reading event occurs" (Karolides, 1992, pp. 24-25). The text is "dynamic" in the sense that "[w]hat the reader makes of the verbal signs reflects shifts in the denotation and connotation of words as well as differences in the images called forth and in the social and psychological attitudes and behaviors of readers" (Karolides, 1992, p. 25). Reading then becomes an "event," controlled by the reader's "past experiences and current circumstance, regional origins and upbringing, gender, age, past and present readings," as well as by "the given moment—the situation, the mood, the pressures, and reasons (perhaps, teacher's directions) for reading, the stance taken toward the reading" (Karolides, 1992, p. 23). In practice this model of literature education serves to facilitate student understanding of works by guiding individual readings via discussion so as to encourage engagement with the text and full class participation.

The reader-response approach to literature study appeared in the late thirties as a reaction to the New Critical concept that the literary work was a self-contained object, somehow reflecting in its interiority its preservation of a long chain of masterpieces (to paraphrase Eliot), and seemingly not dependent on its perceptor for its significance, but rather holding its meaning within itself. Simultaneously, though, it counteracts the old Romanticist insistence that authorial intention provides the center of literary meaning, a point of view that to my knowledge received its most recent voicing in E. D. Hirsch's *The aims of interpretation* (1976).[3] By decentering the work and the author as locus of meaning, reader response makes the experience of the individual central to the reading experience, while balancing that experience against classroom interactions that temper and shape individual interaction. Thus at a certain level reader response serves to validate the individuality of the reader—the student—by reinforcing his or her specific experience of reading, often by balancing it or altering it in accordance with the dominant classroom interpretation.

Reader response has been found to facilitate student engagement with literature, and to this end has had a positive effect in the classroom. But while this approach has its obvious advantages, I feel that it also conceals literary seductions that make it potentially limiting. One problem appears in what B. Martin, pursuing an idea attributed to G. C. Spivak, calls the "personalist" dangers of reading, in which reading involves "seeing one's identity reflected in ways that make it unassailable [except] by the cognitive and emotional pleasures of expanded knowledge and perspectives" (Martin, 1997, p. 15). Put another way, reading to find oneself reflected in the text increases the "cultural capital" of one's experience through the identification one finds with what one understands, or the rejection of what one finds "boring," "frustrating," "not worth reading."

At some point reading literary works, and especially works from times, cultures, and perspectives different from one's own, requires that one face sensibilities that are in many ways fundamentally different from one's own. I had this experience in teaching an upper-level course in American literature of the Colonial period at Northeastern Illinois University in 1995. I had little preparation in this field, having been offered the course late, and had to select texts based on second-hand descriptions of their content. In short, I made the class a learning experience at the same time that I taught it. My immersion, via sermons, spiritual biographies, polemics, and satires, into the Puritan sensibility (itself an eighteenth-century phrasing that would not fit the Puritan mind set) was quite a shock. I really had little idea of where these authors were coming from, and it took me weeks to adjust to what M. Foucault would call the "epistémè," or "epistemological field" (Leitch, 1983, p. 144), of scriptural authority that dominated seventeenth-century New England, which often appears to us grandchildren of the Enlightenment as lacking scientific objectivity and empirical substance.

I consider my reading of the Puritans a positive learning experience, not because I agreed with their ideas or feelings, but because I entered, even if just a little, into a mind set that I consider entirely different from my own. To my way of thinking, in fact, one of the greatest values of literature teaching (and literature study) lies precisely in literature's ability to introduce students to the cognitive perspective of the other, to let them see through the eyes of the other. This "meeting of the minds" differs from many interpretations of the "reader response" approach in that it acknowledges that the text makes sense, but that its sense might be fundamentally different from the sense the reader brings to it. Such reading involves a critical awareness of difference even as one engages with the text and quite possibly merges with its author in a moment of sympathetic understanding.

It might be noted that I have spoken primarily of my experience of teaching the literary works of the Puritans, not of my students' experience of learning about these works. Is it not possible that the students' experience, their direct response to the work, gave them similar insights into the Puritan mind? After all, reading in the reader response model is not ultimately a solitary activity; it involves "making meaning ... a shared endeavor moving on a continuum from an individual's initial tentative construct to that of the group" (Sherrill, 1992, p. 76). Also I have spoken of students somewhat beyond the age group where some of the key issues of reader-response are most strongly in play. As R. Probst points out, "[t]he adolescent, characteristically preoccupied with self, should be an ideal reader. . . . Preoccupation with self should make students uniquely receptive to literature for literature invites their participation and judgment" (1988, pp. 4-5). The issue in the exploration of literature, from the reader response point of view, often is not the recognition of difference from the other, but consolidation of the identity of the self—an identity that may be reinforced or re-evaluated according to the responses of others (students and teacher) to the work. The reader response literature teacher, then, should let students respond to the literary work, for doing so allows them to formulate their own ideas. Insistence on a standardized "objective" meaning that is distributed by the teacher—be that meaning determined by the author's intention or by the objective, inviolable validity of the text—negates this laudable function of building identity. In fact it feeds directly into what P. Freire (1970) calls the "banking system" of education, in which students are passive recipients of preordained knowledge rather than active creators of their own ideas (pp. 57-74). Freire's comments on the dangers of the banking system should encourage fuller acceptance of reader response as an appropriate model for teaching.

But the teacher, I would suggest, has another responsibility beyond that of facilitating personal textual exploration. While allowing personal response tempered by discussion, the teacher should also challenge students to face up to those elements in the work that they might not see or even might not wish to acknowledge—as could certainly be the case with works such as John Winthrop's "A modell of Christian charity," aptly quoted by Ronald Reagan during his first inaugural address, which justifies poverty as God's will and advocates the trickle down theory of social welfare. Such double-jointed reading (reading that is both inside and outside the text, inside and outside the reader) comes close to aesthetic reading, reading for forms, but it also permits the development of a critical consciousness that one can employ in re-visioning texts that do approximate one's sensibility—texts that give voice to the dominant or operative forces of one's own culture and perspective.

One of the potential problems with reader-response teaching lies in the very fact that reader response tends to assume that the act of reading involves an immediately measurable, meaningful, and productive "event." It becomes in some ways a recreation of the cultural capital of the society producing it, and so eschews any "construction of values" apart from those delineated by the society producing it. This point is addressed by S. R. Horton (1989) in a critical commentary on the "faddish" aspect of reader response criticism, which has helped form the basis for the adaptation of the reader response strategy in schools:

> [R]eader response criticism, which arrived in the early 1970s with a liberating "power to the people/readers" whiff about it, can in retrospect more easily be seen as a subtle version of consumerism. The inevitable result of the application of the Fish-ian question "What does that X do?" is not primarily a description or affirmation of some personal emotion or psychological response to a work of art so much as it is the enactment of one of the economic principles of a late-capitalist society: If it doesn't do anything, it's not worth anything. Or, to push a bit harder, "my" response becomes an enactment by one member of a privatized society carefully taught both inside and outside the academy that a private anything, including response, is the only kind of thing worth having (p. 281).

Several interesting conjectures can be made from Horton's insightful comment. The first of these involves the comparison between literature and capital. Rather than Freire's "banking" education, we get "consumerist education." The value gained by literary reading becomes, as it were, a productive force, a privatized ownership, and something immediately viable. It is "me" reading. Horton points toward some of the consequences of this possibility in her essay, though her specific purpose is to address the distinction between reader-response and deconstructive approaches to reading and teaching. Metaphorically for Horton reader response becomes "intellectual 'fast food' easily digested and passed from hand to hand" (p. 281), whereas deconstruction (presumably) becomes either a feast or indigestible, largely because of its ability to expose cultural contradictions and its radical questioning of values.[4] But if we apply the metaphor to literature rather than to criticism, we are confronted with a possible pragmatics of literature in which the literary work becomes an immediately effective (since affective) commodity. The ethos of reader response then seems to come to rely on the literary work's immediate or near immediate ability to generate response in the audience it addresses. Response (to develop another fiscal metaphor) becomes a "share" in the "stock" of the work's potential meanings that one can bargain with, exchange, and capitalize on in the production of measurably valued readings—evaluated perhaps by a grade or a teacher's praise. In the process other potential functions of literature—as for instance its potentially "deconstructive" ability to explore and even call into question cultural values and assumptions—get passed over.

In Horton's understanding of the reader response point of view, the literary work and the response the student "produces" to it through the "labor" of reading becomes cultural capital, reinforcing a view of literature as a productive force pragmatically applicable and "acquired" via reading and interpretation. The values behind such an approach, as Horton points out, are consumerist values, the "enactment by one member of a privatized society carefully taught both inside and outside the academy that a *private* anything, including response, is the only kind of thing worth having." It is important, though, to remember that in the context of the classroom, private reading is almost always closely monitored by classroom discussion and/or by the teacher's evaluation of the student's "interpretation" of the work or of the student's "participation." The result can often be a carefully controlled monitoring of the available readings of a text—an effort that binds, as it were, the individualized and privatized readings of students within a socially or culturally determined "set" of potentially acceptable responses. I have elsewhere pointed out the difficulties this limiting factor might present in the case of multicultural literature (Johnston). Simply put, the danger is that any literary work becomes seen as "cultural capital" and so becomes acceptable—in fact, is made available—only if it can support the cultural values (here a surprisingly conformist individuality determined by consumerism) that lie behind its incorporation into the classroom situation.

The limitations of reader response approaches are in fact well presented by the critical comments of Stanley Fish, one of the central theorists behind the contemporary critical interest in reader response, and the critic whose concern "what does X *do?"* leads Horton to explore the economics of reader response. In his famous essay "Is there a text in this class?" S. Fish argues against the Romanticist position on meaning championed by Hirsch and Abrams in favor of the view that meanings exist in "institutional nesting" (Fish, 1986, p. 627). Using the seemingly clear phrase "The air is crisp" which Hirsch provides as an example of "the stable determinacy of meaning," Fish suggests that, in a room full of musicians, "'The air is crisp' would immediately be heard as a comment on the performance by an instrument or instruments of a musical air. Moreover, it would only be heard in that way..." (pp. 628-29). Fish concludes from such examples as that that "only if there is a shared basis of agreement at once guiding interpretation and providing a mechanism for deciding between interpretations [can] total and debilitating relativism . . . be avoided" (p. 635).

Applied to the classroom, we can see that this position aims toward the standardization of acceptable meanings in literature, not because these meanings are inherent in the work (they may be), but because the works are approached in the institutionalized atmosphere of the school environment. Moreover, beyond individual works, literature itself, and the act of reading literature, come to have fixed (since institutionally imposed) significance: precisely that investment and consumption model discussed above. Put another way, reader response itself reflects the epistémè of contemporary culture. To the extent that reading remains caught in this model, when we read we see nothing but ourselves.

Is the *Iliad* the story of a glorified gang war? That seemed to be the fundamental interpretation it received in a high school I taught and observed in in Chicago in 1997. And in some sense it *is* glorified gang war . . . yet if we stick only to this interpretation, how do we understand the profound impact this work of literature has had upon our culture (unless, as may be acceptable, we understand "culture" as a history of glorified gangs)? Homer as gangsta rap certainly offers a refreshing view of the classics. Yet it is clear that such a reading, precisely *because* it fixes itself within contemporary culture, bears potential limitations, again precisely because it reaches the reader through the contemporary world. That it *does* reach the reader is one of the primary advantages of reader-response, and to this end the accomplishments of this approach should be saluted. But a solid basis in the classics also requires a knowledge of some fundamental differences between Homer's world and our world. How many gang bangers make sacrifices to Apollo? How important is it to recognize the limits of one's understanding? Are texts truly polysemic?

Aesthetic and critical distance, qualities that the study of literature should help promote, increase the possibility that students will learn to view the objects of their own culture from the perspective of the outsider looking into a system, "set," or "epistémè." This ability to retain distance is, I believe, increasingly important—and increasingly difficult to maintain as our culture generates more and more sophisticated methods of intersecting consciousness. An ability to retain distance may lead to social activism; it may lead simply to a quietly articulated awareness of the extent of one's manipulation by the mere presence of the present. (The "present" of the other, for instance that of the seventeenth-century New Englander or of the Greek foot soldier, may have seemed equally "stacked" to someone not fully immersed in its epistémè, its gridlock of ideas.) In this creation of critical cultural distance, literary education can in fact help to increase the individuality of the individual, the separation of the subject from dominant imposed cultural identities that in fact in many ways deny the existence of the self as a separate, important entity. I think the teacher of literature should try to foster critical awareness and a sense of beauty in students, and so (ideally) help them to become more fully autonomous beings.

Reader response offers a clear inroad into the literary work, but it does so at the potential cost of catching us within ourselves, ensnaring us in "personalist" reading, in which "identity [is] reflected in ways that make it unassailable [except] by the cognitive and emotional pleasures of expanded knowledge and perspectives." It can end up seeming representative or emblematic of a "subtle version of consumerism" that reenacts "the economic principles of a late-capitalist society" in which "'my' response becomes an enactment by one member of a privatized society carefully taught both inside and outside the academy that a *private* anything, including response, is the only kind of thing worth having." To counterbalance these effects, we must aim at tempering reader response with æsthetic distance both from the text and from the ideas it generates. Only when this ideal level of abstraction of and from meaning can be approximated can one start to think of engaging more fully the polysemic possibilities of the text.

Notes

1. I would like to thank anonymous members of the audience for their insightful questions, which I have tried to address in some footnotes to this paper. A version of this paper has appeared online in since its delivery at the MPES conference.

2. It is important to note, though, that for Rosenblatt, at least, "it is essential that [the reader] assimilate those elements of experience that the author has actually presented" (1983 [1938], p. 133).

3. It is possible to see the distinction between Romanticist authorial meaning and reader-based meaning as similar to the distinction Hirsch makes between meaning and significance. "Meaning" in this context can be understood as "something that is meant by an implied author or speaker who is not ourselves. Whenever we have posited another person's meaning, we have bracketed a region of our own experience as being that of another person" (Hirsch, 1976, p. 6). Though this "meaning" is "posited" within us, for Hirsch it *is* determinate:

> The important feature of meaning as distinct from significance is that meaning is the determinate representation of a text for an interpreter. An interpreted text is always taken to represent something, but that something can always be related to something else. Significance is meaning-as-related-to-something-else. If an interpreter did not conceive a text's meaning to be there as an occasion for contemplation or application, he would have nothing to think or talk about. Its thereness, its self-identity from one moment to the next allows it to be contemplated. Thus, while meaning is a principle of stability in an interpretation, significance embraces a principle of change. (Hirsch, 79-80)

By this understanding we could see the interaction of reader and text, insofar as it involves the reader's response, as "significant" rather than "meaningful," since meaning, even if it exists in the mind of the reader, exists as *agreement* that that meaning reflects an external validity that can be characterized as reflecting an agreement as to the meaning of words in a biological, social, historical, and psychological context--that of the author, perhaps as structured by the author's previous interpreters. Hirsch's position in fact reflects Rosenblatt's understanding (see note 1), but may be more traditional than some of the more radical interpretations of reader response, as for instance that of S. Fish mentioned below.

4. The question arose as to the distinction between a reader-response and a deconstructive approach to reading. The clearest way to make the distinction is to recall that reader-response as a teaching strategy is incorporated into a constructivist pedagogy-- in the most clearly articulated approach, the reader constructs meaning, and by means of 'probing' involved in this construction the process somehow turns around and 'constructs' the reader. An opposite attitudinal approach emerges in deconstructivist understandings of the relation between text and reader. Here the assumption is that meanings as such create the reader. 'Self' is as much a textual/lingual construct as are all other forms of textual significance. Since the reader is created by meaning, potentially 'meaning construction' of the individual is 'controlled' by external forces, an imposing and potentially limiting intertextuality of all significance (the "violence of the letter"). The intention of desconstructive criticism is to "take apart" encoded or pre-coded meaning potentialities that impose themselves upon readers/selfs by predetermining potential categories of understanding. Deconstruction subverts the predisposition of meaning via its examination of "the play of signifiers"--the deliberate recognition of the extent to which meanings are already constructed and constructing. As T. Anderson (1999) recently put it, though in a context that is primarily critical of deconstruction, "poststructuralists [i.e., deconstructivists] are not philosophers but anti-philosophers in that they believe that no philosophical system ... is adequate as a conceptual framework for action in the world ... they attempt to undermine all systems theories by looking for flaws in their structure and logic and exposing their weaknesses" (p. 14).

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Dewey played on the bongo drums of education to the beat of possibility: The Beat movement as a metaphor for democracy and the art of learning

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There are two facets that I admire most about John Dewey's overall philosophy. The first is that what he theorizes about art pertains equally to education and his ideas about a democratic society. The belief that all things must be perceived as an active organic continuous whole, in which the parts, whether they are of a learning sequence, a brush stroke, or one person in a crowd of millions, also play a part in a larger process. This leads me to the second point. Dewey also argues that all facets, all life, should be considered as a circular evolution of action, thought and continued, reconstructural, experience. He distinguishes two aspects of this circular evolution where, "philosophically speaking, the problem with which we are confronted is the relation of the discrete and the continuous" (1934, p. 335).

The aim of this paper is to accomplish three things. One is to discuss Dewey's philosophy of art in relation to a specific artistic genre, the Beat poetry and art movement of the 1950's and 60's. The second is to demonstrate how similarities between Dewey's philosophy and this movement also bear upon his ideas about democracy and education. The third is to discuss how elements of his philosophy of art, as it informs learning, can be instrumental in developing curriculum theory. Further, if one views education as an art, as I believe Dewey does, then the hope is that creating a new lens via the Beat metaphor, may help us to envision new possibilities for our educational future. To better elucidate this argument, I will bring in the works of more contemporary authors who I believe also "play the bongos" through the written word in theory own works regarding art, education, democracy and life. *In the spirit of a Jazz piece or poem, I hope to compose my own unique* voice through the blending of these writers ideas, playing with these notions of synchronicity, spontaneity and the sublime to forge a re-imaging of Dewey's ideas through the medium of this art movement.

Essentially, in keeping with Dewey's two major philosophical points brought out in the first paragraph, I would like to demonstrate that while all three components can be considered "discrete" they are equally "continuous", each topic building upon the other to create a larger complete image. Art as a way of being, exemplified by words and art work of individual artists from the Beat movement, flow into ideas about curriculum theory, which in turn impact how and what we teach. These experiences greatly shape the lives of our students who eventually move out into society as citizens of a democracy. To create an esthetic whole through the course of this essay, it will be important, as Dewey believes, to see these points in their relationship to each other. He writes, "in art, as in nature and in life, relations are modes of interaction. They are pushes and pulls; they are contradictions and expansions; they determine lightness and weight, rising and falling, harmony and discord" (1934, p.134).

Not only do the same major facets illustrated in one area equally pertain to the others, but it is also in their interaction relationship that I hope to create a new space to discuss issues relevant to education. The form of this paper ideally will in part create its substance. The essence of my argument will emerge within the relationships drawn forth between topics and the substance is not merely the words and the citations themselves but rather their mutually shaping of each other. In other words, "the truth of the matter is that what is form in one connection is matter in another and vice-versa" (Dewey, 1934, p. 128).

A few weeks ago, I sat in on a presentation sponsored by Virginia Film Festival on Beat poetry, jazz music and abstract art. It was entitled "The Culture of Spontaneity" in honor of a book with the same title written by Daniel Bellgrad, who was leading the panel. The panel discussion was composed of prominent musicians, journalists, poets and photographers from the 50's and 60's such as Ed Sanders Dianne Deprima, Ken Jacobs, Fred McDara, Gloria McDara, and David Amram. While I sat and listened, certain words and images kept coming to the foreground of my mind. Words like improvisation, synchronicity, and spontaneity. It took little mental effort to visualize a connection between these terms as described by the panel as critical to their work, and John Dewey's conception of American education as it relates to art and democracy.

Why is art so important in the consideration of education and democracy? Dewey answers the question in this way: "It is by way of communication that art becomes the incomparable organ of instruction, but the way is so remote from that usually associated with the idea of education, it is a way that lifts art so far above what we are accustomed to think of as instruction, that we are repelled by any suggestion of teaching and learning in connection with art" (1934, p. 347). The initial point is that spontaneity, synchronicity and the sublime are terms we frequently associate with the arts. Upon reading several of Dewey's works, I noticed a strong pattern emerging between his ideas about learning, society and art that included similar terms.

In writing about art as an experience, Dewey impresses upon his readers the idea that "true works of art" emerge from the interaction between the artist and the medium. Art is not simply composed of either simply the artist's intent of emotional expression, nor is art merely the "product" or the material as it stands outside of the artist. Through the intent of expression the artist interacts with the material. The art emerges through the process and can only be partially know prior to the completed act. Daniel Bellgrad from the panel states, "I became very interested in pottery and the interaction with the clay and the way in order to create beauty in clay, you really have to push the clay to the limit of where it almost falls down because of gravity."

This process as described by Bellgrad demands an element of spontaneity. The book *Free Play: Improvisation in life and art* (1990) defines the process as: "Qualities of improvisation are penetration, absorption, resonance, flow. Qualities of composition are symmetry, branching, segmentation, wholeness, tension of opposites" (Nachmanovitch, p.172). The tension produced within a spontaneous interaction is critical to the emergence of new learning. As problems (tension) arise in the midst of experience, the individual is pressed to explore ideas or options that might resolve that problem. These situations do not spring forth out of isolation but rather surface from the ongoing procession of continuous life moments. Our learning and interactions occur in the midstream of this "flow" and assist in directing the next sequence of actions that may arise. Improvisation involves taking things within their immediate moment. Barone (1998) reflects that

> For Dewey, aesthetic experiences are not confined to the contemplation of high art, but arise from within their interaction of human organisms with their surroundings. It involves working with what you've got. To start from where you are, rather than where you should be or where you'd like to be, requires a different thought process. It requires one to become aware in the intellect and the sens-

> es to the reality at hand. In this way, the aesthetics of everyday life allow us to have a vision of art as coterminous with being in the world (p. 238)

Therefore, one of the purposes of art is that it allows the individual to draw out a sense of full awareness "of the moment", to be completely immersed in their present situation. This, Dewey argues, is a more valuable place "to be" than some abstract ideal of what "should" be or what will be somewhere else in some other place and time. When we remove ourselves from the immediacy of our experiences we are also de-valuing the opportunities and tools at our disposal. We place the remote or unreal on a superior plane than our real lives. This is often the case with our society's treatment of art. Culturally speaking, the everyday artistic experience available to all is somehow placed far below the value of "high art" which rests preserved in quiet galleries.

Dewey's theory is illuminated more concretely by the words of Daniel Bellgrad when reflecting on what made the Beat movement different from previous art forms. "I began with the things that I knew and then moved out toward other things I knew less about". He adds later:

> When we read Jack Kerouac, it sounds like he's talking to you because he continues to have an involvement in a society and do things spontaneously, and take a chance like a tightrope walker to be free and open in American and try to spread the wonderful spirit.

In keeping with this same idea, Dewey expresses the thought that the artist and the art medium are interacting within a situation or context, and both are becoming changed as a result. He explains that "it is not generally recognized that a similar transformation takes place on the side of 'inner' materials, images, observations, memories, and emotions. They are also progressively reformed" (Dewey, 1934, p.74). This idea of transformation has several implications for what it means to create. Art is not a "product" which can mechanically be issued forth in with machine like efficiency. The key point here is that one must view the process as a whole. "Every well constructed object and machine has form" Dewey says, "but there is esthetic form only when the object having this external form fits into a larger experience" (1934). What Dewey is suggesting through his argument for the arts is that education should also be viewed esthetically. By esthetically, he means that no one part can be taken and separated from the whole. Each brush stroke or line is part of a larger whole, as the art piece itself is again part of the larger experience. Sir Herbert Read echoes these same sentiments when he says, "The aesthetic view of life is not confined to those who can create or appreciate words of art. It exists wherever natural senses play freely on the manifold phenomenon of our world, and when life as a consequence is found to be full of felicity" (re-quoted in Nachmanovitch, 1990, p.37).

Dewey's critique of the reflect arc (1896) marks the distinction between previously held views about thought and action, suggestion instead that ideas and actions do not follow from one to the other in a linear fashion. Rather, they are precipitated by urges beyond and deeper than immediate stimuli. Our development is not comprised of a series of discrete and jerky actions, as from A to B, but instead evolve in a more circular or spiral fashion, each informing the other in an ongoing forward motion. Our development flows rather than moving in sequences, so that every moment, every act, is an end unto itself, and is also equally part of a larger experience in which the previous informs or perhaps inspires the new form being created. From this perspective "the consummatory phase of experience-which is intervening as well as final-always presents something new" (Dewey, 1934, p.139).

Dewey points out that art is a combination of taking previous experience and when combined with the present movement, something new and fresh can emerge. He writes

> The stimulus is that phase of one and the same forming coordination which gives the key to meeting these conditions, which serves as instrument in effecting the successful coordination. They are therefore strictly correlative and contemporaneous. The stimulus is something to be discovered. (1934, p. 370)

What makes an aesthetic experience unique is its capacity to allow the individual to witness an unfolding of the whole into its parts, and new information is revealed by peeling back the layers from the surface of their correlation.

In artistic terms, Dewey's reflex arc theory strongly impacts what may be considered to be the "source" of artistic inspiration, the subsequent act itself and the product. David Amran echoes this sentiment when referring to his own views on the artistic process. While some theories might be inclined to reduce art to being simply the "response" caused by the stimulus of seeing, for example, something that one would like to paint, or that the product itself is merely a reflection of the artist's mood or emotions expressed through the product. David refutes this idea and asks his listeners to consider what may lie invisible under the surface. He observes that "sometimes creativity comes as an instantaneous readout, as if it were say dictation from the sky, but this spontaneous readout might actually be the result of instructions or urgings you've given your mind".

David Amran goes on to describe the Beat movement as an experience that used "improvisations and spontaneity as the method for searching for an alternative". Like Dewey, David explains how the old was integrated with new emerging forms to create a new way of perceiving the world. Reflecting on the Beat movement David recalls:

> It was about not following the old rules and about making new rules, but I think it's important to emphasize that this was not just for the sake of non-conformity... it had more to do with exploring human relatedness particularly through emotions and feelings which tend to be down played as the basis of rational decision making process in the corporate liberal world. Improvisation was based on the ideal of responsive interaction.

Improvisation is born out of being in the moment, having what Dewey might call "having an experience" (1934, p.139) in which the individual must interact using a combination of spontaneous actions and previous experience to navigate the circumstances.

Circumstances, as Greene (1995) writes in re-quoting Dewey (1934), are "all the ways in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situation in which we find ourselves" (p.263). They become the artistic materials for solving a problem, the solution being the product of the creative act of the experience. Circumstances arise moment by moment. The aims of our actions can only be generally pre-conceived. Dewey strives to avoid absolute theories that limit or stultify real life, which is alive, vibrant, fluid and full of passion. By narrowly focusing on pre-calculated future ends we often overlook the present and the immediate world around us. I believe this is one of the greatest similarities between Dewey and the Beat poetry/art discussion panel. One of the notions these artists strive for was that breaking the previous forms, by improvising, one could awaken themselves and others to a world in which the "everyday" was as valid as the world of high art.

To view education in this same manner is to see the child and the learning process, not as segmented or dissected parts, but as an ongoing process of transformation. The student and the educational experience inter-act much like the artist and his medium. Knowledge is not something to be had "out there" but something created between the learner and his or her environment or situation. For Dewey, education could not be abstracted from experience. In keeping with his ideas about the reflect arc and aesthetic knowing, learning he felt was also a "responsive interaction" that involved participation in which the learner engaged in sort of a fluid dance moving through space and time.

Dewey describes space as "a comprehensive and enclosed scene within which things are ordered the multiplicity of doings and under-goings in which man engages" (1934, p. 23). Time "is the organized and organizing medium of the rhythmic ebb and flow of expectant impulse, forward and retracted movement with resistance and suspense, with fulfillment and consummation" (p. 23). If it is within this concept of time and space that we operate as teachers and learners, then we must re-shape our abstract and rigid ideals of theory and practice from their unnatural static state into a fluid and continuous series of lived experiences in which students, like the composers of a Jazz piece, can create a "multiplicity of doings" to the rhythm of their own beat. Therefore, all individual learning experiences and solutions are unique.

This vision of education was more like a Jazz composition. Jazz is considered by many to be the music of Democracy because of its capacity to allow room for improvisation, and individual study within the whole to create unique a harmonious blend of sound. In acknowledging the improvisation of the lived moment:

> It is necessary that the different tones I used be balanced in such a way that they do not destroy one another. To secure that, I have to put my ideas in order; the relationships between bones must be instituted in such a way that they are built up instead of being knocked down. A new combination of colors will succeed to the first one and will give the wholeness of my conception. (Dewey, 1934, p.136)

What occurs when individual and unique forms are permitted to co-exist without ruling each other out is a new blend unique to its parts and yet whole of its own accord. The key ideas conveyed here are individuality, emergence, harmony and spontaneity.

To expect all learners to move through the same experience (as if that were even possible in itself!) at the same rate, getting the same results is like having everyone in the orchestra play the same instruments to the same rhythm using the same notes. "An individual" Barone (1998) states "contributes to the communal growth whenever she successfully redefines herself; and conversely, an individual is fulfilled only through enlargement of the communities sense of what is possible" (p.239). These sounds (evidenced by learning and understanding through active participation) all create the larger composition of a democratic society. In democracy, Dewey clearly illustrates that one of the main elements is that each part is the sum of its whole. It is in the whole that each individual finds his or her own unique place as a contributing member of that community. The goal is not to force an order like that of a machine but to allow the parts to co-create each other and their society.

Through a harmony created by the pulling together the various sounds, such as they are in Jazz music, to "build up" rather than "knock down", is in tandem with the notion of education posed by Green, in which "the focus should be one that dislodges fixities, results one-dimensionality, and allows multiple personal voices to become articulate in a more and more vital dialogue", (1995, p.179). To invite a dialogue in education is to open up a world of complexities that are changing from one moment to the next. A dialogue requires that multiple voices be heard. In artistic terms using the words of David Amram, students represent the "beautiful spontaneous elements of America which (are) being discarded. . . . Jack talked about finding diamonds on the sidewalk".

What is practiced in terms of artistic experiences translates into learning as an act of creativity as well as aesthetic forming of our community in a democratic fashion. Returning to the idea of aesthetic experiences, an individual must examine all of the artistic elements not in isolation but in their relation much in the same fashion that Dewey proposes we view the individual in relation to his or her society. When discussion the dynamics of any social group Dewey poses these questions: "How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared?" and "how full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?" (1916, p. 83).

The concept of democracy as defined by Dewey requires an emergent design rather than one already fixed in place and irretractable. As an emergent design, an improvisation of sorts takes place, made up of individuals within that society all working towards common goals by bringing their individual voices to bear upon the whole. The society will be created by those people whose unique form makes its shape and cannot exist as an entity outside of this form. Dewey proposes:

> Hence, these three alternatives. Society must exist for the sake of the individual; or individuals must have their ends and ways of living set out for them by society; or else society and individuals are correlative, organic, to one another, society requiring the serve and subordination of individuals and at the same time existing to serve them. (1920, p.187)

In this sense form and substance are interchangeable.

Dewey wants his readers to shatter their older notions that form is immutable shape and that substance is content. On the contrary, the interactive process of creation blurs or sublimates the hard lines between the what, the who, and the how. Often, form defines content or at other instances is defined by it. In any case, the substance is gleaned from the energy emanating from within the interplay, and to dissect or pull them apart in an attempt to control or understand the experience is to lose what was being sought in the first place. Just as society neither is the form and individual the substance, nor is individual the form and society the substance. The inter-relationship requires a simultaneous blending of the two.

Like a work of art, the whole of education is the sum of its parts and each part must be viewed within itself as a whole, the individual in his or her uniqueness, and as a vital member of the larger whole of his or her community. Knowledge and learning are not concepts that exist outside of the student as fixed objects but as active "verbs" produced by the doing of learning and knowledge. The inner self and the outer world permeate each other in a mutually changing reality. "Only when the constituent parts of a whole have the unique end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious experience" Dewey explains "do design and shape lose superimposed character and become form. They cannot do this so long as they serve a specialized (isolated) purpose" (1934, p.177). This separating out, between thought and action, knowledge and experience, teacher and student, authority and authenticity, creates a split in which we are left with two discrete polarities which can only grow or progress in conjunction with each other.

What happens more frequently is that we (society/educators) create a false and invisible glass wall in which terms are dangerously applied with disastrous results. Such is the case when in education we treat students' personal experience outside of "the official gaze of schooling" as something "other" and usually of less value. Pinar, in Reflections From the Heart of Educational Inquiry (1991) creates a clear and critical association between the world of art and aesthetic and the ways in which a parallel can serve to remedy this particular split. He writes:

> The uses of autobiography in the effort to comprehend curriculum, devising the method of currere, which allowed one to become more self conscious about the 'strokes' and 'lines' etched into the personality by curricular experience...the process in which Pollack was engaged, processes that begin with relinquishing of so-called realism...allow us to see anew and understand anew (p. 246).

Jackson Pollock's work can inform our educational practices in several ways. An article from the New York Times several months ago entitled "How

Even Pollock's Failures Enhance His Triumphs" was describing one of Pollock's latest exhibits at the Museum of Modern Art. The article reflects on the many ways that through serendipity, through exploration and risk, Pollock created some of his greatest works. "He was always trying to stretch the parameters of the narrow agenda he set for himself, and if he sometimes botched the results, which he did, this was intrinsic to a process that consciously flirted with incoherence: accidents, upon which the art depended, had to be held in tension with acts of control". (Oct. 30, 1998, p. B34). What this passage implies for education in that meaningful goals and experiences can only be partially controlled or known before hand.

As David Amram describes his perception of how Pollock created, one can associate this description as an example of what Dewey called "having an experience". David states "Jackson Pollock, they say, went into an ultra disciplined yet Bachic state of altered craziness for some of his greatest work". He goes on to illustrate how what he calls the "shamanic transmission" demands a heightened state of awareness in which a person's "metabolism and state of preparedness" are critical to the artistic process and evident in any act of spontaneity. Similarly, having an experience is defined as "material fraught with suspense and moving toward its own consummation through a connected series of varied incidents" (Dewey, 1934, p. 43).

The key elements are in the individual's immediate connection to the sensory or sensuous world, as well as maintaining a state of controlled purpose between inner expression and finite material. The balance requires the experience to dance between the receptive experience of passion and the senses that bring forth a vital life flow, and the person's own expressive cognitive awareness of past experiences and future intent. "In short, art, in its form unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming of energy" (Dewey, 1934, p. 48).

As with the previously mentioned ideas on form and content, the past and the present, the ideal (plan) and the real (situation) are mixed together, and the substance of the experience is created by it's form in the dance between these two elements. Although Pollock made mistakes along the way, the tension between accidents evolving from improvised method and control guided by a sense of pre-determined purpose was critical to form a genuine "work of art". This tension is critical for an experience to be anything more than "automatic". Dewey illuminates the process in this way:

> There is always a gap between the here and now of direct interaction and the past interactions whose funded results constitutes the meanings with which can grasp and understand what is now occurring.

> Because of this gap, all conscious perception involves a risk; it is a venture into the unknown...when past and present fit exactly into one another, when there is only recurrence, complete uniformity, the resulting experience is routine and mechanical. (1934, p. 272)

When something becomes mechanical it lacks a vital essence, fluid and passionate. Whether in society, the classroom, or in a musical composition, experience, when overly controlled and held so static as to be fixed and measurable, or immutable, has effectively had the life squeezed out of it. To paraphrase Dewey's words (as to what is necessary to our "lived experiences" if we are to grow), using the language of the Beat jazz musician Ken Jacobs, what is needed is "happy contradiction, enigma, multiple interpretation (and) unfixedness".

To state that experience lies in the relationship between form and substance, between inner and outer, body and mind, self and other, is to acknowledge the flow between reception and output. There is a flow, dynamic by it's very process, that needs to be re-introduced into our definitions of and practices in education, for they will shape the individual lives of our students and our society. Furthermore, Jacobs adds "where there is change, there is of necessity numerical plurality, multiplicity, and from variety comes opposition, strife. Change is alteration, or 'othering' and this means diversity". The place I propose to begin this process is to re-conceptualize educational theory as an aesthetic process.

In describing how I personally became interested in curriculum studies I would have to say, "I fell in love with it". Strong words for the world of academia usually perceived as so dry and lifeless. But ironically it instead is a world of passion and possibility. Carl Jung said, "The creation of something new is not accomplished by the intellect but by the play instinct acting from inner necessity. The creative mind plays with the object it loves" (re-quoted in Nachmanovitch, 1990, p. 42). And underneath its stalwart and monolithic veneer there is a dark corner laid out for the artist.

To live life and create a world as an artist demands, or better, craves, requires that we theorize about education using very different rules. The first of which is that there are no rules. Second is that anything is possible. But in a world defined by hard lines and static realities a split, unnatural or natural, what kinds of understanding can we truly access? Dewey points out that "they ask how a mind and world, subject and object, so separate and independent can by any possibility come into such relationship to each other as to make true knowledge possible" (1920, p.123). It is a split that is created between the academy and the real world of day to day education, a split between what is known and unknown, and most critically a split between what we "think" academically and the life which emerges from our souls. And therefore, no "true" knowledge can actually be brought to the table that will be of use to remedy our current ills.

It is the shattering false images in favor of the desire for what's real in the voices and lives of the people involved. This can be messy stuff because it is alive and pulsing, and beyond our immediate control. "To do curriculum history" in other words, "as 'social epistemology' is to ask about what counts as evidence, the rules by which truth is established, and the effects of having some things count as evidence and truth while other things are de-authorized and made false" (Popkewitz, 1997, p.155). We cut out those parts of ours and other's worlds that we'd rather not see. We dissect these lives, motives, and experiences to fit our theories so that we may paint the picture we set out to create.

Even in the removed world of "theory" the ideas of Jackson Pollock convey an accurate metaphor for understanding the complexities involved in authentically, or aesthetically, creating new conceptions for meaningful educational practices. Pinar (1994) in undertaking his own examination of Pollock's work recalls the following interview:

> In a 1950 interview, Jackson Pollock was asked: 'Then you don't actually have a preconceived image of a canvas in your mind?' He replied: 'Well, not exactly-no-because it hasn't been created you see. Something new...I do have a general notion of what I'm about and what the results will be'. (p. 7)

In re-examining Dewey in this contemporary light some of the same sentiments may be comprehended. Within the field of art, which we have already determined informs educational practice, Dewey emphasizes the need for a balance between one's goal (an image of where one shall end up at the end of a process) and the willingness to be in the process, thus avoiding narrow or rigid actions in attempt to control the outcome too much. He warns of the dangers of confusing means with ends. "Acquisition of skill, possession of knowledge, attainment of culture are not ends" according to Dewey (1920, p.185). He adds, "they are marks of growth and means to it's continuing" (p.185). How often in theory or in practice do we sublimate the process in order to "guarantee" our outcomes whether they appear in guise of state or national "Standards" or our own pet academic theory?

The perception of education and the academy is that it leads to a "double life". Somehow, deliberately or unconsciously, there exists a vast chasm between our research, lectures and publications and the essence of a struggling to make sense of life as one single student from one small classroom in one nameless town. The real world cannot be defined by one single answer. I wonder if we can even "name" or label what it is we seek to find in the endless hours of devouring dusty books and tame diagrams. "The division of the world into two kinds of Being" according to Dewey (1920, p. 121). He argues there is "one superior, accessible only to reason and ideal in nature, (and) the other inferior, material, changeable, empirical, accessible to sense-observation, turns inevitably into the idea that knowledge is contemplative in nature" (p.121). Are we afraid that "we" (scholars) shall cease to exist when we face this split and realize that all our seemingly important spinnings are no more than a fragile web easily broken apart and dissolved by the slightest breeze?

Can we, or should we try to bridge this chasm? Or would that mean the sacrifice of our own well-laid organized justifications for being? In the face of what I call the "essence" which we crave to find and capture so that we can weave more solutions and theories would be instead discover the possibility that we have nothing to say and are therefore rendered hapless, empty handed, and dumb struck? Dewey re-defines this fear of the unknown as the result of a split that occurs in a multitude of ways in our daily life and reflects that "oppositions of mind and body, soul and matter, spirit and flesh all have their origin, fundamentally, in fear of what life may bring forth" (1934, p. 22).

This is a world where perhaps reason must be checked at the door and where we need to re-arm ourselves with a more creative and artistic approach in viewing the world that we so diligently attempt to figure out. Rather, "it is the creative image, vital and burgeoning, that we see before us in the work of these artists, and the new reality that takes shape is not the inhuman world of the machine but the passionate world of the imagination" (Herbert Read re-quoted in Eisner, 1985, p. 39). My quest is to find a space in the world of theory where passion and reason can create together instead of destroying each other. As John Rethorst points out in his discussion of Kant, "this is the dualistic argument that we are creatures both of passion and reason" (1997, p. 8). Dewey exemplifies the ways in which a merging of the duality may be possible.

Through the aesthetic eye many things become re-conceived. Connections can be illuminated, and the various parts, once "others" seen in isolation, become viable components for creating a mutually shaped reality. "Imagination is the chief instrument of good. It is more or less a commonplace to say that a person's ideas and treatment of his fellows are dependent upon his power to put himself imaginatively in their place". But instead, Dewey continues, we live in world where:

> social diversions and barriers exist, practices and ideas that correspond to them are fixed metes and bounds, so that liberal action is placed under restraint. Creative intelligence is looked upon with distrust; the innovations that are the essence of individuality are feared, and generous impulse is put under bonds not to disturb the peace. (1934, p. 348)

The world of real life education is filled with multiple voices from real people struggling to create their own lives and we become no more than a lofty idea raised so high above the din that we cannot hear the music. To our ear, trained in the ways of 'high culture" or as I call it "high theory", this orchestra of various rhythms and sounds appear more like a cacophony than a jazz piece. Aesthetic learning allows us to perhaps re-train our ears to the fine line between harmony and discord. "The process of organic life is variation," (1934) Dewey tells us. He goes on to say:

> The novelty is what causes tensions mentioned above that help define a work of art. Objects that do not create tension have immediate vogue; they are 'best-sellers' of their day, but obviously they do not last. Because life is variation, mere repetitive rhythms such as cookie-cutter houses are an anathema to the esthetic life. (p.168)

This repetitive type of "cookie-cutter" product (or experience) is not authentic art. Authentic art (as a way of living and creating) requires the artist to instead be a co-creator of the images that are brought forth through the process. Dewey explains that relationship between form and experience as one where "balance and harmony are attained through rhythm. Equilibrium comes about not mechanically and inertly, but out of, and because of tension... Form is arrived at whenever a stable, even though moving, equilibrium is reached" (Dewey, 1934, p.14). Tension, in which all parts or aspects are not the same, demands that we do something with them, interact and engage, in order to re-assemble the parts in a way that creates a resolution to the whole. Again, authentic form and substance come from the reconciling of parts to re-formulate themselves in such a way to create a more harmonious whole. Cookie cutter solutions are formed when the parts are so controlled as to have no uniqueness whatsoever, and therefore, no conflict.

The voices and lives of people we aim to study are the materials with which we must become co-creators. Greene clarifies the relationship between art and scholarship as both impact our educational system by pointing to the fact that art provides avenues for unseen realities to appear and unheard voices to emerge. Greene acknowledges "at the heart of what I'm asking for in the domains of the teaching of art and aesthetics is a sense of agency, even of power" (1995, p.150). We must be able to heal the split between our own lives, our own experiences as scholars and the images we struggle to create, instead of removing ourselves as invisible non-entities that are of little consequence.

To engage in an authentic process demands that the artist give up some control to the material at hand. The main elements to having an experience according to Dewey are that it be process oriented and situation specific. Ken Jacobs recalls the empowerment that came from this new -found artistic movement. He recalls, "here was the opportunity to further create the mind. The mind is not yet done. Mass inculcation and exploitation of stupor and dead habit could be resisted". Here was an opportunity for individuals to break free from static and rigid form and re-discover the sublime of everyday experience in order to grow and create. Similarly, in learning, "Dewey has two criteria of an educative experience-interaction and continuity-are interdependent. Genuine inquiry and dialogue in the present situation...is the best way to foster longer-run growth because it makes present learning more meaningful" (Bredo, 1998, p.16).

How would all of this require us to change? It might demand a critical re-evaluation of our theories and practices which we cling to because they're neat, orderly, logical..."easy". Our "legitimate" practices shut out the call for something more alive, more terrifying. The role of art as a process enables us as theorizers to perhaps express what we "think" instead of what we should say. Perhaps we cannot say what we think, by propriety or by the genuine incapacity of words to place syntactical arms around the vastness of what we see and feel. And often, this new understanding cannot be expressed in linear or logical terms.

I see the creative process as a way of weaving a stronger web, one that bridges, rather than divides the "real" world from the "other". To bridge the gaps that exist provides a new space where the senses come alive with the fluid charge of immediacy, presence, and infusion of past and future, between the world we see through our own lenses and that of others, between real and ideal, and between knowledge and experience. We immerse ourselves in the comfort of one-dimensional day-to-day practices. Instead, "teachers and administrators should be seeking 'multiple meanings' ... raising questions about the American tradition, about the American Dream, about what can and should be transmitted to the changing populations in our schools" (Greene, 1997, p.12). Greene goes on to add that it is our task to "seek out alternative ways of representing what is known and what the young are expected to understand" (p.12).

But instead, we often are confronted with the invisible wall created between ourselves, our practice, and the real world "out there", which threatens chaos to our orderly worlds. Greene argues that "it is the imagination-with its capacity to both make order out of chaos and open experience to the mysterious and the strange-that moves us to go on a quest, to journey where we have never been" (1995, p. 23). It is in embracing both education and theory as an aesthetic experience that we may shatter the glass wall.

In the act of the creative process, a willingness to make this quest is vital for work to be an act of transformation. The works and writing of the authors mentioned in this essay (with a special emphasis placed on Dewey who may be considered the foundation of their works) have brought forth images of a world where there is no "one right answer". These ideas illuminate a new, more authentic way, of carving out space for fresh actions that cut more closely to the bone. Transformation, of self, as well as education or society, is not a painless process. It demands the death of long held notions and ideals about the world and ourselves. It impacts our values and our practices as scholars and offers us ways to be better human beings. Aesthetic, poetic (narrative) and artistic ways of rendering theory heal the split between self, other and practice.

How often are we willing to "push the envelope" or to stand at the edge where perhaps we don't already know the terrain? Can we function with the possibility of going where we do not have preset answers as our maps before even beginning the journey? Our notion of maintaining control, of operating only with the "light on" begs that we dare not go there. The reality is that were we to venture forward into that chasm, we might find ourselves stuck, stricken with terror, realizing our helplessness, our humanness, in the face of circumstances in which there are no easy answers and we are confronted with great pains to utter, "I don't know".

Art, the artist's eye, and art as a way of being promise creation rather than destruction. Art speaks to the soul. It is the language of poetry, metaphor, shape and form that allows us to face the task ahead by bringing forth into the light the vital life force elements stuffed between the cracks of concrete, dead, and static theory. Dewey also concedes that:

> poetic meanings, moral meanings, a large part of the goods of life are matters of richness and freedom of meanings, rather than of truth; a large part of our life is carried on in the realm of meanings to which truth and falsity as such are irrelevant. (1929, p. 411)

Art brings the language of understanding needed to anchor the journey, where literal meaning cannot be exacted. To try renders us speechless, saying everything but what needs to be said, seen, or heard. We have to some extent marginalized the every source of creative inspiration we crave in order to bring forth new and needed possibilities simply because we could not weigh and measure them first. Often those voices come knocking at our door, and though uninvited, they are still critical to our very existence. It is the artist, not the logician nor the scientific theorist, who is armed to open that door and to begin a dialogue or a dance with the essence that is the cornerstone to all our practices and beliefs.

Art and education are passions for me. Both entertain the "craving" for understanding of self and the world that can be filled only by a source of thought or experience that emerges from the core. What I've been discovering of late is that not only does art serve us in helping to better comprehend and express the essence of what we seek in curriculum theory, but that theory itself can become an art form in its own right. Being an artist is nothing I do. It is something I am. If we are to take ourselves out of the periphery and go back into the center of what it means to study theory and to discover possible futures, that I can only do so with the lends of an artist. This is necessary for me to say what otherwise can't be said, to draw out the essence of the meaning I seek from the cracks between the cement, and to seek the untold possibilities from out of the darkness. Creation requires risk. It requires a willingness to let go of outcomes and immerse ourselves with a sense of faith in the process.

One of the primary reasons I believe that Dewey places such emphasis on art in his philosophy is that art is based in and results in action. "Views such as this inform my argument for a pedagogy that integrates art education and aesthetic education", Greene writes (1995, p. 147). She continues, "yes, it should be education for a more informed and imaginative awareness, but it should also be education in the kinds of critical transactions that empower students to resist both elitism and objectivism, that allow them to read and to name, to write and re-write their own lived worlds" (p.147). Art by its very nature is an experience both mental and sensory. In Dewey's philosophical discussion of art, his ideas for educational reform show through. Immediacy, fluid, connected-ness, and passion are some of the words that might summarize this reform.

The artists of the Beat movement used similar tools to transform themselves, their art and their society. In a summary written by Mark Jenkins written for The Washington Post (April 26, 1998), the Beat movement was described as "rock combined (with) poetic language (and) pop-culture immediacy". I can find no better genre than this to exemplify Dewey's ideas and to demonstrate how his definition of "art" can inform and transform our society and our educational values and practices. The aim is to integrate the various discrete parts of our lives and experiences, and to re-consider the following, using an aesthetic language in which all parts combine to crate a whole: who we are, what we are, and what we do, and where and perhaps the best question of all, why we do? David Anram concludes, "so the spontaneity comes in the thrilling additions the artist brings in the Odysseus riffs that shape the structure. The essence of spontaneity is to live a lifestyle that allows it". It is to live a life in which art, learning and action may become one continuous blend of a forward moving (and hopefully passionate) "lived experience".

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Technology, Community, and Marginalized Youth

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Advocates of educational technology (and the Internet in particular) have made optimistic claims which seem to increase in scope and fervor as the days pass. Edward Friedman and Beth McGrath declare that "the Internet will be the premier tool for the enhancement of teaching and learning in the 21st century" a claim which may likely be true given what Thomas Sherman has quite correctly identified as "unquestioned confidence in the value of Internet technology" among educators.[1]

One area of Internet technology that has proliferated is the so-called online community, where barriers of race, gender, and sexual orientation are presumed to diminish, if not vanish entirely. At the same time, race, gender, and sexual orientation also are means by which to organize online communities such that individuals of a particular race, gender, or sexual orientation can assemble online with others of similar interests and background.

For example, Eugene Provenzo writes:

> A gay student, not out of the closet, living in a conservative rural community can be in touch with other youths or possibly adults with alternative sexual orientations. Information that is not normally accessible is now easily obtained. Depending on the values of the local community, such possibilities can be seen as positive or as highly undesirable...The World Wide Web and Internet can change the cultural experience and, in turn, the ecology of the school and community in which it is used.[2]

This paper will critique this assertion by providing an alternative to the notions of both community and democracy implicit therein. I will call upon the work of John Dewey and Dennis Carlson to provide conceptions of democracy and community which inform my critique. Further, I will argue that the growth of the Internet as a commercial entity inhibits, rather than encourages, its development into the kind of democratic community that many technology advocates wish it to be.

DEWEY ON COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRACY

John Dewey offers criteria by which to ascertain whether human interaction can and does qualify as communal.[3] It is granted that these criteria are by no means privileged; others can be developed and (once critiqued) applied as well. First Dewey demands communication: members of a society must have the means to communicate and must do so, regularly. In fact, Dewey identifies communication and social life as synonymous. This communication must be done with "fullness and accuracy" but, once obtained, the result is "an enlarged and changed experience."[4] Next, members of a community must have something in common: they understand the nature of these commonalties by communicating, but the commonalties themselves (Dewey lists aims, beliefs, aspirations, and knowledge) create community by virtue of their existence.

At this point some might claim that, by appearing to satisfy the conditions Dewey establishes, the Internet *is* a community, and one which is particularly helpful for marginalized youth who are stifled in their own localities. Such individuals certainly identify with each other based on common aims, beliefs, aspirations, and knowledge; indeed, chat rooms compel a kind of identity construction via commonality simply by being virtually there. Furthermore, the Internet represents to some the ultimate form of democratic communication: countless citizens engaged in dynamic, contemporary debate on a seemingly continual basis.

Yet the reality of the Internet is less optimistic, particularly in light of Dewey's notion of democracy. Implicit in Dewey's statement on community is democracy, and, in particular, the democratic ideal. For Dewey, isolation and exclusiveness were antisocial: "whenever one group has interests of its own which shut it out from full interaction with other groups so that its prevailing purpose is the protection of what it has got, instead of reorganization and progress through wider relationships."[5] Indeed, democracy demands "not only freer interaction between social groups but change in social habit–

its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse."[6]

Furthermore, and importantly in the context of this paper, Dewey was wary of an overemphasis on the particular needs of individuals in schools:

> We are apt to look at the school from an individualistic standpoint . . . yet the range of outlook needs to be enlarged. What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon, it destroys our democracy.[7]

Thus the Deweyan position on democracy, community, schools, and the individual is qualified to mean living in a manner that is connected with others. Such connections necessarily require communication to maintain. The schools have a role in preserving the democratic nature of a community by avoiding a focus on the individual and instead highlighting the connected nature of shared experience. Dewey is explicit on this point when he notes that "school must itself be a community life in all which that implies" and "the learning in school should be continuous with that out of school."[8]

Community, Marginalization, and the Internet

Dennis Carlson sees the problem of marginalization as one that can be solved without the use of technology. Carlson identifies three ways in which notions of community are being reconstructed in contemporary society. The first, a *community of interest,* involves individuals forming groups based on common goals and desires. At once suggesting shades of both Dewey and Internet chat rooms, web sites, and so on, Carlson is quick to point out that such communities are "fundamentally limited" as they prohibit the articulation of a shared, common, public interest as a result of non-inclusion.[9]

Carlson envisions a second kind of community, which he identifies as a *democratic multicultural community.*[10] Here difference is represented and embraced in concert with an ongoing and common public discourse such that the common culture is continuously being redefined. This kind of community is a recent development, argues Carlson, but it nevertheless is promising insofar as it encourages "dialog across difference" and motivates "a new progressive agenda for educational renewal."[11]

A third kind of community that Carlson identifies is linked to *cultural neo-conservatism.* On this view the kind of marginalizing communities that Provenzo claims the Internet can subvert actually, and perhaps ironically, encourage gay youth to express themselves in places other than schools. By keeping "Others" out of the public sphere, the cultural homogeneity that Carlson's new right envisions becomes (apparent) reality.[12]

Recall Eugene Provenzo's claim that the Internet could serve as a means by which gay youth can be "in touch" with others in a way that can "change . . . the cultural experience and . . . the ecology of the school and community."[13] One may infer that the individual action of the student accessing information on the Internet is expected to result in a kind of social activism that will bring about social change. Yet an examination of the information that is available on the World Wide Web suggests that little energy is given over to social activism. Instead, much attention is paid to meeting other gay youth on social terms on the one hand, and expressions of anger and frustration on the other.

While these activities may be both positive and affirming for the individual, they offer little hope of being catalysts for social change. To the extent that schools and communities are only interested in satisfying the needs of the individual student, such activities might seem worthwhile. However, as schools ought not focus solely or even primarily on the needs of the individual student at the expense of the development of community, such measures are an inappropriate prescription for the problem of marginalized youth. Indeed, if homosexuality is rendered as a "problem", then instead of viewing gayness merely and falsely as a problem of the individual, the oppression of gay youth ought to be viewed as the "problem" that the conservative community must address.

Even if politically active sites were popular and readily available, there is no clear means for individual students scattered widely about the country to organize political action in their own communities. One response to marginalization might be to reject outright the local community in favor of the virtual community, but this response only encourages further marginalization of students who fail to meet specific social norms in local communities. Said another way, while the so-called "virtual community" may be strong on the Internet, that is not the community that has marginalized the students in the first place. Thus, it is the local community which requires more, not less, attention from the student.

Indeed, the way in which the Internet can quite literally keep gay youth "in their place"—specifically, in front of the computer, in the confines of a bedroom or living room, but in all cases isolated rather than active as participants in the larger political community—is exactly the problem, not the solution. Technology can and often does prevent rather than encourage the inclusion of marginalized others by removing the social and political controversy that difference compels. Lost is the Deweyan notion of democracy since authentic personal connections between citizens are replaced by the high-speed connections of modems, and the communal (and often controversial) dialog of the public sphere is usurped by the anonymity of the chat room.

My point is not that technology is somehow evil, or that the Internet cannot become a conduit for social change. Rather the suggestion is that Internet enthusiasts appear to favor the promise of virtual communication over the authenticity of personal engagement and political involvement. To reiterate: gay youth are not marginalized on the Internet, but in their local communities. It would therefore be inappropriate (and ultimately ineffective) to expect that social change can emerge through Internet activity (at a distance) that comes at the expense of social activism that is localized.

I also want to make it clear that the Internet, while representing many things, does not represent a community. There may be aspects of the Internet that suggest communality, but a fully realized community exhibits characteristics (many of which I have already articulated) which the Internet simply does not. Critics of this assertion might say that this notion of community is an anachronism, informed by turn-of-the-century sensibilities about what civic life is supposed to be. Yet, until society fundamentally changes the kinds of interactions and, to borrow again from Dewey, "modes of associated living" that qualify as community, then such a notion (however dated it might be) is one appropriate standard by which to judge claims of communality.[14] The alternative is to accept every new chat room and web site as a burgeoning community: useful from a marketing perspective, perhaps, but decidedly inadequate for a serious consideration of the ways that democracy and community interrelate as regards marginalized youth.

To wit: how can individuals who isolate themselves via self-identification in a medium which privileges communication with isolated others engage in the kind of interaction that democracy requires? They cannot, for the Internet (somewhat paradoxically) permits unlimited communication of a limited kind. [A] may chat online with [B], but only if [A] and [B] have narrowly identified themselves in such a way as to "find" each other in cyberspace. This while the Internet permits multi-user communication, none of it need occur between individuals who disagree, because users are occupied "chatting" and "surfing" pursuant to their own individual tastes and interests.

Alas, this is exactly as advertised—and I mean that in the most literal way. The Internet is not promoted as a means for thoughtful democratic reform or as a site for critical engagement; it is promoted as a means to find that which you as an individual are interested in and follow it, hyperlink by hyperlink, through the abyss of cyberspace. That the Internet should (or could) be anything else flies in the face of what advertisers have embraced: e-commerce before e-democracy.

This is perhaps the most compelling point: that the Internet (which is quickly becoming, if it has not already become, primarily an instrument of commerce) might be seen as an agent for democratic change suggests either naivete, or misplaced optimism, or a bit of both. In any case the presumption that the commercial Internet might be the foundation for a new and desirable form of democratic community speaks volumes about popular conceptions about the way in which democracy, technology, and commerce might reasonably coexist. IBM may run television advertisements about the burgeoning global community, featuring a Crayola-box view of faces from a wide range of exotic locales, but the notable exclusion of the poor as one example of the (literally) disconnected ought not be ignored. When one's ability to participate in democracy becomes linked to the speed (or mere existence) of one's modem, then democracy has morphed into something which owes more to Motorola than to Monroe. That this transformation will happen not merely *while* the citizenry is online but *because* the citizenry is online should concern even the most ardent supporters of Internet technology.

As such, schools must be seen as sites where the importance and utility of the Internet can be challenged—particularly in light of claims that (implicitly or explicitly) portray the Internet as the conduit of future democracy. That the Internet is quickly becoming ubiquitous in classrooms does not offer much hope given the non-critical nature of inquiry and critique exhibited in schools. Furthermore, I am convinced that the Internet will not lead to the inclusion of marginalized Others, but instead will further hinder the kind of communication and democratic action that discourages such marginalization from occurring in the first place.

NOTES

1. Edward A. Friedman and Beth McGrath, "The Internet Isn't a Threat to Students . . . It's a Tool for Teachers," *Education Week* (September 30, 1998); Thomas M. Sherman, "Another Danger for 21st Century Children?" *Education Week* (June 3, 1998).

2. Eugene Provenzo, "Educational Computing as a Value-Laden Technology," in *Critical Social Issues in American Education: Transformation in a Postmodern World,* Second Edition, eds. H. Svi Shapiro and David E. Purpel (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 299-308.

3. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916), 4.

4. Ibid., 5.

5. Ibid., 85-86.

6. Ibid., 86-87.

7. John Dewey. *The School and Society; and, The Child and The Curriculum* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 6-7.

8. Dewey, *Democracy and Education,* 358.

9. Dennis Carlson, "Gayness, Multicultural Education, and Community," *Educational Foundations* (Fall 1994): 6.

10. Ibid., 7.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 6. "Others" in this context is understood to mean, as Carlson suggests, individuals who are "disempowered and represented as deviant, sick, neurotic, criminal, lazy, lacking in intelligence, and in other ways 'abnormal'." These would include racial and ethnic minorities, women, the poor, and homosexuals.

13. Provenzo, 303.

14. Dewey, *Democracy and Education,* 87.

J.F. Herbart and Moral Education

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Charles de Garmo (1916) began his classic book *Herbart and the Herbartians* with the introduction—"What Pestalozzi left for Herbart to do." We begin this paper with a similar introduction—"What Herbart left for the Americans to do." Acccording to de Garmo, Johann Friedrich Herbart made three major contributions that still impact American education today:

1) He brought education into the university as a science and discipline in its own right thus helping teacher-training institutions to develop a scientific methodology.
2) He gave scientific precision to instructional methodology by founding it upon a system of psychology and
3) He emphasized that ultimate goal of education is the development of moral character which must be based on a system of ethics (de Garmo, 1916:4).

Current events such as the shortage of qualified teachers, the number of students who graduate from eighth grade but cannot read, and the violent shootings at the Colombine High School in Littleton, Colorado show that Americans have much to do if they are to realize Herbart's three goals. Similar criticisms were made of the educational sytem in Germany during Herbart's time. Although popular during his life-time, Herbart did not received the recognition due for creating a system of education based on psychology and for insisting that the ultimate goal of education was the development of moral character. Herbart is included in most survey textbooks used for introduction to the history and philosophy of education courses (Ornstein 2000, Gutek 1995, Johnson et al. 2000.). However, I surprised when research on his ideas led to the discovery that the only current studies are in German. In fact, there are only six sources in English that I have been able to find. Herbart's contributions are the subject of three journal articles, one doctoral dissertation and two books. Hopmann, Stefan, Riquarts and Kurt (1995) "Starting a Dialogue: Issues in a Beginning Conversation between Didaktik and the Curriculum Traditions" *Journal of Curriculum Studies,* Hilgenbeger, N. (1994) Johann Herbart. *Prospects in Education* 23(3 & 4): 649-664 and Johanningmeier, E. (1989). "Dunkel's Herbart Revisited: The Milieu in Which He Worked." *Midwest History of Education Society Journal* 17: 150-163. Ursula Stendel Hendon wrote her doctoral dissertation in 1980 on "Herbart's Concept of Morality in Education and its Role in America. Harold Dunkel wrote *Herbart and Education* in 1970 for the Random House Studies in Education series. Finally, Charles de Garmo's classic book *Herbart and the Herbartians* introduced Herbart to American in 1916. Current educational research is lacking in articles on Herbart, and thus is missing out on valuable insight. I hope that this paper can make a contribution to this paucity of literature.

A short review of Herbart's life will help us to understand the development of his philosophic ideas. Johann Friedrich Herbart was born in Oldenburg, Germany on May 4, 1776. Two months after his birth a new nation was born across the Atlantic. Herbart's ideas were to inspire the educational system of this new nation years after he died. Herbart's contemporaries were Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Mozart, Beethoven, Schelling, Hegel and Napoleon. It was an exciting time in which to live. His life spanned a period of great political revolutions and the evolution of great systems of thought.

Johann was tutored at home as a young child due to a childhood accident. Herman Uelzen, his tutor helped him master the skills of philosophic inquiry that served him for his lifetime. When Johann entered formal schooling he was well ahead of his classmates. What was to be his life-long interest in morality was already apparent in a high school speech he gave at Oldenburg in 1793 entitled "Something about the Most Common Casues Which Effect the Rise and Fall of Morality in Nations". The speech was published four years later (Hendon, 1980:14). Herbart gave the valedictory oration to his graduating class the following year. Again his interest in moral education is evident as he contrasted the views of Cicero and Kant concerning the supreme good.

Johann studied philosophy at the University of Jena under the guidance of Johann Fichte. Although he studied the recently published works of

Immanuel Kant, Herbart moved away from his contemporaries' idealism to his own brand of realism inspired by the ancient Greeks. Perhaps it was this realist philosophy that enabled him to so accurately observe the elements that constitute effective teaching. Johann did not complete his studies at this time because in 1797 he received a job offer to tutor the two older children of Karl Friedrich von Steiger in Switzerland. For the next three years, Herbart tried out many of the devices and procedures that were to become "his system". He developed his general system through this, his one and only experience teaching young children. He spent the rest of his life explaining aspects of this "system" in the various books he wrote. While in Switzerland, Herbart visited Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi's school in Bergodff (Dunkel, 1969:13). He published the *Science of Education* in 1806. He was offered Kant's chair as a full professor at the University of Konigsberg in 1808. Here he worked for the next 25 years, setting up a practice teaching seminar, the forerunner of the modern day student teaching experience.

Herbart's "system" was based on a psychology that explained ideas as developing from a process of "apperception", in which new ideas are absorbed and reflected upon by those already present in the consciousness. His theory anticipated Piaget's ideas of assimilation and accommodation. The task of instruction was to help the student organize what he knew. From this psychological base, Herbart developed his four-step method of instruction: 1) clarity, 2) association, 3) system and 4) method. This method can be seen to be the forerunner of the modern day lesson plan. As significant as these contributions are, they are beyond the scope of this paper that seeks to study his moral ideas in an effort to see how they can contribute to helping us set up more effective methods of character education in our schools today.

The are four main writings in which Herbart's principles regarding the moral goal of education can be found: *"The Esthetic Revelation of the World as the Chief Work of Education", Outline of Pedagogical Lectures, General Pedagogy Deduced from the Aim of Education* and his book on moral philosophy *General Practical Philosophy.Hendon. (1980). Herbart's Concept of Morality in Education and its Role in America. University of Alabama...* Herbart tells us that "the one and the whole task of education can be summed up in the concept—morality". Herbart sought to clarify the concept of morality. "Morality, or virtue is the idea of inner freedom which has developed into an abiding actuality in an individual"

Herbart's five moral principles are summarized in his *Outlines:*

1. The term virtue expresses-the whole purpose of education.
   Virtue is the idea of inner freedom which has developed in

> an individual into a permanent reality. Thus, as inner freedom is a relation between insight and, volition, a double task is at once set before the teacher...
>
> 2. Of the remaining moral principles, the idea of perfection points to a sound body and sound mind, including a high regard for both and their purposeful cultivation.
> 3. The idea of benevolence suggests to the teacher that all stimulation toward malice be avoided as such stimulation might be harmful. But it is essential that the pupil be brought to respect benevolence.
> 4. The idea of right demands that the pupil give up strife. Moreover, it demands an examination of strife, so that respect for what is made a firm resolve.
> 5. The idea of equity relates to cases where the pupil has deserved punishment as requital for the intentional misdeed. Here the measure of punishment must be determined carefully and must be acknowledged as just by the one punished.(Herbart, 1901).

For Herbart, the idea of inner freedom is the "idea of ideas", the most important idea. It represents a will whose volitions are in accord with its moral insight. He also maintains that among his five moral ideas, the idea of benevolence stands out as the one which most attests to the growth of the will in that this idea sets out that the will existing in one individual act for the sole benefit of the other individual, always involving a charitable attitude toward the other individual (Hendon, 1980: 72)

Herbart proposed that the basis of morality lies in the will. "The whole task of education is now clear—to make man morally good, that is to be of "good will". Herbart identifies two aspects to the will, i.e. the commanding will (the moral judgement) and the obeying will (the natural desires). This can be expressed as moral insight and moral volition. The task of education is to produce good will in the pupil. This can be accomplished in several ways. "Students can learn moral standards from their family and friends, and they can learn in it school by means of subject matter, especially history and literature. The goals is to help the student develop a moral code which with guide their life." The problem then is not to spell out the rule so conduct, but to define the good will. According to Herbart, to educate was to produce the good will through the educational process. "It follows that education in order to have a permanent effect must try to use instruction not only for mere information but also for the formation of character. It requires a great deal to raise knowledge to the level of erudition. It is a still more difficult task to combine the imparting of knowledge with the formation of character. In other words, the mere quantity of knowledge and the logical and practical training in notions, maxims and principles must affect the whole emotional attitude of a person." (Herbart, 1901)

Since morality has its place only in the individual's will, founded on right insight, it follows, first, that the work of education is not to develop in the pupil a certain external mode of action, but rather ethical insight with a corresponding will power. Herbart said that this can best be done by developing "many-sided interest". Only a person with a broad range of interests can have the experience necessary for intelligent moral decisions. The school can promote this experience through the subjects of instruction which in addition to their practical value may also be utilized for their moral potential. The core of Herbart's moral instruction can be summarized as leading from knowing to willing. Interest is the connecting link between the two (Hendon, 1980:50, 108). Herbart chose the subjects of the curriculum for their moral potential. The scientific subjects appeal to the knowledge interests and include math and science. The historical subjects appeal to the sympathy interests and include history, geography, languages and religion. Teaching is the conveying of new knowledge, developing aptitudes and imparting useful skills. Education should not just impart knowledge and shape aptitudes and skills, but it had to serve to develop a 'moral insight' and to 'strengthen character' (Hilgenbeger, 1994:649-664) which are aspects of the will. The task of education then is to produce the good will in the pupil.

When Charles de Garmo from Illinois State University went to Germany, it was to study the best ideas of pedagogy found in the German university, noted for its research. He came in contact with the pedagogical ideas of Johann Herbart; thus Herbart came to America. Schools in America in 1890 were based on the goal of developing mental discipline and learning the basic 3 R's. Memorization, drill and recitation were the method of instruction. Since in Herbart's pedagogy, morality is the aim of instruction, a new method of instructions was introduced. Teaching the mind was not as important as teaching the will. Curricular subjects were no longer chosen for their logical progression, but now they were selected for their moral value. Schools adopted the Herbartian moral goal and said that their goal was to produce "good" citizens. The process of bringing about individual morality was generally referred to as "character building." The moral character was defined as consisting of "moral insight," "moral dispositions," and "moral habit."

John Dewey joined the National Herbartian Society, but never subscribed completely to this philosophy. How could he? Parallels can be drawn between Herbart and Dewey—both were philosophers who wrote about education and each started a practice teaching school in which to try their theories. However, their areas of dissimilarity are greater—Herbart was a realist and Dewey a pragmatist; Herbart believed in the moral goal of schools and Dewey believed in the social goals of schools. Herbart's based his moral education on the premise that the will is teachable, Dewey thought that morality was relative. In 1920, the Herbartian society merged into and was superseded by the Progressive Education movement. It had made its mark though as "developing ethical values" was one of the tenets of the Progressive Education principles and their acceptance of the moral aim of schools (as distinct from a religious aim) became a mainstay of American education.

I believe that Herbart's idea could also help the current character education movement. We are seeing a proliferation of character education programs and curricula. Many are based on teaching a "word a week". These will not succeed in their goal of forming character unless they take into consideration the importance of teaching the will as well as the mind as Herbart suggested. Similarities with the educational situation found in the 1890's can also be found. There is an emphasis on "returning to the basics" and "meeting the standards" which lead to drilling students on content mastery and 'teaching to the test'. Curriculum is chosen based on its ability to help standardized scores. We should return to choosing curriculum based on its character building value and emphasize the value of literature and history in this area. Development of the affective and volitional nature of the child needs to take priority if we are to help student internalize moral values thereby enabling them to make good moral choices. Schools must make opportunities available to students so that they can freely choose to be "benevolent" and to do acts of service towards others instead of acts of violence. Much value can be reaped through further research into Herbart's assertion that "the ultimate goal of education is the development of moral character" and its implication that "the good will" in the students needs to be and can be developed.

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Learning and Reciprocity

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In this paper I argue that communicative reciprocity is an essential aspect of the learning process from the earliest stages of human intellectual development. Further, I will show that recognizing the fundamental status of reciprocity has important implications for educational theory and practice.

I define communicative reciprocity as the ability to adopt at least partially the point of view of another in order to mutually adjust interpretive frameworks for the purpose of understanding. Since it is agreed that learning starts in the crib and since many theorists influenced by Jean Piaget have concluded that infants and young children are cognitively impoverished in a way that makes it impossible for them to adopt a non-egocentric perspective, it is obvious that my view that reciprocity is necessary for learning is incompatible with a rather formidable theoretical tradition.

My first task will be to adduce evidence from the areas of child cognition and development to support a twofold claim:

(1) that personal interaction and communication of intention begin within the first few months of life and

(2) that mutual understanding is the basis for language learning as well as the further development of human intelligence. After showing the essential role of primitive forms of reciprocity in early learning, we will then look briefly at the role that reciprocity plays in institutional settings like the classroom, paying special attention to the kinds of "distorted communication" which arise when norms of

communicative reciprocity are violated or ignored in educational settings.

I. From Piaget to Pragmatics

On the basis of many experiments conducted over several decades Piaget concluded that infants and very young children are severely limited in their ability to communicate, because they lack cognitive structures which would enable them to understand that differences in perspective exist. Because of this epistemological limitation, they are totally bound within their own egocentric world. Piaget maintains that the course of human cognitive development and its attendant proficiency in language use are largely directed by the maturation and development of cognitive structures which gradually allow one to "decenter," to move flexibly from one point of view to another so that "objective" rather than "subjective" knowledge of reality can be obtained and subsequently encoded into language. Further, this structural development occurs in stages, each of which is more "adequate" in the sense that each stage is logically more complex and integrates all the competencies of the previous stage.[1]

Although much of what Piaget claimed concerning intellectual development continues to be borne out in broad outline by experiments and the observations of educators and observant parents, in the past three decades child language researchers and cognitive theorists have been led both by empirical evidence and conceptual considerations to abandon or alter certain significant features of Piaget's theory. It is noteworthy that the philosophical basis for these challenges has come from the branch of philosophical pragmatism known as speech act theory. In his groundbreaking 1975 article on the origins of child language, Jerome Bruner credits as his inspiration

> . . . the view of language that has been developed over the past decade by a group of philosophers who were, I think, clearing the ground for a pragmatically oriented study of language: Austin (1962), Grice (1968), Strawson (1959) and Searle (1969), principally. Their aim as analytic philosophers was, of course, to examine the way in which ordinary language is used, and I emphasize USED. The tradition stems, probably, from Wittgenstein's sibylline maxim that the meaning of an utterance is its use. These philosophers insisted that there are at least TWO ways of conceiving of meaning in language. One of them is in terms of the actual utterance, without regard either for the context in which uttered or for the objective of the utterer in directing the discourse to another. The second approach considers not the

> utterance in a timeless sense but, to use Grice's phrase, in relation to its occasion of use. . . . It is the interplay between the two that permits the child to enter the language so quickly.[2]

Expanding on the insights of speech act theorists, Bruner and other researchers called for a functional approach to studying the transition from pre-linguistic to linguistic communication in infants. They argued that the study of language acquisition has been distorted by overemphasizing existing structures and failing to recognize the dependency of such structures on the function of language, particularly the way speech forms are initially used. If the speech act pragmatists are correct that language is an extended and conventionalized form of human action, then, to be properly understood, "its acquisition must be viewed as a transformation of modes of assuring co-operation that are prior to language, prior both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. . . .[3] Furthermore, studying the functional and pragmatic conditions under which children become competent language users should provide the basis for a promising approach to the study of mind and cognitive development.

Margaret Donaldson is one child language researcher who has challenged Piaget's views about children's egocentrism and inferential abilities. Donaldson has found both methodological and substantive difficulties with some of Piaget's conclusions about the intellectual impoverishment of young children and infants. Regarding methodology, Donaldson and her colleagues have objected to Piaget's conclusions on the grounds that many of his experiments involving children's abilities were constructed in such a way that children did not know what was expected of them, i.e. "task demands" were not made clear. Again drawing from philosophical pragmatism, these researchers claimed that children have a tacit understanding of certain pragmatic principles of conversation.[4] For example, children are unaware that in certain artificial experimental situations normal conversational rules might be suspended. They continue to operate according to the principle of cooperation which underlies all discourse and are particularly inclined to adhere to the maxim of relevance. Thus, they will often in good faith try to draw on any background knowledge they may have to try to affirm or "make sense" of any and all options or situations which the experimenter presents to them, not knowing that they are expected to reject what may be, from the point of view of the experimenter, deviant responses. The fact that these options are being authoritatively presented by an adult further tends to legitimate the options presented. (Multiple choice tasks are especially confusing to very young children who do not understand the rules of the testing "language game.") Thus, in a testing environment in which the experimenter knows that the normal rules of conversation have been suspended but the child does not, the experimental results are very likely to be skewed. To demonstrate this result, Donaldson and her colleagues reconstructed many of Piaget's experiments to make experimenters' expectations more clear, and the picture of children's cognitive abilities which emerged from these studies was markedly different from Piaget's.[5]

How was it possible for Donaldson to come to such strikingly different conclusions about children's intellectual abilities? Answering this question points up the substantive difficulties with Piaget's conclusions. According to Donaldson, in order for children to demonstrate their ability to reason, inferential tasks must be embedded in a context which involves intentions and purposes immediately relevant to the child, although, contra Piaget, these intentions and purposes need not be his or her own. (Donaldson found, for example, that having children discuss stories they had listened to was a particularly fruitful way to elicit spontaneous specimens of child reasoning, both deductive and inductive.) The key to eliciting understanding from children seems to be that the task at hand must make what Donaldson calls "human sense" to them. Piaget was right in his claim that very young children (under the age of seven according to Piaget's stage theory) turn in very poor performances on tasks which involve abstract or formal modes of inference. However, he was wrong in concluding that infants and young children are therefore profoundly egocentric and unable to reason. We can only speculate whether, had he been aware of the pragmatic variables which must be taken into account in working with children, the results of his extensive and carefully reported experiments conducted over such a long period of time might have been quite different.

II. Intersubjectivity: The Roots of Communicative Reciprocity

Some of the most provocative counterclaims to Piaget's egocentricity thesis have come from the laboratory of developmental biologist Colwyn Trevarthen, who has argued on the basis of empirical evidence that human beings are equipped at birth with the rudiments of a personality which is not only sensitive to other persons but expresses itself as a person does. According to Trevarthen, infants both initiate and respond to communicative interactions with their mother and others with whom they have close affectional ties.

Trevarthen studied infant behavior during the first year of life after birth. His research was stimulated by discussions with Bruner, who has long been interested in the connections among the social, intellectual, and linguistic development of humans. Intrigued by the possibility that a study of infant development which allowed for the possibility of reciprocal interaction between neonates (infants newborn to two months in age) and their primary caregivers (usually the mother) might hold important clues to understanding the process by which children become educated, Trevarthen used high-speed film and video equipment capable of recording the most minute and fleeting infant facial expressions, sounds, and movements to document repetitive and predictable patterns of action in both expressive and receptive functioning.

These repeating patterns strongly suggest the presence of what he calls intersubjective processes between mothers and their babies.[6]

According to Trevarthen, two essential features are captured by the term 'intersubjectivity'. First, the term implies the existence of *subjectivity:* the infant must exhibit at least the rudiments of individual consciousness and intentionality necessary for purposeful action in regard to *things*. Purposeful action implies acting as an agent, relating objects and situations to the source of action and predicting the consequences of actions. Subjectivity thus involves doing things in relation to the physical world and "the ability to show by coordinated acts that purposes are being consciously regulated." At a level of greater complexity, *intersubjectivity* involves the further ability "to share mental control with other persons." In other words, in order to communicate, infants must also be able to recognize and adapt to the subjectivity of others. They must be aware, at least in some rudimentary way, of a distinction between persons and things.

Much evidence for subjective processes, which involves the relation between infants and physical objects, has been collected in the past three decades, evidence which tells against another Piagetian claim that infants have no "object concept." This research strongly suggests that even infants of only one or two months of age are able to perform certain rudimentary acts which, though largely ineffectual, already have enough adaptive form to be considered purposeful. In their waking hours, very young babies often look at, listen to, and touch objects with the beginnings of alertness for the changes in experience which follow what they do. Patterned and intelligible activities like grasping and manipulation, kicking and step-like movements, avoidance or withdrawal from certain stimuli, or signs of distress associated with the absence of certain objects (e.g. a lost pacifier) all provide evidence for what seems to be inchoate purposiveness toward a world of objects.[7]

If we take at face value the strong evidence for infant subjectivity, what reason is there to think that infants are also capable of the kind of complex communicative intentions necessary for intersubjective interaction? Even if it can be shown that infants react in certain predictable ways to their environment, part of which happens to include "human objects," one might object that the question still remains whether they are capable of the kind of reciprocal sharing of intentions with other persons required for authentic communication. Put another way, do infants recognize not just the objectivity, but also the subjectivity, of other human beings?

Acknowledging the methodological problems involved in drawing conclusions about mental states on the basis of infant behaviors commonly associated with normal biological maturation, Trevarthen remarks:

> The whole complex of actions...seems to imply that the infant has a clear commitment to intentional communication. But do infants adjust their expressions in relation to other people or are their different expressive movements entirely the result of changes in a vague proto-communicative state, one that is pure output stimulated by recognition of a face but is blind and deaf to signals from communicative acts of persons? [8]

According to Trevarthen, an adequate answer to this question will be one which fairly examines the sensitivity and responsiveness of infants to signals from persons who desire to communicate with them and which seeks out a middle ground between extreme nativistic and extreme social-interactionist explanations of intellectual development.[9]

Based on his photographic studies, Trevarthen rejects both nativism and social-interactionism in their "pure" forms in favor of an account of intellectual development involving inborn categories and processes of mind which are highly sensitive to experience and education. On his view the human intellect, though not a product of the cultural environment, nevertheless develops by adapting to it. Put in terms of neurophysiology, the life cycle of the brain "looks like a cycle of mental growth with an enormous degree of prefunctional morphogenesis of main structures as well as great plasticity."[10] On the social side of the learning and developmental equation, the evidence suggests that conceptualization, language, and conscious understanding depend to a large extent on socially defined meanings picked up by the infant's highly plastic intelligence. Genetic factors and the normal course of biological development are simply not adequate to explain the kinds of complex cognitive processes engaged in by infants and young children who have been immersed in a rich social environment in which their participation has been both expected and actively encouraged. On the other hand, observation and description of the communicative context do not support the alternative view that the infant's emerging personality is completely molded and shaped by the humans in the social environment.

What the facts of developing cooperation between infant and mother strongly suggest, according to Trevarthen, is that the consistency and regularity of infant expressive movements, which are automatically perceived as communicative by adults, is a cross-cultural phenomenon. This phenomenon in turn suggests the existence of an innate, pan-human "vocabulary" of facial signs that provide a universal basis for human communication. Rather than viewing the mother (or primary caregiver) merely as a "cultural agent" who controls the communicative environment, Trevarthen insists that both mother and infant exercise control within the communicative context. The infant's share of this control comes from certain fundamental powers or capacities that are not socially created. On this matter it is worth quoting him at some length. He writes:

> . . . a factual account of behaviors which are coherent, certainly not chance . . . bear direct morphological resemblance to culturally shaped communicative actions of adults in all human societies. The finding of pre-adaptive structure and process are . . . promising . . . if startling. . . . [T]he interactions with the mother may, certainly do, facilitate occurrence of communicative episodes (it is easier to communicate with someone than with no one) and hence nurture the development of communicative skills, [but] these skills do not originate by this means. The details of infant behavior show that both infant and mother contribute to both perception and production of acts of communication. In the infant's case these acts are pre-adaptive to gestures that become ritualized and to grammatically formed patterns of speech acts that develop into the articulate words of a particular language. . . . [I]ntersubjective understanding is not acquired by a random, structureless gurgling infant by importation from the mother. It is not synthesized from language or social existence. The complexity of the loose relationship and interaction between mother and infant from early days makes this interpretation untenable. What the baby does has an innate foundation which one can see. The evidence for the conclusion is objective, if about subjective events for which we humans have strong and very useful powers of perception and understanding, would we only use them.[11]

My primary goal in this paper has been to show that communicative reciprocity is foundational to the learning process. Although a full examination of all the literature on infant/child cognition and language learning is beyond our present purview, I have cited both empirical and conceptual considerations to support the plausibility of the claim that, contra Piaget, reciprocity and at least a rudimentary form of intersubjective understanding are part of human experience from the earliest stages of life. However, it should be noted that it has not been claimed that children never have difficulty taking a perspective which differs from their own. Children do often have this difficulty. However, so do adults, as a quick perusal of the op-ed page of any newspaper will confirm. Rather, the more reasonable conclusion is that both children and adults sometimes fail to "decenter," but that this failure cannot be explained by differences in basic cognitive functioning.

If we accept the claim that reciprocity is essential to learning, it is important to explore, at least briefly, what implications the patterns of reciprocity and mutual adaptation displayed in the first months of life have for teaching and learning in later, more institutional educational settings. To that subject I now turn.

III. Pragmatic Principles in the Classroom

The German critical theorist Jurgen Habermas has used the fundamental pragmatic principles of speech act theory as the basis for both an analysis and critique of classroom communication. His theory of communication *as action* bears directly on the themes of reciprocity and intersubjective understanding we have examined thus far.

Habermas categorizes the general types of action or interaction on the basis of the dominant intentions of speakers and hearers. Further, the extent to which these intentions are openly shared and recognized by the parties in a communicative exchange has a moral dimension which relates to the rational autonomy of individuals and thus suggests itself as a basis for a normative evaluation of various educational goals and methods.

Central to the theory of communicative action is the notion of the ideal speech situation, which is Habermas's attempt to reconstruct the underlying assumptions of everyday speech communication. According to him, communicative competence presupposes a set of background assumptions involving cognitive, moral, and interpersonal dimensions. These assumptions also involve judgments about the truth, appropriateness, and authenticity of utterances and speakers. As such, the set of background assumptions plays a role similar to a Kantian "regulative principle." That means that though the ideal speech situation is itself a counterfactual construct-it is not empirically realized-it nevertheless involves assumptions all humans must make if speech communication is to provide the normal, everyday means of human interaction which it in fact does.[12]

How does the ideal speech situation apply to educational processes and the teaching and learning relationship? The communicative ideal is fully reciprocal in that it presupposes the equality of the participants in a communicative exchange. However, if fully reciprocal communication is achieved, it is no longer appropriate to speak of teaching, but only of mutual learning. This being the case, how can the asymmetries of knowledge and power which are part of educational experience be reconciled with the communicative ideal?

To answer this question, Habermas develops the notion of the ideal *pedagogical* speech situation. He argues that although the communicative ideal involves fully reciprocal forms of action which in turn involve the rational autonomy of participants, educational forms of action which are by definition less than reciprocal can nevertheless be justified if (1) they have as their goal the rational autonomy which makes full reciprocity possible and (2) they maximize the degree of rational activity which is possible for the student's level of development and (3) their predominant aim is to promote understanding rather than to influence the student in a way which is concealed. The ideal pedagogical speech situation is therefore one in which the student is able rationally to assess views or, at least, to hold them in a manner which is open to rational assessment.[13]

Along these same lines we might recognize a similar asymmetry in the mother-child interactions discussed earlier. In the early learning environment the mother's part involves generating expressions which are adapted to her infant's interest and which respond to the expressions of the infant. The patterns of rhythm and repetition typically employed by the mother are closely adapted to the cognitive, learning, and information processing abilities of their infants. In the way they relate to their infants, most mothers instinctively practice an early form of what educators refer to as "scaffolding." That is, mothers typically solicit the infant's participation by anticipating, mimicking, mirroring, echoing, exaggerating, expanding, or otherwise "propping up" their infant's early attempts at communication until competence is attained, at which point they tend to "back off" and allow the infant or child to take a more aggressive role.[14]

The point is that the same asymmetrical patterns which characterize the interaction of mothers with their rapidly growing and developing infants is also characteristic of effective teaching and learning patterns at all stages of intellectual development. This positive "inequality" seeks to expand on cognitive abilities in part by recognizing that these abilities exist and can be further developed. Similarly, asymmetries in institutional teaching/learning relationships can be justified insofar as they maximize and especially do not fall below the learning level already reached by the student and if they are conducive to bringing about future conditions in which decisions may be more dialogically reached. In short, one can never justify either denying or undermining the rational capacity of students. On the other hand, neither can one justify leading students into a level of discourse to which they cannot be expected to respond rationally, given predictable limitations of emotional or intellectual maturity.

To the extent that the goals, content, and methods of instruction deviate from this pedagogical ideal Habermas puts them in the class of communicative pathologies he refers to as "systematically distorted communication." Such communicative pathologies are distorted because they

> . . . can be conceived of as the result of a confusion between actions oriented to reaching understanding and actions oriented to success. In situations of concealed strategic action, at least one of the parties behaves with an orientation to success, but leaves others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied.[15]

As applied to education, actions which involve the inculcation of any belief on grounds other than "reaching understanding" and which thereby undermine the possibility of (at least future) rational assessment by students are more properly termed miseducative or indoctrinational. Thus, if pedagogical methods implicitly regard students as objects to be manipulated by reward and punishment or as potential recruits for ideological agendas, educational institutions will be characterized by what Habermas calls "systematically distorted communication."

In this paper I have suggested that to avoid this consequence it is necessary to investigate the patterns of reciprocity which are present in the earliest and most fundamental forms of learning. An open assessment of these patterns reveals that, contra Piaget and others who have argued against the rational capacity of children on the basis of their supposed egocentrism, reciprocity is intrinsic to learning, communication, and all forms of cooperative understanding.

NOTES

1. Jean Piaget, *Genetic Epistemology* (New York:Columbia University Press, 1970. The fullest development of Piaget's "stage" theory can be found in Jean Piaget, *Biology and Knowledge:An Essay on the Relation between Organic Regulations and Cognitive Processes* (Chicago:University of

Chicago Press, 1971). A succinct and readable account of the stage theory which also includes discussion of several key experiments which are supposed to show children's poor performance in regard to such mental operations as conservation, class inclusion, and reversibility can be found in Jean Piaget, *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic* 26 (1962):120-128.

2. Jerome Bruner, "The Ontogenesis of Speech Acts," *Journal of Child Language* 2,no. 1 (April, 1975):3.

3. Ibid., 1-2.

4. The classic formulation of the principles of conversation is by H.P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation" (1975), in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A.P. Martinich (New York:Oxford University Press, 1985), 159-170.

5. Margaret Donaldson, *Children's Minds* (New York:W.W. Norton & Company, 1978). See Chapters 2, 4, and 6 for some "reconstructions" of several of Piaget's experiments involving visual perspective, class inclusion, conservation, and reversibility. Donaldson and her colleagues found that when special pains were taken to ensure that children understood the demands of the task and if the experiments were framed in terms of familiar human motives and intentions, results improved dramatically.

6. See Colwyn Trevarthen, "Communication and Cooperation in Early Infancy:A Description of Primary Intersubjectivity," in *Before Speech:The Beginnings of Human Communication*, ed. M. Bullowa (London:Cambridge University Press, 1979) and Colwyn Trevarthen, "Instincts for Human Understanding and for Cultural Cooperation:Their Development in Infancy," in *Human Ethology:Claims and Limits of a New Discipline* (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1979):530-571. Trevarthen's evidence comes from films and video recordings of 165 encounters between thirty-four (fifteen male, nineteen female) infants and their mothers at the Harvard Center for Cognitive Studies and the Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh. In describing his findings, I will in general follow his practice of referring to "infant-mother" intersubjectivity, although the reference to mothers is not meant to be exclusive of fathers and other persons with whom infants may have close ties.

7. Both Trevarthen and Donaldson cite the work of Tom Bower as the most comprehensive summary of research on infant cognition as regards the "object concept" (or lack thereof). Piaget's central piece of evidence for the lack of the object concept (which would be a necessary condition for infant subjectivity) is an experiment in which a toy being played with by a five or six month old infant is covered with a box or a blanket, at which point the infant makes no attempt to recover it. Piaget argues that "out of sight is (literally) out of mind" at this stage; the infant makes no attempt to recover the toy because it has ceased to exist for him/her; the infant is simply incapable at this stage of development of distinguishing between self and not-self (the egocentricity thesis). Bower and Jennifer Wishart designed a counter-experiment in which an object was made to "vanish" by turning out the lights. Even in a totally blackened room, infrared television cameras recorded that infants actively search for the "missing" object. It is puzzling why infants fail to search for the toy in Piaget's experiment, but his conclusion that this failure stems from a complete lack of object permanence seems unwarranted. See T.G.R. Bower and J.G. Wishart, "The Effect of Motor Skill on Object Permanence," *Cognition* 1(1972):165-172 and T.G.R. Bower, *A Primer of Infant Development* (San Francisco:W.H. Freeman, 1977).

8. Trevarthen, "Communication and Cooperation in Early Infancy," 331.

9. Variations on nativistic views include those advanced by such thinkers as Jerry Fodor, Noam Chomsky, and to some extent Piaget, all of whom account for human intellectual growth and development largely in terms of innate structures. Social-interactionist views, on the other hand, are often associated with the views of G.H. Mead and Lev Vygotsky.

10. Trevarthen, "Instincts for Human Understanding and Cultural Cooperation," 571.

11. Trevarthen, "Comments and Replies," in *Human Ethology*, 583-584.

12. Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1 (London:Heinemann Educational Books, 1984). It is noteworthy that Trevarthen says, "I use the word 'intersubjectivity' in the sense of Habermas...[to] specify the linking of subjects who are active in transmitting their understanding to each other....We need to penetrate the psychological process by which conscious intending subjects related their mental and emotional processes together. I feel that 'intersubjective'emphasises this." (Trevarthen, "Communication and Cooperation in Infancy," note 2, 347). Habermas uses the term in reference to the kinds of conditions that must be satisfied if an utterance is to be judged rationally valid (in the broad sense). He says that these conditions "cannot be satisfied one-sidedly, either relative to the speaker or hearer. They are rather conditions for the intersubjective recognition of a linguistic claim, which, in a way typical of a given class of speech acts, grounds a specified agreement covering obligations relevant to the sequel of interactions." (*The Theory of Communicative Action*, 298, translated and quoted by R.E. Young in *A Critical Theory of Education*, 108. (See note #13 below.)

13. R.E. Young, *A Critical Theory of Education:Habermas and Our Children's Future* (New York:Teacher's College Press, Columbia University, 1990), 101-107. The work of Habermas has become more accessible to English-speaking scholars through Young's translation and commentary of Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action.*

14. The notion of scaffolding stems in part from the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who identified what he called a "zone of proximal development" (ZPD). (See L.S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language* (Cambridge,Mass:The MIT Press, 1962.) The ZPD is the gap in cognitive development between what a child can currently do without help and what he or she can accomplish given the appropriate help or intercession by an adult. Thus, ZPD represents a point at which a "dialectical" increase in cognitive functioning occurs. For a more recent and interesting discussion of the ZPD as applied to concerns about the development of "problem-solving" skills, see Jane Healy, *Endangered Minds:Why Children Don't Think and What We Can Do About It* (New York:Simon & Schuster, 1990), 177-192. Bruner, too, discusses the importance of scaffolding, which he refers to as "loaning children our consciousness." See Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1986).

15. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 305, quoted in Young, 107. Habermas uses J.L. Austin's well-known distinction between the illocutionary and perlocutionary functions of a speech act as the basis for his distinction between *strategic action*—action which is directed toward the goal of bringing about some state of affairs a speaker may desire *other than* the state of reaching understanding itself—and *communicative action*—action in which the participants openly reveal, harmonize, and coordinate their thoughts and individual plans of action with one another. In communicative action, the emphasis is on the illocutionary function of speech, i.e. the act of conveying meaning from one person to another. In contrast to communicative action, the perlocutionary function of speech tends to dominate most forms of strategic action (those actions "oriented to success" rather than "oriented to reaching understanding"). Although strategic actions also involve illocutions, they differ in that they lack the full "openness" or revelatory nature of purely illocutionary acts; indeed, they often involve outright concealment of intention (i.e. "hidden agendas" or "subtexts.") Illocutionary aims, while present, are subordinated to perlocutionary ones which involve influencing a hearer in some way. Thus, all forms of manipulation using language are forms of strategic action. For Austin's original distinction, see J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things With Words* (Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1962).

Court Defined Philosophy: Rehnquist, Minimalism, and Access

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For many years the term "access" has been used to describe services provided to students with disabilities. In *Board of Education* v. *Rowley,* 458 U.S. 176, (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court decided that physical access was all that schools were required to provide special students, and that the law required districts to provide no particular standard of intellectual access for these students once inside the buildings. This minimalistic approach to education has replaced all other philosophies of education in the quest for higher standards.

The Court lowered the requirements for districts who serve students with special needs just as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was amended to make more specific requirements for the education of these students. While the reduction of services to students with special needs was the most direct result of this decision, it's impact on educational reform in general may be the most insidious. In the quest for higher standards, states have instituted more standardized tests, younger introduction of many academic subjects, and a number of alternatives to teacher training.

Apparently by higher standards we mean more evaluation, more nationalization of curriculum standards, and more standardization of basic knowledge. What are standardized tests, national curriculum matrices, and NCATE other than an attempt to adjust all schools to the minimum standards of education? Genuine intellectual access cannot be obtained through standardization, measured with a number two pencil, or mandated by a group of bureaucrats. Only by ignoring legal minimums and developing a philosophy of education based on intellectual access for all students will we attain any semblance of the achievement we profess to want for our students.

THE FACTS OF THE ROWLEY CASE

Amy Rowley was a deaf kindergartner. The school purchased hearing aides to accommodate her in kindergarten. While she made decent grades, mostly B's, her parents believed that she was not progressing at the rate she would have in the absence of her disability. They asked that a sign language interpreter accompany her in all her classes to help her make the same academic progress as her non-disabled peers. The school district maintained that since her grades were above average, they were not required to provide any further accommodations for Ms. Rowley. Their case alleged that since she was progressing, and not failing, they were doing their job. It was not their job to see that she reached her academic potential.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the district, and directed the school district to provide the interpreter for Ms. Rowley. In doing so, their expectation was that it was the responsibility of schools to facilitate the academic achievement of all students, not just the non-disabled. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Education for All Handicapped Children Act did not, in fact, require "state[s] to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with opportunity provided nonhandicapped children".

The case was reversed and remanded.

REHNQUIST'S OPINION

Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the decision for the majority. In his decision he wrote that the lower courts were wrong in saying the statute failed to adequately define the term "access". According to him, it was defined during a time when physical access was the primary issue facing students with disabilities; therefore, "access" meant physical access to the building and only so much academic involvement as to make the access "meaningful". Rehnquist believes that congress did not imply any requirement that districts make sure that disabled students were achieving their potential. In his decision he wrote:

> The Act's language contains no express substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children (Pp. 3041-3042)

In a way he is correct. The origins of disability law in the Rehabilitation Act were written during a time when most children with disabilities were excluded from regular schools. So the laws have been written assuming that the first responsibility of schools is to provide physical access to students with disabilities. After all, a child cannot learn in a school if he is not even allowed in that school. Rehnquist acknowledges this in his discussion of the legislative history:

> The Act's legislative history shows that Congress sought to make public education available to handicapped children, but did not intend to impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than is necessary to make such access to public education meaningful. The Act's intent was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children by means of specialized educational services than to guarantee any particular substantive level of education once inside. (Pp. 3042-3046.)

Well, it does seem as though Rehnquist's assumption here is that schools have some "particular substantive level of education" which they are required to provide nondisabled students. Those of us who are parents of nondisabled children, I'm sure, would like to believe this is true. On the other hand, those of us who are parents of children with disabilities would like to believe that it is the job of our local school district to provide our children with an education that is substantively similar to that our nondisabled children receive. These programs may be implemented differently, they may have different assessments and personnel attached to them, but surely we expect the schools to be teaching our children what we, as a nation, have decided are the fundamentals of knowledge that all citizens should be afforded.

Chief Justice Rehnquist would argue with me about that, though. His words stand on their own.

> The Act does not require a State to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. (Pp. 3046-3048)

I have not conducted a national poll to find out what parents, teachers, administrators and citizens believe that schools should be doing. My discussions with parents in the six districts in which I have worked or lived leads me to believe that parents believe that the schools ought to be providing their children who have disabilities with an education which maximizes their potential. Why spend hours in IEP meetings advocating for your child, working with districts to provide a placement in the least restrictive environment, and reviewing the curriculum and assessment for a child if the district is, in fact, only required to make the experience "meaningful" for the child? Perhaps the language Rehnquist uses gives us a clue.

LANGUAGE OF REHNQUIST'S WRITING

It is important to keep in mind while reading Rehnquist's opinion on this case, that this is intended only as a response to a legal case. It was not intended to address schools as moral systems, schools as arbiters of social norms, or any of the other ways in which schools affect our culture. Rehnquist was only writing about what schools are legally obligated to provide for students with disabilities. He left it up to the educators to decide what they are ethically obligated to provide.

> The Act's legislative history shows that Congress sought to make public education available to handicapped children, but did not intend to impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than is necessary to make such access to public education meaningful. The Act's intent was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children by means of specialized educational services than to guarantee any particular substantive level of education once inside. (177)

This is among the most poignant parts of his decision. I restate it here because I believe that people who are concerned about philosophy of education need to concern themselves with what this paragraph says. If the law intended no substantive level of education, but only intended to provide ramps, elevators, Braille books, nurses to distribute ritilin, and private rooms for taking tests, then what are we going to do about that? I cannot walk into a school and tell its employees that they are legally required to provide my daughter, who has a communication disorder, with any more than an a minimal education that is "meaningful". I can debate with them about what a meaningful education should entail, but the weight of the law is on their side as long as she passes. But Veronica is one of the lucky students. She has parents who will not allow the school to waste her life on meaningless low-level tasks that do not challenge her. She lives in a district that places a priority on the learning of special students. Wouldn't it be nice if all students with disabilities had this luxury?

How do we legislate philosophy? If educators do not buy into the notion that students with disabilities can achieve academically, then they will teach them accordingly. If administrators consider it a waste of their district resources to provide special programs, they will not provide them. And the supreme court will put no teeth in the statute to make them.

Again, Rehnquist relies on the statutory legal definitions to make his case.

> Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a "free appropriate public education" as defined by the Act. (188)

As a teacher I expect more from my students than minimally to "benefit from the instruction". I expect them to work their hardest and achieve to their potential. I hope that all teachers expect this from all of their students. I hope that teachers will provide "individualized instruction. . .with sufficient supportive services" for all of their students. This is not necessarily the case.

A. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE

If the statute does not require students to be taught to their potential, then what does ti require? The Act was painted with very broad strokes.

> The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title. (1401(18))

Congress went on to become more specific about the necessary requirements that schools should provide to students. IDEA assumes that students with disabilities will be moving into regular classrooms, and that fewer students will be in self-contained classrooms. With this in mind congress included the following:

> When the handicapped child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the achievement of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will be one important factor in determining educational benefit. (1401(19))

In this section the statute can be used to support Rehnquist's decision. It certainly sounds like congress was saying that passing grades were the primary evidence of success in school for student with disabilities. On the other hand, passing grades are probably the primary evidence of success in schools for all students. How many colleges are there that do not look at a students' GPA prior to admission? Not very many. What needs to be stated, though, is that grades should mean the same thing from one student to the next, one school to the next. Those of us in education know better, right? Grades are only one limited indicator of success, and need to be balanced with many other variables to contain any accuracy or relevance.

To this end, the statute requires states to appoint a panel of experts to review the state requirements for special programs.

> [States must create] an advisory panel, appointed by the Governor or any other official authorized under State law to make such appointment, composed of individuals involved in or concerned with the education of handicapped children, including handicapped individuals, teachers, parents or guardians of handicapped children, State and local education officials, and administrators of programs for handicapped children, which (A) advises the State educational agency of unmet needs within the State in the education of handicapped children, [and] (B) comments publicly on any rules or regulations proposed for issuance by the State regarding the education of handicapped children." 1413(a)(12)

The problem, of course, with appointed panels of experts is that they are part of the political process, and not always involved for the most altruistic reasons. And commenting on the state's rules and regulations will not necessarily do anything to change them. But more particularly for each student the district must provide:

A statement of the program modifications or supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child to advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals, be involved and progress in the general curriculum , and participate in extra curricular and other nonacademic activities and to be educated and participate with other children with disabilities and nondisabled children. (Www.ideapractices.org/regs/majorissues.htm)

This statement, from the new regulations (IDEA97), makes it clear that congress wants students with disabilities to be involved in the entire schooling process, not just the fulfillment of the IEP requirements. If special students are "to be educated and participate with other children" that assures that they are not to be relegated to the broom closet on the first floor.

Philosophical Underpinnings of this Language

While it is convenient to think that it is not the job of the schools to achieve the academic potential of all students, it is certainly worthy of note. What does this rhetoric say about the philosophy of those who hold this view? For Mr. Rehnquist I believe that the debate over Rowley was purely legal. For those of us involved in the process of education, the debate should be more broadly understood. A law, a statute, or a regulation is never going to be comprehensive. It is not possible in that forum to include every possible example and outcome that one can construe from general language. Similarly, it should not be the purpose of the justice system to impose education by the lowest common denominator upon school districts. It was only possible, and perhaps only fitting, for the Supreme Court to address the facts in evidence before them. It is then our purpose as educators to bring that language to life in our practice if it is worthy. Rowley did not set a high enough standard for schools. The statute did not set specific enough, rigorous enough requirements. We must set rigorous, specific standards, but we should not regard statutory language, no matter how high the standards appear, to decide our practice. Best practice for each student should be decided by the same type of rigorous standards that we set for our students. Research, writing, reflection on teaching and learning are the ways to decide programmatic constructions for students.

One other aspect of philosophical underpinnings that is important here are definitions. Definitions of terms give us tremendous insight to the language which is used to define schools. In my mind the most important terms in this case are "appropriate", "adequate", and "meaningful". The dictionary defines these terms as follows:

> ***appropriate*** 1. Suitable or proper 2. Formal: belonging or particular v.tr. 1 take possession of; 2. devote (money etc.) To special purposes
> ***adequate*** 1. Sufficient, satisfactory 2. proportionate to 3. Barely sufficient (from Latin adaequatus "made equal")
> ***meaningful*** 1. Full of meaning; significant 2. Logic; able to be interpreted. (Meaning: n. 1 what is meant by a word, action, idea, etc. 2. Significance 3. Importance adj. Expressive, significant) (The Oxford Modern English Dictionary, 2nd Ed. 1996).

These terms are frequently used interchangeably by connotative definition. When we speak of a "free appropriate public education" I think that most people believe that education to be both meaningful and adequate. While the standards movement rails about rigorous high standards, disability law continues to talk in terms of adequacy. What is the movement between adequacy and rigor, and how do we figure out when we have one, the other, or both? Most students, not just students with disabilities, are probably getting an adequate education. They are able to get some sort of job after graduation, go on to college or trade school, and participate in the American dream of eating cheeseburgers and wearing blue jeans. To move from adequacy to rigor strikes me as a fundamental change in philosophy of education, and will necessitate curricular reform, instructional changes, and—most likely—re-creation of funding practices. As a nation we should expect no less.

Statutory Language to Support Higher Standards of Access

The final regulations reflect the new statutory language which requires that the Individualized Education Program for each child with a disability include:

> - A statement of the child's present levels of educational performance including how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and progress in the general curriculum;
> - A statement of measureable annual goals related to meeting the child's needs that result from the child's disability to enable the child to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum;
> - A statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services; and
> - A statement of the program modifications or supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child to advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals, be involved and progress in the general curriculum, and participate in extra curriculuar and other nonacademic activites and to be educated and participate with other children with disabilities and nondisabled children. (www.ideapractices.org)

These are still general, and focus on programs more than individual student needs, but are clear in their intent to provide students with disabilities an opportunity to participate as full members of their school community. Congress goes on to discuss the importance of continuing education and research in the careers of teachers who deal with special students.

SEC. 672. RESEARCH AND INNOVATION TO IMPROVE SERVICES AND RESULTS FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL- The Secretary shall make competitive grants to, or enter into contracts or cooperative agreements with, eligible entities to produce, and advance the use of, knowledge --

(6) to address the range of special education, related services, and early intervention needs of children with disabilities who need significant levels of support to maximize their participation and learning in school and in the community. (IDEA 97 p. 120)

This language is profoundly different than the language that Rehnquist was able to interpret as only providing minimal access to schools. To maximize the participation and learning of students requires that there be some basic, substantive requirements in the curriculum. This clearly indicates that students are expected to have their needs met both by early intervention and continuing services. The government provides grant money to schools who desire to maximize the potential of students with disabilities.

In the following section, (b) NEW KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION; AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES- Congress states:

(1) IN GENERAL- In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall support activities, consistent with the objectives described in subsection (a), that lead to the production of new knowledge. (Ibid)

In this way Congress hopes to provide for students with disabilities by contributing to the knowledge base that will enable their teachers to help them succeed. They go on to write:

(i) enable children with disabilities to make effective transitions described in section 674(b)(3)(C) or transitions between educational settings; and

(ii) improve educational and transitional results for children with disabilities at all levels of the educational system in which the activities are carried out and, in particular, that improve the progress of the children, as measured by assessments within the general education curriculum involved. (Ibid)

and

(d) IMPROVING THE USE OF PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE; AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES-

(D) Enabling professionals, parents of children with disabilities, and other persons, to learn about, and implement, the findings of research, and successful practices developed in model demonstration projects, relating to the provision of services to children with disabilities..

(E) Conducting outreach, and disseminating information relating to successful approaches to overcoming systemic barriers to the effective and efficient delivery of early intervention, educational, and transitional services, to personnel who provide services to children with disabilities. (Ibid, p. 122)

While the Supreme Court lowered the legal requirements for schools who serve children with disabilities, Congress has attempted in its revision of IDEA to provide higher expectations that districts will provide these students with a quality education, help them to overcome barriers to that education, and help them transition from that education into a job or higher educaiton. This is, surely, what we want for all of our children.

I. Philosophical Underpinnings of this Language

The statute can be read in a way that supports the court's philosophy. It can also be read to indicate that schools should provide students with an education that allows them to maximize their potential. While Justice Rehnquist wrote that the original IDEA did not require schools to provide students with disabilities a comparable education to their nondisabled peers, the 1997

Amendment to IDEA clearly states that congress believes that schools should be in the business of educating children with disabilities, not just providing physical access to their buildings.

With these changes in the law, have we changed our national philosophy of education? Probably not. The standards debate uses criterion reference tests as the lynch pin to all things rigorous. Politicians insist that one more standardized test on reading or mathematical skills will provide that precision that the schools currently lack. Schools of Education provide accrediting organizations with mountains of statistics and charts to prove that they are doing their job educating future teachers. Has even a teaspoon of this beaurocratic paperwork helped one child learn anything? I sincerely doubt that it has. I am not against evaluation, programatic or otherwise, but we seem to be confusing evaluation with learning. It is best for students to have their IEP in place. It is best to have a team of people to collaborate for the good of students. We cannot allow our assessment mania to cloud the cold, hard fact that statistics cannot tell us very much about these kids, disabled or not.

The statue has been modified by a congress who clearly wants to see children with disabiltiies receiving an education that will help them in life. We should expect no less from the people who serve this constituency. We should expect no less for any student in any classroom in this country.

I. In what ways Rowley has influenced national philosophy of education

The decision in the Rowley case has lowered the requirements for programs designed to serve handicapped students. In addition to that, the national debate about education reform and higher standards seems to reflect the influence of the minimalistic approach to education suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Rowley case. The very fact that the goal of these higher standards is to raise test scores - scores based on acquisition of knowledge rather than any higher form of learning - suggests to me that this national debate is less concerned with intellectual access than physical access. It is concerned with the appearance of reform rather than actual reform. The true higher standards in education will be when we expect students to develop to their highest potential in schools, and not just acquire some random facts to scribble into little bubbles.

In his book *Schools that Work* George Wood wrote:

> Perhaps the main tenet of the legislated-excellence movement is that children should learn "more". Recommendations for more time in class, more homework, more core academic subjects, and more standardized testing are all based on the assumption that exposing children to more direct instruction in more subject-matter areas will

> mean that children will learn more "stuff." The problem is that there is no evidence that htis is true. Exposure does not equal learning. And exposure certainly does not equal retention. For example, we all took American history several times in school. Yet poll after poll points out Americans' striking lack of recall on basic facts about the Constitution or our history. Thus, the legislated-excellence movement holds within it the possibility that its reforms will make schools worse, not better. By having students cover even more material it virtually assures that nothing will be covered in depth. Students may become good Trivial Pursuit players, but they will be lousy citizens and neighbors. (Wood, 167)

Surely what we want is for all of our students to learn well, not learn lots. Inclusive classrooms, performance assessments, multiple intelligences instruction, all these things that have been well-researched and shown to provide students with higher levels of understanding, self esteem, competence, and sense of community. Yet we systematically deny them these things when we track them, standardize test them to death, and give them minimum requirements to "pass". It seems as though we have taken the easy way out.

Thomas Toch wrote a book called *In the Name of Excellence.* In it he writes about the uses of intelligence tests at the turn of the century when manditory attendance and child labor laws went into effect, glutting the schools with new students. Many of these new students were from immigrant families with minimal English skills, and a myriad other qualities that made them different from the upper socioeconomic constituents the teachers were accustomed to.

> What the new intelligence tests offered secondary school educators - and what they sought desperately - was an efficient and "scientific" way to manage the mass of new students pouring into the public schools. "There was a heightening sense after 1908 that educational measurement had ushered in a new era in which the promise of efficiency could at last be scientifically fulfilled," said historian Lawrence A. Cremin in The Transformation of the School, his classic study of Progressivism in American education. With the advent of educational measurement, schools gained a putatively objective means of sorting their students. More significantly, however, the new tests armed educators with a justification for avoiding the difficult task of teaching traditional academic subjects to nonelite students. It was thus convenient for educators to turn a blind eye to the glaring weaknesses in both the tests and the conclusions drawn from them. (Toch, p. 44)

We would do well to keep both eyes completely focused on our moral obligation to all of ours students.

I. CONCLUSION

We cannot allow the law, be it the supreme court or congress, to decide our philosophy of education. We cannot allow those who believe that national standardization will solve all of our problems to blind us to the reality that there is not one right way to teach and learn. It is our job, as teachers, parents and advocates for education, to decide that we want the best for each student in each classroom in this country. It is our obligation to them to facilitate their learning and provide as many options for their lives as we can. While we are gatekeepers in some ways, and must be sure to promote self-discipline among our students, our colleauges and for ourselves, we must do so without letting preconceptions crowd out compassion, without letting battle fatigue drown out the individualization of experiences. When we truly value each of our students as an individual and not as a statistic on a piece of paper who can raise or lower public perception of the district, can we be free to teach and learn in a caring community.

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Holistic Multicultural Education: A Journey Toward Soul

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Consider the following dialogue:

DISCIPLE: I have come to offer you my service.

MASTER: If you dropped the "I," service would automatically follow (de Mello, 1982, p. 102).

There are innumerable possibilities for interpreting the meaning of the above dialogue. Using the dialogue as a point of reference, I will address four possible categories of interpretation: egocentrism, ethnocentrism, multiculturalism, and metaculturalism. The categories will focus on two dimensions: a broadening of awareness and a deepening of trust. Finally, I will tentatively draw out implications for the educational process.

Egocentrism is interpretation at the most limited degree of awareness. The reference point which frames the interpreter's consciousness is his or her self. The primary question regarding the dialogue would be, "What does the dialogue have to do with me?" The answer(s) which the interpreter develops would mold the dialogue into the image and needs, both conscious and unconscious, of his or her self. Examples of possible interpretations at the egocentric level might be:

- It's important for me to offer service; it will make me a better person.
- Service isn't automatic. It takes work. I can do it.

In other words, the egocentric type would miss the point of the dialogue.

The second type of awareness moves beyond egocentrism, but still operates primarily from a monocultural stance. This is the ethnocentric type of interpretation. This type describes someone who is unwilling or unable to address experience outside of a particular ethnic heritage. Such a person is culturally encapsulated. Using ethnocentric in this way, an African-American male from the urban northern United States might seem to be ethnocentric in his ability or willingness to understand the perspective of a white female American from East Texas. But, I would like to broaden the meaning of ethnocentric, such as is the case with Western European Judeao-Christian culture and Asian Buddhist, for example. Ethnocentrism, then, includes foundational differences in the organization of perception and assumptional framework that guide and frame human behavior.

The male and female described above might arrive at similiar interpretations of the dialogue, especially if they were operating out of the egocentric level of awareness. By way of contrast, consider the interpretation that might come from someone operating out of a non-Westernized Hispanic culture:

- You must be ready at all times to be of service to your family.
- The family is much more important than me, so it is necessary to drop the "I" to really be of service.

These interpretations grow out of the accepted realities of traditional Hispanic culture. "My house is your house" is but one example. Since the focal point of Hispanic life is the family rather than the individual, the dropping of the "I," such as "I want," "I would like to," etc., is a necessity in guarding the primacy of the family.

The above is an example of the qualitative shift that occurs when a Western viewpoint is moved outside of Western culture, a shift out of monocultural encapsulation. In such a shift, one does not simply learn a new language, one enters a new universe where the old ways of being and doing no longer have validity. As Wittgenstein (1953) noted, to speak a different language is to live in a different reality. It may also be true that it is only through the deep experience of a radically different culture that one can come to appreciate one's own culture.

There is a parallel between moving out of egocentrism and moving out of ethnocentrism. Each move involves a "shifting out" of a limited cognitive, affective, and perceptual set into a broader arena of awareness. This "shifting out" of a limited frame is familiar to multicultural teachers, as when a student comes to a new awareness of self, for example. In teacher training programs in which I am familiar, much attention is typically given to self-exploration and self-awareness, often under the focus of reflective awareness, in order to reduce the blind spots of egocentrism. Ethnocentrism is dealt with in a fashion, but, as will be noted below, its blind spots are typically ignored or passed by unawares (McLaren, 1989).

Often the issue of ethnocentrism can be subtle at the level of educational practice. If an ethnocentric, culturally encapsulated Western teacher is working with a class of non-Western Filipino students, for instance, the teacher might view the students' self as underdeveloped or undifferentiated, that is, by using ethnocentric, Western lenses. There might be a choice, then, to replace the defective Filipino self with a superior Western self. This supposed gift of a healthy self is no less damaging, culturally and personally, for being well-intentioned.

This type of "shifting out" is called multiculturalism. At this level, interpretation takes into account an awareness of the many possibilities for meaning across cultures. Thus, there are any number of interpretations for the above dialogue, depending upon which cultures the interpreter brings into play to provide the frame(s) within which the dialogue is to be understood. Also, interpreters have multicultural perspectives even when they operate strictly within their own culture, since this perspective allows the interpreter access to perspectives and insights which are hidden to their culturally blinded peers.

Unfortunately, the process of developing a multicultural perspective is no simple matter. Perhaps a superficial sense of multiculturality can be acquired from reading this article and other books and articles on multiculturalism. But, such a superficial exposure may prevent deeper exposure to multiculturalism. That is, a superficial approach may actually work as *the* intellectual paradigm, enclosing it within one set of conceptual lenses.

Multiculturality necessarily involves intense, ongoing, and comprehensive submersion in the "otherness" of an alternative culture's reality. This experience must get to the point where individuals begin to experience themselves as the "other" within the normative reality of that culture (Schutz, 1975). It is only in leaving one's own cultural reality and entering that of another, to the point where one's own inner cultural reality is at risk, that one can accomplish the "crossing over and coming back" which makes multiculturality possible (Dunne, 1972).

Geertz (1973) describes what he calls the "dramaturgical self" of the culture of Bali. In contrast to the Western notion of self as autonomous and individualistic, this self finds its identity in a highly styalized "never changing pageant that is Balinese life" (p. 486). What is real to the Balinese self is not the individual, but the part in which the individual participates, a social and dramatic role that was acted out by others before and will be acted out by others after. Geertz (1973) writes:

> Physically, men, women, and children come and go--mere incidents in a happen stance history of no genuine importance, even to themselves. But the masks they wear, the stage they occupy, the parts they play, and more important, the spectacle they mount remain and constitute not the facade but the substance of things, not least the self . . . There is no make-believe: of course players perish, but the play doesn't, and it is the latter, the performed rather than the performer, that really matters (p. 868).

How might the multicultural Western teacher approach a student from Bali who showed signs of emotional distress, who was not working up to expectations? With great caution, certainly, but with a profound sense of humility regarding the extent to which an outsider cannot fully enter the experience of another person, whether or not the outsider shares the student's cultural heritage.

With time and effort the teacher may learn how the Balinese student's self (if we can speak of "self" in a culture which has no such category or concept, and no such reality) with a sensitivity to the goals of Balinese culture for the self. At the same time, there is a *structural* awareness regarding the relationship of culture and self that is crucial here. In the above paragraph the teacher would be putting together a sort of culturally sensitive version of teaching, attempting to maintain the integrity of the Balinese circle of reality. The multicultural teacher would also realize, however, that the Balinese cultural self is ultimately just as oppressive, just as much a distortion as the Western cultural self.

There is an underlying *structure of relationship* between culture and self which appears to be invarient. Just as the teacher witnesses to the binding of soul in the Western self (Moore, 1992), so there is a parallel binding of soul in the Balinese self. It is a different binding, to be sure, as the soul is grounded in everyday life and experience (Moore, 1992). And the soul within is likely to be configured differently as well. Yet, there is a similiarity and continuity to the teacher's interpathic presence and successful teaching. It is through interpathic presence that soul is recognized and cherished; and it is this form of presence which constitutes metacultural education.

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

How does this theoretical framework play out in teaching? Let us return again to the dialogue mentioned at the beginning of this article. The response to cultural differences of egocentric teachers would be determined and limited by their own needs. If egocentric teachers were uncomfortable with strong affect and with differing cultural values, they might say, "Just try to put your culture behind you." Conversely, if egocentric teachers needed intensive affective stimulation, they might say, "It's ok to get your feelings out."

Many other responses are possible at this level. There are two key features, however. One is that egocentric teachers are dealing more with their own needs than with the student's; those personal needs provide the frame and focus for the teacher's understanding of the dialogue. The second key feature is that the teacher is largely unaware of the full extent of the biases that these needs create and of the consequent impact on teaching. In other words, the dialogue has nothing to do with either "Put it behind you" or "Get your feelings out."

The response to the dialogue of the ethnocentric teacher is best presented in a cross-cultural context. Assume for a moment that the disciple is Western and the master is Asian. Ethnocentric Western disciples would be able to distinguish their own emotional and relational needs from those of the master. Even though the disciple initially asked the question, the emphasis would be on individuation and autonomy. At this level, the problem would lie in working out of a Western cultural framework without awareness that this Western "reality" is a cultural creation which is profoundly different from the master's. Perhaps at this level the disciple might respond, "Perhaps the problem here is that I can only be of service if I take better care of myself," thereby promoting the Western values of autonomy and self-reliance.

Multicultural teachers are also capable of appropriate empathy, but serve no particular cultural master. The disciple's response here might be in terms of options. "Perhaps there are many ways of serving," the disciple might suggest. Multicultural teachers want to help students come up with a response to students' questions and/or issues which fit their personal needs, that is respectful of their cultural heritage, and that would help them adapt effectively to the situation in light of students' values.

It is important to note that while multicultural teachers serve no specific culture, neither have they broken with culture as a whole. The multicultural teacher does not witness to anything *beyond* the multicultural frame.

The metacultural teacher is also capable of empathy and has risen above culture-blindness. They may make no attempt to figure out the dialogue presented at the beginning of this article. The metacultural teacher will witness to the inadequacy of cultural answers rather than integrate or reintegrate students into the comfort of their own culture. The metacultural teacher would not even assert, "I have come to offer you my service."

The metacultural educator lives "in" reality, noting that reality is both safe, meaningful, and coherent as well as unpredictable, uncontrollable, frightening, and chaotic. The culture disagrees and says, "No, life's not that way (unsafe, meaningless, incoherent), you just brought whatever your suffering on yourself when you failed to do X," where X is the specific culture's version of behavior.

The metacultural educator recognizes that failure often is not the student's but rather the culture's failure: the failure to live up to the American Dream, to safety, prosperity, etc. If the teacher tries to help students cling to self and culture (self as culture defines it), working to return to and rapair cultural meaning (and thus repair the self), then at some level both will experience the hollow inauthenticity of the culture's illusory promises.

With these insights, the metacultural educator is most truly free to be present to students. A metacultural educational environment allows both teachers and students to cooperate in a process by which the self's cultural meaning (self as the culture defines and rewards it) is surrendered so that the soul (the I-Thou relationship) emerges as the dominant experienced reality. Hope shifts from the culture's promises about the future to the profound intimacy and realized promise of the present moment in which we experience nature, things, and people as other "Thou's." A deep bondedness also emerges, a trust which is beyond reason, cultural stereotypes, and expectations.

In this metacultural space humanity develops. As of my students wrote in her journal (one of my class requirements):

> When I began to keep this journal something happened. I realized that my task was broader than merely keeping a journal. It was to understand and cooperate with what was going on inside me, especially what promised to promote the healing of old wounds and hurts. My task was to maintain a relaxed mood, like the relaxization exercise we do before class affords me, and to accept my past hurts as

a part of my growth, so as to avoid interference with my new inner strength. For the first time in my life I felt free.

CONCLUSION

Below is a table which depicts levels of awareness and cultural reality.

Awareness	**Egocentrism/ Ethnocentrism**	**Ego Awareness/ Ethnocentrism**	**Ego & Cultural Awareness**	**Metacultural Awareness**
Culture	Monoculturalism	Monoculturalism	Multiculturalism	Metaculturalism
Self	Un-self-aware	Self within culture	Self beyond culture	Self surrender Soul
Teaching	Unseasoned	Seasoned culture blind	Seasoned culture sensitive	Interpathic presence
Teaching style	Student modeled in the image of teacher's self	Student modeled in the image of teacher's culture	Student's self and culture joined by teacher; teaching is within the context of cultural integrity	Teacher to accompany student in journey beyond culture to reality and presence

The metacultural educator, then, strives to achieve awareness of the ways in which self and culture bind self and students. Metacultural teaching encounters and embraces wonder, mystery, and paradox, the "stuff" of life. It offers a context in which cultural-blinders are removed, through awareness and understanding, so that teachers and students experience not merely self but soul; that "I-Thou" experience which is at the heart of our very humanity.

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Can Democratic Education Still Inspire?

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True believers in democratic education have fallen on hard times. Among other things, we find ourselves landed in the situation I describe in the first part of this paper, a bleak rhetorical landscape wherein advocates of public schooling for all are unsuccessful at convincing anyone of the enterprise they champion in the moral terms that they themselves accept. Rather, we must justify ourselves exclusively in instrumental terms that appeal to external agencies such as polymorphous business demands for value-addedness, any number of politically expedient "accountability" agendas, de jure requirements of statutory and (mostly state) constitutional law, etc. My intention is to show something of how impoverished this kind of after-the-fact justificatory discourse has become. I conclude, however, on an optimistic, even utopian note. For within the wasteland of consumerism and its creature "youth" exist some surprisingly hopeful elements—moral commitments, even—that might undergird new understandings of education and its relation to democracy. In the absence of compelling alternatives and in the wake of the faltering political alliances of yesteryear, such new visions, inchoate though they may still be, are well worth considering. My paper, then, presents the broad strokes of the current situation as cause for pessimism, yet proceeds in an upbeat manner toward how things might look otherwise.

The Challenge of Usefulness

In a way the threat of instrumentalization is nothing new and nothing unique to education. Like other cultural processes and institutions, education perpetually tends toward subservience to socially hegemonic centers of power. To echo a common observation, as an institution, education displays a certain functional relativism, as the direction from which authority over it flows is relative to the powers that be in society generally, regardless of the reigning socio-political regime. As is almost always the case, the grounding upon which schooling is justified is largely a function of what legitimates and maintains that "base." Not that there are no countertrends, instances of relative institutional autonomy, even small rebellions from time to time. But, on the whole, education in a theocracy looks pious, under capitalism it justifies itself by its profitability to the right parties (as a long-term "investment," at least), ethnic nationalism cum fascism learns blood and soil, Soviet-style ideological totalitarianism transmits doctrinal correctness, and classical aristocracy sponsors corresponding paideutic and courtier ideals.

Democracy is no exception. All known instances of democratic education foster and supervise pedagogical institutions conducive to the democratic polity's civic mission. Since they lie so close to the heart of symbolic processes surrounding sociopolitical legitimacy, the mass pedagogical efforts that in part define democracy can only very rarely escape this "orders from above" totalizing process before being either destroyed or coopted. By various mechanisms, from violence to discreet discouragement, anything significant that is truly anomalous in the sphere of schooling is eventually brought into line. Almost by definition, the project of schooling is to a defining degree reproductionist in this sense. This phenomenon is neither bad nor good as such, of course, because, given what one might call this educational relativism, the moral status of the educational enterprise is dependent upon that of the more powerful social forces that shape and direct it; if education is a means to larger and higher ends, its moral value rises and falls as a function of those same larger and higher ends. A moral mimic, education's "voice" is rarely its own.

Historically in the U.S., the energetic mixture of religious, white supremacist, free market and democratic faiths that has founded and extended the idea of schooling for all also supplies the terms of debate within which education's successes and failures are assessed. Democrats worry about apathy and civic exclusion. Business leaders issue national reports scolding schools for workers' low productivity and noncompetitiveness. Christian fundamentalists, by far the U.S.'s most politically effective religious variety, address the alleged abandonment of *their* morality at the schoolhouse door. Anglophile nationalists, fearing the demise of *their* language and lifeways from across the Mexican border and from within the inner cities pursue fearsomely popular measures to exclude undocumented immigrants from public education and, for those who remain, erect triumphalist "English Only" requirements. And, following the logic of their own primary agendas, three of these four constituencies of the erstwhile "public school movement" are now decisively pulling out of the coalition. Only the democrats remain. Once upon a time these often conflicting groups could unite over issues as diverse as economic reproduction, immigrant assimilation, racial segregation (i.e., in support of it), civic participation and their own brand of secularism. But the agreements upon which this alliance was based have proceeded to deteriorate, probably since around the Civil Rights era. The bargain now appears all but over.

Worse, all is not well within the camp of the remaining democratic loyalists themselves. Where they "win," as they still often do, the democrats' victories are most often pyrrhic triumphs mostly due to the realpolitik of teacher unions' statehouse lobbying clout and their professionally deployed advertising war chests. To be sure, the defeat of various state referenda on school vouchers is sometimes said to evidence a widespread public commitment to democratic education. As Albert Menendez has recently chronicled, these votes have for some time been impressively lopsided in favor of the public school status quo.[1] But what exactly are these victories victories *for?* While no one one really knows, I would venture that they are less symptomatic of any widespread vestigial commitment to the common school than they are, at their best, reflective of distributive concerns. Public schools are defended because of the practicality and equity of the distribution of schooling, and not so much with reference to the enterprise's civic mission. The direct public provision is upheld quite apart from any substantive valuation of what is being distributed: the suburbs tend to be satisfied with their schools that "work" to secure credentials and employment, whereas more direct government provision is needed in poor rural and inner city areas, not so much to promote civic ideals, but to guarantee that there exists any distribution of schooling at all (with the hope that it might "work" there, too). The most substantial argument of the democratic left against school vouchers, for example, is that a full-blown plan will destroy public schooling's overall funding base, making the poorest schools even poorer.

While such predictions are probably accurate—one need only look the British urban "sink schools" that are actual casualties of such a plan—it is not *per se* an argument for why public education is the kind of thing we all ought to value. It rests circularly upon its own incontestable assumption that we should properly fund schools in poor neighborhoods. One can agree conditionally that if something is valuable it ought to be distributed in a certain way—in this case equitably. But this assumes the value of the thing to be distributed--in this case public schooling. The circularity reveals a weakness of the argument of the democrats, who are unable to convince anyone anymore on the moral terms that actually motivate their own efforts. The result is that they cede what should be their moral and political authority to the forces of "progressive" corporatism and its school-business "partnerships," enterprise zones, and the like. We should distribute the thing equitably (as a practical matter for activists, working toward this goal alone takes up everyone's energy and resources) and the thing is worthwhile because it augments the employment prospects for people who desperately need jobs. In this way, a crude economic instrumentalism—to be sure, always a feature of life under any form of capitalism—metonymically lodges itself, disguised, within the soul of the democratic educator. The situation is analogous to how, when justifying, say, immunizing or feeding ghetto children semantically slips from a discussion of why it is immoral to avoid the policy to why the (enlightened) self-interest of people in the suburbs is threatened by the avoidance. It is a good investment: "we" can pay $1 for Head Start and daycare on the front end or risk having to pay $10 for police and jail afterwards. What makes us care, really, is not so much the human suffering, but the fact that if *they* get tuberculosis, *we* might get it, too. It is understandable how economic use value becomes the chief mode of justifying education to everyone ("if they won't listen to morality, maybe we'll try *this* strategy now"). But it is also tragic. For like capital itself, shifts and accumulations in public discourse are often unnoticed at the key turning points. When they are noticed, it's often too late; what once was a strategic concession now takes on a life of its own. What was supposed to be a rhetorical means becomes an iron cage of ends that are taken as substantive. So it is that economic use value becomes the chief mode of justifying education—and most everything else—to everyone. As Marxists have long framed it, schooling is in this literal sense a capitalist tool.

One curious feature of tools, economic or otherwise, is that insofar as they efficiently work toward their assigned ends, they tend to vanish from explicit awareness. Unless I'm contemplating buying a new one or I fetishize it for some aesthetic reason, I don't normally, during my commute to work, think consciously about my car. It becomes an item for my direct attention, however, when I hear a funny noise coming from the engine or, in the extreme case, it breaks down and stops functioning altogether. Like any tool, insofar as it is useful it tends, as Heidegger described it, to withdraw from explicit awareness.[2] Insofar as it "works" toward its assigned economic ends, education vanishes as a matter of public concern, but when it "breaks"—or, more properly, when it is perceived to have broken—it gets looked at, even obsessively so, as a scapegoat. (Witness how schools are blamed during the bust part of the economic cycle but not credited during the boom.) Not only, then, do the terms of discourse alter themselves but, at least when things seem to be going smoothly enough (at least, of course, for those sanctioned to voice "how things are going"), the fact that there are terms of debate at all is largely hidden from view. Envigorating public discussion under such difficult conditions thus requires, before it can even properly begin, a preliminary demonstration of the contingency of the terms in which the debate has been framed, by forging a language of possibility, as it were.

Cautious Optimism

So how might one go about the absurdly utopian task of reinvigorating the set of motivations behind the democratic mission of education for all? Is it possible for such a thing to inspire at all any more—or is it hopelessly out of fashion, too uncynical, too unironic, too noncommercial? For, in a way, by now it seems almost quaint, like dusting off some vaguely charming antique found in your grandparents' attic. But one can't help wondering: what might some spit and polish do?

It seems to me that there are at least two distinctly moral values that are shared quite strongly by many, if not most people in our country generally--even across our vastly heterogeneous identity lines. This is especially the case with the younger, MTV-suckled, Generation X, X+1, etc. (among whom I count myself). Interestingly, these shared values are part and parcel with the very consumerism, the cynicism, etc., but also the tolerance and skepticism, that has widely been argued to characterize this generational cohort.3 If we can embrace these two values, run with them in our imaginations for awhile, maybe something appealing will emerge. These shared values are: ***1) Value pluralism.*** There are many ways to be well with the world and do good in it, many roads to happiness, wisdom, goodness, humanity. Not that ***anything*** goes, but, at the least, a great many things do. ***2) Philosophical humility.*** No one holds all the answers to life's most important questions—not scientific experts, religious leaders, therapists or, sorry to say, philosophers. One of the greatest "turn offs" in our society—particularly among the young—is the blowhard who claims to know something important with certainty, who attempts to speak from a position of universality, provide a master narrative allegedly immune from doubt. Pluralism and humility go hand in hand; it would be hard to be earnest about one and not the other. Each requires a dialogical openness, a provisional respect for the truth claims of the other person, even the person who strikes one as extremely odd and offensive, or maybe just vaguely ridiculous—pierced, tatooed, their pants falling low, their underwear showing.

These convictions can be shallow or they can be deep. Their shallow form is most often encountered in what might be called the MTV ironist style of life, the one who is "too cool" to be serious about anything. Here, image is everything, a live and let live (or die) attitude being all this stance can sustain morally—until of course, as it necessarily will, it feels victimized by the injustice of not getting everything it wants, or is made to want, by advertising and the vast want-manufacturing apparatus generally. In many cases, however, the shallow humble pluralist may be forced to gain depth when she finds herself to be the victim of more substantial injustice (e.g., discrimination or violence). Or, in an equally serious though different scenario, the humble pluralist may fall into the clutches of detachment and experience a crisis of meaning that calls for more searching answers (or, alternatively, suicide, sexual obsession, or drugs).

It is clearly upon the deeper variety of humble pluralist—perhaps, as an individual, a survivor of the shallow version—that we should pin our hopes. The depth is exhibited in a propensity to follow through with the convictions, to think them through as they apply to different areas of life, especially those that were once "raw" areas of experience, those largely untouched by conscious reflection and critique (e.g., the state of mind of settling into something entertaining on TV, paying the bills, sexuality and romance). Continuing the requisite follow-through that consistency demands, the humble pluralist would become extremely annoyed with larger socio-political trends that seem anti-humble and anti-pluralist.

And this is where she becomes my protagonist. Particularly when she daydreams about the Good Society and its schools.

Maybe in the right mood, she dreams a little dream. . .

A Dream of Equality and Education

Applying her pluralism and humility to social "spheres," to use an expansive term, she considers how they cater to a wide range of public needs and, in the ensemble, represent a dazzling array of expertise, commitment, tradition, caring, and, in the largest sense, forms of human meaning and excellence. Religion. Medicine. Education. Politics. Law. Art. Business. Farming. Romantic love. Athletics. Family ties. And dozens more. Each of these represent whole regions of human endeavor, within which individuals are able to give meaning to their lives, find hope, avenues for beauty and caring, or simply reasons to get up every morning. No one person reigns supreme in all—or even a great many —of these areas of meaning and collective effort, what Michael Walzer calls the "spheres of justice."[4] Well-grounded and widely shared humility and value pluralism together cultivate many flowers, though they might sneak a preference for some perennial and personal favorites.

In this Good Society, this pluralist utopia, there are no illicit transferences of hierarchy or domination from one sphere where preeminence might have been fairly acquired and maintained (for example, a brain surgeon giving orders to subordinates during a tumor removal) to another where such sphere-specific distributive arrangements do not belong. The surgeon will not, *on account of his surgical prowess,* amass disproportionate wealth, require his staff to vote for his candidate, be thought sexy by women half his age, be looked to for advice on how to discipline preschoolers, be given VIP treatment at the grocery store checkout line, get his children into the best schools or keep them from the military draft. He will not, in short, be able to parlay his position in the medical sphere into undue advantage in any other sphere. He may secure those advantages because he happens to possess the relevant qualities within the other sphere (e.g., perhaps he is a frequent shopper at the grocery store, is truly handsome to the opposite sex, etc.), but he will not receive them on account of his medical expertise. The same expectations will hold for corporate CEO's, media celebrities, fundamentalist preachers, U.S. senators, plumbers, schoolteachers, dogcatchers, philosophers, and everybody else.

At the institutional level in this Good Society, things look much the same. Good fences among the multiplicitous spheres of human involvement make good neighbors. Political processes are not disrupted by capital's capitol steps lobbying or a corrupting campaign financing system, one's level of wealth does not determine one's access to basic human needs such as transportation, housing, food, education, health care, etc. Individuals are, in fact, encouraged in their pursuit of happiness, a pursuit that is recognized by this model society to be inevitably bound up with social life: our intersubjective needs and obligations arising from our ensconcement in the voluntary and involuntary associations that give meaning to our lives. The internal distributive principles that allocate goods and services within the respective spheres, as well as the sphere-specific symbol systems that "explain" those distributions, are respected and accorded protection in policy, informal custom and law. When interspherical disputes arise (When is a medical procedure a want and not a need? Can I pay extra for a tutor for my children? Should politicized churches be exempt from taxation? Should the arts be federally funded?), there are in place Solomonic procedures—formal legal and otherwise—for dispute resolution that, while not necessarily pleasing all parties to every dispute, are universally recognized as impartial and otherwise fair.

In the everyday conduct of institutional life, there is a basic level of what one might call "spherical respect," where those in one sphere do not automatically think they should have sway in another sphere. "Inhabitants" of one sphere in this sense do not *dictate* to others. If they do perceive the need to intervene extraspherically (a schoolteacher recognizes an abusive situation in a student's home, local businesses notice that their recent hires are illiterate, employers try to accommodate the sincere religious scruples of employees, scientists lobby politically to secure research funding), they do so cautiously, and in full awareness of the moral and political complexities of crossing past the nether regions of their expertise and authority. Everyone of necessity crosses borders and possesses the "dirty hands" of moral and political complexity. Yet the universal awareness of this fact that we're down on all fours together breeds a becoming humility among the citizenry, a character trait not to be confused with timidity or deference. Citizens are obliged to speak, but they are also obliged to listen.

Such a robustly pluralistic society offers of a dazzling range of avenues down which human flourishing may proceed. This enables a proportionately astonishing degree of what David Miller specifically terms "social equality": a basic respect that individuals have for one another not just out of the altruistic kindness of their hearts but also because the circumference of their society's moral imagination is wide and pluralistic enough to allow for so many legitimate routes by which individuals may *earn* the regard of their fellows.[5] My being a garbage man is not simply a social joke. In doing this job, I earn the wages to support a dignified standard of living and have, in concert with my fellow workers, the political power to shape my working conditions and to ensure that they are tolerable. And, if I do my job well, my contribution to the life of the community will be understood and appreciated. It may be a dirty job but it is not a stigmatized one. If I suffer from a recognized disability, though there will be no guarantee of success in anything I try, access will be open to me as widely as possible given the nature of the social and economic position I seek. I will not face arbitrary exclusion or the insult of pity. Make no mistake: the kind of basketball I play is wheelchair basketball. But no one will say, "it's only wheelchair basketball."

The lived norm of social equality that is the lifeblood of the Good Society of spherical pluralism removes this "only." Though there are those who disagree, even vocally, with my religion, I am not only physically and emotionally secure in my practice of it, but the social equality I enjoy guarantees that there is no context in which I need be ashamed of my rituals and other aspects of my affiliation—or lack thereof. Though she may never really understand it, and though we may argue about it heatedly, even the most scientifically materialist of my neighbors will have, at the end of the day, the humility and good grace to respect my piety. For who among us holds the key to human happiness and the answers to life's final questions? When, as all of us do from time to time, I extend myself beyond where I ought—I venture opinions on subjects I know nothing about, I secure some unfair personal advantage, I dismiss a newcomer through prejudice, I allow others to treat me as special beyond what I deserve—I am reminded by my own developed conscience and, gently, by those attentive others who surround me, that I am breaking the rules. We remind one another how we sometimes establish in microcosm the very social inequalities that our pluralistic Good Society as a whole is meant to abjure.

In this mad fantasy the democratic forces have rallied and are triumphant, a victory whose winners are everyone pursuing one of the infinitely diverse ways of being human (within constitutional moral limits that are geared toward preserving as much of the diversity as possible while also, as Judith Shklar famously urged, disallowing cruelty in its many varieties;[6] this utopia is neither a free-for-all nor the libertarian "get out of my way!" good life). Education in such a society has two main functions. First and foremost, it is empowered and charged with *being education*. In stark contrast to my initial pessimistic picture of its servility to those in power, education presents itself proudly (but not haughtily) and autonomously (but not aloofly) to the larger community. Education as such is its first allegiance, and practitioners within the educational sphere share the animating, passionate conviction that it *does* mean something to devote oneself to learning and teaching, that such a life is, in the end, *on its own terms,* worthwhile. Educational institutions are therefore, in a crucial sense, autonomous, refusing to "step and fetch it" for hegemonic forces in politics, business and religion as they once did in the bad old days when they were crudely instrumentalized by whomever was in control. This institutional autonomy is gained, though, not via a series of refusals, but by the determination to satisfy individuals' personal needs and serve other social spheres where it is appropriate to do so. The autonomy arises, organically, precisely *through* service to others, creating and then fostering the wholesome dependencies characteristic of democracy at its best. Business no longer has the audacity to say to schools, "we need workers who can do

X, Y, and Z, so hop to it!" Instead, the business sphere cedes to education its own proper sphere of authority, recognizing that profitability is not the sole arbiter of value and that schools, by making possible a multiplicity of avenues for human flourishing, enrich everyone when they are allowed to do their *own* thing. We finally live according to the spirit Dewey's famous reply to the vocationalist David Snedden that the point is not to adapt our schools to the needs of the economic regime but to "alter the existing industrial system, and ultimately transform it," when that is the direction in which our best educational compasses point. Democracy trusts its educators to *educate*.

The second main thing schools do in the Good Society is that they provide for what might be called the complex edification of democratic citizens. They teach multiplicity and humility, not in order to produce weak-willed relativists, but to produce individuals who are truly able to *live* the experience of mutual human equality and respect. Students learn how much their own well-being and that of their community depends upon theirs and their neighbors' ability to find and cultivate meaning in important areas of their lives, even, in a way, to "lose" themselves in those areas if need be. They gain a disposition for a kind of existential adventurousness, a willingness to experiment with forms of expression and styles of living. Some of them will become restless experimenters, never able to settle down for long in any one area, apparently needing to metamorphose themselves at regular intervals (with the help of robust and accessible education available to them across their lifespans). Others, however, will remain settlers in the spheres to which they feel fated, some even staying committed to what their parents had done, and their parents before them. Some, in the Western "sowing wild oats style," will adventure before settling, whereas others, in a manner more reminiscent of Eastern traditions, will settle and then adventure in the autumn and winter of their lives. And there will be every imaginable variation upon this theme. Unvarying, though, will be the mutual respect individuals will practice and perceive in one another, for those coming and going, for those tarrying and staying, for those exploring expressions of which none of us have so far dreamed.

Finally, education, a last possessive of a principled allergy to being used by external interests, will disgorge the pollutants that currently poison it. As Francis Schrag has recently argued that it should,[8] education undertakes what was previously thought impossible: it detaches itself from its economic use-value; in other words, it does not allow preeminence and achievement within itself to translate into the sphere that presently, in a literal sense, capitalizes upon it. It gets out of the diploma and credentialling mill business for starters, refusing to legitimate processes that have nothing to do with what education *really* is. No one's remuneration and overall social dignity is any longer dependent on where they happened to climb on the credentials ladder; education's short-sighted complicity in a sham meritocracy, one where credential=merit=money=dignity, is exposed and corrected. From another direction, educational institutions do their best to make plain to everyone that if the quality of a child's education is a function of her socioeconomic status, let alone her race, gender, disability, etc., it is a violation of everything the Good Society stands for. Such a state of affairs represents an injustice viscerally felt as a violation by those who recognize in the welfare of others around them the preconditions for their *own.* At last, health-preserving firewalls arise between the educational and business spheres.

The victorious democrats in this fantasy understand that in order to unite, sometimes it is necessary to separate. Good fences are often needed in order to make good neighbors of the various social spheres that make our lives worth living. In this way, education can indeed produce wealth for everyone, the most durable of which will exist *on its own terms*—an *educational* wealth that has no necessary exchange value beyond itself. Inhabitants of the Good Society understand this intuitively, with a moral capaciousness and generosity that seems just beyond our present reach. But we can always dream, something we democrats must never fear to do.

Notes

1. Menendez from kappan

2. Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977)

3. For a constructive recent extension of this view along similar lines, see Ted Halstead, "A Politics for Generation X," *Atlantic Monthly,* August 1999, pp. 33-42. See also Peter Sacks, *Generation X Goes to College: An Eye-opening Account of Teaching in Postmodern America* (Chicago, IL.,1996).

4. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983)

5. David Miller, "Complex Equality," in *Pluralism, Justice and Equality,* ed. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

6. Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard/Belknap Press, 1984), pp. 7-44.

7. John Dewey, "Education vs. Trade-Training: Reply to David Snedden," *John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, Volume 8* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), p. 412.

8. Francis Schrag, *Back to Basics: Fundamental Educational Questions Reexamined* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995).

Making Manifest: Viewing Wittgenstein's Philosophy through Derek Jarman's Lens

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I consider the use of Derek Jarman's film, Wittgenstein as a resource for those writing, thinking about and teaching Wittgenstein's philosophy. I explain how the deeply Wittgensteinian character of Jarman's film is powerful in making manifest central Wittgensteinian themes. I begin by considering the role of biography in philosophical scholarship, arguing that it has a particularly important role in the case of Wittgenstein. In the second section of the paper I describe the form and content of the film and something of the process of its production. The third section of the paper discusses the strategy I employ when using the film in class. In the fourth section I develop the claim that the film is a Wittgensteinian one, discussing the ways in which it makes Wittgensteinian themes visible, showing them rather than saying them. By manifesting Wittgenstein's crucial distinction between saying (telling) and showing (manifestation), the film guides its audience into a way of seeing and thinking that is essential to understanding Wittgenstein's later approach to questions about language and its relationship to reality. In so doing, the film functions as a valuable text for scholars and teachers of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

THE PERSONAL IS PHILOSOPHICAL

Traditionally we tend not to think very much about a philosopher's biography. Arguments and ideas matter rather than their authors and proponents. Analytic philosophy in particular distains the practice of situating ideas in their social, historical and political contexts, remaining attached to the notion of the philosopher and his or her ideas as somehow transcending located embodiment. As an undergraduate I was given nuggets of detail from the narratives of philosophical lives - Kant liked to walk the streets of Königsberg, Descartes was not an early morning person, Hume was partial to a game of backgammon - but, outside of the history of philosophy, the idea that it might be helpful to our understanding to grasp how "[the] work came from the man [or woman]"[1] was, and still tends to be, absent from philosophical methodology and from the philosophy teacher's pedagogic. My experiences of using Jarman's film as a philo-biographical text in the undergraduate classroom demonstrate that it can be beneficial both for students' understanding of Wittgenstein's work and their motivation to study his work. Indeed, In responses to a questionnaire about their learning experiences, students commonly remark that the film has increased their motivation for and interest in studying Wittgenstein's philosophy. This perception is borne out by their grades for essay assignments, the average for which has increased by five percentage points since I began using the film in the manner I describe below.

By bringing the philosopher to life, the film brings his work to life, not only by means of its explicit articulation by the voice of the filmic characterization of Wittgenstein but also by the way in which the very form of the film shows Wittgenstein's views about the (inter alia) relation between language and the world and about the pursuit and aims of philosophical enquiry. For students in particular, Wittgenstein's philosophy is articulated in a way that cannot be achieved from reading the relevant texts in the context of a relatively short module in a senior undergraduate course.[2]

It is particularly appropriate to draw together the personal and the philosophical when considering Wittgenstein's work; for his work was in a certain sense, autobiographical. He considered philosophy to begin with confession, to be a struggle of the person.[3] He writes, for instance,

> Working in philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) *Culture and Value,* p. 16e

From the outset, the film captures this way of thinking of and of doing philosophy; dramatising the Weinigerian quote which preface's Monk's biography, the film's central character demanding of himself as he rows across a moonlit Norwegian fjord,

> "How can I be a logician before I'm a human being? The most important thing is to settle accounts with myself." (Jarman/Butler Script for the film, *Wittgenstein,* p. 182)

This angst, derived from the deep need to feel at one with oneself, pervades the film just as it does Wittgenstein's philosophical work. Wittgenstein's biographer, Ray Monk, claims that the *Philosophical Investigations* "more, perhaps than any other philosophical classic" makes demands on a reader's involvement to the extent that in the absence of such involvement, it will be almost impossible to grasp what Wittgenstein wants to say.[4] The reader needs, Monk continues, to share Wittgenstein's confusions, those confusions must be (or become) the reader's confusions. Even if we don't care as deeply and obsessively as Wittgenstein did, we must at least see why these matters are worth caring so deeply about. Jarman's film then, functions as an entrance and a guide to Wittgenstein's preoccupations and confusions. By setting them and him in a rich dramatic context, the film enables us to engage at a level at which we can achieve the necessary personal involvement.[5]

WITTGENSTEIN THE MOVIE

The film was originally commissioned as part of a series of TV productions about the life and work of philosophers and a screenplay and script were written by Oxford literature scholar, Terry Eagleton. This was adapted by Jarman and Ken Butler, his associate director, when the British Film Institute made funds available for the production of a 75 minute feature film. Whereas the television film envisaged by Eagleton would have adopted a more conventional and naturalistic style with its interior and exterior scenes shot in Cambridge, Jarman's aesthetic approach coupled with the constraints of producing a feature film on a budget of just £300,000 (a familiar scenario for Jarman and his team), meant that the screenplay and script were changed to enable the entire film to be shot in the studio. These constraints contribute to a film that is characteristically Wittgensteinian in form and content.[6]

Although the film, like Monk's biography, aims to show how the philosophical work comes from the man, it does so as a drama, not as a documentary nor as a drama-documentary, and in fact resembles a stage play in form and appearance. Inevitably, then, Jarman's Wittgenstein is a dramatic character, not the documented figure that might be presented had someone come across old home movie footage of Wittgenstein. It is thus important that students of Wittgenstein's work do not become too much in thrall to the cinematic personage; that they do not, as one put it, fall prey to a "cult of the personality" and thereby lose their ability to critically analyse Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas. The personage is, however, very closely traced from the portrait of Wittgenstein that is finely detailed in Monk's widely acclaimed and frequently cited biography. While remaining a dramatic construction, it is, as far as one can tell, a truthful portrayal that neither caricatures nor understates its subject.[7]

Although basically chronological—its pre-title sequence displays a schoolboy Wittgenstein at a writing desk recounting his family background; its final scenes take place at Wittgenstein's deathbed—the film does at times play with the details of his life and work. This is only to be expected, for one must bear in mind and emphasise to one's students that Jarman's task was to "turn philosophy into cinema".[8] For example, the well-documented incident in which Italian economist, Pietro Sraffa's, demonstration of the Neapolitan gesture of brushing one's chin with the fingertips (apparently) motivated Wittgenstein to give more thought to the theory of meaning developed in his *Tractatus* is portrayed in the film by the dramatic device of three young women making contemptuous V-signs at Wittgenstein in the street. The incident serves Jarman's aim of showing Wittgenstein as an outsider within Cambridge academic society, but its philosophical import is not lost. What Wittgenstein viewed as the necessity of a theory of meaning taking an anthropological stance, looking at what language users say and do with language, closing the gap between theory and practices, is perspicuously demonstrated, as is Wittgenstein's likely despair at finding that "I have spend most of my life groping down a blind alley."[9]

The play-like feel and appearance of the film derives largely from Jarman's use of colour against a black drape. Where Wittgenstein is dressed always in more or less the same grey academic garb, the Cambridge characters shine out against the black, dressed in brightly coloured clothes - a scarlet cloak for Russell, purple waistcoat for Keynes, a green ostrich feather hat for Russell's lover, Lady Ottoline Morell. As Jarman puts it in his introduction to the film script, "Grey Ludwig and dotty Cambridge, friends in High Key."[10] Whilst the entire film is suffused with Wittgensteinian ideas, it also includes many explicitly philosophical moments. These divide into roughly two types reflecting some of the variety of devices Wittgenstein used in the practice of philosophy: seminar scenes in which Wittgenstein the teacher develops his ideas and students and colleagues endeavour to engage with them and reminders which Jarman assembles for the audience in like manner to that in which Wittgenstein's writing contains devices for guiding the reader's recollection of the pre-theoretical use and therefore meaning of language.

THE CLASS

When I enter the first class of the course pushing a video trolley there is always a show of surprise (and relief?) from the students. In their two or three years of Philosophy classes this is often the first time they've been shown a film. When I first used the film it served merely as an introductory piece shown at the beginning of the Wittgenstein module to provide a 'background' to the philosophy we were about to study. (At this stage students have been advised to begin reading the *Philosophical Investigations.*) I would try to make a point of referring back to scenes in the film during the course of our consideration of Wittgenstein's work, but the film was not integral to the course. With subsequent screenings of the film, however, I became more convinced of the film's Wittgensteinian form and content and of its effectiveness as a way into an understanding of some major themes in Wittgenstein's work, particularly his distinction between saying and showing and its effect on his later approach to language and his views about how philosophical enquiry should be approached.

The strategy I now use is to show the film in its entirety at the first class followed by a discussion of the film. I also hand out a questionnaire which gauges students' reactions to and opinions about the film as a learning tool. Some of this can be completed after the first viewing, but the remainder, which reflects on learning experiences, must be completed at the end of the course. I have found that it is important to warn students at this stage (i) that the film does not follow the cinematic conventions to which they are probably accustomed[11] (ii) that Jarman is working within and seeking to develop a gay aesthetic. I want them to be aware of this, but not to dwell on it, rather to think about the way in which Jarman shows how Wittgenstein's sexuality (and his difficult relationship with it) contribute to his position as an outsider within the Cambridge philosophical community. I also emphasise that watching the film is not a substitute for reading the printed philosophical texts, rather it is supposed to be complementary and motivational.

In subsequent classes I use a tape I've made of short takes from the film. These comprise the seminar scenes and the assemblage of reminders. As we discuss and analyse Wittgenstein's theories about linguistic meaning and practice, language's relationship with the world, privacy and the nature and purpose of philosophy, I show the clips at appropriate points as reminders and reinforcement but also as visual manifestations of the ideas, which bring alive the words in our texts. Each clip may be shown 6 or 7 times during the course of our six seminars. They provide reinforcement of and familiarity with Wittgenstein's ideas and enable me to use Wittgenstein himself (or at least, Jarman's Wittgenstein) as the teacher in his own seminars, defending and developing his claims and themes.

The austere, pared-down form of Jarman's film mirrors that of Wittgenstein's published works (and unpublished remarks and notes), assembling fragments of a philosophical life in the same way that Wittgenstein himself assembled fragments of philosophical thought and constructing tableaux just as Wittgenstein constructed experiment—the builders, the apples, the beetle in the box—by means of which he and his addressees could explore the bumps and imperfections of our linguistic practices, eventually reaching the point where we achieve an awareness of the ways in which we are prone to language's "bewitchment".[12] Jarman writes that he used the black background because it "annihilates the decorative"[13] and this is in turn reminiscent of Wittgenstein's approach not only to writing philosophy but also to the designs (for every detail of which he took responsibility, from the structure itself to the window catches) for his sister, Hermine's, house in Vienna, a house that was a monument to austere modernistic distain for decorative embellishment. Also significant is a commonality in Jarman's and Wittgenstein's aims. Jarman's goal as a flim-maker was similar to that of Wittgenstein as a philosopher, that of "reminding us, even teaching us, how better to see";[14] of shifting the light so that we can see things differently.

The film's seminar scenes function as conversations in which Wittgenstein's ideas are drawn out through interaction with students, colleagues and himself. This device, while not entirely true to Wittgenstein's actual teaching style, serves to manifest the frequently dialogical and hence, inclusive, nature of Wittgenstein's philosophical discourse. Throughout his remarks and investigations he makes explicit use of an interlocutory voice which articulates the theories and pictures that have tended to hold us captive and from which we should, according to Wittgenstein, seek therapeutic relief. Moreover, as well as believing that Philosophy must begin from personal confession, Wittgenstein conceived of and pursued much of his work as a dialogue with himself. These scenes, then, demonstrate the style and nature of Wittgenstein's philosophising and this is important given that Wittgenstein placed so much emphasis upon how and why philosophy should be undertaken. This process of drawing out ideas has the effect of bringing them into view, of making them perspicuous and this bringing into focus the ordinary that already lies before us is, for Wittgenstein, the purpose and point of philosophy. Thus the film does for our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas and of Wittgenstein himself what Wittgenstein believes philosophy should do for our understanding of truths about reality and our relation with it (among other themes).

The strongest example of this cinematic reflection on dialogue as philosophical process occurs in the final seminar scene in which the Maynard Keynes character engages Wittgenstein in a dialogical explanation of his work. This exchange, during the course of which, Keynes extracts from Wittgenstein an account of his transition from the Tractarian position regarding the relation of linguistic practices to the world to the anthropological stance of the later work, provides a synopsis of central themes in Wittgenstein's work, and thus serves as a miniature philosophical portrait for the audience: Wittgenstein's own *Gospel in Brief.*

The film's assemblage of reminders serves as a further visual manifestation of Wittgenstein's reflections about philosophy and of his many experimentations with philosophical practice. Jarman weaves in short scenes which include: the young Wittgenstein beside a red post box which , "tells me I am in England"; signposts reminding us of the analogy Wittgenstein is fond of using to show his conception of the practice of following linguistic rules; a game of dominoes to remind us of Wittgenstein's language games metaphor. On one level, these visual reminders help us by giving life to Wittgenstein's own devices. On another they serve to manifest a conception of philosophical reflection (and education) as a process of recollection of submerged knowledge, a theme that is also present in Wittgenstein's work. He remarks for instance,

> To study philosophy is really to recollect. We remind ourselves that we really use words in this way. *Big Typescript,* (unpublished Nachlass) p. 419

One of the strongest aspects of Jarman's philosophical film-making and a source of his success in "turn[ing] philosophy into cinema" is his sensitivity to the tensions within both the life and the work that came from it; tensions which perhaps find some resolution towards the end of Wittgenstein's life and the end of his work.[17] Jarman's film displays this theme most directly in scenes late in the film which make perspicuous the role of these tensions in Wittgenstein's life and philosophy. Keynes, sitting beside Wittgenstein on his deathbed, tells a story echoing *Philosophical Investigations* §107 of a very clever young man who managed to achieve his dream of reducing the world to pure logic[18]

> A world purged of imperfection and indeterminacy. Countless acres of gleaming ice stretching to the horizon.

Attempting to explore his creation but forgetting about friction, the clever young man falls flat on his back. He despaired that the perfect world he had created was uninhabitable. With the wisdom of age, however, he comes to realise that

> roughness and ambiguity aren't imperfections. They're what make the world turn.

Despite the liberation in seeing that this is just the way things are, the wise old man remains homesick for the radiance, absoluteness and relentlessness of the ice. And so he remains

> marooned between earth and ice, at home in neither. And this was the cause of all his grief. Jarman/Butler Script for Wittgenstein, p. 142

Certainly Wittgenstein's inability to feel at home in neither the perfect Tractarian ice nor the imperfect earth of his later work was a source of grief in his life, but it had more positive effects in terms of his work. Indeed, Wittgenstein felt that despite the sense of alienation he felt there, he actually did his best work in Cambridge.[19] The wise old man has seen that there are no sui generis philosophical problems that will be solved by the discovery of the essence of the objects of our enquiries. Yet he is still unable to bring himself to give up philosophy. His later work makes appeal to the ordinary, the rough ground of the everyday, yet philosophy and the philosophical life it brings with it is (and was even more so in Cambridge in the earlier half of the last Century) extra-ordinary. Even if we consider that to engage philosophically is to continue the questioning that began in childhood, and thus that doing so is unexceptional in that sense, we must surely acknowledge that a life of such engagement is far from ordinary.

The idea that the goal of philosophy should be that of bringing words back home parallels Wittgenstein's own struggle to feel at home. Jarman's film, itself the reflection of his own sense of being other and of a search for a place in the world that would count as "home",[20] makes these tensions visible through its tableaux of Wittgenstein's experiences and its largely melancholy mood. Wittgenstein remained on the margins of all the milieux in which he might have found solace. He leaves his bourgeois Viennese family unable to bear turn of the century Vienna. Signing up for the Austrian infantry in the Great war, he's treated at best with suspicion by his comrades; an eccentric who insists on being sent to the front time after time. He returns to Cambridge where he's lauded as the next great philosopher, yet he's terrified that his work is misunderstood. He cannot bear the environment of college dinners and societies such as the Apostles where his otherness is satirised and the self-congratulatory behaviour irks him.[21] The Anschluss forced Wittgenstein to exile himself from

Austria; for the Nuremburg Laws made him a German Jew and therefore potentially subject to the terror of the deathcamps. Faced with the alternatives of being a German Jew or a British university lecturer, Wittgenstein has no choice but to take up a position in Cambridge. This decision makes it impossible for him to return to Austria and he thus considers himself to have abandoned both his family and his historical, if not his natural, home.

In all of these relationships, then, Wittgenstein occupies the position of the outsider within. He is accepted as a philosopher (if not well understood) and therefore able to participate in Cambridge philosophical discourses, but his otherness as foreign, gay, Jewish and troubled means that he remains on the margins. But this places him in a position from which he can understand and participate in those language games, yet is also in a unique position from which to critically reflect upon them without threatening anything in which he has staked his identity. It is only because he remained within the language game that was Cambridge philosophy that he experiences alienation from it. Similarly, he is exiled from his native Austria, unable to fully acknowledge and make peace with his sexuality and distanced from his jewishness and is thus included in yet excludes himself from these forms of life.

In his introduction to the film script, "This is Not a Film of Ludwig Wittgenstein", Jarman remarks,

> Invisible worlds, brought into focus. Galileo's telescope, Newton's prism. The glass. Negative. The lens of the Hubble telescope and the camera lens. "This is not...", p. 66

and his flim shines and directs light into and onto Wittgenstein's life and work, making manifest the relationships between them. It is by bringing Wittgenstein, a man who liked to escape into the darkness of a cinema, into the light, that Jarman brings off the challenge of making man and ideas visible.

Notes

1. Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Duty of Genius* (London: Vintage, 1991) p. xviii. Monk is explaining the motivations for his biography of Wittgenstein. He says that the aim of his book is to explain what Wittgenstein's philosophical work 'has to do with *him*', to make connections between Wittgenstein's spiritual and ethical preoccupations and his philosophical concerns.

2. A study of sections of *Philosophical Investigations* takes up approximately one quarter of a course in which students also study Frege, Russell, Kripke, Putnam, Quine and Davidson.

3. Monk, Ibid, p. 366. Wittgenstein's use of a citation from Augustine's *Confessions* as the opening passage of the *Philosophical Investigations* can be understood as an attempt to position the work within a confessional strand in our philosophical tradition.

4. Monk, *Ibid,* p. 366.

5. In their responses to my questionnaire about their learning experiences, a majority of students

(1998-9) found the film at least "helpful" in developing their understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas.

6. It should be noted that the results of this transition from Eagleton's script to Jarman's film were not whole-heartedly applauded by Eagleton, who was disappointed by many of Jarman's changes, particularly the attention payed to Wittgenstein's more whimsical remarks. As Ray Monk subsequently pointed out in a response to Eagleton's comments, much of the "silliness", including the device of the Martian, originates in Wittgenstein's own remarks. For the Eagleton/Monk exchange see *The Guardian,* London, 18/3/93, 19/3/93.

7. Quoting Jarman's diary, his biographer, Tony Peake, tells of a Cambridge audience of "students and remaining Wittgensteinians" who "wholeheartedly applaud[ed]". It is not noted whether any of the "Wittgensteinians" were Wittgenstein's contemporaries or students. Peake, T., *Derek Jarman* (London: Little Brown, 1999) p. 515.

8. This quotation from Jarman's as yet unpublished diary appears in Peake, T., *Derek Jarman* (London: Little Brown, 1999), p. 508.

9. Jarman, D. & Butler, K., Script for *Wittgenstein* (London: BFI, 1993) p. 112.

10. Jarman, "This is not a Film of Ludwig Wittgenstein", in Script, p. 65. It is interesting to note that here and elsewhere in his published writings Jarman, like Wittgenstein, writes in aphorisms.

11. I avoid making unfounded assumptions about the viewing tastes of each cohort by first asking them about the last film they saw. Examples of their viewing in the past year included: *The Matrix, The Other Sister, Startrek: Return of the Jedi,* and *Gone with the Wind.*

12. Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) §109

13. Jarman, "This is Not a Film of Ludwig Wittgenstein", p. 67

14. Peake, *Ibid,* p. 326.

15. One of Wittgenstein's former pupils, Alice Ambrose, gives an account of Wittgenstein as a teacher in her, " Moore and Wittgenstein as Teachers", *Teaching Philosophy,* 12.2, June 1989.

16. Although I have drawn attention to both the dialogical nature of much of Wittgenstein's work and his conception of philosophy as recollection, I do not mean to suggest that these dialogical moments are follow a Socratic pattern, nor that he the notion of recollection in play here is the Socratic one. Indeed, Wittgenstein had a rather negative view of these Socratic devices. See for example, *Culture and Value* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 14e

17. Norman Malcolm recounts that Wittgenstein's last words were, "Tell them I've had a wonderful life!", Malcolm, N., *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford: OUP, 1984) p. 81.

18. At §107 Wittgenstein writes,

> the more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a *result of investigation:* it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable, the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need *friction* . Back to the rough ground!

19. Monk, *Ibid,* p. 395.

20. Interestingly, Jarman felt that this film, more than some of his others, managed to manifest most clearly his own state of being, in his diary he writes, ". . . the balance I have achieved in *Wittgenstein* much more clearly reflects my situation . . . ", quoted in Peake, *Ibid,* p. 515. *Wittgenstein* (the last of Jarman's films to involve visual images) then, represents a final homecoming for Jarman himself.

21. Julian Bell's satirical poem about Wittgenstein is reproduced in Monk, *Ibid,* p. 256 and also appears in Jarman's film. See *Jarman/Butler Script,* pp 110-112

Cultivating Philosophical Skills and Virtues in Philosophy of Education

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> To educate educators! But the first ones must educate themselves! And for these I write.
>
> —*Nietzche*[1]

In this paper I argue that the introductory course in philosophy of education ought to primarily focus on developing philosophical skills and virtues in the students (usually preservice teachers), above trying to improve their knowledge of intellectual history. Everyone's interests—preservice teachers' and their future students'—would be better served if we tried to teach our future teachers how to be philosophers, above teaching them about the history of philosophy. I will argue that this is a reasonable and attainable goal, and one that ought to be given greater consideration by teachers of philosophy of education courses.

I. The Historical Approach

For the most part, courses and textbooks in philosophy of education approach philosophy of education as either thematic or figurative history of philosophy of education, or moments in intellectual history that have influenced thought and practice in education. By "thematic" history I mean the "—isms" approach—idealism, pragmatism, realism, and so forth. By "figurative" history I mean reading some (or about) figures like Plato, Rousseau and Dewey, among others.

These historical approaches have been often criticized.[2] Since the typical students in a philosophy of education course are in teacher-certification programs in colleges or departments of education, it is likely that they have never had a philosophy class before. It is also likely that they have never had an advanced course in the humanities or the social sciences that required reading often difficult primary sources (especially those of a more historical nature). This makes the figurative approach difficult, since they have such a difficult time reading the books, much less understanding and appreciating them. Since students have little background in intellectual history, they also tend to have trouble decoding much of the jargon and generalizations of the "—isms" approach. Also, students should realize that, charitably interpreted, there are few serious disagreements between the many "schools" of philosophy: a thoughtful person can and should accept many of the main tenets of each school. The "—isms" approach often discourages critical thinking and thoughtful and broad eclecticism in favor of a "jump on the existentialist (or idealist, or whatever) bandwagon" response.

The historical approaches, both "—ism-matic" and figurative, as typically presented in philosophy of education texts, also cloud the fact that philosophers throughout history have continually responded to *problems.* They have tried to understand and solve problems, and their writings are their proposed solutions. Since these courses and texts tend to focus neither on the figures' problems, especially as they understood their own problems, nor their reasoning and arguments behind their solutions, the focus is primarily on the proposed solutions. So students survey particular philosophers' or schools of philosophers' verdicts on various topics related to education, some which are similar to contemporary problems, probably more that are not. The historical approach to philosophy of education considers problems to some extent, but these are often problems that students don't find personally problematic. If there is any problem-solving in these courses, it is someone else's problems that are being solved, usually not the students' problems.

II. WHO CARES?

My suspicion is that the overwhelming student reaction to all this history is, "So what?!?" Some students might find it somewhat interesting, and sometimes amusing, to hear the various proposals that people have believed throughout history, but nowadays most of the better proposals for education seems so obviously correct. Student reactions to these views might take the form of some of the following:

> "Of course everyone should receive schooling of some kind! Of course discipline shouldn't be so strict! Of course how children actu-

> ally do learn is relevant to how they should be taught! Of course poor people, females, and non-whites should receive schooling! Of course rote memorization is not a very good way to learn! Of course we should realize that children are not miniature adults! Of course students need some freedom, but they also need some constraint and guidance as well!"

These characterizations may be a bit unfair, but they are not very far off base. While some students do appreciate that many of the great historical philosophers' ideas about education were revolutionary at the time and have had important effects on our educational systems, most students find that most of the better ideas of the historical philosophers are just good common sense. History may have much to teach us, but what this is is often not obvious to most education students (oftentimes even with the students that will be history teachers). Students find much of the history of philosophy of education quite bizarre and almost all of it quite irrelevant to their teacher training. It is not hard to imagine, if we must, students asking questions like, "Who cares about these oddball views?", "How is this relevant to me?", "Why is this interesting?!", and finally, "But, how can this help me *in practice?*"

Most preservice teachers are pragmatists: they believe that something has "cash value," to use William James' phrase, only if it will help them cope and, eventually, flourish in their concrete experiences in the classroom. Students often and easily get the impression that philosophy of education offers little to help them prepare to be teachers and is thus of little value. It seems to me that there is often nothing wrong in being a pragmatist, being interested in something only if it will help one meet one's goals. I can agree, to a large extent, with the preservice teachers' estimations on what is important for them. But I disagree with their generalizations that philosophy of education is something that will not help them in ways that are important to their long-term success as teachers. It may be that one *approach* to philosophy of education, a primarily historical approach, is not very helpful for preservice teachers to meet their goals (whatever they may be, as they are often unarticulated—and a philosophy of education course is a good place to begin more clearly articulating these goals), but to condemn one species of philosophy of education is not to condemn the entire genus.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE, NON-HISTORICAL APPROACH

There is an alternative conception of philosophy of education that I suspect even the preservice teacher would be more likely to agree is a worthwhile pursuit, a conception of philosophy of education that involves the deliberate attempt to improve the preservice teacher's critical thinking, reading, and communication skills. While the preservice teacher usually has an overly narrow and myopic view of what her own goals are (and should be) and what would help her achieve her goals, usually she has also been given an overly narrow view of what philosophy of education is. Furthermore, this conception of philosophy of education deviates from much of mainstream contemporary philosophy. Because of this deviation, the study of philosophy of education tends to lacks the professional and vocational benefits, and, especially, the personal benefits, that the study and *practice* of contemporary philosophy provides.

In what follows, I develop the proposal that philosophy of education courses ought to focus on the fruits of learning how to *do* philosophy, on teaching preservice teachers how to *be* philosophers, above trying to acquaint them with intellectual history. In the process of developing these views, I dispense with the common but obviously mistaken views that philosophy and philosophers are inherently mystical, mysterious, inscrutable, irrelevant, and impractical. I develop the positive view that to be a *philosophical* person is simply and straightforwardly to be a person with particular intellectual skills and virtues. And there is nothing mysterious or strange about that. Furthermore, I suspect that many preservice teachers would agree that these kinds of skills would be good for her to have, that it would be good for her to try to become this kind of person. If this is so then it is likely that she would be more readily motivated to try to work to develop these skills, and, in effect, become a philosopher of education, not someone who has merely had a course on the topic.

IV. WHAT *IS* 'PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION' ANYWAY?

Philosophers of education, as I understand their role, investigate the philosophical problems raised by education, just as, say, philosophers of art, science or religion investigate the philosophical problems raised by these respective fields, activities, or areas of experience.[3]

Usually the first question for any "philosopher of" a particular field is the question, "Just what *is* this field I am studying anyway?" What *is* art or science? How is genuine art or science to be distinguished from non-art or non- or pseudo-science? How is good science or art distinguished from bad science or art? Before we attempt to think clearly about these questions, we are often confident that their answers will come quickly and easily. But once we begin systematically thinking these questions through, we realize they are quite difficult to answer. Wittgenstein pointed out that it is very difficult to say exactly what a game is.[4] If this is so difficult, we can expect that the philosophers' problems will be all the more challenging.

For the philosopher of education, an initial question is, "What *is* education anyway?" This seems to be an overly abstract question: perhaps some more accessible forms of the question are these: "What is an 'educated' person? What are the characteristics of an 'educated' person? Are there any qualities that anyone *must* have in order to be 'educated'? If so, which and how many of these characteristics are *sufficient* for a person to be 'educated'?' To call someone educated is to say something good about that person. What goods does an 'educated' person possess?"

As with our questions about games, art, and science, we ought not be too disappointed when we find that our response to the question of what an educated person is not a perfectly sound proof, immune from all counterexamples or exceptions. But this need not distract us from our goal, for even if we are unable to discern *exactly* what an educated person is and is not, if we are persistent and careful we can expect that we will gain a greater understanding of what it is to be educated, what the marks of an educated person are (and, by extension, what an uneducated person is too), and what must be done to bring a person from the latter camp into the former. By carefully considering these kinds of difficult questions, preservice teachers should begin to more carefully develop and articulate their sense of directions and goals for success in teaching.

Thus a primary question for philosophers of education is the question, "What is an educated person?" Since education is such a broad, all-encompassing phenomenon, we can expect that philosophers of education will have to consider a wide range of philosophical problems raised by education. What are some of the philosophical problems confronting would-be teachers, especially problems that they might find interesting? I suspect that for preservice teachers some of the more interesting problems are those that directly involve their own beliefs, characters, actions, and feelings. For anyone, the most pressing problems, the ones that we are often most motivated to try to understand, are usually those that concern and affect his or her self.

V. What Is an Educate Person?

If we consider the general question "What are the marks of an educated person?", some of the more immediate responses might likely include that an educated person, minimally, is able to communicate well—understand others and express herself clearly, is able to reason well, and has knowledge of important facts and how to perform important cognitive tasks.[5] Beyond this, many would say that an educated person, in a broad sense, is a morally good person, a person who tries to do right and avoid doing wrong, cares about the right sorts of things and has a good set of priorities, and does his or her part to contribute to a just society. Many would also say that an educated person is self-reflective: she thinks about her own beliefs, goals, and virtues and vices, and tries to improve herself where she can; she considers the meaningfulness of her life, whether her life is good and why this is so. If her life is not as meaningful as she hopes it should be, she tries to make it more meaningful.

The items on this short list above might seem rather obvious. It is not very controversial to argue that since educated people have many of these qualities, if teachers are in the business of producing educated people, they should encourage and cultivate these kinds of qualities in their students. Also, teachers should develop and improve these qualities in their own persons, both for their own growth as educated persons and so students might follow their positive examples.

VI. Meaning, Reason, and Truth

But perhaps this characterization of an educated person is not so obvious. Many would agree that knowledge, abilities to clearly communicate, and moral decency are necessary for a person to be properly educated. But most of us are rather unclear about what we actually mean by any of this. If asked, "What is knowledge?" or "What is a good person anyway?" we may have some answers on hand, but more often many of us are confused and at a loss for explaining what we actually think about such matters. We often say things without considering what we might mean by them. But, presumably, having some idea what we mean when we say things like these is very important.

I propose that one thing philosophy of education courses should do is address these kinds of confusions and attempt to equip preservice teachers with the skills to begin clearing up some of their latent philosophical confusions and better discern what they should believe about philosophical matters relevant to their own beliefs, characters, and actions, both in and out of the classroom. Thus philosophy of education courses ought to focus on developing philosophical skills and abilities and integrating these skills into preservice teachers characters so that they might become *virtues*—traits of character, manifested in habitual action and thinking, that are good for people to have.[6] We ought to deliberately teach preservice teachers how to think philosophically and, at a deeper level, become the kind of people for whom philosophical questioning and thinking becomes a habit.[7] Once the notion of philosophical skills and virtues is understood, it seems likely that preservice teachers would agree that these traits would be good for them to have, both professionally and personally. Thus, the motivational and interest factors are already there, in contrast to the motivation and intellectual background required to make the most of the more historical approach.

VII. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AS 'APPLIED' PHILOSOPHY

To investigate the above brief characterization of an educated person we must investigate topics in the traditional areas of philosophy. If we think an educated person has knowledge, it would be good for us to have some better ideas of what knowledge is. We should then do some epistemology or theory of knowledge. If we want to know what good reasoning is, we should learn something about logic. Similarly, if we want to have a better idea what a good person is and some proposals for what the right thing to do is, we should learn some about ethics and moral philosophy. Are the school systems unjust? To answer this we should learn some ideas of what a just society would look like. The same argument would apply to concerns that insights from philosophy of language, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and existentialism, and other philosophical sub-disciplines are relevant. While these disciplines' practitioners usually deal with their subjects in quite technical manners, I see no reason why many of the core themes and theories from these fields cannot be presented in a manner that the average undergraduate can understand and appreciate them. It seems to me that many of the more sophisticated philosophical theories have their causal or conceptual roots in ways that "ordinary" people think about things. Or, at least, they can be interpreted and presented this way.

We all have ideas about knowledge, justice, and goodness, but most of our ideas are unclear and confused since we have neither the patience, interest, nor trained ability to clear up for ourselves what we believe. Recognizing this common confusion, incoherence, and likely inconsistency in our own beliefs and attitudes seems to be a first step in becoming a philosophical person and a clear communicator.[8] People sometimes find philosophers annoying because, for one reason, they tend to continually probe people with questions: they say, "I don't understand what you mean by that, could you please explain again, perhaps in other terms? I'm unclear what you are saying, can you help me understand?"

These questions show that philosophers tend to hold other persons' words, and their own, in high regard. They take what people say very seriously and don't want to misunderstand or misrepresent their ideas. But these philosophical skills are just careful listening skills, which, unfortunately, are not encouraged or deliberately taught as much as they should be. These also transfer to skills in oral and written communication, abilities to speak and write clearly, simply, and vividly.[9] Careful communication lends itself to critical discussion and dialogue, as opposed to people just speaking their mind without serious concern that people understand them. Clarifying the ways we speak and write also allows for more people to engage in the conversation: confusing talk is frustrating and alienating for everyone, especially those who are unfamiliar with the jargon. That much of philosophy (and the humanities in general) is unnecessarily unclear in its manner of presentation probably contributes to the ambivalence many people have about these subjects. [10] This unfortunate situation should be remedied.

VIII. Clearing Away Some Confusions

I have argued that a first step in a philosophy of education course is to show students that there is much confusion and a lack of clarity in the ways we all talk, show them that this is a problem, and begin showing them how to develop the skills to carefully and critically ask themselves and others what they mean when they say things. I suspect that many students are surprised when they come to see how inadequate (even by their own lights) their understanding is of many of concepts which they regularly use. Difficult concepts such as *knowledge, skill, good thinking, right* and *wrong, good* and *bad, truth, error, correct answers, happiness, skills, fairness, teaching, learning, respect, justice, equality, deservings, meaning, value, grading, rights,* and many other concepts are all immediately relevant to the daily practices of a teacher, in and out of the classroom. But what do these all mean? We use them all the time, but most of us just haven't thought about what they mean or what these concepts stand for. It seems to me that it would be good to focus student attention on what they think they are saying when they communicate. This could easily take the form of interesting brainstorm sessions. In suggesting that we should focus on trying to understand what we mean when we use words, I do not mean to suggest that this activity must be done to the point where it becomes excessive and tedious. My proposal is similar to the dusty and dry 'analytic' philosophy of education tradition in that it focuses on 'clearing away confusion', analyzing concepts, and discerning criteria, but mine makes room for normative and "fuzzy" questions and is more modest in its estimations for success. Most contemporary analytic philosophy does not suffer from the positivistic vices of early analytic philosophy of education.

Students should also be acquainted not just with influential views about the meanings of concepts, for example, proposed meanings of "right" and "wrong," but, beyond these concerns about meanings, there are the more important proposals for what it is for something to *be,* for example, right or wrong, or genuine knowledge, as opposed to mere true belief. Students should investigate the most influential conclusions held on these topics and the reasons and arguments behind these conclusions. The ability to think in terms of conclusions, proposals, or "main points" and to articulate the reasons and premises that are said to *validly* support them is an extremely valuable skill. To discern someone's main point sometimes requires great attentiveness, patience, and charity. To articulate the reasons behind the conclusion is to make the issue clearly understandable. Even just a little logic, if understood well, can go a long way. Also, the disposition to ask and determine how questions or problems could be answered or solved is a valuable one.[11] Are we worried about an empirical problem that would be solved by a scientist? A conceptual problem, a problem or disagreement about how we use words? Or some other kind of problem? The ability to identify the kind of problems or issues we are dealing with is invaluable to understanding and solving them.

Navigating through these philosophical problems making use of these intellectual skills we can discuss questions such as, "What is knowledge?" One traditional account of knowledge is that it is something like justified true belief. Many preservice teachers are confident that one can know a false belief, or that one person can know that something is true and someone else can know it is false. Other students are confident that to know something is just to believe it. Others at least say things that suggest that they are skeptical about the whole notion of truth and falsity ('that may be true for you but not true for me!') or the idea that having reasons is necessary for some kinds of beliefs to be knowledge. Others might dispute the idea that some knowledge arises from a properly functioning cognitive system, such as, for example, good vision. They may find that to be prejudicial against the blind or nearsighted.

Since teachers are in the business of ensuring that students gain knowledge (and to properly grade students, teachers must themselves *know* whether the student *knows* the matter), these issues should be discussed and some of the more obvious worries and confusions laid to rest. Some of these worries above are legitimate (not wanting to offend others by saying their beliefs are false, not wanting to say that people of other time-periods or cultures are cognitively inferior, compared to *us*), but if we understand the worries, it is fairly clear that traditional accounts of knowledge, truth, and reason-giving can accommodate them. Thus there is little reason to believe that there is no knowledge or true beliefs or that any opinion is as good as any other.[12] It seems reasonable to believe that a teacher's positive understanding of knowledge, truth, and reason-giving would be helpful for her in her task of transmitting knowledge, enabling her students to believe truths, and fostering her students in giving reasons for their beliefs.

Views similar to the relativism and skepticism about knowledge above are, if not actually held, more commonly expressed with respect to ethics and morals. For example, there is the common view that "What's right for you (or 'them') might be wrong for me (or 'us')!" Views like these are relativistic ones. In their common forms, they have been repeatedly shown to be inadequate, if not outright incoherent.[13] Yet they do seem to be somewhat popular. Even though almost all preservice teachers believe the numerous recent acts of violence and terrorism by young people are all morally wrong (that is, that those kids really ought not have done those actions), many of these same students are apt to proclaim allegiance to the "whatever you believe is right is *right for you*" theory. I suspect that most of them really do not accept this theory, but it seems that great progress would be made if their relativistic worries were laid to rest, as well as the common view that moral education *must* be religious-based. The progress in rejecting these views would not necessarily be moral progress (as rejecting relativism and divine command theories of ethics does not entail becoming a more moral person), but it is certainly an improvement in one's thinking skills to learn to understand what follows from a general principle and reject the principle on that basis.

Much of the more fruitful discussions about moral education seem, to me, to involve clearing away objections to directive moral education,[14] the strategy of directly and explicitly teaching that some kinds of actions are usually right, that others are usually wrong, that these are the marks of a morally virtuous or good person, that these characteristics make for a bad person, that these are the kinds of things that you should more care about in life, and so forth. While the question of what should be taught is somewhat, although not very, controversial (we all agree about much more that we realize), there seem to be no good arguments against purposefully teaching ethics and morals. Since teachers do it anyway, whether they want to or not, a course in philosophy of education is an ideal place to show them that there is nothing inherently objectionable in the practice. This frees teachers to do what they would have done probably naturally but without any lingering, deep-seated worries that they are manipulating or brainwashing their students, violating their autonomy, or overstepping their bounds.

Teachers can easily understand ethical theories and theories of justice such as consequentialism, Kant and Kantianisms (such as Rawls' and Alan Gewirth's theories), virtue theory, communitarianism, and even Nozick's libertarianism. Versions of each of these theories can be developed from basic moral insights that preservice teachers already have or would readily acknowledge as, at least, plausible if they were shown to them. We all have intuitions that support each of these moral points of view, simple intuitions that are can be show to be the roots of some very sophisticated moral theories. Strictly speaking, many of these theories are incompatible at the fringes, but this doesn't seem relevant here, since we are interested merely in providing preservice teachers better frameworks to think about right and wrong and good and bad in their own personal lives and as teachers, as well as have some better principles with which to teach their students.

Another topic related to ethics is multiculturalism. While this is often discussed in other courses, it seems that it is, at root, a movement grounded in moral perspectives. Making these perspectives explicit should demystify some of the political jargon surrounding multiculturalism and enable teachers to better understand the issues. On a related note, the common educational plea for "tolerance" should be explored and clarified. What should we be tolerant of? Are there things we shouldn't tolerate? Why? Developing a more careful, reflective principle of tolerance should be a goal for a teacher who values diversity and individuals' well-being.

A few more final proposals: it would behoove science teachers, as well as their students, if they were acquainted with some basic issues is philosophy of science. If possible, it would be wonderful for math teachers to have a good answer to why it is true that 2 and 2 are 4. It would be good for teachers to consider whether the school system is just or unjust, and what might be demanded of us and the policy makers if they are unjust. Since most teachers will work in the public schools, it might be worthwhile to wonder why we have public school systems in the first place. There are historical reasons, of course, why this is so (schools are very important for a nation's well-being), but food and clothing are also very important, and we don't have a public restaurant or clothing store system to provide these goods to the masses. Presumably, treating education as a public good has consequences. It would be interesting to discern what they are.[15]

Finally, since teachers' long term goals include somehow making a contribution to the meaningfulness of their students' lives (even if it is never consciously realized, or not realized until many years later) it seems appropriate to consider the question of what is a meaningful or good life. While Sartre may be too difficult to read, many other philosophers and fiction writers have had other interesting ideas that ought to be considered and discussed.[16] This reflection should turn back on the teachers' lives, as their abilities to reflect philosophically about their lives and their own educational goals (for both themselves and their students) should keep them growing throughout their teaching careers. This sort of philosophical disposition might well keep them intellectually alive and thereby help to avoid burnout.[17]

IV. CONCLUSION

To conclude, a careful and self-reflective, but, at times, exploratory and playful, investigation of these kinds of philosophical questions encourages the development of philosophical skills and virtues. If preservice teachers possessed more of these skills and virtues, this would be good for both them and their students. This alternative approach to philosophy of education focuses on improving teachers' cognitive abilities in areas that are not often addressed in non-philosophical courses. It attempts to enhance teachers' intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness, self-reflection, creativity, attentiveness, insight, communicativeness and abilities to articulate, patience, and understanding, among many other virtues.[18] I have argued that these skills and virtues are more readily developed through the study and practice of contemporary philosophy, rather that the study of the history of philosophy.[19]

Facts about intellectual history are easily and quickly forgotten; it seems likely that a semester spent deliberately working to develop philosophical virtues could have a greater, perhaps life-long, impact on a teacher and his or her future students. For this reason, I encourage further investigation towards focusing philosophy of education on the practice of teachers *doing* philosophy and *becoming* philosophers.[20]

NOTES

1. Richard Schacht attributes this quote to Nietzche, but says that the manuscript source is uncertain. He says it is cited elsewhere as "VII: 215." See his "A Nietzchean Education: Zarathustra/*Zarathustra* as Educator," pp. 318-332, in *Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives*, ed. Amelie Rorty (Routledge, 1998).

2. For criticisms of the historical approach to philosophy of education, some of which are similar to the ones offered here and below, see David P. Ericson's "Orientation to Philosophy of Education: Locating the Field of Play for New Audiences," *Educational Theory*, Fall 1997, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 501-511. Also, for criticisms of the "—isms" approach in philosophy of educa-

tion see William F. Frankena's "Is the Philosophy of Education Intellectually Respectable?" in the *Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society,* ed. Robert E. Mason, 1961, pp. 36-45. Interestingly, while criticisms of the historical approaches are easy to come by, I have not found anything like a substantive defense of the approach beyond unsubstantiated claims that the approach has its merits. For an overview of the debates over the value of studying the history of philosophy in general, see Jorge J.E. Gracia's *Philosophy and Its History: Issues in Philosophical Historiography* (SUNY, 1992). Also see Michael Scriven's "Increasing Philosophy Enrollments and Apointments through Better Philosophy Teaching," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Assocation* 50, no. 3 (1977), pp. 232-234, and continued in 50, no. 4 (1977): 328. Among many other interesting and provocative suggestions, Scriven suggests that "philosophy of education should come home to mama" (324).

3. This characterization of philosophy of education is parallel to Susan Haack's understanding of philosophy of logic. See her *Philosophy of Logics* (Cambridge UP, 1978), p. 1.

4. See Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* 3rd Edition, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, 1958).

5. I obviously sidestep the more difficult question of *which* knowledge and skills are important.

6. This definition of a virtue is found in James Rachel's *The Elements of Moral Philosophy* 3rd Ed., (McGraw-Hill, 1999), p. 178.

7. I do not offer much in terms of practical suggestions on how to do this. For suggestions, see Richard Feldman's *Reason and Argument* 2nd Edition (Prentice Hall, 1999), Anthony Weston's *A Rulebook for Arguments* (Hackett, 1992), Martinich's *Philosophical Writing* 2nd Edition (Blackwell, 1996), Tziporah Kasachkoff, ed. *In the Socratic Tradition: Essays on Teaching Philosophy* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), and the journals *Teaching Philosophy and Metaphilosophy.*

8. A.P. Martinich, in his *Philosophical Writing* 2nd Edition (Blackwell, 1996) argues that many of the skills of philosophy are just good communication skills. He writes that, "If half of good philosophy is good grammar, then the other half is good thinking," p. 4.

9. William Tolhurst brought the "clear, simple, vivid" mantra for writing to my attention.

10. See Gerald Graff's *Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education* (Norton, 1992) for considerations along these lines.

11. I raise this point because I have had a student suggest that a philosophy of education course should discuss the merits of block scheduling, tracking, and cooperative learning. Whether these methods are worthwhile is an empirical/social-scientific question, not a philosophical question. These are philosophical questions only insofar as they involve asking whether whatever is promoted by these methods is valuable or good, but I suspect the student was not interested in this. Rather she was interested in learning if these methods work or not.

12. For a good introduction the issue of relativism in both epistemology and ethics, see *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral,* eds. Jack Meiland and Michael Krauz (U. Notre Dame Press, 1982).

13. See any recently published introduction to ethics textbook. There are very sophisticated versions of ethical relativism, but none of these versions readily imply the "If I like it, it's right for me" attitude or crude ethical theory.

14. For some of these objections to and defenses of directive moral education, see the articles on moral education in Christina and Fred Sommers, eds., *Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics* 4th Edition (Harcourt Brace and Co., 1997) pp. 574-704.

15. Richard Feldman suggested this topic of concern.

16. See, for example, Peter Singer's *How Are We to Live?: Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest* (Prometheus Books, 1995).

17. William Tolhurst suggested this point.

18. Good discussions of these virtues are found in W. Jay Wood's *Epistemology: Becoming*

Intellectually Virtuous (Inter-Varsity Press, 1999) and Linda Zagzebski's *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge* (Cambridge UP, 1996).

19. Arguments for this claim concerning the lack of parity between the fruits of *doing* philosophy (including learning about some contemporary philosophers' conclusions) versus learning *about* philosophy and learning historical figures' conclusions needs to be made more explicit. I am thankful to Harold Brown for pointing this out to me. A further problem is that the relationship between learning facts and skills need to be investigated.

20. For helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions for this paper I am grateful to Harold I. Brown, Randall Curren, Richard Feldman, and William Tolhurst, and students in my 'Introduction to Philosophy of Education' course at NIU, especially Shawn Sims.

The Dream of Superman

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In the summer of 1959, I was five and a half years old when my friends told me that Superman was dead. They said our number one childhood hero had shot himself with a pistol containing a kryptonite bullet.

In the years to come, I would continue to follow the many adventures of the Man of Steel, both on television and in the DC comic books. Even so, the enjoyment and magic was always clouded by the sudden violent death of George Reeves, the actor who played Superman. Reeves portrayed a far more sunny, cheerful, and optimistic Superman than the one in the comic books. And yet his death was officially ruled a suicide, clearly indicating that George Reeves was a seriously disturbed man. If possible my dream of Superman was to find out what really happened that summer evening in 1959.

A book on the death of George Reeves called *Hollywood Kryptonite* by Sam Kashner and Nancy Schoenberger was published in 1999 by St. Martin's Press. In issue number 62 of FILMFAX magazine, I published a book review.

Since the publication of *Hollywood Kryptonite,* Jan Henderson published a revised, expanded, and updated book version of SPEEDING BULLET in 1959. This new edition was even more fascinating, absorbing, and entertaining than it was in its original magazine format. It was published by Michael Bifulco in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

Several weeks ago, ABCs television program "20/20" did a feature on the death of George Reeves. They ruled it a suicide. Jan Henderson's book *Speeding Bullet* laid out a well researched and more importantly well-documented case for homicide. The Kashners were lazy and took Henderson's research while coming to a bogus conclusion.

Beyond all this hard evidence, George Reeves' death was not a suicide because he never would have let down the millions of children who believed in him. To be sure, George Reeves was disgusted with the typecasting and the path his career had taken after he became Superman. No doubt he was often exasperated with all those little kids like myself, but George Reeves took the role of Superman and the responsibilities that went with the cape seriously. The first television "Lois Lane" actress Phyllis Coates said that when he complained about the role and she advised him to quit the show, George Reeves would refuse because he took a perverse pleasure in knowing that he played the part better than anyone else. Any other actor would have been laughed off the screen in those tights, but George Reeves gave it the magic it needed: talent. For that I will always believe in George Reeves.

In the summer of 1999, I visited Hollywood, California, taking a movie fan's tour of the film capitol. I found still standing three of the four studio lots where THE ADVENTURES OF SUPERMAN was filmed during its six years of production: the old Selznick-RKO Pathe studios, the California National studios, and the old Charlie Chaplin studios.

On the internet, I discovered where the remains of Superman were buried. So on Hollywood Boulevard, I boarded a bus that took me into the Hollywood hills past Los Angeles, then past Glendale, past Pasadena, and into the small city of Altadena. There I walked through the gates of Mountain View Cemetery and asked a workman where the Pasadena mausoleum was. He informed me that Mountain View had only a single mausoleum and it was just down the road.

I entered the mausoleum and looked to my left and discovered a corridor called "The Colabrium of Tranquility." Inside I came across a crypt for "G. B. Reeves, 1916-1959." Could this be the final resting place of Superman? If it was, the year of birth was wrong and should have been 1914 instead of 1916. I moved down this passage a few feet more and here I would finally find the real tomb of Superman. There was no mistaking it for the writing on the crypt said "MY BELOVED SON "SUPERMAN" GEORGE BESSOLO REEVES 1914-1959." Later I discovered that George Reeves' mother had left explicit instructions to Mountain View Cemetery not to show her son's grave to the Superman fans. Over the years, the cemetery workers would simply bring the fans who searched for Superman, to the mistaken grave of G. B. Reeves and say "Here's Superman." For years no one knew who was G. B. Reeves or whether the grave was the grave of Clark Kent.

Completing my dream, I traveled in 1999 to the adopted home of Superman: Metropolis, Illinois. There in this huge warehouse called the "Super Museum" are tens of thousands of artifacts and collectibles based on the character of Superman. However, the only part of the museum that interested me was the section dedicated to the television series THE ADVENTURES OF SUPERMAN. In a prominent place is the full color Superman uniform worn by George Reeves during the series. When I thought no one was looking, I gently touched his cape. It was the end of a long journey to find a man I had never met but could never forget.

NOTE

There is an excellent fan magazine devoted to the life and career of George Reeves called "The Adventures Continue." It was first published by Dr. Don Rhoden and now is published by Jim Nolt, 220 N. Walnut St., #7, Lititz, PA 17543. (717) 625-4458. His new e-mail address is <jimnolt@ptd.net>. In issue number 6 published in 1991, writer Terry Roark contributed a memorable tribute to Superman. The Executive Director of the MPES Dr. Michael Oliker also published an article in it entitled: "On Confusing Geerge Reeves with Superman." The Adventures Continue, no. 13 (1997), pp. 56-59.

Dewey, the Arts and Popular Culture: TV Studies In Classroom Communities

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INTRODUCTION

John Dewey, throughout his work, expresses the idea that everyday life should be an integral part of educational experience. In *Experience and Education,* he notes that, "Anything which can be called a study… must be derived from materials which… fall within the scope of ordinary life experience" (p.73). In *The School and Society,* he complains about the isolation of school from life. He notes that from the child's perspective, "the great waste in school comes from his inability to utilize the experience he gets outside the school in any complete and free way within the school itself " (p. 75). In *Democracy and Education,* Dewey contends that, "The scheme of the curriculum must take account of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the existing community life…" (p. 191).

In our time, popular culture as represented here by television, cannot be separated from "community life." It is embedded in national and global discourse, in social interaction, in power relations and in the formation of individual and collective identities. TV, like it or not, is also in our schools. It is sung, danced, discussed, and imitated (Dyson, 1997). It is on lunch boxes, notebooks and on toys and gadgets that come to school. It is impossible to separate TV from institutional life, and to ignore its influence on education and everyday experience.

I think Dewey would agree that it is, therefore, crucial for educators to invite TV's pedagogies into educational settings for sustained, critical examination. TV, as an embedded part of ordinary life, educates us. We must also educate ourselves about it, and legitimize such study.

In this paper, I describe my research project in which I explored the possibility of educational settings as Deweyan sites where people may gain awareness of and assume responsibility for the ways in which TV culture seeps into lives and dictates values, ideologies and expectations. I also discuss educational settings as democratic, transformational sites where "consumers" are empowered to become "producers" of culture by creating counter-hegemonic texts and performances. I consider how the Deweyan processes of reflective thought (1910/1991), moral deliberation (1932/1989), public discourse (1927/1954), and positive freedom (1960) may play roles in developing educational practices that lead beyond the "quest for certainty," and toward a quest for new stories. I problematize this quest since, as I learned, it is not easy.

DEWEYAN DUALISM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND POPULAR CULTURE

The prevalence of dualistic thinking has wreaked havoc on public understanding of popular culture, and on the idea of seriously examining it in educational settings. I refer to a few of the dichotomies addressed frequently by Dewey (1927/1954,1929/1988) such as public/private, theory/practice and high/low cultures. These splits, by means of fragmentation, specialization and hierarchical valuation (Giroux and Simon, 1989), often impede human capacities to see and experience connections and big pictures. This, in turn, prevents the possibility of combining, in education, pleasure, entertainment and private experience with work, study and public experience.

In my research, I wanted to provide educational means for experiencing, critiquing and transforming popular culture. To do so, I applied methods that work the middle of dichotomies. For example, I attempted to bring private, individual interpretations of popular culture, which are often stabilized and privileged, into the public realm for scrutiny and for negotiating new meanings. I also attempted to integrate critical, theoretical and reflective discourse with modes of action. (Friere, 1970). In Dewey's (1929/1988) terms, I combined reflective thought with the experiences of making and doing, of arts and creativity. In addition, I looked at how rigorous study of TV entertainment in school (low culture in a high space) may challenge assumptions about the distances between high and low, and may encourage discussion about the politics of defining each.

The Project: Community Viewing, Critical Discourse and (Re)writing & Producing TV

I conducted an ethnographic study in which I took on the roles of group leader and teacher/researcher. I gathered a small group of people who work at the university to meet once a week. The group was composed of food service workers and graduate/undergraduate students. Together, we 1) watched TV in a campus classroom, 2) engaged in critical discussion of programs and viewing practices, and 3) responded by writing and performing original scripts and improvised stories.

In the first phase of this project, I wanted to observe what happens when TV viewing becomes a public event designed for educational purposes. I asked the group to decide on and view a TV program together. They decided on "The Simpsons," and watched it at its regular time on Monday evenings. My intention, by making a public event of viewing, was to subvert the normal private and privatizing (Gitlin, 1994) functions of watching TV. Usually, viewing occurs at home where people are either alone or among intimate friends and family members who, most often, feel and think as they do (Ang, 1997, Fiske, 1993). TV, in such situations might prompt comfortable, validating and unquestioning conversations, or there may be no conversation at all. I wanted to see what would happen in a social situation in which people were required to speak, and to take responsibility for explaining their views. I wanted to find out if people would view and interpret TV differently in a situation that required an awareness of the feelings, thoughts and rights of unfamiliar others. Dewey (1927/1954) noted that communal life could be differentiated from mere association in that it was constituted by, among other things, "...emotionally, intellectually, consciously sustained" (p. 151) processes. I wanted to observe if and how a group of individuals who did not know each other might transform themselves into a community of critical viewers by sharing the experience of intelligent, conscious and sometimes emotionally charged TV viewing.

In the second phase of the project, I asked participants to engage in critical discussions of TV. Specifically, I wanted them to address issues regarding the hegemonic (Gramsci, 1998) role that TV plays in our culture. I was curious to see if there would be any resistance to critiquing TV. I also wanted to see what issues would emerge in our conversations. We discussed topics having to do with the practices of targeting and positioning audiences, misrepresenting and marginalizing individuals and groups, and promoting Hollywood and the cult of celebrity. We also discussed TV viewing as a source of pleasure, comfort and emotional release. Here, I attempted to create a situation in which "free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication" (Dewey, 1927/1954). I encouraged the group to reflect out loud on all that we watched. Furthermore, I encouraged them to share their responses with an appreciation for the public and private implications of what they said. I wanted them to have a sense of the personal and social "consequences" of their ideas. I wanted them to critique with a sense of responsibility for what they might do about the problems they raised.

In the third phase of this project, I asked participants to transform their critical responses and theories into written texts that would be read aloud and dramatized. We used writing and theater arts to move beyond criticism. As Jim Garrison (1997) puts it, "Only a secure, privileged academic could ever fall in love with constant deconstruction..." (p. 51). Criticism, by itself, is easy. Criticism with an eye toward change is hard. Criticism with a sense of responsibility for change, and as an opening for action is harder still. We wrote and performed as a means of testing our critiques and counter-hegemonic conceptions of TV.

The arts were also used to "...break through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness" (Dewey, 1927/1954, p. 183). New narratives were sought, experienced and articulated. As Lensmire notes, "...in a world marked... by the production of oppressive structures, we want-- we want and need—new stories" (in press, p. 35).

Our engagement with the arts was clearly not a matter of "private craftsmanship," which "ignores the social life of discourse outside the artist's study" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 259). Instead it was a matter of creative collaboration from our engagement, as a community, with TV. We proceeded from Dewey's (1934/1989) notion that "art is the remaking of the experience of community (p. 87). Together, participants answered with their lives to the "humble prose of everyday living" (Bakhtin, 1990, p.1).

Creative writing and dramatizations were conceived of as the practice of positive freedom, "... the freedom for some end-in-view [which] requires discipline and responsibility" (Garrison, 1997, p. 51). The group took responsibility, through the arts, for recreating TV. Writing and drama became transformational activities that allowed the group to exercise its "freedom to create the future and to reconstruct the world" (Lensmire and Satanovsky, 1998, p. 28). In our limited but alternative space, we attempted to convert worn-out, hegemonic TV narratives into new ones that expressed divergent views, and provided greater pleasure and deeper meanings.

SOME FINDINGS

In preliminary analysis, I found that the group wrestled, in the first phase of the project, with some of the problems involved in forming a viewing community. Yet, participants were ultimately able to negotiate relationships and form a strong community. Participants in the second phase of the project were, for the most part, highly skilled at criticism and were able to meet the challenges that such discussions present.

However, in the third phase of the project we came to a halt. Writers in classrooms are not accustomed to being asked to create and produce new stories. Instead, they are often rewarded for serving up the safe, familiar ones that ultimately maintain the status quo. Our group, slow to begin writing, struggled with what it meant to define and create new narratives. Finally, the group understood that while new stories are, in many ways, reconstructed from the old, they may contain different character representations, as well as alternative plots and themes, and different or blended genres.

I found that the methods of improvisation (Spolin, 1963) provided a breakthrough for our group when we reached a standstill. As participants acted out stories together—with our objective in mind to be "on the outlook for something better" (Dewey, 1932/1989, p. 273)—they were able to engage in an "imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct" (p. 275). They were able to reflect, as a group, on the possible real-life consequences of their improvised actions. Further, they were able to reach beyond imagination, to experience themselves within new narratives and to see and experiment with new realities. As Dewey (1934/1989) pointed out, "It is by a sense of possibilities opening before us that we become aware of the constrictors that hem us in and of the burdens that oppress" (p. 349). The improvisations, as openings, provided an unexpected, but highly effective transition from criticism to written counter-narratives.

WRITING NEW STORIES: GABRIEL'S ACTION HERO

While participants did, in the end, answer back to TV with texts that represented their realities and values, and while their texts were divergent, this process was difficult. Participants, at first, sat stumped and silent at my request that they write new stories. I have to admit that I was slightly amused by the sudden restraint shown by my otherwise big shot critics and outspoken discussants. Even after the improvisations had prompted lively movement in creative directions, the group froze at the thought of writing new stories. I wondered if it was the writing that bothered them, or the new stories.

I realized that the words, "I would like you to write now," can sound schoolish and burdensome—especially to adults who have been working all day, and had been promised that participating in this project would be enjoyable. On one level, I understood that they were resisting the task of writing.

On another level, however, I believed that they were reluctant to write new stories. What does it mean to write a *new* story, and why take that responsibility? It can be difficult, even troubling, to think through what we represent and how we might change. It is a commitment to put it in writing. Why not just let Hollywood producers impose their stories on us? Maybe they are not so bad after all. And if they are, we can just turn off our TV sets.

I did not accept participants' first attempts, in improvisations, to create cynical, "Saturday Night Live" sorts of stories that *seem* alternative, but ultimately, represent the other side of the hegemonic coin. In order to provide a starting point, I asked them to write a description of a character who is either not represented or who is misrepresented on TV. At this request, the group tried a few diversionary techniques such as telling jokes and changing the subject. I finally gave them my severe teacher look, and told them I meant what I said. The group played along. A ponderous quiet descended as participants faced their writing pads and clutched their pens. After twenty minutes, Gabriel, a doctoral student in philosophy, and a self-described long-haired intellectual wrote:

> My mind is completely blank. What kind of character should I create? My first impulse is to write a long-haired intellectual. Hey! What an original thought. No, actually I think it might be more interesting (for me, at least) to write a fictionalized version of someone I've known.
>
> Name: Gene
>
> Middle aged husband, father, factory worker, etc.

Gabriel was straining. What constituted a "new" TV character? Someone like himself? He later explained that he wanted to "write an intellectual" since TV shows such as *Frasier* consistently represent intellectuals as smart-but-ignorant buffoons. This irked him since he and most intellectuals he knew were not like that. Yet, this was too close to home to write about. Instead, he chose to develop a safer but equally marginalized (though not as privileged) character. Either way, Gabriel was beginning to consider how new stories could be constructed. He was thinking about how he could summon his everyday experiences in order to create such stories. Gabriel was looking beyond the dictates of TV culture for fresher, alternative, more substantial stories.

Gabriel ultimately did tackle the problem of representing intellectuals. In his final text, a sketchy, unfinished story, Gabriel wrote:

> The setting: We see a receptionist working at an office. She is obviously overworked and underpaid. She wonders why her stupid boss has to buy the largest SUV on the market. He says that he wants to buy it b/c it's cool. She doesn't know what to say.
>
> Enter Intellectual Man, fearless fighter of stupidity in all its forms. IM teaches her about the 19th cent. American sociologist Thorstein Veblen and his "Theory of the Leisure Class." Armed with her new knowledge, our secretary challenges her evil boss. She tells him that he wants to buy a huge SUV because it is the most wasteful thing that he can buy. She tells him that he hopes to impress women by showing them how wasteful he can be.
>
> Later, she meets IM again, and she learns about Karl Marx…

Gabriel created a counter-narrative (Giroux, Lankshear, McLaren, Peters, 1996). He created a democratic hero genre in which multiple heroes could emerge. In his story, we root for two heroes—not just one. We root for Intellectual Man who shares his knowledge and uses it to empower others, and we root for "our" secretary who, in spite of her low status, is an avid learner who also shares her knowledge.

In Gabriel's democratic tale, heroism and intellectual dispositions are within the grasp of those who are open to attaining them. They are not reserved for a privileged few. As the "overworked and underpaid" secretary struggles to make sense of what she learns and experiences, she musters her courage, teaches and speaks up to her boss, and emerges as an intellectual and a hero.

In his text, Gabriel applies the Deweyan ethical standard of "social well being" (1932/1989, p.251) to the processes of making art. Gabriel uses his story to administer social justice, to equalize the relationship between a subordinate and her boss. He also equalizes the relationship between the secretary and Superman by giving the secretary access to heroism and intellectual life. Moreover, Gabriel does not assume that the social world is fixed and impossible to change. He assumes, instead, that social transformation is an ongoing, inevitable process. He assumes, in his writing, a democracy in the making (Dewey, 1927/1954), and that "the making" is a necessary good. As Dewey notes in Art as Experience, "…art is more moral than moralities. For the latter are, or either tend to become, consecrations of the status quo… reenforcements of the established order" (p. 350).

By changing the rules of the hero genre, Gabriel found new ways to represent intellectuals. Intellectual Man and the secretary are not clueless buffoons like Frasier. They are portrayed as "organic intellectuals" (Simon, 1982) who can live in the real world and are able to integrate theory and practice. They seem to realize, in contrast to traditional intellectuals, that it is impractical "to know without understanding" (Simon, 1982, p.100). Gabriel's intellectuals are counter-heroes who adhere to a different set of principles, and inspire vastly different feelings in their audience than the dominant culture's action heroes who clamor for our attention on TV.

This brings me to Superman—who I have been instructed to include in this paper. I am not a Superman scholar or fan, and am not well-versed in the political, philosophical or historical aspects of the show. Given this, I can say that, for my purposes, I am intrigued by the Superman/Clark Kent persona. Two "good guys" manifest themselves in one man, and seem to get along. The shy, awkward, humble Clark Kent only reaches for Superman when he must, and Superman spends most of his time in the offices and on the sidewalks of Clark Kent's ordinary life. I think Dewey would have appreciated such integration.

As a teacher and researcher, I am interested in the heroic possibilities embodied in Clark Kent. Like Gabriel's secretary who is championed in his story, Clark Kent struggles with the realities of everyday life. An exploration, in educational settings, of the courage that this requires could lead to questions regarding what constitutes a hero and who decides who our heroes are. A discussion of Clark Kent as hero could clear the way for creating, through writing and the arts, new heroes that represent the values and lives of everyday people in our diverse landscapes.

CONCLUSION

In his discussion of "consumer production," de Certeau (1988) emphasizes the need to examine what people "do" or "make" of TV. However, he points out that this is difficult because dominant systems fail to leave any place in which the consuming public "can indicate what they make or do with these systems" (p. xii).

Educational settings can provide a "place" where popular culture can be publicly interpreted, questioned and reconstructed. I echo Dewey's (1900/1990) observation that the isolation of school from life is wasteful. It is a lost opportunity. Educational settings can either function as consenting spaces where the making and doing of everyday life are buried, or they can function as transformational spaces where such activities are brought into the light, and are shared, honored and studied.

Reality Bytes: How Images of Reality in Modern Films Affect Adolescent Perceptions

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Imagine yourself waking one morning to find some otherworldly object thrown into your path, setting you on a quest that ends in the painful discovery of a reality that is different from the one you have always assumed to be true. You find instead that those whom you trusted, whose lives were inextricably tied to yours by blood or by friendship or marriage, were part of a charade in which everyone participated in except you.

Or worse, imagine that your life begins to unravel as you suddenly find yourself between two worlds: one that you had always assumed was the "real" world, and one that claims to be the real world. The deeper you become immersed, the more the horror begins to grow as you realize that you, and the entire civilization around you, are mere pawns in the hands of a cadre of artificial intelligence who have created an alternative world through virtual reality. The world as you have known it does not represent reality at all.

Or even worse, imagine that your most salient fears, that you may have developed a schizophrenic personality, one that commits heinous crimes against your natural "will," are not realized at all. Instead, you find that the duplicity you have been experiencing is really the consequences of being a virtual character in an artificial reality. You don't really exist at all.

These scenarios have one thing in common: they are plots from Hollywood films that reflect an increasing interest in technological advances, such as exploring the growing power of the media, the gruesome consequences of cyberspace control, and the surrealistic possibilities that could emerge from the expansion of virtual reality. Not that Hollywood is unfamiliar to "pushing the envelope" when it comes to dreaming up stories that include fantasy and the supernatural. Certainly films' unique attraction over its more limited ancestor, live theatre, is its freedom from time and space. Yet what superficially appears to be mere entertainment and escape art often cannot logically exist without a message of some type behind it. What is indigenous to modern films is no less than what resides in all aesthetics impacting our culture: the declaration that art imitates life and that our perceptions can be shaped by the dominant aesthetics around us, or more to the point, that life imitates art.

The adventures of Superman with its inception as a comic book was saturated with a nationalistic ideology, proclaiming an affirmation of "truth, justice, and the American way" at the end of many episodes. Superman's famous identity embodied all that Americans held sacred to fortify their spirit of nationalism: a strong work ethic as Clarke Kent (heaven knows those super powers could have found easy ways to make money); an impeccable moral foundation (remember, he never lied); and a devotion to family (as Clarke Kent, he sent half of his checks to his widowed mother).

Similarly, the Star Wars series is not without a transcendent message as the rebels stand for the force of good and the enemy represents the powers of darkness. Here the metaphysical conflict is at the heart of the episodes where two worlds of competing ideologies provide the philosophical scaffolding for dualism.

For the more recent cyber-conflicts, the question "what is reality?" pervades the ethos of the films as the characters' lives are jolted by their own misconceptions of reality. The fact that they ask questions like "What is real?" is not so surprising since questioning the nature of reality is as old as philosophy itself. To Plato, reality existed in the world of true forms; to Aristotle, reality could be known by experiencing the material world, and to Enlightenment thinkers, reality could be known through reason, science, and experience. In other words, discovering the nature of reality implied arriving at a destination, going in a direction that would take the seeker from one place (ignorance) to another (understanding . . .and the true nature of reality). In terms of these films, however, the *reality of reality itself* is in question, and discovering reality is really a moot point; rather, the destination is accomplished by adjusting one's life to a different perception rather than with finding the answers.

This change in the epistemology of knowing reality can be traced initially to Kant's claim that an ideal world is beyond our comprehension. "Kant argues that the human mind is incapable of knowing the world 'in itself,' which he calls the *noumenal* world. Thus Kant implies that this noumenal world is the 'measure' of knowledge, but then he tells us that we can never know it. Instead, we are limited to the world of *phenomenal* experience—in other words, the world as we know it" (Benson, 2000, p. 151). Here Kant begins unraveling the thread of reality's origin but still connects it to an objective source.

However, the actual turning away from reality itself as a concrete possibility can be found in the philosophy of Nietzsche who believed that men cannot bear the burden of reality and that only in illusion can culture flourish and survive. Consequently, he insisted that the only way to true freedom is by realizing that reality is unobtainable.

According to Nietzsche, since reality is in constant flux, aesthetics provide the only therapeutic agency offering a potential for genuine authenticity. He states: "Men are deeply immersed in illusion and dream images; their eyes glance only over the surface of things and see "forms"; their sensation nowhere leads to truth, but contents itself with receiving stimuli and, as it were, with playing the game of touch on the back of things." (Megill, 1985, p. 50) To avoid our illusions he suggests that we "become the artists of our own existence, untrammeled by natural constraints and limitations . . . accepting this view, we see the necessity of lies; and accepting the necessity of lies we embark upon a divine—that is, a creative—way of thinking" (Megill, 1985, p.).

From these quotes we can see that Nietzsche's philosophy is neither comforting nor conforming to what most of us would like to think describes the nature of reality and the meaning of our existence. Yet it is this philosophy that both under girds postmodernist theories and the recent films that can be characterized by a blurring of the nature of reality. By claiming that reality is in constant flux and rejecting a theoretical conception of reality, Nietzsche blurs the distinction between the true and apparent world. In "Twilight of the Idols" he provides a six-stage history of the demise of the "true" world:

1. Platonism: the true world available to all
2. Christianity: The true world available only to Christians
3. Kantianism: the true world always removed from us
4. The true world exists, but no longer serves any purpose
5. The true world itself is cast aside
6. The idea of the true world is cast aside (Benson, 2000, p.151)

As the idea of a true world diminishes the artist can become a "freed intellect" who is capable of creating his own world. Included in Nietzsche's belief that knowledge requires a rejection of this "true" world is a rejection of the distinctions that are characterized by concepts; therefore, as the autonomous person becomes more aware of instincts and experience as a more authentic way of knowing, the distinctions between subject and object, and the true and apparent world are diminished. Reality is no longer even in question. He states: "Any distinction between a "true" and an apparent world—whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant—is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life." (Nietzsche, 1968).

The first scenario I presented was from *The Truman Show,* where Truman is the unwitting subject of a globally televised program in which hidden cameras capture his every move in a kind of soap opera, sit-com fashion. His community, his friends, and even his family are all actors who, under the direction of Christof, create "a world within a world that is." Christof, the director and producer, assumes a god-like role as he dictates the events influencing Truman and manipulates his understanding of the world. For example, when Truman tells his teacher he wants to be an explorer she answers, "There's nothing to explore—it's already been done"; and when he demonstrates any curiosity for the world outside his community, efforts are made to create a fear of the unknown, like drowning his father in the ocean to make him afraid of water. *(The Truman Show)*

In a climatic moment when Truman's thwarted love-interest Sylvia accuses Christoff of possessing an incredible hubris to engineer such a project, Christof answers, ""I have given Truman a chance to live a normal life. The world you live in is the sick place." *(The Truman Show)* Clearly in this scene Christof is Nietzsche's artist who is "untrammeled by natural constraints," above the ethical responsibilities that would require him to realize the inherent narcissism in exerting absolute power over a person's life. Instead, like Nietzsche's artist, he accepts the necessity of lies as a means to accomplish what he perceives to be a better end; the fact that the lie is based on an illusion makes no difference, since man, in Nietzsche's view, has no access to reality whatsoever. In fact, Nietzsche "accords primacy to the aesthetic precisely because it does *not* give us insight into reality. Indeed, it does not even claim to do so. On the contrary, it is explicitly a realm of illusion, and as such it stands in opposition to the unacknowledged illusion of logic and dialectic" (Megill, 1985, p. 50)

Christof has cast aside the "true world" and has accepted in its place a reality that he controls as the artist. In a televised interview with Christof, when the host asks him why Truman never came close to discovering the true nature of his world, Christof answers, "We accept the reality of the world to which we are presented." *(The Truman Show)* To artists of Nietzsche's ilk, the illusion provided in the art form is more than enough justification for its existence, and in accordance with the fourth part of Nietzsche's six-stage history, the true world exists, but no longer serves any purpose.

In the second and third scenarios, I presented scenes from *The Matrix* and *The Thirteenth Floor,* respectively. Both films explore far-reaching, future possibilities in a world that is becoming transformed by virtual reality. In *The Matrix,* what the main character, played by Keneau Reeves, assumes to be the "real" world is a computer-generated dream world which the controllers, or Artificial Intelligence, created to maintain their own existence by using human energy. The humans have essentially become "brains in a vat" whose only existence is substituted by a neural interaction called the matrix.

In the *Thirteenth Floor,* the main character discovers he IS the virtual reality, as the plot reveals multiple worlds in which the characters can assume more than one identity. Similar to characters in time travel that can go from one time period to another, this virtual reality film allows "real" people to exchange places with computer-generated characters and vice-versa. I place these two films together because both plots present a blurring of the lines between reality and simulated reality, where the distinction between the real and the apparent world become increasingly more difficult to discern.

In a review discussing the phenomenal popularity of *The Matrix,* the author-brothers, Larry and Andy Wachowski describe their efforts to create more than merely action-packed drama by including philosophical questions of human existence to generate an epic proportion to their story. To their credit, the mythological and religious imagery provide a deeper symbolic level and keep the audience aware of the greater issues surrounding the plot, as names like Trinity, Cifer (the villain with the last part of Lucifer's name), and Morpheus, a derivative of Orpheus, give clues to their characters' personality. The dialogue includes weighty discussions where Morpheus answers Neo's questions, "What is real?" and "How do you define real?" and explains the matrix as "a world pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth." *(The Matrix)*

The essence of what comprises the self, however, is left untouched. For example, if Neo's "true"self was, so to speak, in a vat, and his existence in the matrix only a neural interaction, then who is the self that began anew after being unplugged? Does he carry the values and ethics of the simulated self? If the "self" who was contained in the matrix was artificial, when does the actual self assume its true identity? Further, if the people inhabiting the matrix have been deceived into thinking they are living in reality, how can those who have been unplugged justify killing them, when killing them in the matrix puts an end to their life altogether? How can they justify killing those who are not artificial intelligence?

Similarly, in *The Thirteenth Floor,* if the virtual character possesses a higher consciousness than his flesh-and-blood creator, where did this higher self emerge? Did the essence of self begin at birth (for the real character) or at some arbitrary time in the virtual character's life (if one can call it so)? It would seem that what may underlie some assumptions in these films is an acceptance of the postmodern belief in a shifting or nonexistent reality and a perspectival, or personal interpretation of truth. In other words, the nature of reality reflected in the plots may or may not reflect the "true" world, or even recognition of a true world. They may represent Nietzsche's last phase where the idea of a true world is cast aside. However, as the lines are blurred and reality seems as contingent as the click of a computer, could audiences, particularly immature ones, begin to assume a kind of distancing from reality themselves? Could a form of transference begin to happen, one that projects the screen's "realities" onto the realities in viewer's lives?

I would be making a self-evident point to connect violence to the media. Studies have already shown time and time again how television, movies, rock music, and video games have contributed to the increasing violence in our public schools. The worst violence experienced in schools so far, Columbine High School, has been connected, at least indirectly, to the boys' fascination with the film *Natural Born Killers.* In terms of video games, violence has become an accepted sport that is so completely anesthetized from reality that killing is a predictable part of the game. In the video game Carmageddon, as many as 33,000 people can be exterminated after all levels are completed—and that's being the winner!

What I am hypothesizing, however, is a more insidious dilemma, one that would affect adolescents who would never plot to bomb their school or knock off their peers. This form of escape, offered on all levels, begins to create an expectation for entertainment to substitute as experience, and as so, one's reality is sublimated. In her indictment against modern forms of art, Dorothy Sayers warns against perpetuating what she calls "pseudo-art," that she identifies as "escape" literature in the worst sense [which creates] . . . an escape from reality and experience into a world of merely external events—[and results in] the progressive externalization of consciousness."

She goes on to say that "for occasional relaxation this is all right; but can be carried to the point where, not merely art, but the whole universe of phenomena becomes a screen on which we see the magnified projection of our unreal selves, as the object of equally unreal emotions. This brings about the complete corruption of consciousness, which can no longer recognize reality in experience. When things come to this pass, we have a civilization that lives for amusement, without guts, without experience, and out of touch with reality."

Before you begin to interpret my hypothesis as the ravings of a histrionic killjoy, consider the recent cinematic phenomenon, *The Blair Witch Project* whose unconventional advertising and homespun filming style played the ultimate trick on audiences throughout the country. Using preliminary interviews to create a sense of authenticity, a website to distribute personalized information, and leaflets reporting the "missing" students, the filmmakers created a whole new reality that went beyond giving their audiences an escape for a few hours inside the theatre.

Instead, the blurring of the lines between the real and the apparent world was so dramatic that, despite the barrage of articles and reviews discussing its fictional nature, some still think it's a true story. According to the sheriff from Burkittsville, Maryland, where the movie was filmed, "When you tell them the truth, they think there's a conspiracy and a cover-up." (*Time,* 1999) In an article from *Time* discussing the sensational reaction toward the movie, the responses are reported: "Some viewers have vomited during particularly tense scenes . . . at the picture's climax, a Chicago woman let out a full throttle scream." (*Time,* 1999) In another article, one viewer is described as "so frazzled she begged for an escort home," and another as saying, "You mean it's not [real [? The website made it sound as if it was. I can't believe it." (*Time,* 1999)

These techniques have basically been applauded by the media and moviegoers alike for their originality and spirit of independence, and although one might point out how Orson Wells' "War Between the Worlds" created a similar frenzy, it is important to note that the Halloween Caper was never intended to frighten in the way that it did. Blair Witch was planned. The authors' intention was to create a reality so believable that audiences would make the story part of their own reality . . . a good scare, but, what might follow these techniques?

Sayers reminds us that Plato warned his fellow Greek citizens about frittering away their emotions and looking to the theatre for nothing but amusement and entertainment, citing Plato's warning to a culture immersed in emotion: "If you receive the pleasure-seasoned Muse, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law and agreed principles. "

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John Dewey and Traditional Education

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In this paper, I intend to argue that John Dewey's educational philosophy should not be viewed as opposition of traditional education, which, in this paper, refers to the subject matter and teacher centered educational practice. I will argue that his progressive educational ideas have roots in traditional education, thus, should be taken as an enhancement of traditional education. My interest in the present work rests on the fact that Dewey seems to be the person who is either showered with fame or blame for progressivism. On the one hand, there is a widespread unexamined acceptance of Dewey's educational philosophy, which takes anything new and innovative as elements advocated by Dewey. On the other hand, Dewey has been attacked by proponents of traditional education as guilty of having destroyed the intellectual integrity of American life. Among the large volume of literature on Dewey's scholarship, undue emphasis is placed on how Dewey's philosophy deviates from traditional education. While this may be partially attributed to Dewey's uncanny manner of his disagreement with certain aspects of traditional education in his speech and writing, I intend to show that Dewey's educational ideas actually agree with many of the fundamentals of traditional education. This clarification is not only necessary to the critics of Dewey, but also to the hundreds and thousands of Dewey's followers to implement Dewey's educational ideas comprehensively.

PART I. MAJOR CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF JOHN DEWEY

The central criticism of the contemporary critics on Dewey is the alleged anti-intellectualism he advocates in his promotion of child-centered education. According to John Keats, Dewey's advocate of democratic education destroys standards, authority in the classroom and replaces the strong logically arranged subject matter with mere life-adjustment training. As he put it in *School without scholars:*

> Democracy being our way of life—at least in theory—the educational pragmatist pervades his classroom with his idea of democratic processes. ...The children are encouraged to suggest their tasks, to do their schoolwork in committees of their formation, to elect their leaders, and to respect one another's work and opinions... (Keats, 1958, pp. 85-86.)

Keats is concerned with Dewey's emphasis on democratic education that replaces the solid subject matter orientation of the traditional school with children's freedom.

Mortimer Smith, another leading critic of Dewey's philosophy, charges Dewey for the decline of learning in American schools. He wrote:

> One of the primary flaws in the Deweyan philosophy, its failure to set up ends, its insistence the 'the educational process has no end beyond itself' ... has undoubtedly had unfortunate classroom repercussions. As a corollary to this, the progressives have often perverted the valid doctrine that the educational program ought to take account of the child's needs and interests into a mere catering to what the student thinks he wants. And the conception of the discipline all too common to progressive education has sometimes amounted to an abandonment of adult responsibility for the guidance of the young. (Smith, 1954, p. 18)

Smith argues that Dewey's inadequate view of education has resulted in lowered educational standards, and anti-intellectualism. He claims that progressive programs all try to do away with formal subject matter as traditionally conceived. American education has then become mediocre.

In *Education and Freedom,* Rickover concurs with Keats and Smith in blaming Dewey for throwing out the rigorous intellectual components in the curriculum and offering an easy escape for a difficult problem American education faces. That is, changing the liberal arts curricula to fit the desires and interests of students. He said:

> His (Dewey's) emphasis on fitting curricula to the desires and interests of the children...offered a simple solution. Today we must have schools that develop in all children—talented, average, and below average—the highest level of intellectual competence of which they are capable... This means that our schools must return to the tradi-

> tional task of formal education in Western civilization—transmission of the nation's cultural heritage, and preparation for life through rigorous training of young minds to think clearly, logically, and independently. (Rickover, 1959, pp. 17-18)

Rickover is interested in pointing out that Dewey's insistence on using students' prior experience in learning undoubtedly has substituted solid learning with know-how only.

According to Hutchins, another leading critic of progressivism, Dewey's child-centered educational philosophy does nothing but gives a good time to children at school. He notes:

> The principal reason for the popularity in the United States of what is called Progressive Education, in which Mr. Dewey also had a hand, is that the children have a good time in school. In a child-centered society...any effort to insist on painful work in school naturally encounters resistance. (Hutchins, 1953, p.86)

Hutchins maintains that education is the development of the mind or intellectual powers. Since everyone has the potential to actualize the inborn intellectual capacity, schools should focus on this aspect of learning. School is not a place where anything goes. It is a place where the transmission of the cultural literacy is affirmed, where ignorance is expelled. Hutchins argues that democratic education is providing the good education, which means intellectual training, to all. Life-adjustment education has destroyed the democratic process by depriving many students of the opportunity of intellectual training.

The major criticism from the contemporary critics of Dewey aims at the anti-intellectualism they claim Dewey advocates through his conception of democracy, interest theory, the activity school, and the open door policy for life-adjustment or vocational study subjects in the curriculum. According to the critics, traditional education, which focuses on transmission of the nation's cultural heritage, intellectual training through liberal arts studies, and affirms the teacher as the authority of the classroom, must return to American classrooms. In this way, the general intellectual competence of the nation will be strengthened.

Part II. Dewey's Educational Ideas

The argument of the paper that Dewey's educational philosophy, in many aspects, is a development of, not an opposition to the major positions of the traditional education necessitates a careful review of Dewey's educational ideas.

Democratic Educcation

According to Dewey, democracy rests on a shared common interest and change in social habit. He said: "A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience." "Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest..." (Dewey, 1957, p. 101) The implicit meaning of these statements is democracy cannot come into existence by making its citizens conforming-puppets. It must encourage free interaction and communication of experience of its members so that there is a common shared vision and goal. Dewey maintains:

> A society which makes provision for participation in its goods of all members on equal terms and which secures flexible adjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. (Dewey, 1957, p.115)

To Dewey, in order to make everyone an effective, intelligent citizen, education must be democratic. Schools should provide free and intelligent choice between alternatives, engaging students in meaningful interactions with their environment—the subject matter, the teacher and peers. Democratic education, according to Dewey, must be as broad in the area of opportunity as in the pluralistic society, which gives its birth. Through his theory of experience and growth, which represents a continued employment of the student's past experiences to discover and solve new problems in the world, Dewey argues that democratic education will use the resources of the past, but will add to these the resources of the present. Dewey (1957) pointed out: "A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability." (pp.101-102.) Clearly, Dewey is concerned with getting everyone involved in education, and to him, this end cannot be achieved by means of external imposition, rather, through different opportunities offered to individuals and by means of personal dispositions in the learning process.

Activity

Dewey's emphasis on activity in education is a natural flow from his emphasis on experience in learning. What Dewey argues is the obtainment of knowledge should always model after the scientific experiment. According to him, when people act upon their environment, the environment responds by acting back on them. In this way, people undergo the consequences of their action. It is through constant interactions with the environment that knowledge is produced. (Knowledge according to Dewey is the result of tested and verified logical constructions, which have grown out of the process of reflective inquiry.) Based on this theory of knowledge, activity or action becomes very important in the process of learning not simply for the sake of activity, but for its ability to generate controlled experience and knowledge. He argues the purpose of education is to present an environment in which interaction would effect an acquisition of meanings that are so important that they in turn would become instruments of further learning.

In promoting his concept of activity school, Dewey is aware of the danger of replacing intellectual inquiry with mere training. He wrote: "mere activity does not constitute experience." (Dewey, 1957, p.163) He felt that activities out of school many times are ineffective. He said:

> Activity out of school is carried on under conditions which have not been deliberately adapted to promoting the function of understanding and formation of effective intellectual dispositions. (Dewey, 1957, pp.319-320) No one doubts, theoretically, the importance of fostering in school good habits of thinking... (What) the school can or need to do for pupils, so far as their minds are concerned, is to develop their ability to think. (Dewey, 1957, pp.170-171)

For Dewey, the initial stage of the development of thinking is empirical experience. It is through direct contact with empirical situations one starts to engage in mental work. (Dewey, 1957, p.181) Experiences or activities not only initiate thinking, but also serve as a medium for arousing the interest of the learner by transforming the school life into a community life, in which pupils find themselves capable participants. He wrote:

> We must conceive of them (activities) in their social significance. ...in short, as instrumentalities through which the school itself shall be made a genuine form of active community life, instead of a place set apart in which to learn lessons...(Dewey, 1957, p.14)

Dewey maintains that intellectual components are not to be found in the inner structure of a subject, but in its function. That is, "in its power to start and direct significant inquiry and reflection." (Dewey, 1957, p.225)

Interest

According to Dewey, interest is a fundamental element in learning. When the child is interested in learning, that is, when the child unifies the learning with his own end, the child will want to learn. He argues that children are naturally curious. By nature, they want to learn. This natural circuit of energy is cut off when the learning becomes external, meaningless, and separated from the end of the child. As Dewey(1938) put it in *Experience and Education:*

> The traditional scheme is, in essence, one of imposition from above and from outside. It imposes adult standards, subject-matter, and methods upon those who are only growing slowly toward maturity. The gap is so great that the required subject-matter, the methods of learning and behaving are foreign to the existing capacities of the young. They are beyond the reach of the experience the young learners already possess. Consequently, they must be imposed. (P.19)

Dewey argues that in the learning process, the psychological and the social aspects are organically related. Without the observation of child psychology, education becomes an imposition from without, not within. Without the social aspect, pupils will not understand how to put their powers to use. Thus, learning becomes useless. In order to make every child want to learn, education must cater to the child's interests. That is, the child's own instincts and powers should furnish the material and give the starting-point for all education.

It is important to note that in promoting the child-centered education and rejecting external authority, Dewey did not negate the necessity for adult guidance. He wrote:

> When external authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected, but rather that there is need to search for a more effective source of authority. Because the older education imposed the knowledge, methods, and the rules of conduct of the mature person upon the young, it does not follow...that the knowledge and skill of the mature person has no directive value for the experience of the immature. On the contrary, basing education upon personal experience may mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts between the mature and the immature than ever existed in the traditional school, andconsequently more, rather than less, guidance by others. (Dewey, 1938, p.21)

Subject Matter

To understand Deweyan concept of subject matter, we need to relate it to his experience and interest theories. Dewey's position that subject matter is based on the assumption that knowledge is the result of the organism interacting with its environment rejects treating subject matter as a course of study, but resources available for the transforming of indeterminate situations into determinate ones. According to Dewey, the resource available for such a transformation is the child's experience or social life. He said:

> —the true center of correlation on the school subjects is not science, or literature, nor history, nor geography, but the child's own social activities. ... The primary basis of education is in the child's powers at work along the same general constructive lines as theose which have brought civilization into being. The only way to make the child conscious of his social heritage is to enable him to perform those fundamental types of activity which makes civilization what it is. ...this gives the standard for the place of cooking, sewing, manual training, etc., in the school. (Dewey, 1929, p. 9-10.)

We must note that Dewey's advocate to include the vocational subjects in the curriculum does not aim at replacing intellectual training with manual skills. Dewey (1900) noted:

> In educational terms, ...these occupations in school shall not be mere practical devices or modes of routine employment, the gaining of better technical skill... but active centers of scientific insight into natural material and processes, points of departure whence children shall be led out into a realization of the historical development of man. (P.19)

The above suggests when cooking, a form of social life, is included in the curriculum, it naturally leads students' interests to the discovery of the significance of the formal study subjects such as reading, writing, mathematics, and chemistry. The child's social life unifies the traditional study subjects in the classroom, making the child realize the real meaning of his/her learning. To Dewey, true education is the stimulation of the child's powers by a social situation in which the child finds himself. The task of the teacher is not to impose the 3 R's, literature, history, and geography on the child; rather, it is to organize the teaching in such a way that the transmission of the civilization is kneaded into the subject the child is interested in and familiar with.

PART III. THE HARMONY BETWEEN DEWEY AND TRADITIONAL EDUCATION

The analysis of Dewey's educational philosophy undoubtedly points out many of the differences Dewey had with traditional education. However, the differences seem to have been magnified to such a degree that the basic agreement between Dewey and traditional education has been ignore. This may be partially attributable to the fact that Dewey used the concepts for which he is criticized but often times his meaning was different than that contained in the critic's interpretation. In his idea of democratic education, Dewey called for the repudiation of external control, something that traditional education embraces, for the reason of massive participation of individuals in education. He recognizes that meaningful engagement in the learning process cannot come about unless the learner is interested. And one way to arouse the interest of the mass is to democratize the learning process by meaningful interactions with the environment people find themselves in. This is the surest approach to ensure everyone reaches his/her highest potential.

The argument that education must be democratic and be available to all reveals a match with that of Hutchins and other traditionalists who argue vehemently that every citizen should have the opportunity to a good education (intellectual training). The traditionalists argue that in order to make every citizen free and intelligent participant of a society, all must receive intellectual training. One position that both Dewey and traditional educationists are obviously concerned with is that every person is entitled to a maximized opportunity to realize his/her human potential. While traditional education tries to affirm such an education through external control, Dewey finds it more effective to let the learner take the steering wheel of his/her learning. Dewey's method is to make the learning interesting and meaningful so that the learner chooses to affirm such an education for him/herself.

Dewey and traditional education also agree with each other on the importance of the role of the teacher in learning. It should be pointed out that Dewey never objected to teacher guidance, a major position in traditional education. In fact, he called for more teacher guidance and teacher-student interactions in the classroom. As quoted before, Dewey (1938) said: "...basing education upon personal experience may mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts between the mature and the immature than ever existed in the traditional school." (p.21) Dewey's criticism on external authority of the traditional education is not to eradicate it from the classroom, but to make it more effective and more psychologically acceptable by the child. According to Dewey, the role of the teacher is crucial in the learning process.

Dewey is also accused of sewing the seeds of anarchy in his interest theory, activity school and his concept of subject matter. A chaotic learning environment will result from a child-centered classroom that gives children freedom in learning, promotes hands-on experience, and introduces vocational subjects such as cooking, sewing and basket weaving in the curriculum. These are alien and downright hostile to the intellectual orientation of traditional education.

To see whether Dewey's interest theory, activity school and his concept of subject matter are hostile to intellectual training, a clarification about what intellectual training amounts to in traditional education is in order. If intellectualism means the successful passing of the traditional subject matter course only, then Dewey certainly advocated more subjects in his educational philosophy. However, if intellectualism means the ability to think clearly, logically, and independently as in the words of Rickover quoted before, then Dewey's educational ideas rejoins traditional education about intellectualism at the root of the issue.

In his idea of the activity school, Dewey never extolled activity simply for its own sake. In fact he was concerned with this possible confusion. He noted: "...mere activity does not constitute experience." (Dewey, 1957, p.163) True educative experience must be useful and possess the capacity to control future experience toward educational goals. (Dewey, 1938, p.13.) Thus, he argued that the activity in the school should be implemented from the point of view that it serves as the point of departure from which the holistic understanding of the historical development of man is gained. If intellectualism is to be understood as cognition and thinking clearly, logically and independently, Dewey's emphasis on the general understanding of the development of the world and human activities reveals a great deal of his concern for intellectualism.

The use of the child's experience in learning lends a hand to the child to interpret the meaning of his/her learning. It is not to be taken simply as a way to keep the child alert and active, but also a means to engage the mind of the child, making it more inquisitive about areas and disciplines connected to his/her experience. In specific terms, when the child plays with a ball, the child naturally inquires about the dispositions of the ball, such as why it bounces, and why it rolls continuously and stops when it hits a rock. These inquires motivate the child to understand physics, and other related disciplines. The encouragement of independent thinking cannot be more revealing in such an educational arrangement.

Epistemologically, Dewey thought intelligence is gained through reflective thought. In his work *How We Think,* Dewey delineated five steps to transform experience into knowledge. To him, when people interact with the world, they encounter problems. Knowledge being the intelligence to manage the world is gained when the problem is solved. Therefore, a child should learn through problem-solving projects. In this way, the child is naturally encouraged to put his/her mind to find the solution to the problem that is so real. This way of teaching logically connects the child with the world he/she lives in. In the search for the solution, logical reasoning is exercised when the child creates an inventory of solutions and projects the consequences of each solution in order to choose the best to test.

Moreover, intellectualism in Dewey's interest theory is also apparent. Dewey (1903) taught that no activity can be called forth unless the organism is interested (pp.7, 12, 16) To quote Dewey (1957) again: "Interests and aims, concern and purpose, are necessarily connected." (p. 120) To him, aims are intelligent personal purposes. By nature, interest is an inherent part of aim. As Griffin (1965), a Deweyan Scholar, said: "To act with an aim is to act intelligently. To act intelligently is to act with a mind." (p.97) The intellectual aim of education cannot be achieved without the interest of the child. Since educational aims are not external to the child, the teacher's role is to take hold of the present interests and energy of the child and harness them into something that is in the best interest of the child. In Dewey's words, the "mediated interest" (1895) are an effective means to reach the educational end, which as we have seen earlier is the general understanding of the world, the consciousness of the social and historical heritage, the ability to think clearly and to solve problems.

In relation to subject matter, Dewey never down played the importance of the traditional organized subjects despite his conceptual disagreement with traditionalists on what counts as subject matter. Although Dewey was not happy with the traditional ways of teaching the core subjects such as literature, history, and geography, he never indicated that they should be thrown out of the curriculum. In fact, he recognized the importance of these subjects to such a degree that he wanted children to learn them as something meaningful and connected to their life. That is a main reason he suggested that cooking, sewing and other manual training become active centers of scientific insight into natural material and processes. Only when these organized subjects are connected to the subject matters the child is familiar with will the child become interested in the traditional organized subject matter and learn them by heart.

The previous analyses suggest that Dewey's educational philosophy and traditional education share the common ground for many basic ideas. Both embrace the idea of education for all; both emphasize adult guidance in learning; both advocate intellectual training and a solid knowledge background for every child. From these perspectives, Dewey's educational philosophy should not be taken as opposites of traditional education, but its enhancement. In order for all teachers to implement Dewey's educational ideas into the classroom effectively and accurately, this understanding of Dewey should become one of the key areas in the studies of John Dewey.

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On the Possibility of Aesthetic Experience: Dewey, Dickie, and the Context of Art

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This essay argues that a Deweyan understanding of aesthetic experience provides a complementary and necessary component for current contextual theories in the philosophy of art. The first section of the essay places Dewey's account of experience within the context of the philosophical problems faced by contemporary aesthetics. The following section presents a brief sketch of Dewey's understanding of experience in general, and of aesthetic experience in particular. A special emphasis is placed on the role that environment plays in Dewey's understanding of experience. Finally, the last section of the essay shows some congruities between Dewey's understanding of the social experience of art and one of the most popular current contextual theories: George Dickie's "Institutional theory of art." In closing, it is argued that Dewey's account of aesthetic experience provides a viable means to incorporate the lived experience of a work of art with current contextual definitions of art while avoiding the pitfalls encountered in traditional accounts of aesthetic experience.

I. INTRODUCTION

"Experience" is arguably the most important concept within John Dewey's thought. His commitment to how organisms act and react to an environment that is lived, transformed, suffered, and enjoyed—in short, "experienced"—permeates the whole of his writings. Yet, despite the prominent place of experience within Dewey's thinking, it is also one of his most misunderstood concepts. A brief survey of the widespread controversies, criticisms, and accusations leveled against Dewey's non-traditional usage of the term reveals a long history of misunderstandings, misreadings, and hasty dismissals. The consequence of this unfortunate legacy of misinterpretation resulted in a marginalization of Dewey's account of experience within the philosophical community; a consequence which now overshadows the potential benefits his understanding of experience provides for many problems faced by present-day theory.

In the field of aesthetics, in particular, the disparity between Dewey's commitment to the lived experience of a work of art and the type of philosophical problems considered important within contemporary aesthetics leads one to ask the question, "what place, if any, can Dewey occupy within the philosophy of art today?" Given the sparse treatment of Dewey's thought within current aesthetic debates the answer to this question remains uncertain and problematic. While most philosophers of art readily concede that the substantial impact of Dewey's *Art as Experience* on the first half of this century guarantees him a assured place in the history of aesthetics, his thought is widely neglected in the treatment of current problems within the philosophy of art.[1]

One primary reason for Dewey's neglect can be traced to a series of fundamental transformations occurring in aesthetics in the last half century. The most noticeable transformation was a decisive shift away from theories of aesthetic experience and towards an analysis of the aesthetic objects themselves. This shift not only produced a number of new directions for aesthetic theory, but it also reshaped the methodology used when asking questions about art. In this way, many contemporary critics, most notably George Dickie, have challenged the very existence or need of a theory of aesthetic experience.

For Dickie, thinkers as diverse as Dewey to Kant to Schopenhauer are lumped together as "aesthetic experience" philosophers of art. These thinkers, so his argument goes, are sorely out of step and woefully unprepared to deal adequately with the types of artworks produced by the avant-garde in the twentieth-century. It is argued that the twentieth century's general trend toward anti-representational art, including (but not limited to) the problematic features contained in the Dada artistic revolution, the "ready-made" pieces of Marcel Duchamp, and more recently, the work of Andy Warhol, produced works of art that defy any traditional attempt to understand or define "art" in terms of experience. Consequently, so his argument goes, aesthetic experience must be consigned to the dustbins in order to make room for a more suitable and rigorous understanding of art in the twentieth-century and beyond.

Few would deny that Dickie's arguments cut right to the heart of problems inherent within traditional formulations of aesthetic experience; particularly, when trying to understand art today. Furthermore, critics like Dickie are undeniably correct in the assertion that a disinterested and autonomous conception of aesthetic contemplation, attitude, or experience is not only unhelpful but is also out of place when considering the history of art in the last century. For example, it would take no small amount of effort and creativity to reconcile a theory of aesthetic experience such as Schopenhauer's grandiose description of the "aesthetic contemplation of the Idea" with the banal experience of a coat rack or urinal presented to us as art by an artist like Marcel Duchamp.

The failure of traditional formulations of aesthetic experience to incorporate the novel and puzzling aspects of Modern art forced many contemporary philosophers of art to shift their focus away from traditional conceptions of the experience of art and towards an analysis of the context surrounding the artwork itself. Through an analysis of the context in which an artwork is imbedded—whether that context be one of physical location as in George Dickie's "Institutional theory of art,"[2] the context of theory as in Arthur Danto's description of the "artworld,"[3] or the context of history as in Noel Carroll and Jerrold Levinson's "historical definition of art"[4]—the claim is made that our best hope for understanding and defining art in our present age is to look at the context or environment out of which art originates.

While the shift away from theories that define art rigidly in terms of a formalized commitment to autonomy and intrinsic aesthetic properties and towards a contextual definition of art is welcome and needed, something is still lacking within current contextual theories of art. What is missing is an adequate treatment of the individual's experiential interaction with a particular artwork in context. Current contextual theories supply only half of a new understanding of the "experience of art" through their object-oriented appeal to a definition of art that relies on an artwork's surrounding environment. What is now needed is a new description of an individual's concrete experience of both art, and the social and environmental context in which that art is imbedded.

I believe that the neglect of "experience" by contextual theories is due largely to the bad publicity that aesthetic experience has received in the last thirty years. However, just because traditional accounts of aesthetic experience fail to provide an adequate treatment of art today does not mean that any attempt to describe our experience of art should be abandoned. Rather, what is need is a new understanding of aesthetic experience that not only co-exists with current contextual theories, but hopefully, also strengthens them by providing a comprehensive treatment of our lived experience of a work of art in its context. Dewey's understanding of experience as an interaction with one's environment provides a starting point for such a project.

Before Dewey's contribution to contemporary aesthetics is shown, it is both beneficial and necessary to briefly sketch his general usage of the term experience. Whereas traditional descriptions of aesthetic experience stress the detached and disinterested nature of aesthetic experience from ordinary experience, Dewey makes no such demarcation. Thus, it is important to note the continuities Dewey maintains between aesthetic experience and ordinary experience, as well as the continuities between our experience of the fine arts and our experience of the everyday world.

II. Experience, Environment, and the Everyday

Dewey spent much of his philosophical career trying to revitalize words that had become stale through repeated use in the history of philosophy. Among his attempts to revitalize words like "God," "nature," "knowledge," and "truth," Dewey's attempt to re-describe our traditional understanding of "experience" represents one of his most ambitious tasks. Perhaps Dewey's greatest contribution to a new understanding of experience is found in his emphasis on the environmental context of experience. Through his critique of traditional accounts of experience, and his promotion of the role of context, Dewey attempts to transform the act of "experiencing" from one of passive and self-enclosed contemplation to one of active participation.

For Dewey, the Enlightenment tradition gave us an atomistic understanding of experience locked up in a philosophical terminology that situates the act of experiencing squarely within a subjective and private consciousness. Experience, in this sense, becomes something analogous to a "veil" or "screen" that distinctly separates our minds from the environment being perceived. While not denying the importance or significance of the subjective qualities of experience, Dewey argues that these traditional accounts of experience describe only a limited portion of the act of experience itself. Furthermore, according to Dewey, traditional accounts of experience misrepresent the actual lived experience of an organism by treating the act of experience as an autonomous and private process that can be, or should be, detached and understood outside of the environing conditions in which that experience occurs.

Dewey argues that the traditional epistemological emphasis on a stoic and neutral analysis of experience apart from the living environment in which that experience occurs is an artificial and costly mistake. As he states, "the very point of experience, so to say, is that it doesn't occur in a vacuum; its agent-patient instead of being insulated and disconnected is bound up with the movements of things by most intimate and pervasive bonds."[5] Contrary to traditional descriptions of experience, Dewey maintains that an environment in not something that is merely apprehended by an organism through experience. Rather, a particular environment or context sets the very conditions for the possibility of any experience at all.

For Dewey, one's experience can never be a self-referential act. In order for an act of experience to occur it must take place within an context or environment. He points out that, "It is not experience which is experienced, but nature—stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity and so on. Things acting in certain ways *are* experience; they are what is experienced."[6] Understood in this sense, experience is always first and foremost a relational process between an organism and a particular environment. Thus, an environment is not something that exists "outside" of one's experience just as one's experience of an environment does not take place solely "inside" one's subjective apprehension. In his new understanding of experience Dewey attempts to move past the dualism of subject-object created by these misleading spatial metaphors. In their place he proposes an understanding of experience that situates the organism within an environment, that understands the organism as an active part of an environment. Experience, for Dewey, becomes the intersection of an organism with an environment.

One of the great benefits of Dewey's description of experience is its ability to capture the dynamic inter-relationship that an organism and environment exercise upon one another. In the act of "experiencing" an organism is actively effected by an environment just as the environment itself is altered by the presence of the organism. Understood in this way, the act of experiencing shifts from a passive observation of one's surroundings to an active interaction with one's environment. An act of experience becomes something that one undergoes, suffers through, or enjoys; it becomes a process that takes shape through an environment and because of an environment. Likewise our experience of distinctly human values like goodness, aesthetic beauty, or truth—just like the experience of fear, contentment, or rapture—are not found in the passive contemplation of qualities or ideas existing above and beyond one's environment. Rather these meanings and values are the products of an active engagement with one's surrounding environment, history, tradition, and culture.

Given Dewey's understanding of experience as interaction it is not surprising that his account of aesthetic experience differs radically from traditional accounts of aesthetic experience. Unlike traditional theories of aesthetic experience Dewey does not maintain that aesthetic experience is something that is separate and distinct from everyday experience. Rather Dewey maintains that aesthetic experience is simply everyday experience in its most meaningful and intense form. Thus, in a sense, it is perhaps misleading to speak of Dewey's theory of "aesthetic experience" at all. For Dewey, aesthetic experience and everyday experience are part of a continuous process that differ only by intensity and degree. Using a geographical analogy to illustrate his point, Dewey explains that, "mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest upon the earth. They *are* the earth in one of its manifest operations."[7] Aesthetic experience, in this sense, represents a manifest operation, a high point, an intensification, of our everyday experience of the world.

In this fashion, Dewey's account of aesthetic experience is directly opposed to the Kantian legacy of a disinterested and detached experience of beauty, nature, or art. For Dewey, aesthetic experience can never be understood in terms of passive contemplation because an experience, in this case an aesthetic experience, always involves an active participation on behalf of the individual involved in the act of experiencing. Dewey maintains that the idea that aesthetic experience is detached or disinterested, that it is a special state or attitude—in short, the conception of aesthetic experience that has dominated the history of Western aesthetics—is itself symptomatic of the neglect that aesthetic theories have paid to the lived relationship between art and life. Consequently, one of Dewey's main tasks in *Art as Experience* is to re-establish the connection between art and life by exploring the relationship of aesthetic experience to the context of our everyday experience of the world. In the opening pages of *Art as Experience* Dewey claims that his task, "is to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute experience."[8]

However, when presented with the artworks of the twentieth century avant-garde, the relevance of a recovery of aesthetic qualities in everyday experience, and the culmination of these experiences in works of art, Dewey's glorification of the lived experience of art becomes a questionable foundation upon which to build a theory of art. In the twentieth century, the differences between art and life are certainly much more evident than the similarities. Thus, whereas Dewey's thoughts on aesthetic experience fit nicely into a discussion of Greek sculpture, the poetry of Keats, or a painting by Matisse, they initially appear misplaced when confronting the paradigmatic artworks of our time: a stark red square, a urinal, or a *Brillo* box. Consequently, for many critics, Dewey's re-description of aesthetic experience is simply too old-fashioned to be of any use for aesthetic criticism and too vague to provide anything more than one more utopian/inspirational account of how art and life can be co-extensive processes.

In particular, Dewey's account of "*an* experience" has been the subject of numerous criticisms and misunderstandings. Stated briefly, Dewey maintains that *an* experience represents those moments in ordinary experience when sensations, thoughts, and emotions are consummated into an organized and meaningful structure. These types of experiences contain a pervasive trait that separates them qualitatively and temporally from the general stream of experience. Dewey writes, "we have *an* experience when the material runs its course to fulfillment. Then and only then is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences."[9] In this manner, according to Dewey, *an* experience is self-contained, unique, and identifiable, in relation to other past and future experiences.

George Dickie, one of the most notable critics of aesthetic experience in the last century, provides a representative example of the confusions surrounding Dewey's description of *an* experience. According to Dickie, Dewey's terminological use of "*an* experience" is symptomatic of the traditional desire to transform the experience of art into a transcendent aesthetic phenomenon. Dickie writes that, "Dewey caught up in his idealistic vocabulary, italicizes the 'an' of the ordinary expression of 'an experience' and gives the expression a metaphysical twist."[10] Thus, Dickie maintains that Dewey, following in the footsteps of Schopenhauer, creates the unneeded phenomenon of "*an* experience" when the ordinary process of "paying attention" to a work of art would suffice. Dickie concludes his criticism of Dewey by claiming that aesthetic experience is merely a "roundabout and misleading way of talking about some of the features of a work of art."[11]

In his argument Dickie apparently reads Dewey as one more figure in the tradition of aesthetic experience begun by Kant and Schopenhauer. By framing Dewey within this tradition, Dickie naturally reads Dewey's use of "*an* experience" as another attempt to transcendentalize our experience of art. However, given Dewey's repeated emphasis on the interactive quality of experience the position that Dickie attributes to him appears confused. In fact, one could claim that Dickie, in his quest to eradicate all accounts of aesthetic experience from our contemporary field, does not appreciate the radical break that Dewey makes with traditional theories of aesthetic experience in *Art as Experience.*

Dewey incurs some blame for these misreadings due to his choice of the awkward term "*an* experience." For critics like Dickie, this type of terminology suggests that one is attempting to distinctly separate one type of experience (in this case, an aesthetic experience) from the experience of everything else. This was, of course, exactly what Dewey was trying not to do. Rather, Dewey's regrettable choice of the phrase "*an* experience" signifies those experiences that are memorable and identifiable from those that are not. As Dewey states, "*an* experience has a unity that gives it its name, *that* meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship."[12] In this way, an experience is probably best understood in terms of identity. *An* experience does not make an experience transcendent or aloof from life, but rather denotes something in our general stream of experience that has become identifiable, memorable, and particular. *An* experience, for Dewey, is what separates the idea of paintings in general from *that* painting by Matisse, poetry through the ages from *that* poem by Wallace Stevens that captures *this* moment so well, or to take an example outside of art, picnics in the park from *that* wonderful picnic we enjoyed in the spring of 1992.

Once some of these misunderstandings have cleared, Dickie and Dewey occupy surprisingly similar positions in their critiques of traditional descriptions of aesthetic experience. In the final section of this paper I will turn to another similarity shared by Dewey and Dickie. Through the similarities of Dickie's "Institutional theory of art" and Dewey's emphasis on the social character of art the benefits that Dewey brings to contextual theories of art will be revealed.

III. ART, EXPERIENCE, AND CONTEXT

Our last century has produced an amorphous collection of objects, words, and sounds called "art" that appear to defy any definition that relies on an analysis of aesthetic essences or exhibited intrinsic properties. To complicate matters further, artistic movements such as Dadaism, pop art, and conceptual art, "create" artworks that are virtually indistinguishable from everyday objects. Duchamp's submission of a urinal to an 1917 artshow under the title *Fountain,* and Warhol's 1964 display of *Brillo Boxes* offer two famous examples. Traditional aesthetic theories based on the analysis of the formal exhibited properties of art, or traditional "experiences" of artworks, are unable to properly distinguish these works of art from ordinary objects in our everyday world.

Because of artworks like Duchamp's *Fountain* or Warhol's *Brillo Boxes,* contextual theories of art have enjoyed popularity in the increasingly complicated matter of defining art. George Dickie provides one of the most influential contextual theories in his "institutional theory of art." Briefly summarized, Dickie maintains that an object is a work of art when the status of art is conferred upon the object by authoritative members of artistic institutions. He proposes two criteria that all objects share in order to be classified as art. Dickie claims, "A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact, (2) a set of aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld.)"[13]

This type of classificatory definition of art eliminates the problems encountered by traditional theories in their attempt to define art in the twentieth century. For Dickie, art is no longer defined by the exhibited properties of the artwork but rather by the context of where and how the artwork occurs in society. This context is characterized formally in locations like art galleries, museums, concert halls, and theaters. The "core members" of the artworld include the artists or "presenters" of works, and also the spectators or "goers" who appreciate the works. However, Dickie claims these roles are not defined formally or rigidly. He maintains the context of an artworld is a loosely organized, informal institution that does not demand an elite membership card. Thus, Dickie claims that "every person who sees himself as a member of the artworld is thereby a member."[14]

From a strictly definitional standpoint, Dickie's institutional theory is effective at separating art from non-art. An object is "art" if it is placed as a candidate for appreciation within a institutional context that confers that status. Problematic works of art like Duchamp's *Fountain* are incorporated painlessly into Dickie's definition of art. In this case, the difference between art and an ordinary urinal depends on its situational context—Duchamp's urinal is found in a gallery, while ordinary non-art urinals are typically found in rest rooms. However, Dickie's institutional theory has received extensive criticism due to this purely classificatory function. One major criticism is that while Dickie's theory provides an effective means by which to separate art from non-art it does not show reasons why a particular object has had the status of art conferred upon it instead of some other object. In other words, it does not provide any account of our value of the impact an artwork has on our experience. In this context, Dewey's theory of experience provides a great benefit to contemporary contextual theories like Dickie's institutional theory of art.

In fact, Dewey anticipates Dickie's institutional theory of art in a number of passages within *Art as Experience*. This is not surprising, since both thinkers place a great deal of emphasis on the environmental context of a work of art. Like Dickie, Dewey claims the division between art and non-art is based on the acceptance of existing social conditions and institutions. However, whereas Dickie finds the institutional nature of contemporary art promising for a new definition of art, Dewey finds the idea of institutionalized art indicative of our modern tendency to separate culture into isolated compartments. Dewey claims art (along with religion, morality, economics and politics) has been divided artificially into a distinct and separate cultural category. He maintains that our limited identification of the "experience of art" with specific "institutions of art," such as museums and galleries, is itself symptomatic of an unhealthy division between art and life. For Dewey, "art" is not an inherently autonomous and specialized phenomenon. Rather, it is only within our experience of art in galleries and museums that art is transformed from its indigenous status in everyday life into a "pure" object that is set apart from life. For Dewey, it is only when art is enclosed within a specific institutional context apart from everyday life that a need arises for a special definition of art. Thus, one could surmise Dewey would find no small irony in the fact that a philosopher like Dickie defines art in terms of an institution that created the very need for a specific definition in the first place.

IV. CONCLUSION

Dewey paid little explicit attention to the anti-art and avant-garde movements of his day. Thus, it may appear odd to discuss the benefits of Dewey's understanding of aesthetic experience alongside artworks like Duchamp's *Fountain*. However, many passages in Dewey's *Art as Experience* support Duchamp's professed desire to break free from the static traditions surrounding art at the beginning of this century. For Dewey, as for Duchamp, innovation is the driving purpose behind all artistic creation and experience; in Dewey's words art is, above all, a "device in experimentation."[15] However, whereas Duchamp threw his artworks at the world in protest, Dewey nurtured the hope that art could be restored to its rightful place in our everyday life.

The effectiveness of artists like Duchamp to emancipate art is readily seen in the number of theories that arose to incorporate their artworks. Contextual theories of art, like Dickie's institutional theory, currently represent the best means to define art in the present day. However, due to their purely classificatory function, these theories only solve half of the problem posed to the philosophy of art in our present day. Dewey's understanding of experience as an interaction with an environment provides a complementary and missing piece to contemporary contextual definitions of art. After all, we do not just rest content once a philosopher has successfully defined a controversial object as either art or non-art. Rather, we talk about the object, debate is value, draw inspiration from it, or perhaps decree that it marks the end of civilization. In other words we interact with the artwork, more specifically, we experience it.

Through the incorporation of a Deweyan conception of experience—by which I mean an understanding of our distinctly human interaction with specific environments such as nature, cultures, cities, and museums the idea of aesthetic experience can and should be recovered. Through a recovery of aesthetic experience a comprehensive account of our lived experience in the present age becomes, once again, a possibility.

NOTES

1. Two notable exceptions can be found in the work of Thomas Alexander and Richard Shusterman. See Alexander's *John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987.) and Shusterman's *Pragmatic Aesthetics* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992.)

2. See Dickie's *Art and Aesthetics: An Institutional Anaylysis.* (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974.) Dickie has revised his Institutional definition in his more recent book *The Art Circle* (New York: Haven Publications, 1984.) In this paper I have chosen to focus on his earlier version as it has become the cannonical and most widely debated version of an institutional theory of art.

3. See Arthur Danto's, "The Artworld," *The Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1964): 571-84.

4. See Levinson's "Defining Art Historically," *British Journal of Aesthetics* Vol 19. (1979) 232-50. and "Re-defining Art Historically" *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol 47. (1989) 21-33. See Carroll "Art, Practice, and Narrative" *The Monist* Vol. 71. (1988) 140-56 and "Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art" *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol. 51. (1993) 313-26.

5. John Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy," in *The Essential Dewey Vol. 1.* ed. Thomas Alexander and Larry Hickman, (Indiana University Press Bloomington: 1998.) p. 50.

6. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* (Dover Publications, New York: 1958.) p. 4a.

7. John Dewey, *Art as Experience, The Later Works: 1925-1953, Vol. 4,* ed. Jo Ann Boydston, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989.) p. 9. All subsequent references will be noted as *AE* plus page number.

8. *AE,* p. 16.

9. *AE,* p. 35.

10. George Dickie, "Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic Experience," *The Journal of Philosophy* (62) 1965, p. 132.

11. Ibid. p. 136

12. *AE,* p. 44.

13. George Dickie, *Art and Aesthetics: An Institutional Analysis,* p. 34.

14. Ibid. p. 36.

15. *AE,* p. 392.

Teaching and Experiencing Hardy's *Tess of the d'Urbervilles:* A Deweyan Approach

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First of all, using anything like a Deweyan approach to teach this novel will immediately set you on a different course from the prevalent trends of literary theory and pedagogy. It is remarkable how little attention there is in all the printed criticism to what it is like to experience this novel. That would be true if you were teaching Tess in the 30s, in the 50s, or now. Today there is post-modern phase in which the narrative is found to be full of indications showing that it is not a story of human beings and their choices, but a demonstration of Hardy's clever blow-up of all sorts of Victorian narrative conventions. That interpretation is not exactly wrong; it may be supported with evidence from the text, but the consequences for experience, as far as I can see, are disastrous. For one thing, if Tess is not even a character, how can anyone care about her? But that seems to be the new age we are in: the side-comments critics would give, in earlier decades, about feeling the power of the book, or of marvelling at Hardy's compassion, of being nearly overwhelmed with the felt qualities of Tess's story—these now are rarely heard. One of the latest essays I have read actually complains that *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* is likely to get you, the reader, deeply involved.

In the 30s and earlier, critics were still in the habit of trying to package the novel under some overall metaphysical heading, such as "cosmic pessimism." They might cite Hardy's reading of Schopenhauer, for example, and some of Hardy's statements made after he quit writing novels in 1895. He lived until 1928, and wrote an epic poem, "The Dynasts," in which tiny human figures from the period of the Napoleonic wars are pitifully constrained to carry out what they think are acts of human will, but are actually programmed to fail by some sardonic higher spirits of the universe. Hardy's personal memoir contains a statement of his suspicion that evolution had made an error with regard to the human psyche, creating an organism with an expectation for emotional fulfillment that is too utopian to ever work out in the real world of Nature. By quoting such evidence, the experience of Tess was thus prevented from being had, simply by being encapsulated in a fixed pessimistic formula. In my own earlier day as a critic, beginning about 1960, the trend was to find discrete image patterns in the novel and string these together. Tess's ribbon on her hair, when she is introduced into the novel in chapter 2, is red; when she has an accident with the family horse and the animal gushes out gallons of blood, some of it right on her dress, the blood is bright red, and about 50 chapters later, the color of Alec's blood as it seeps through the ceiling just below the room in which Tess has stabbed him, is also red. This sort of thing, though of course carried out with considerable ingenuity, was supposed to be appropriate to the novel. But what it did was focus attention along such a narrow band of interest that it reduced the experience into a safely fixed quantity. Later there came a feminist wave which was better, because it demonstrated a compassionate and committed concern for the fate of Tess as a woman. But it tended to read the novel as a story of Hardy's inability to avoid gender biases. This too turned out to be a way of avoiding the risks of experiencing a work of art which places harder demands upon its readers than those of ideological conformity.

I taught *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* for over 30 years, and am now writing a book about it. I have a manuscript of over 200 pages, a kind of "experiential commentary" on this novel. For this occasion, I have selected some of my main points; see what you think.

But first: for those who have not read the novel or have not read it lately, here is a basic outline of its plot:

Tess Durbeyfield, a beautiful responsible, intelligent 16 year old woman (or girl) becomes involved sexually with Alec d'Urberville, a rich young man; possibly she is raped by him. She leaves him, but gives birth to his child. The baby dies in early infancy. After a long period of depression and self-examination, Tess then meets Angel Clare, a man who seems to be extremely appreciative and loving, only to have him cruelly reject her, when on their wedding night, she confesses her sexual past. After much suffering, she realizes the cruelty of her husband, and partly to receive help for her destitute family, returns to the arms of Alec d'Urberville. When Angel Clare, her husband, unexpectedly does return after all, she stabs and kills Alec, runs away with her husband, and is captured and executed for murder.

Obviously, there are some overwhelming emotional elements in this plot. The novel has a threshold for experience that is easy to cross over: people start responding to it without any urging on the teacher's part. That is good. But they also tend to jump to conclusions.

1. Almost all students are concerned with the rape or seduction of Tess by Alec. But which is it? Surely that would make a difference in the experience being had. Student readers are much like professional critics in this respect: they are often immediately sure it was rape, but then are baffled and angry when they realize that Hardy has left the scene almost entirely undescribed and indeterminate.

There is a good Deweyan way to meet this difficulty, and as early as 1961, when I wrote a graduate school paper on *Tess,* I had found it: Hardy is deliberately focussing on the context, the situation, the whole relationship, of Tess and Alec. He wants us to imagine its overall quality—or its changing qualities as the novel goes on. He deliberately does not want us to short-circuit our responses by applying the name "rape"—or even the less emotional but still stereotypical naming, "seduction," to this story.

The problem is that few students will accept that answer. The scene simply bothers them too much. Hardy, I think, made sure that it would. That is surely not something in their experience that I would want to pass over. So I have had to work out a better answer, a process I will discuss shortly.

Early on, I realized that I was applying the contextual approach to the rape or seduction question prematurely. I was trying to skip over a genuine aspect of this part of the experience —genuine and virtually undeniable for almost any thoughtful reader— namely, that the scene and the problem it contains is a cause for real perplexity. I remembered after a while Dewey's great insight, in *Experience and Nature,* that genuine perplexity is a real feature of experience. It is not the job of philosophers to re-describe the world in such a way as to deny its problematical features. That sort of neatening-up was exactly what had misled philosophy for centuries. Teachers and literary critics are extremely prone to it as well. But a Deweyan approach might avoid this trap.

2. After learning how to read about Tess and her problems with Alec in the first part of the book, the reader is asked to respond to a new and different quality. For some 18 chapters, that new quality is palpable. Tess begins her life again, and moves to take a job at a prosperous dairy farm called Talbothays, where she comes to know her new lover, Angel Clare. But the quality is not just that of two lovers, nor of two lovers who happen to exist

against a background of farming. This is not just a farm: Talbothays is endowed by Hardy's beautifully lyric writing with qualities of Nature. This is a Nature that is fertile, life-giving, sensuous, sensual and very sexual. Yet presented in these direct terms, it is also presented as Nature in the broad philosophical sense of the abiding human habitat. And it is presented by Hardy as the basis of a powerful world-view that is highly critical of Christianity. He is not being critical, though, of Christianity *per se:* that would be a mistake made by readers with little sense of context. If with a Deweyan eye you read for the context, you soon see that it is the long tradition within Christianity of sexual repression and the need to dictate sexual control over women especially, but also over men, that is the effective context.

What develops is an increasingly deeper blend, a fusion, of Tess and Angel and Nature, of a woman and a man and their sexual love within Nature. Hardy powerfully suggests that Nature is a norm: the lovers should love, and their love is sexual. They both realize this. But laced through this section are many indications that they are not going to be able to consummate their relationship. I experience their hesitations, their fears: there are qualities of tension and resistance in this part of the novel, which as Dewey points out are invaluable ways to intensify and give meaning to an experience. But I have found that it is a mistake to assume that the students are going to get this.

Anyone even remotely familiar with Dewey's thought will realize that the problem is not one of having everybody in the class notice the 3 terms, nature, sex, and love, and feed them back to the professor on an exam. Such performance is unworthy of the name of knowledge, and in Deweyan aesthetics is clearly a pathetic substitute for undergoing the experience. Yet it is far from unthinkable in contemporary undergraduate teaching practice. We might ask, why would anyone do such a thing to this experience? I suspect Dewey would understand the cause of such a reduction in this way: we still have our profoundly dualistic habits of mind, which prevent us from crediting and responding to an experience where mind and body, sex and love and Nature, are aligned.

I have found that I have to teach what is there. But today, in our intellectual climate, is it even possible to assert that anything is "there," objectively? There are plenty of reasons to avoid relying on a facile sense of what is objective, as Dewey well knew. Nonetheless, he provides a voice of sane guidance and support on this issue when he writes: "...the critic shall seize upon some strain or strand that is actually there, and bring it forth with such clearness that the reader has a new clue and guide to his own experience."

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(Dewey, 1987,p. 318). This aspect of teaching calls for attending to what is obvious, and as Richard Shusterman has pointed out in *Pragmatist Aesthetics* (Shusterman, 2000), professional critics often prove to be the worst sort of guides to a literary experience just because they compete with one another in coming up with arcane interpretations. They thus lose touch with the experiences they are trying to deal with. There are professional critics who try to deny the positive feelings of Nature in this section by quoting little snatches of text that they regard as menacing or ironic. Students in college begin to pick up this same habit. I have inquired carefully into all of such proposed passages, and although I can't present my evidence here, I can say this: considered as experience, it is quite preposterous to claim that Hardy cancelled out his positive Nature/sex/love writing with negative ominous warnings. At least he did not do anything of the sort in this 18-chapter section. It simply does not feel that way.

But in our culture it is easier to remove oneself to a safe distance and pretend to watch Hardy cancelling his feelings than it is to allow the feelings to form in one's self. From what I have seen of professional criticism and in the responses of students in my classes, this destructive resistance to the experience is often reinforced by habits of interpretation. A Deweyan approach that insists on registering the force of the Nature/sex/love fusion, even if there is nothing clever to say about it, can defend the possibility of "an experience" in this novel.

The situation for the teacher, however, is not a hopeless one. I do not want to paint a one-sided picture of highly resistant students: once I show them the kind of fusion I think is obviously there, most of my students have found that they could respond to it. Students still seem to have enough of a sense of Nature within them, not to mention the capacity for love and sex, to get this. The critic as Dewey says has often to do no more than to carefully lay out before the reader what the qualities of the work of art are, and that may be enough.

But how does one show them? Fortunately, what the teacher can do in this situation is not difficult: I have found that the best strategy is to read some of the key passages in class. As a teacher you are also showing that you believe these passages are worth the student's receptiveness, because you yourself are modeling a kind of openness. You read the passages, allowing your own voice to have the feeling-tone that the phrasing seems to call for, and without interspersing any comments of your own. You cannot and should not talk students into feeling things that they don't. But you can encourage the students who do indeed want to feel the force of these passages to do so without the shame of being thought sentimental, or of thinking themselves to be naive just because they feel something that is moving and meaningful.

You may at some point follow up with a reading aloud of the quite obvious sexually-toned passage in which Angel carries Tess bodily over a stream that has become flooded. Students today may need to be refocussed on this passage, which was considered so sexual in Hardy's day that he had to alter it completely when he first brought the book out in serial form in 1891. I have found that undergraduate students now are so spoiled with their over-exposure to sexual images that they hardly notice this, but again, when they are given a reason to focus on it, they generally can do so, and with a large enhancement of their experience.

3. The novel then swings into a terribly painful section, in which Angel and Tess have their marriage ceremony and then go to their honeymoon location, in a specially chosen farmhouse, only to encounter disaster when Tess confesses her past to Angel. Even some of the most sophisticated non-Deweyan critics find the section unavoidably painful, but they have no way to deal with that quality as experience. Thus the non-pragmatist critic J. Hillis Miller comments: "I for one find the description of Angel Clare's failure to consummate his marriage to Tess almost unbearably painful" (Miller, 1982, p. 119). But this pain has no further part to play in Miller's writing on Tess. He seems to be mentioning it only in order to get it out of the way. Here the problem is again one of experiencing; feeling the pain of the couple's love-disaster, and allowing it to suggest connections with the whole situation. A first correction of Miller's statement would be to say that you are virtually called upon as a reader to feel this pain primarily from Tess's point of view, since she is the one being so unjustly hurt, even though Angel through his own fanatic belief in female virginity also hurts himself. But the main obstacles to experiencing this passage with something like an appropriate depth are, first of all, moralizing, and second, haste. Both of these pitfalls are discussed by Dewey in *Art as Experience.*

Of course almost any aesthetics would decry moralizing, but Dewey has a more subtle view of this problem than to simply condemn it. He recognizes that the moralist at least is one who realizes that an important issue is involved in that which she or he is condemning, and Dewey is by no means saying that there are no moral values inherent in aesthetic experience; we just do not experience such values in the form of didactic or explicit statements. Aesthetic experience gets beyond such modes of teaching, and would it would not be genuinely aesthetic if it had to depend upon them.

The *moralizing* takes the form of simply condemning Angel for his practice of the double standard, blasting him as insensitive male pig, and classifying Tess as a victim. One of the most enlightening classroom experiences I had came years ago, during a discussion in which I invited all members of the class to agree that Angel, who has the responsibility here for hurting Tess, must be condemned as doing an evil thing. I was still under the influence of my graduate school mentor, Professor Wayne Burns of the University of Washington, who had claimed that anyone who reads this section must agree that Angel is doing evil. And I was still interested in finding agreement in basic interpretation of at least some issues encountered in reading a novel. At first it seemed that everyone in the class agreed to do that, but surprisingly, one woman, the one vocal feminist in the class, offered a thoughtful negative: Angel after all is practicing what has been taught to men for generations about feminine virtue and the myth of feminine evil. It would thus be unintelligent to just blame him as an individual human male. I agree, although for a somewhat different reason: it would be unintelligent because it would allow the experience to be wasted in simple indignation, when in fact it reaches far into the historic situation of the painful personal struggles of women (and of men too) for their right to regulate their own sexuality. This does not mean that the Deweyan approach requires us to give up our shocked response to Angel's act. But it urges that we experience its full meaning.

The *haste* that is destructive of the experience comes from essentializing it down to one fact; as one such critic puts it, Angel "abandons" Tess on her wedding night. (Boone, 1987). But anyone who encounters this situation at the honeymoon farmhouse, finds that it is far more complex, and the pain far more protracted. It is pain that is again made more difficult to undergo by the several instances during this part of the experience in which there appears to be hope that the couple will overcome their differences and consummate their love with lovemaking. It doesn't happen. Instead there is a basic quality of Angel hurting Tess, and of Angel's sexual ideas hurting them both, that takes place not in one moment but is spread over several chapters. I have been almost stunned to read, at one point in the text, that the experience of Tess and Angel in that farmhouse lasted 3 days. As Hardy writes it, it feels much more like 3 weeks.

Do students realize the painfulness of the experience? Nearly all of them know that it is painful, but what they seem to lack is any method for experiencing it. The teacher again may just lay out the way the subject matter is handled by Hardy in these chapters, and that is still a good method here, but it seems not to be enough in itself. There has to be some sense of what to do with the laid-out subject matter. The concept of experience, in the Deweyan sense of accumulating more and more force and meaning as the experience develops through time, can be a vital instrument for deepening their grasp of this novel, especially in this section.

It is not necessary to teach a lot of Dewey to convey a sense of this: perhaps just adapt the little parable he writes in *Art as Experience* of the stone rolling down the hill. If that stone could have feeling, if it could have felt an interest in reaching the culmination of its movement, if it gathered up interest in things that it encounters along the way—whether these things hinder it or help its movement; and if it could react to these things accordingly, and when it reached the bottom of that hill the stone could come to rest in a way that feels related to everything that had gone into the movement—then it would have had *an experience.* And if the students going through the agonizing chapters of Tess and Angel's aborted honeymoon can similarly feel an accumulation of meanings as these chapters go on, then they will have had a major part of an experience of this novel. If not, they will have an unrelated mixture of elements: various evil omens, Tess's confession, Hardy's comments, the grotesque facial expressions of the characters, the absence of a benign sense of nature, outlandish descriptions of the interior of the room, the multiple elements of Tess and Angel's discussion of the issues, their volatile and changing emotional states, the sleepwalking episode where Angel carries Tess as if she is dead and calls her his beloved, and the couple's separation. There is no substitute for the simple needs of ***undergoing*** and ***doing:*** of staying with the passages long enough to have an undergoing of all these elements as they occur in sequence, and of actively realizing—doing—how they all weave together to make that separation at the end so devastating, even as it relieves some of the pain.

4. I return now to the problem of whether Tess had been raped. When she confesses her past to Angel, Hardy once again does not narrate anything she has said. Everything is done indirectly. We seem to have another great gap in the narrative. But this impression can be modified if we have an attitude not of expecting to get the facts told to us, but one of inquiry. I do not suggest that Dewey's theory of inquiry be applied in any detail. Just teaching that theory would take the class far afield; if anything were to be presented formally, it would probably be preferable to make use of a recent concise account of *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (Dewey, 1986) such as that by Hickman (Hickman, 1998), than to try to delve into the technical density of Dewey's 500-page argument. But there is no overestimating the value of the *attitude:* we cannot just "know" anything, when there is a problem. We have

to inquire. And we must admit that in our culture the habit of inquiry is much less honored than is the habit of strongly voicing one's opinion. This means that in the classroom we are not primarily beholden to the professor's wisdom or to the students who are most adept at speaking out. A different habit has to be cultivated.

Before setting off on this inquiry, maybe we can avoid it by asking if there any definite evidence to go on. There is a place in the narrative where there is talk in Tess's village of her having been raped. In this context, her fellow field-hands are talking about her baby. "There were those that heard" a woman sobbing in the woods that night. But who were "those that heard," and what did the sobbing mean? We are not told. The speaker asserts that it took "a little more than persuadin'" to have brought on Tess's pregnancy. And it would have been bad news for a certain man—obviously Alec—if the men who heard that sobbing had got to the scene a little earlier. The speaker believes Tess was raped. Yet the listener does not seem to accept this as definitive: "Well, a little more [persuading], a little less, 'twas a thousand pities it should have happened to she, of all others." This is inconclusive: an inquiry is still necessary.

Eventually I hit upon a method: let us listen carefully to what the characters themselves, especially the two who are most involved, say, and see if anything is implied about the rape or non-rape. This should be unobjectionable, and is so simple a method of inquiry that you would think it had been tried from the start, from the time the novel was first published. But amazingly enough, or discouragingly enough, it has not been. Inquiry, I am afraid, is still an untried logic. My hypothesis is that if Tess had been raped, she or Alec would have mentioned or alluded to this at some point in the novel. With this in mind, I look again at the confession scene. Nothing is reported, right? Not quite: we are not told *what* she said, but we are told *how* she said it: "murmuring the words without flinching," and with "no exculpatory phrase of any kind, and she had not wept." Is that all? Not quite: "Her narrative ended; even its re-assertions and secondary explanations were done." If it included even "secondary explanations," then it would have been pretty complete; her having been raped would certainly have been told, even though she would not have used this fact as any kind of exculpation. (Incidentally many students do not know what the term "exculpatory phrase" means. Pointing its meaning out is a worthy service for the teacher to perform). But Angel's only responses are to her having had sex with, and having had a child by, Alec. He gives no indication of having been told that she has been raped. He shows no anger whatever concerning Alec. Now this is completely unlikely in its context. In fact a few chapters earlier Angel had got into a fistfight with a man who had insulted Tess's reputation, and then in a nightmare, had fought this fight all over again. I cannot imagine that he could hear Tess's story of having been not just insulted but raped, and not express any outrage. That would be *possible,* but is it *imaginable?* I don't think so. But the inquiry is not over.

Tess and Alec do meet again and in some scenes, they do discuss their relationship, sometimes quite heatedly. It is likely that she would have mentioned or alluded to an assault. But that mention never occurs. Alec is sorry for having taken advantage of her, and Tess in one of her last emotional speeches to Angel refers to the "trap he set for me in my simple youth,"—but these are references to a whole situation. The idea that Tess had been raped looks less and less likely.

My process of inquiry eventually suggested that we go back and listen more carefully to Tess's report to her mother when she returns from Alec's estate. She comes home pregnant. Once more, Hardy follows his method, and what Tess told is not told: "Tess went up to her mother, put her face on Joan's neck, and told." But we can surmise from her mother's response that there was no talk of rape: "And yet, tho'st not got him to marry 'ee....Any woman would a have done it but you, after that!" Joan, Tess's mother, is angry about the falling through of Tess's mission of seductively getting her rich pseudo- "cousin" to marry her. But that mission never meant allowing her daughter to be raped. Nor is her response credible as a reaction of this mother to the news that her daughter had been raped. Neither would Tess have any reason to conceal such a mitigating fact from her mother.

We reach a conclusion to this inquiry: it is warranted to assert that given the all the narrative disclosures and gaps we have, there was no rape. This assertion may be qualified by saying that, given the ambiguities that must remain, rape is still a possibility. We remain fallible in our humanly limited conclusion, but all the same it is definite enough to allow us to say that *dwelling* on the possibility of rape will take you nowhere in this novel, and — the important point here—it will distract you from the experience that it is possible to have. The inquiry thus does a good job of pragmatic work: it redirects attention in such a way that the experience is furthered. The inquiry has been primarily cognitive in its aims, but with its conclusion comes a re-emphasis on the overall qualitative experiencing of the novel.

In teaching this problem of inquiry, the teacher is also achieving something beyond the narrow boundaries of the initial question: she is teaching the very habit of careful inquiry, even and especially concerning problems that have huge emotional immediacy. This might be Deweyan education at its best.

5. One of the distinct advantages of a Deweyan approach is that it is both/and: it calls for caring attention to the precise details and qualities of the novel, and it expects that you will continue to be affected by this reading in your life after the reading is completed. As Dewey puts it in *Art as Experience,* every important aesthetic experience is both consummatory and instrumental. When we include in our teaching of this novel some opportunity for considering what it might mean now, 110 years later, in our own lives, we are not adding some compromising alloy to the blend; we are not spoiling the experience by asking such a thing. All we are doing is finding a channel for the natural flow of interest that goes beyond the moment of closing the book, in terms of its larger implications.

The instrumental impact of the novel is partly, and obviously, how it vividly educates us about the double standard and virginity. That is not an outmoded interest. In our own age, the federal government spends many millions of dollars trying to promote abstinence only, which surely implies a return of the fetish of virginity into our culture. But our culture is complicated. While that abstinence campaign goes on, meantime thousands of young people engage in sex so casually as to make it feel meaningless: notice the recent research on "hooking up," that is, having oral sex with someone you just happen to meet at a party. (See articles by Jarrell, 2000; Gilbert, 2000). That activity sounds like it would have nothing to do with a book from the 1890s, like *Tess*. But that is a mistaken assumption, a result of narrowing down the scope of Tess. In the spread of its implications, the novel cannot be limited to just the one note of its criticism of the double standard. It is a contribution whose value can be felt by whoever today is still dealing with the struggle for self-regulation and fair dealing in sexuality. This is no simple matter, and there will be plenty of students who have been brought up to believe that their own judgments must be subordinated to value systems that they have been taught. How Tess will impact upon them is impossible to predict. Yet there is still an unmet need for fairness between people in sexual love relationships. We as a culture are still working on that problem. *Tess* today can easily be connected with our experiences of that ongoing struggle.

There is at least one more complex implication, an instrumental value of the experience of this novel that is tougher to work out. How can I put it? Perhaps best, as a question. We teachers will probably not want to do more than ask it: what is the relation between sexual love and the world of Nature? We are going to ask that, it seems to me, if we have experienced the major section of Tess in which love, sex, and Nature are fused into one quality.

Imagining how we can connect that experience with our own living is an instrumental value of this novel.

6. I hope I have at least begun to show that the Deweyan approach I have outlined can do a lot for bringing out the experience of *Tess* in a teaching situation. I have not seen any approach that can match it. But a caution is in order: it may not be feasible to suppose a complete sense of unity in the novel. Dewey is fond of saying that there is one integral quality to a work of art, a quality that allows it to become AN experience. I wonder if he was thinking of art works with the length and complexity of novels when he made such statements.

Hardy created in some of the later sections of the novel a series of excessive and unnecessary punishments or sufferings for Tess. Why he did this is a matter of speculation. He obviously identified with Tess, but perhaps felt he had to atone for his deep investment in the sexuality of the Talbothays section. He probably had not planned to go nearly as far as he did in making that section so appealing and so critical of accepted sexual morality. I suggest that the only way he could keep that section was to construct another one in which Tess is punished. In my experience—and this has occurred in nearly all my reading and teaching of the novel over the past 30 years—Tess has already suffered plentifully in her dealings with Alec and Angel, and with her own family. There is no integral or organic reason for her to have to go through even more. But to Hardy's mind, that is not true. And so he creates a part of the novel in which the development of Tess's character is severely subordinated to Hardy's own plan. And that makes for a different quality within the novel.

Similarly, there is a problem with the ending of the novel that comes just after the expected ending, after Tess's execution for the murder of Alec. This post-ending has Angel walking into the distance with Tess's younger and still virginal sister whom he might marry. That gives the novel a jarring sense of non-closure in which the very notion of female purity which the novel has thoroughly undermined, is now confusingly reasserted on the last page. No reader seems to be able to understand just why that extra ending is there, but again, it has a different quality within the novel, and one that has considerable power.

There is a problem here in Dewey's aesthetics, a problem I believe we will be hearing more about in David Granger's paper for this panel. It is a problem first pointed out by Stephen C. Pepper, in his 1939 essay, "Some Questions on Dewey's Aesthetics." (Pepper, 1939). It has never been put to rest.

My guiding rule is to follow the experience wherever it may lead, and, in spite of Dewey's advice, not try to make it fit within any single quality. If *Tess* *of the d'Urbervilles* is to be experienced as a great novel, it has to be had and taught with all its problems and qualitative changes. It can be done.

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Expression, Imagination, and Organic Unity: Remarks on Deciphering John Dewey's Relationship to Romanticism

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INTRODUCTION

We are presently witnessing a renewed interest in John Dewey's aesthetics. And it would seem that this interest marks a significant intellectual reorientation and not simply a passing fad. The publications *Educational Theory, Studies in Philosophy and Education, The Journal of Aesthetic Education, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* and the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society,* among others, have for some time now been seeing articles which look to accentuate Dewey's aesthetics while tempering his scientism. Many of them take their lead from Thomas M. Alexander's acclaimed *John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience & Nature* or Richard Shusterman's *Pragmatist Aesthetics.* And two recent books by noted educators, Jim Garrison's *Dewey and Eros* and Philip W. Jackson's *John Dewey and the Lessons of Art,* offer ideas on how the fruits of Dewey's more poetic side might be used to enhance his relatively prosaic writings on education.[1] I have come to find my own work of late pursuing a very similar path.

Yet I have also found that appeals to this more poetic Dewey are not without their potential hazards. Books like *Human Nature and Conduct* and *Democracy and Education* are of course always a challenge for readers schooled in subject-object metaphysics, as I suspect was the case with most of us. In *Art as Experience,* though, things are further complicated by Dewey's use of English romanticism (a favorite from his youth) in explicating some of his central ideas; particularly, I would submit, those dealing with expression, imagination, and organic unity. For in using the romantics in this way, he inadvertently encourages the idealist and subject-object readings of his aesthetics which continue to undermine his thesis of art as experience. Perhaps the poetic Dewey would not exist for us without the early influence of the romantics. No one can say for sure. But their writings arguably remained with him in one form or another throughout his life. My aim in this paper, accordingly, is to suggest how one might understand Dewey in relation to the romantics so as to avoid the kind of misunderstandings and confusions that their juxtaposition in *Art as Experience* invites.[2] It is my hope with this to offer something, however small, to further the cause of Dewey's aesthetics in revitalizing the prevailing functionalist discourse on the means and ends of education.

EXPRESSION

In one of the more quotable lines from his Preface to *Lyrical Ballads,* William Wordsworth states that "all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings."[3] Many of Wordsworth's readers have taken this as suggesting that the meanings expressed in poetry are the consequence of the poet's excess vitality spilling directly and uninhibitedly onto the empty page. (Hence, the account goes, his censure of the mediating artificialities of so-called "poetic diction.") The poem or expressive object, then, is essentially the externalization of the internal, such that the poet's mind communicates its creative energies to the images of the external world in a more or less instinctual fashion.[4]

But this interpretation is at best only partially accurate. Dewey, for one, is quick to remind us of the important rider Wordsworth attaches to the above statement: "[Poetry] takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility."[5] Wordsworth is not looking to offer a definition of poetry, much less presuming to define it as the sheer outpouring of feelings. He is instead trying to describe the process of poetic creation, and in a way that recognizes the movements of thought as well as of feeling. Poetic expression for Wordsworth, in the language by which Dewey denotes a unified experience, involves complementary phases of doing and undergoing—the poet is someone who has thought both "long and deeply" (Preface, p.597). Thus Wordsworth does his best to present the creative process (in his experience at least) as consisting of multiple phases, with reflection serving to modify, direct and fund the feelings occasioned by recollections of certain experiences from childhood (Ibid).

Yet even this exposition would appear perhaps inherently flawed. Wordsworth's theory of expression, if it can be called that, has over the years received numerous criticisms from several different areas along the philosophical spectrum. Often these criticisms have been unique to certain vantage points, such as the vagueness and ambiguity of the term 'expression' noted by the analytically minded, but a few suggest themselves more uniformly. For example, in the context of an English class, one might ask: What constitutes the particular "self" that is supposedly being expressed in poetry? By what interpretive strategy or device can a student read the feelings of a poet accurately and so be sure that she has responded appropriately to a given poem? Is Wordsworth's petition to natural habit, emotion, and language up to the task, especially in light of his manifest rejection of assorted poetic rules and conventions? And if it proves insufficient, how then is the student to assess the genuineness of the poem? Or, must we accept the disquieting idea that expressive meanings are merely inferred from poems or, still worse, subjectively projected onto them? Additionally, it has been observed that one does not necessarily have to be sad to write a sad poem, or, for that matter, to understand it—an empirical fact that would seem a rather grave challenge to Wordsworth's position. In what follows, I will attempt to show how Dewey's theory of expression skirts this general line of criticism. It is at once an extension and reconstruction of Wordsworth's seminal account.[6]

There are two vital, complementary aspects to Dewey's expressionism. Expression, Dewey tells us, is a function of both the natural interaction of organism and environment and the cultural interaction of the members of a society. That is to say, it has its origins in biophysical events but cannot be reduced to them (Alexander, p.214).

To get a sense for how Dewey understands expression one must first return to the rudiments of his philosophical-psychology. Most critical here is Dewey's claim that, "Impulsions are the beginnings of complete experience because they proceed from need; from a hunger and demand that belongs to the organism as a whole" (*LW 10:* 64). Impulsion, in other words, is the natural drive for organized, meaningful activity at the root of all experience. Whereas an "impulse" is specialized and particular, "impulsion"

> is the craving of the live creature for food as distinct from the reactions of tongue and lips that are involved in swallowing; the turning toward light of the body as a whole, like the heliotropism of plants, as distinct from the following of a particular light by the eyes. (Ibid)

Notice that Dewey explicitly refers to impulsion as encompassing the entire organism, not just the mind or body taken individually. The same holds for expression and its generative conditions.

But unlike expression, impulsion is by definition blind, unorganized activity, and thus remains unrealized or unfulfilled until the live creature ventures out into the world and modifies it—makes it a medium—so as to answer to the organism's needs. Many times the environment opposes and deflects impulsion on this outbound course (*LW 10:* 65). Things fail to appear, get in the way, or do not behave as the impulsion demands. Perhaps, for instance, the necessary modeling clay is not available for student projects, the students are physically constrained, or their clay will not easily do what they would like it to. This resistance, Dewey wants us to understand, is the ultimate source of self-awareness, emotion, and interest (Ibid). Some resistance merely thwarts and frustrates impulsion, creating irritation and rage—a student angrily crushes the clay in his hands (LW 10: 65-66). However the raw discharge of emotion is never expressive. It does not draw to it and order the objective material (e.g. sounds, images, words, ideas) necessary for expression, but simply indicates a release of energies (*LW 10:* 74-75). The teacher or some other on looker might well interpret the student's behavior as expressive—a possible sign of insecurity with artistic activity, say. Yet unless he is aware of the meaning of his behavior, the student's crushing of the clay cannot be considered "an act of expression" (*LW 10:* 67-68). "To discharge is to get rid of, to dismiss," Dewey points out (*LW 10:* 67). "But resistance that calls out thought generates curiosity and solicitous care, and, when it is overcome and utilized, eventuates in [expression]" (*LW 10:* 66).

Adequate expression necessitates that we effectively recognize the intent implicit in our impulsions, be they either global or local (impulses). It is not enough, *contra* Wordsworth, to let them find their own way, even after a sustained period of "tranquility" (Preface, p.597). This is because for Dewey the resistance that linguistic resources offer the writer or clay the sculptor is critical for expression in that impulsion must "give account of itself in terms of the things that it encounters," thereby making them "significant objects" (*LW 10:* 65). (As Dewey says, anticipating Wittgenstein, "the object is that which objects."[7]) This means that the expressive act and the expressive object are organically connected. One cannot do its work without the other (*LW 10:* 88-89). To make things significant objects, media, they must be cared for, minded affectively as well as cognitively. Here, the acquired meanings or "working capital" accrued through prior experience, including those arts Dewey calls habits, come into play (*LW 10:* 66). In the process of giving account of itself, Dewey explains, "present impulsion gets form and solidity while the old, the 'stored,' material is literally revived, given new life and soul through having to meet a new situation" (Ibid). The result is a qualitative transformation of energy, of impulsion, into thoughtful, imaginative activity.

Accordingly, expression in Dewey's view is not simply an externalization of the internal. There is no "spilling out" of an inner feeling that preexisted in a complete and definite form, and which can be explained solely in terms of mental activity. The fact that it many times seems spontaneous "belongs to the appearance of [expressive] material above the threshold of consciousness, not to the process of its generation" (*LW 10:* 82). Emotion, the "inner" raw material of expression, becomes distinctively aesthetic only when it is organically connected with some "outer" raw material; namely, with a medium such as words, clay, paint, a physical gesture, or even an everyday object. Thus expressed meanings always incorporate novel modifications of one's original inspiration or emotion as a consequence of working with objective materials. They are always qualitatively more replete than the original inspiration, is how Dewey might put it. In contrast with many theories of expression, then, including Wordsworth's, emotion for Dewey is an indefinite need for response, and should not be confused with "the" feeling of anger, fear or elation. It only becomes some sort of nameable feeling through expression in a medium. Wordsworth's poet might well write in a mood of powerful emotion, but adequate expression—even in the "primitive" language of "man in nature"—necessitates that he consciously gather and make articulate the material affiliated with the mood aroused.

Expressive meaning here is clearly neither inferred from nor subjectively projected onto objects. In fact, there is much more to it than discrete subjects and objects. Expressive meaning grows out of a situational transformation, with all that situations entail for Dewey. That is to say, its content is ultimately informed by the manifold components of those larger systems of meaning within which we think, feel, and act. Expressions of fear, for instance, differ not just in intensity but, situations being unique and unduplicated, also in quality. This is why it is impossible to detach the *what* from the *how* of expression while leaving expressed meanings intact. "Were it the function of speech to reproduce that to which it refers," Dewey notes, "we could never speak of fear, but only fear-of-this-particular-oncoming-automobile, with all its specifications of time and place" (*LW 10:* 73). Fear is situationally intentional; it is *"to* or *from* or *about* something objective, whether in fact or in idea" (*LW 10:* 72). Therefore the material embodiment of expressive meaning is a temporal event, the activity of becoming an object for expression through a unified experience. Arguments about whether expressive or "tertiary" qualities are in the object or in the perceiver are in the end as gratuitous as those dealing with supposed primary and secondary qualities. All qualities for Dewey are a matter of the conditions and contexts of experience, and involve variously directed and organized responses of the organism to its environment.

One other important consequence follows from this account of expression. As distinct from the romantics, responding to a poem or other art object as meaningful is not with Dewey primarily an affair of accurately reading the poet's emotional state. It could even be argued that, its feasibility notwithstanding, such a reversion to the poet makes the poem itself a mere accessory, if not in some sense superfluous. Emotion in Dewey's account is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for expression. *Emotion is not what gets expressed; it is the manner of expression. That is to say, it is not the self that gets expressed, but the sensed meaning arising from the interaction of organic and extra-organic energies and materials.* Emotion is the organizing and energizing force, directing this interaction towards an articulate response through some medium. This does not eliminate the possibility that our English student might, because of her habits of perception, fail to grasp the semantic structure of a given poem or medium and hence not experience it as expressive, no matter how "natural" it might seem to the poet. Consequently the foremost interpretive interest for Dewey is trying to "learn" the object or medium, to gain an understanding of how it can *become* expressive. Communication and shared experience with other members of the relevant culture are doubtless valuable here. But this also presupposes a more long term interest as well—learning the senses of the world through our natural impulsion to experience it with meaning and value (Alexander, pp.218-222).

EXPRESSION AND IMAGINATION

Perhaps the most pivotal facet of expression for Dewey and his romantic forebears is imagination. It is also I think the most elusive and readily misconceived. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in his *Biographia Literaria,* describes the imagination as "that synthetic and magical power" by which the poet attempts to effect

> the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than unusual state of emotion, with more than usual order; judgement ever awake and steady self-possession, with enthusiasm profound or vehement.[8]

These are the main poetic elements of Coleridge's dynamic "system of opposites." Coleridge coins the term 'esemplastic,' an analogue of the German 'ineinsbildung' (literally, forming into one), to denote this reconciliation of opposites. The unity achieved through this imaginative synthesis is a complex organic unity rather than a simple Neoplatonic unity of origin, since the basic principle of the cosmos for Coleridge is not oneness but "multeity in unity" (*Biographia,* p.287). Multeity in unity is to be the desired norm in life as well as in beauty; and, reminiscent of Kant, it must be seen to exist in and for itself and not for any utilitarian purposes. In conceiving of creativity as esemplastic, then, Coleridge freely appropriates the language biologists use to discuss the living, growing organism. "Indeed," remarks critic M.H. Abrams, "it is astonishing how much of Coleridge's critical writing is couched in terms that are metaphorical for art and literal for a plant."[9] Like a plant, the esemplastic imagination generates and produces its own form, drawing in and then transforming for its own purposes the alien and diverse elements of its surrounding environment. It is nourished by sensory material much like a plant is nourished by soil, water, air, and light. It enables the seed of the mind to germinate and blossom like the unfolding of a flower.

The same can nonetheless not be said of Coleridge's decidedly negative portrayal of fancy. Fancy, as he speaks of it in the *Biographia,* is not warmly organic but coldly mechanistic. Whereas the imagination is active, vital, and synthetic, fancy is passive, "an arbitrary bringing together of things that lie remote...by means of some accidental coincidence" (*Biographia,* pp.84–85). Fancy to Coleridge is little more than insouciant mimicry, and "must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association" (Ibid., p.305). The resemblance to Dewey is as intriguing as it is potentially misleading.

Dewey, too, believes that imagination is indispensable to creative expression; though I suspect he would likely be suspicious of Coleridge's insinuations of "magic" at work. Dewey writes that imagination allows "meanings and values that are wider and deeper than the particular here and now in which they are anchored [to be] realized by way of expression" (*LW 10:* 277). In other words, it facilitates the embodiment of fresh meanings and values in emotionally charged sense. Yet the office of imagination is not limited to creative expression alone. Imagination also has what Coleridge calls a "primary," as opposed to its "secondary" or poetic, function (*Biographia,* p.304). Because experience becomes a matter of perception only with the insertion of meanings derived from prior experiences, "all conscious experience has of necessity some degree of imaginative quality" (*LW 10:* 276). "Imagination," Dewey contends, "is the only gateway through which these meanings can find their way into present interaction" (Ibid).

Dewey also contrasts the imaginary with the imaginative in a way that approximates Coleridge's distinction between fancy and imagination. The imaginary, like the fanciful, acts as a somewhat arbitrary and capricious withdrawal from the world. It recoils from the work of creating new meanings, leaving only a temporary excitation with little or no lasting value. "Mind stays aloof for the most part and toys with material rather than boldy grasping it," as Dewey explains (*LW 10:* 272). And this is what frequently happens, he says, when teachers attempt to make subject-matter interesting through external means, by merely dressing the emperor in new and exotic cloths. The imaginative, on the other hand, though perhaps seeming exotic at first, endures through its ability to rejuvenate and enhance the world (*LW 10:* 274). It discloses new possibilities for meaning in experience by sensitively taking in the full scope of things.

Of the several traits which Dewey ascribes to imagination, its role as a unifying agency is ostensibly the most reminiscent of Coleridge. This is I think especially the case where the meeting of old and new, past and present is concerned; and Dewey himself invites the comparison in *Art as Experience* with a few brief but pithy quotations from the *Biographia* (*LW 10:* 272). Yet it is here also that I would urge caution, and for two reasons.

First, one must recognize that Coleridge basically accepts, however begrudgingly, Kant's dualistic subject-object metaphysics. His would-be "polar logic" clearly dictates the inherent opposition of the self ("spirit" or "mind") and nature (the objective world)—or more to the point, of art and nature. Consequently the imagination has with Coleridge the pressing task of redeeming for humanity, through the transcendental Self, the inert earthly world of everyday phenomena.[10] It must creatively repossess nature for the mind, breath life into it, all the while maintaining a vivifying and productive antithesis. The imagination is then not only charged with the esemplastic function of reconciling discordant aesthetic qualities such as old and new, sameness and difference, but, more critically, the subjects and objects which Coleridge regards as essentially distinct entities. "[The imagination is] the mediatress between, and reconciler of, nature and man," he says, it accomplishes "the union and reconciliation of that which is nature with that which is exclusively human."[11] Beauty for Coleridge is a state we experience when the universal is perceived to emerge organically from concrete diversity. While this sounds rather like the task of the imagination in the idealist aesthetics of Dewey's *Psychology* (1887), it is surely not the Dewey of *Art as Experience* (1934).

Second, both Coleridge and Wordsworth adhere to Enlightenment convention in treating imagination as a special self-contained faculty or power. In fact they would have us believe that the imaginative faculty is actually the proximate source of art, its sovereign author, if you will. This "higher" faculty also displays the characteristics of a tenuously held and fragile possession, like one's poetic Muse, in that it can be gained, lost, and with time (one hopes) regained. Thus Coleridge and Wordsworth consistently advert to "the" imagination—a substantive entity—something that one sees in much of the popular literature on art and aesthetic education, but will never find in Dewey's later writings. This is because Dewey locates imagination not in the mind or some other part of our intellectual equipment, but in the entire dramatic field of self-world interaction (*LW 10:* 272). Imagination is a way of being oriented towards things, seeing and feeling them, as they constitute an integral whole. It is the extensive blending of interests at the point where self and world come together. "Imagination is [not] the power that does certain things," Dewey wants us to understand, "an imaginative experience is what happens when varied materials of sense quality, emotion, and meaning come together in a union that marks a new birth in the world" (Ibid).[12] Or, if you wish, "The conscious adjustment of the new and the old *is* imagination" (*LW 10:* 276). What is being described here is not an individual possession but rather a phase of natural events capable of extracting from existing conditions unrealized possibilities for meaning. Therefore imagination for Dewey is much more than an autonomous faculty or power: It is the active, reconstructive project itself (Alexander, p.260).

ORGANIC UNITY

As a principle for interpreting and guiding human affairs, 'organic unity' has been much maligned of late in subject-matter ranging all the way from aesthetics and the philosophy of mind to ethics and political science. Many proponents of those practices of textual analysis known collectively as "deconstruction," for instance, have forcibly argued that the various organicisms (1) inevitably marginalize certain parts of the internal structure of "texts" (e.g. poems, experiences, selves, communities) in order to preserve their integrity and wholeness and (2) likewise disregard their constitutive dependence on what they exclude. So, they tell us, to pursue the closure of an organically unified art object (or experience, self, community) is to close oneself off to those necessarily marginalized elements of the object critical to its unity and hence meaning, but which are (illogically) treated as subordinate to the more privileged elements.[13] The brief discussion of organicism to follow originates out of this particular set of issues.

From Dewey and his present-day advocates back through the romantics (especially Coleridge), Hegel, Aristotle, and Plato, arguments espousing the merits of organic form and functioning have had a pronounced influence on Western philosophy. All of these arguments, be they addressing aesthetics, epistemology, or metaphysics, can be said to endorse some kind of wholism, such that the individual parts of a given entity are to be understood only in relation to their functioning in the larger, ongoing whole. Each part at once draws from and contributes to this whole. Further, it is claimed that every organic whole is more than the sum of its parts, there being emergent properties or meanings which cannot be traced back to the parts in isolation. Yet while the conceptions of organic unity exhibited by these thinkers tend to share the same anti-mechanistic root metaphors of the living being, they were upon close inspection woven from a markedly diverse assortment of philosophical cloth. Thus I have come to think that any effort to devise a blanket critique of organicism—and deconstruction has not proven itself immune to this—must be greeted with at least a modicum of suspicion. By again comparing Coleridge with Dewey, we should be able to bring to light a few of the more consequential variations within the different organicisms.

Coleridge is known to have fashioned some of the more influential and categorical statements on organic unity and the literary arts. With all the assurances of a Kantian rationalist, he contends in the *Biographia* that the "*legitimate* poem" is one in which the parts "mutually support and explain each other; all in their proportion harmonizing with, and supporting the [larger whole]" (*Biographia,* p.13). In the degree to which this is accomplished, Coleridge continues, "the reader should be carried forward, not merely or chiefly by the mechanical impulse of curiosity, or by a restless desire to arrive at the final solution; but by the pleasureable [*sic*] activity of mind excited by the attractions of the journey itself" (Ibid., p.14; also quoted in *LW 10:* 11). Taken together these passages reflect the great reconciliation of opposites that Coleridge aspired to effect within his own poetic theory. That is to say, Coleridge's "legitimate" poem answers to both the vitality of the living organism and the dictates of universal reason. From the perspective of its internal structure, the poem is a heterogeneous, dynamic unity of interdependent parts whose identity depends upon the larger whole. Regarded as a whole, though, one gets a somewhat different picture: The poem, like the philosophical system that it embodies, is a self-enclosed and independent entity. Moreover, the tighter its integration (via the synthesizing power of the imagination) and the greater number of components it incorporates, the higher level of being the poem achieves. Poetic growth or progress is therefore denoted by a kind of vertical movement. The representative analogy is not of an expanding horizon along a constant plane but of an upward spiral which, like Hegel's description of the stages of philosophy, reflects a cyclical process of distinction, reintegration, and transcendence.

There are two distinguishable yet complementary manifestations of organicism at work here. Coleridge believes that an organically constituted poem will naturally lend itself, allowing for modest variation between individual readers, to an organically constituted experience. Such a poem approached in a manner sympathetic to organic form and functioning—one combining the requisite interpretive interests, habits, values, and so on—and this belief appears in the main warranted. (Whether Coleridge consents to enough individual variation is another question.) Dewey would remind us, too, that this basic idea could well be extended to include other objects not typically identified with the arts.

It is however possible to detect a slight difference in emphasis between Dewey and Coleridge. Whereas *Art as Experience* takes as its primary subject-matter the organically constituted experience as a work of art, the *Biographia* tends to stress more the organically constituted object as the poetic embodiment of a specific philosophical system. Though this might appear in the end a trivial distinction—perhaps even imprudent since subject and object must ultimately work together in experience—it does I think help to point up the fact that Dewey's organicism is rather more functional and less foundational or structural than that of Coleridge or, *a fortiori,* Hegel.

The above is not to gainsay those places where the residue of Dewey's Hegelian period can make his organicism sound disconcertingly foundational. These places undoubtedly exist.[14] Dewey writes as late as 1934 that aesthetic experience is distinguished by "a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close," wherein "the *form* of the whole is...present in every member" (*LW 10:* 62). The same, as I read Dewey, could be used to characterize a unified educational experience. In nearly every instance, though, he qualifies these references to inclusion, closure, and wholeness in a fashion consistent with Derrida's idea of *differance,* of the endless movement of differential (or deferred) relations within and without a "text." For example, Dewey recurrently suggests that aesthetic form "is arrived at whenever a stable, even though moving, equilibrium is reached," one which effects a "balanced movement" but portends of no final closures or absolute conclusions (*LW 10:* 20). There are any number of ways of experiencing an object or event as an (not *the*) organic whole, any number of possible part-whole relationships to be gleaned by the astute participant. Compare this now with one of

Coleridge's memorable "critical aphorisms" on "poetic style": "whatever lines can be translated into other words of the same language, without diminution of their significance, either in sense, or association, or in any worthy feeling, are so far viscious in their diction" (*Biographia,* p.23). Coleridge's thinking, while invoking the concepts of growth and development, is ultimately bound to the ideal of a flawless, self-contained organic unity; Dewey's is guided by the ideal of an organic unity that is flexible, open-ended, encouraging its own reconstruction. It is an organicism that actively gestures towards the possible from traces of the previously deferred. And again, the same I think would be used to characterize a unified educational experience.

Dewey never allows us to forget that the meaning of objects is constantly changing in accord with the changing situational contexts of experience. An art object may be relatively stable as events go, he well recognizes. But it only "lives in some individualized experience," and given the relative instability of the experiencing subject, must be freshly "recreated every time it is esthetically experienced" (*LW 10:* 113). Hence as well as inducing significant variation in experience for different individual perceivers, selective emphasis of part-whole relations dictates that a work of art "chang[e] with the same person at different times as he brings something different to the work" (*LW 10:* 334). With this rather unassuming idea Dewey then conducts us to an important realization: Aesthetic experience saps its own reconstructive momentum whenever it seeks to assimilate all of the energies of tension and disorder, all of the deferred meanings, that surround it. Shusterman, thinking of Dewey, puts it this way:

> the unity of aesthetic experience...is a developing process which, in culmination, deconstructively dissolves into the flow of consequent experience, pushing us forward into the unknown and toward the challenge of fashioning new aesthetic experience, a new moving and momentary unity from the debris and resistance of past experience and present environing factors....It is as much a stimulating disturbance toward the new as an achieved ordering of the old.[15]

Aesthetic experience with Dewey culminates not in a vertical movement—a transcendance to a higher level of being through a tighter and more comprehensive unity. It is instead distinctively horizontal—a move towards an ever expanding horizon of meaning and value. Nor should the consummatory unity of this experience ever be considered a place of final rest. Just as self and world inevitably age and change over the months and years, so too must the particulars of the equilibrium temporarily attained between them. Dewey writes:

> [The] attainment of a period of equilibrium is at the same time the initiation of a new relation to the environment, one that brings with it potency of new adjustments to be made through struggle. The time of consummation is also one of beginning anew. *Any attempt to perpetuate beyond its term the enjoyment attending the time of fulfillment and harmony constitutes withdrawal from the world.* (*LW 10:* 23, my emphasis)

Aesthetic experience emerges with the aid of intelligence from the manifold rhythms of everyday life, wherein all things pass ineluctably in and out of existence. This, in a word, is Deweyan naturalism. There is no hidden and self-identical "higher" reality to be unmasked, no permanent haven for which to strive; there is only the body and mind working together in and through the natural and social environment to create and recreate meaning.

It is I imagine difficult in the end to say whether or not Coleridge's organicism can successfully parry the full critical thrust of deconstruction. If nothing else, its sheer complexity makes it less the easy prey than it is often presumed to be. I am confident in light of the preceding, however, that Dewey's more radical organicism can more than meet the challenge. As with deconstruction, it calls us to recognize the fundamental contingency of existence and the flux of events. The search for permanent, foundational wholes in such a world can only lead to the kind of reductionism and hypostatization that occludes all traces of difference. Yet I believe, too, that Dewey argues convincingly for the need to develop and maintain some relatively stable wholes. In particular, he shows us that the gratifications of unified experience are vital to a worthwhile and fulfilling life in an aleatory world, as well as to the sort of education that this world would seem to recommend.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In light of the preceding discussion, I believe that Thomas Alexander is correct to caution us not to read Dewey as anything like a full-fledged romantic. However he rightly urges that neither should we ignore the romantic dimension of Dewey's thought. As he observed a number of years ago, "Clearly in Dewey's case we see a stern attempt to *transform* many of the ideals of romanticism into practicable and realizable goals" (Alexander, p.283 n.3).[16]

In closing, then, I would like to enumerate some of the significant places where Dewey's aesthetics more or less parts company from romanticism. Each, as I suggested at the outset, can easily mislead or confuse educators attracted to what I called the more poetic Dewey. In contrast with the precedents found in Wordsworth or Coleridge, for Dewey (1) all forms of expression are as much a function of the body as of the mind; (2) expressive meaning is wholly inseparable from its conditioning medium (ergo, there can be no such thing as an "impulsive expression"); (3) the self or its emotions are not what is expressed, but rather the sensed meaning arising from the purposeful interaction of self and world; (4) the goal of interpreting an art object is not simply to "get it" by reading the artist's mind; there is considerably more meaning to be gleaned from openly exploring the expressive potentialities of the object and its medium; (5) the aesthetic imagination is fundamentally intentional rather than free-floating or disinterested; (6) imagination is not a discrete faculty or power, but a whole contextual orientation towards things capable of disclosing alternatives to present conditions; (7) art does not reveal the essence of things or achieve higher levels of being; it is a means of expanding one's everyday horizons of meaning; and (8) a unified experience should act as much as "a stimulating disturbance toward the new as an achieved ordering of the old"; to strive for a perfectly harmonious, inclusive unity is inevitably to stifle growth and possibility. The fact that *Art as Experience* obliges us to confront these contrasts can, perhaps, through this sort of investigation, give us a better sense for how one might faithfully put Dewey's aesthetics to use in the classroom. And perhaps, too, Dewey's affinity for English romanticism will have done us a favor after all.

NOTES

1. See Thomas M. Alexander, *John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience & Nature,* (Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1987) (This book will be referred to as Alexander with page numbers in the text for all subsequent citations.), Richard Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics:Living Beauty,Rethinking Art,* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), Jim Garrison, *Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching,* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997) and Philip W. Jackson, *John Dewey and the Lessons of Art,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

2. The only major texts that I know of which directly compare Dewey and the romantics along these lines are Russell B. Goodman's *American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Kathleen M. Wheeler's *Romanticism, Pragmatism, and Deconstruction,* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). Both, however, tend to trivialize the critical contrasts that I look to illuminate here.

3. William Wordsworth, Preface to *Lyrical Ballads* in *Romantic Poetry and Prose,* Harold Bloom and Lionel Trilling, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.596. This piece will be referred to as Preface with page numbers in the text for all subsequent citations.

4. Notice the parallel with "wholistic" writing process approaches to teaching literacy, with their lingo of "fast-writes" and "golden lines."

5. John Dewey, *Art as Experience, LW 10:* 75. The line originally appeared in Wordsworth's Preface, p.608. After their initial citation, each of Dewey's writings (taken from the Southern Illinois Press *Collected Works* edition) will be referenced in the text in the above standard form, consisting of initials representing the set *(EW, MW, LW,* for *Early Works, Middle Works,* and

Later Works respectively), the volume number, and the page number.

6. For an evenhanded look at the shortcomings of conventional expression theory, see Monroe Beardsley's *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism,* second ed., (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981).

7. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14:* 133.

8. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp.16-17. This book will be referred to as *Biographia* with page numbers in the text for all subsequent citations.

9. M.H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), p.169.

10. This comes out most vividly in Coleridge's "Dejection" ode, which memorializes the poet's loss of his power to humanize the phenomenal world. It is in the ode also that Coleridge the idealist confronts Wordsworth in declaring that the origin of joy is located solely in the human viewer and not in the external world.

11. See *The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,* vol. III, Kathleen Coburn, ed., (New York, 1957), p.4397.

12. In the original context of this sentence, Dewey is rather generously trying to suggest that Coleridge, despite his manner of speaking, did not in reality see imagination as a special power or faculty. This is not though how I or most commentators interpret Coleridge.

13. See, for example, Paul de Man's *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism,* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), Christopher Norris's *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice,* (London: Methuen, 1982), and Jonathan Culler's *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982). While de Man and Norris target the allegedly Coleridgian organicism of the New Criticism, Culler furnishes a more comprehensive line of censure. However, all three writers work to deconstruct the idea of organic unity by drawing on Jacques Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence. This critique reveals that no objects or concepts in the world, insofar as they are linguistically mediated, can ever be fully present, but are partly constituted by their differential relations with other elements in the larger linguistic system. Derrida applies this critique to stunning effect in *The Truth in Painting,* trans. Geoff Benninghton and Ian McLeod, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

14. That said, it should be noted that Dewey's initial attraction to organic unity as a paradigm for both natural and social contexts came not from Hegelian idealism, but from reading T.H. Huxley's Darwinian *Lessons in Elementary Physiology* as an undergraduate at the University of Vermont. Dewey explains: "Subconsciously, at least, I was led to desire a world and a life that would have the same properties as had the human organism in the picture of it derived from the study of Huxley's treatment." He then adds, "I date from this time the awakening of a distinctive philosophic interest." See "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," *LW 5:* 147-148.

15. Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics,* pp.32-33.

16. I would argue that this project of Dewey's is even more substantial than this brief comment (which is consigned to an endnote) suggests -- that Alexander is a little too dismissive of romanticism in intimating that only in spirit is it compatible with Deweyan pragmatism. On the more existential side of things, there are also shared insights concerning our human willingness and ability to live gracefully (and gratefully) with "uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge," as well as the consequences of our failure to do so, that deserve serious attention (*LW 10:* 41). But these would have taken me well beyond the scope of the present paper.

The Education of Stephen Dedalus

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Whether seriously, ironically, or both, James Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* describes the emotional growth of a bright young man, Stephen Dedalus, from infancy to an age at which he feels ready to launch into the world. Critics view this generally autobiographical work as a Bildungsroman, a novel that treats "the development of the protagonist's mind and character, in the passage from childhood through varied experiences—and often through a spiritual crisis—into maturity, which usually involves recognition of one's identity and role in the world" (Abrams 193). But along with its impressionistic history of Stephen's maturation, Portrait gives an account of, reflection on, and reaction to an education—a classic, Catholic, largely Jesuit Irish education from prep school to university that mirrors Joyce's own education down to the schools attended (Clongowes, Belvedere, and University College). Thus Portrait may often tell us as much about Stephen's (and Joyce's) education as it does about the product of that education.

The novel follows Stephen from childhood through his departure from family and country, semi-college-educated, for France. At novel's end Stephen's liberal education has clearly succeeded in many ways. He can converse tellingly on the æsthetics of Aristotle and Aquinas and writes villanelles. But from a societal perspective Stephen's education seems to have missed its mark. Stephen blatantly rejects traditional values of family, church, and country, and spurns efforts to re-establish the native Irish tongue. He seems to isolate himself from dominant and radical issues and ideologies while falling into a Bohemian aestheticism. Throughout the book Stephen oscillates between embracing and rejecting the values encouraged in his lessons before he finally seems to turn fully away from them. His maturation thus involves fluctuating attitudes toward the content of his education. We can explain this fact by noting that while Stephen learns at school, he also seems at times to learn in tandem with it, sometimes even against it, following a sort of para-curriculum that becomes as important as the curriculum impressed upon him by the holy brothers. The social milieu of his education is central to his development.

Even before he starts school his education begins—in childish narratives, sensual discovery, nursery rhymes, and fundamental, quasi-mythic lessons pertaining to the dangers of anti-social behavior. This part of the book presents scenes and quotations in seemingly simple associative order. At one point Stephen hides under a table, and his mother says he will apologize, to which his father answers, "If not, the eagles will come and pull out his eyes." The childlike rhyme "Pull out his eyes, / Apologise, / Apologise, / Pull out his eyes" that ensues presents Stephen's internalization of the threatened consequences of not participating in the social game of acknowledged culpability. Blindness, torture, and isolation loom in the "innocent" declaration of his fate if he does not "apologize." Set off from the rest of the text and italicized, this rhyme develops mythic overtones that launch the book into its well-noted classical imagery, connecting via blindness, according to Brivic (252), to the Oedipus myth and all the psychological significance this fact carries, and via the eagles to Dædalus, the fabulous artificer who made wings to escape from King Minos and Crete with, and also possibly to Prometheus, "fore-knowledge," the bringer of fire to humanity, who is punished by having his liver eaten by vultures. Either veritably or ironically, Joyce thus subtly sets Stephen as "larger than" life, exceptional, a feature that returns as Stephen oscillates between solitary epiphany and aggrandized concern with his social position.

At Clongowes, Stephen confronts his first school environment, and his struggles seem more with mastering who he is than with learning the sums, geographical features, historical facts, and Latin declensions that fill his lessons. From the very first Stephen seems frail. He feels "his body small and weak amid the throng of players" (20) on the football field, a view reinforced by comparison: "Roddy Kickham was not like that" (20). His sense of powerlessness is perhaps further reinforced by the intense social scrutiny he, like all children, undergoes, as when Nasty Roche tries to "place" his family:

> —What is your father?
> Stephen ... answered:
> —A gentleman.
> Then Nasty Roche ... asked:
> —Is he a magistrate? (21)

Social classifying intensifies in situations where Stephen finds himself at odds with any solution to the problem "how to fit in." Sometimes, there seems to be no correct answer, as in the following exchange:

> —Tell us, Dedalus, do you kiss your mother every night before you go to bed?
> Stephen answered:
> —I do.
> Wells turned to the other fellows and said:
> —O, I say, here's a fellow that kisses his mother every night before he goes to bed.
> The other fellows stopped their game and turned round, laughing. Stephen blushed under their eyes and said:
> —I do not.
> Wells said:
> —Oh, I say, here's a fellow says he doesn't kiss his mother before he goes to bed.
> They all laughed again. Stephen tried to laugh with them. He felt his whole body hot and confused in a moment. What was the right answer to the question? (25-26)

Such "questions" appear as riddles to which there is no "true" answer (Stephen makes contradictory claims) but perhaps a socially "right" one (though this is not the case at all). Stephen is learning sums and facts in the curriculum, but the curriculum of his milieu offers a series of guesses about social position and threatens ostracism. This other curriculum is reinforced by unquestioned assumptions—for instance, that a priest must know more than his aunt "because he [is] a priest" (23). For Stephen, who hopes to become like the "boys in poetry and rhetoric" because they have "big voices and big boots and [study] trigonometry" (28), social status equates with power and is related to age. On top of the rigidifying school environment, Stephen faces the (to us at least) obvious hypocrisy of his family life. At home for Christmas, Stephen is asked to say prayers for Christmas dinner, then hears "blasphemy" spurred by the Parnell adultery scandal that his father then makes shoddy, soon-abandoned efforts to disguise:

> —*Woe be to the man by whom the scandal cometh!* said Mrs Riordan....
> That is the language of the Holy Ghost.

> —And very bad language if you ask me, said Mr Dedalus coolly.
> —Simon! Simon! said uncle Charles. The boy.
> —Yes, yes, said Mr Dedalus. I meant about the ... I was thinking about the bad language of that railway porter. Well now, that's all right. Here, Stephen, show me your plate....(40)

Looking for acknowledgement, Stephen's effort is to understand words and interpret the ambiguity they create in situations, because he defines himself through these words and situations. The imprecision of his understanding emerges largely from his rapid associative thinking. For instance, his relation to Eileen, a childhood sweetheart, is confounded by Dante's insistence that he not play with a Protestant. He recalls Protestant taunts pertaining to the Virgin Mary —*"Tower of Ivory. House of Gold"* (49)—and connects this image with impressions of Eileen's hands and hair, reflecting the "latent" sexuality of his age. The abstract social issue of the Catholic/Protestant debate becomes understandable only when it transforms into concrete imagery that he can associate with lived experience. He concludes somewhat vaguely that "By thinking about things you could understand them" (49).

The one thing Stephen cannot understand, though, is injustice: the punishment of the whole school for the crimes of the few, and his own undeserved pandybatting by Father Dolan for not reading. Having accidentally broken his glasses, Stephen is excused from reading, but Father Dolan, perhaps not aware of this, punishes him for slacking off. Central to the dilemma is Stephen's misunderstanding of Father Dolan's words and intentions:

> —Where did you break your glasses? repeated the prefect of studies.
> —The cinderpath, sir.
> —Hoho! The cinderpath! cried the prefect of studies. I know that trick.
> Stephen lifted his eyes in wonder and saw for a moment Father Dolan's whitegrey not young face, his baldy whitegrey head with fluff at the sides of it, the steel rims of his spectacles and his nocolored eyes looking through the glasses. Why did he say that he knew that trick? (55)

We know that Father Dolan assumes Stephen's culpability in his accident, or perhaps does not even get that far. "Trick" is an expression of bullying rather than of the truth. Stephen, though, assumes that Father Dolan honestly means what he says, and cannot understand how an accident can be viewed as a trick. His decision to complain to the Headmaster about his unjust punishment makes him a hero among the boys at Clongowes, but also marks the beginning of a cycle of epiphanic moments in which Stephen marks himself off from others: "He was alone. He was happy and free..." (62). It also marks a transition out of the quandary of self- and social-positioning that was life at Clongowes. This becomes clear when, early in chapter two, we learn that "Words which he did not understand [Stephen] said over and over to himself till he had learned them by heart: and through them he had glimpses of the real world about him" (64). Stephen has learned a strategy for discovering meaning in words that in his mind connects them to reality. He is ready to move on to the issue of acceptance or rejection of the core values of his society—and some would say to the battle for his mortal soul.

With regard to actual descriptions of teaching situations, the central "lesson" in the *Portrait* consists of the presentation over several days of the torments of hell at the retreat of Saint Francis Xavier that Stephen attends while a student at Belvedere College (102-14). This presentation sparks a central crisis for teen-aged Stephen—whether to become a priest, and more significantly, whether to accept the religious teachings so fundamental to his society. Joyce skillfully combines direct quotation and indirect discourse in presenting the lecture. At times he has the sermon come directly from the mouth of the preacher, who even "[takes] a chainless watch from a pocket within his soutane and, having considered its dial for a moment in silence, [places] it silently before him on the table" (108), thus reminding us that this is, after all, a lesson bound into the temporal organization of the retreat. At other times, though, the sermon floats as indirect discourse, as if in Stephen's or in our own thoughts. The lecturer's voice thus melds into the thinking of the auditor and the reader. Stephen's awareness of his state of sin (he has started frequenting prostitutes) intensifies the torment stimulated by this ingestion of hell-fire-and-brimstone. His efforts to find his "true path" reflect his earlier struggle to find his way at Clongowes. In chapter four, after being asked directly whether he thinks he has a calling as a priest, he wanders on the beach and seems to have a vision that connects to his decision to become an artist. We see here again a direct connection to the earlier epiphany in which his personality seemed consolidated. His response again answers to an action of the priests, and his epiphany serves as reaction to it:

> He was alone. He was unheeded, happy and near to the wild heart of life. He was alone and young and wilful and wildhearted, alone amid a waste of wild air and brackish waters and the seaharvest of shells and tangle and veiled grey sunlight and gayclad lightclad figures, of children and girls and voices childish and girlish in the air.

> A girl stood before him in midstream: alone and still. She seemed like one whom magic had changed into the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird.... She was alone and still, gazing out to sea; and when she felt his presence and the worship of his eyes her eyes turned to him in quiet sufferance of his gaze.... Her image had passed into his soul for ever and no word had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy.... A wild angel had appeared to him, the angel of mortal youth and beauty, an envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before him in an instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory.... (151-52)

His decision to choose beauty—"error and glory"—over God seemingly emerges from this instance, though in fact we have been skillfully led to it. These instances of aloneness—his separateness after the boys cheer him, his revelation of his calling on the beach—become visionary moments that sustain him both through and against his education. In each instance consciousness in solitude, removal from "lessons," permits consolidation of some budding awareness that at least appears to stimulate emotional or spiritual breakthrough. These breakthroughs likewise foreshadow his ultimate decision to leave everything he has known and go to France. The increasing complexity of these moments, for the first two their progressive distance from physical reality, and even the intensifying density of the prose style through which they are presented reflects the convolution of Stephen's maturing mind as he progresses through his education. His first epiphany, stimulated by corporal punishment, establishes identity and reflects a level analogous to the rote learning or knowledge-building that has occurred in his education to this time. No great depth of character formation has occurred, and this lack is reflected in the content and level of the lessons learned, as well as in the style through which Joyce reflects Stephen's childish thoughts. At the later stage, on the beach, vision has turned inward, though it has an "objective correlative" in the physical presence of the girl. The ultimate stimulus, rather than physical strength, is mental torment, the stirring of remorse and torment through lecture and imagination in a way that reflects Stephen's deepened psychological abilities and which expresses the intensified effort of "character formation" implied in the sermon. In fact the torment stimulated through the sermons on hell and later reflected in Stephen's thoughts and actions recalls, in a Christian parallel, the "Promethean" torment promised to the child at the beginning of the novel. Prometheus and Christ both suffer for helping humanity, though their intentions and ultimate fates differ. By the time Stephen comes to face his mortal salvation, simple apologies have been replaced with a recognition of one's spiritual unworthiness as a result of Original and venal Sin. His ability to have a vision outside of the childish hallucinations of his illness at Clongowes (36) hints at a depth of apprehension appropriate to his teen age, if not also remarkable in its sensibility. Stephen has moved from exterior stimulus to internalization in a way that prepares us for his next level of maturation, where he evaluates, synthesizes, and applies learning in his formulation of an aesthetic, however much it may lean on Aristotle and Aquinas.

Key passages in the *Portrait* always stand out for me—the joy of the first triumph, the pounding of the sermon, the emotional power of the vision on the beach, and the lucidity and clarity of Stephen's aesthetic analysis. These points illuminate Stephen's movement from his insecurity as a child through his absorption in religion to, surprisingly, his emergence as a teacher—for what does Stephen do in his aesthetic analysis but lecture his friend Lynch, starting by claiming to have clarified the omissions in Aristotle's Poetics (178-87)? In rebelling against the system, that is, Stephen attempts to become it. He is preaching classical aesthetics and invoking the artistic position of a "God ... paring his fingernails" (187) who has control over all—though only in art.

At University College, the young adult Stephen certainly stands out as notable, intelligent, and a maverick leader among the few students with whom he associates. As for Joyce himself, Stephen's university experience becomes central in "forming his character and public image" (7). Based on the life experience we have witnessed, though, we can assume that this quality of leadership represents the fruits of the lessons of the para-curriculum. Stephen's self-assertiveness as well as his tendency to shun popular causes reflects his learned ability to achieve glory—epiphany—in isolation. He refuses to support any of the causes that boil among the students of University College, and decides to reject the church to the extent that he won't even fake prayer to please his ailing mother. These decisions reflect the direction that his rejection of the social roles his society—and so, one might argue, of the social intent of his education—have geared him toward. After all, he was asked if he had the vocation to become a priest, and seriously considered it.

Though he is seriously engaged in thought while at university, Stephen is not to all purposes seriously engaged in "education" as an institutional entity. This lack of concern shows in Stephen's attitude toward his coursework. He blows off attending class (153; 161) and sees himself, perhaps justifiably, as smarter than his teachers (162-66). Further, he has rejected the values that his education, at least in its doctrinal sense, has pointed toward, leading Davin, the student organizing the promotion of Irish nationalism, to ask of Stephen, "Are you Irish at all?" (176) Stephen's answers, and his comments upon his beliefs concerning his position in his society, point to some of the conclusions he has reached. "This race and this country and this life produced me," he says. "I shall express myself as I am.... Ireland is the old sow that eats her farrow" (177). The reader notes that Stephen is still engaged in interpretation and misinterpretation; a long meditation on the quotation from Nash *"Darkness falls from the air"* ends with his realizing that he has misquoted the line *"Brightness falls from air"* (201-02). And while speaking to a friend about his rejection of his faith, Stephen suggests some sense of inevitability in his emergence as the person he has become:

> —It is a curious thing, do you know, Cranly said dispassionately, how your mind is supersaturated with the religion in which you say you disbelieve. Did you believe in it when you were at school? I bet you did.
>
> —I did, Stephen answered.
>
> —And were you happier then? Cranly asked softly. Happier than you are now, for instance?
>
> —Often happy, Stephen said, and often unhappy. I was someone else then.
>
> —How someone else? What do you mean by that statement?
>
> —I mean, said Stephen, that I was not myself as I am now, as I had to become. (207)

Despite his view that "This race and this country and this life produced me," Stephen's vision of himself invokes a sense of finality to his becoming "myself as I am now, as I had to become." What he does not mention, of course, is how much of a role milieu and academic culture have played throughout the novel in his becoming who he is. The book continuously weaves education's effect into the emerging of the individual and measures the relative value of social environment against curriculum, weighing in heavily with the former. Exposure to the forces of culture and subculture (Irish culture, school culture, sexual culture) becomes most important—and yet exposure to knowledge is what lets Stephen start to understand these forces. Intellectual apprenticeship develops discernment, and makes him more sensitive to and conscious of his environment. This provides a measure for one kind of success in education: the expansion of skills into real life, theory into practice, assimilation into synthesis. It also raises issues that might be of concern to educators. Is an education's success measured through the development of social function or "job.skills" it achieves, or through the individual it creates? To what extent does an effective education involve learning what to reject or what to ignore? However we answer these questions, we cannot deny the fundamental role education plays in creating the young artist Stephen Dedalus—as well as its importance it had in giving us James Joyce.

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Educating the Self: Archetypal and Fairy Tale Patterns in Rousseau's *Emile*

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Rousseau writes In *Emile,* "I hold it to be impossible to bring a child...to the age of twelve in the bosom of society without giving him some idea of the relations of man to man and of the morality of human actions" (*Emile* 97). This idea of a "morality of human actions" is key to Rousseau's understanding of the human odyssey, since for Rousseau to learn to act responsibly and morally lies at the core of human growth. But it seems difficult to separate the practical from the moral aims of education, allowing human nature to develop to serve its own good. To achieve these ends, Rousseau thinks, one must rely on the innate human disposition to act morally rather than offer moral lessons. In fact, Rousseau says, the most useful rule in education "is not to gain time but to lose it," since education does not involve "teaching virtue or truth but ... securing the heart from vice and the mind from error" (93).

In his philosophy of education, then, Rousseau stresses helping the child confront its natural disposition and the forces of nature in it while developing reason—the faculty that will let the child act consciously and responsibly.[1] Rousseau's strategy is to avoid using reason as a teaching instrument while applying "negative education," "which tends to perfect organs, instruments of our knowledge before giving us this knowledge, and which prepares reason through the exercising of the senses" (Letter to Beaumont 35). By emphasizing use of the senses,[2] Rousseau means to develop discernment in the child.[3] Before developing reason, Rousseau maintains, the child receives "not ideas but images" (107), and lacks judgment and memory.[4] Children seldom relate in terms of abstractions, and if they use reasoning, it is always limited "to their immediate and palpable interest" (108). Only communicating via the senses, Rousseau believes, brings one into the child's universe.[5] For Rousseau, then, the child will only be able to see, sense and finally create simple ideas through guided images. Once trained to form "simple ideas by the conjunction of several sensations" through what Rousseau calls sensual or childish reason, the child attains the threshold of intellectual or human reason, forming complex ideas by linking simple ideas.

Rousseau's use of the senses to develop the ability to see and later perceive reveals an educational philosophy based on an actualization of instinct through images that reflects the components of natural morals in human nature. This fact links his approach to the functions of fairy tales in the theoretical writings of Bruno Bettelheim and Marie-Louise Von Franz. Emile's master uses stagings that carry basic, universal messages concerning psychological and physical survival, echoing a fundamental characteristic of the fairy tale, through which children confront inborn drives and projections. I will discuss Bettelheim's and Von Franz's approach to fairy tales, then show how Rousseau's stagings achieve similar results.

In *The Uses of Enchantment,* Bettelheim examines the role fairy tales play in the child's psychological development. In these tales, he writes, "internal processes are externalized and become comprehensible [in] the figures of the story and its events" (Bettelheim 25). Fairy tales help children develop identity (24) and resolve unconscious conflicts. Children cannot relate through abstractions; since they live mostly in the present, action speaks to them better than do theories.[6] Importantly, fairy tales do not require rational understanding to be effective: "the form and structure of fairy tales suggest images to the child by which he can structure his daydreams and with them give better direction to life" (7).[7]

Fairy tales therefore actualize inner processes and foster imagination when the child's own imaginative process is limited. Even if they often have moral content, though, fairy tales do not teach morals as such. Bettelheim differentiates fairy tales from fables, which rely on the teaching of a definite code of conduct.[8] Similarly, myths emphasize the life of a hero one wishes to emulate, thus creating distance between the child's limitations and the hero's superhuman accomplishments.[9] Fairy tales alone offer instructive symbolic stories that edify through speaking to the unconscious while excluding rational interpretive processes. Using a Freudian perspective, Bettelheim sees these tales as informing the child's unconscious of the inner and outer boundaries of the self, revealing the pleasure/pain principle and reality principle and providing symbolized recognition of the id, ego and superego.

A related though different approach appears in the writings of Marie-Louise Von Franz. Developing a Jungian perspective, Von Franz sees fairy tales as mirroring collective unconscious material. While not directly claiming an ethical moralistic feature for the unconscious, she speculates that, given humanity's feeling reactions and tendency to evaluate activities and motives, the human psyche contains structures that react to its own acts. Conscious and unconscious elements exist in the human psyche, and Von Franz distinguishes unconscious motivations from the conscious superstructure of reflections, analyses of motivations, and subjective judgments. Because of their highly concentrated metaphorical and symbolic form, fairy tales let people get in touch with these aspects of the psyche. While they do not automatically illuminate all ethical superstructures, they address inherent universal structures, helping people read themselves.

To clarify her approach, Von Franz compares Freud's perspective to Jung's as far as the notion of ethical historical infrastructures is concerned. Jung's collective moral code—a mix of conscious, semi-conscious and unconscious pressures on individual motivations—coincides with Freud's superego, which in our society links into the Judeo-Christian tradition. But Von Franz specifies that Jung's ethical psychic reaction is not identical with the Freudian superego—in fact, the two can clash. Two factors interact in ethical reaction: a collective ethical code that varies between nations and an exclusively individual moral urge that may not coincide with the collective code. One could call this individual reaction "the voice of God," an inner instinct. For Jung and Von Franz, it springs from an archetype of the self, a "divine" psychic center named differently in different cultures. Though born of the layers of the collective unconscious, this structure can be "highly individual and highly specific" (Von Franz 143). Von Franz's point is that conscience, though inherently elusive, is preexistent.[10]

Since they mirror deep, diverse layers of the unconscious, fairy tales supply metaphorical and symbolic keys that bring their audience to some aspect of the psyche. They present collective material dealing with universal and inherent structures and not automatically with problems of the ethical superstructure. Fairy tales address the unconscious, intuitively putting the individual in touch with herself through tuning the potential moral aspects of the individual. Like Bettelheim, Von Franz does not see fairy tales as rational or moral. They do not dictate a definite code of behavior, but rather prompt basic ethical dispositions, thus helping people get in touch with their individuality. Though similarities exist between Bettelheim's and Von Franz's theories, because she views these tales as expressing archetypal material, Von

Franz does not limit her analysis to their effect on children exclusively. They appeal to all ages, embodying popular wisdom and common sense.

Fairy tales provide an incentive to the imagination and instruct in a non-rationalistic way. They address the unconscious, and aim through guided images to create order in the psyche. They are non-analytical and not abstract, but rely on the figurative to speak to the unconscious. They address internal conflicts by guiding them into consciousness via fantasy. They also appeal to instinctual moral urges by sensitizing the feeling function, but do not teach morals—or not in a linear way. In brief, fairy tales integrate the self by stimulating psychic and/or archetypal material, generating infrastructures that touch archetypes and providing intuitive and experiential modes of discovery.

Rousseau banned all books save *Robinson Crusoe* from Emile's education, but we can see in his teaching an approach that reflects the strategies traced in fairy tales. This approach appears in the stagings, which serve not to bring out morality, but to develop moral aspects of the person-to-be. Though Rousseau advocates negative education at an early age, he does not exclude the fact that the child is a potential moral being. Simply, the instructor must understand the difference between the Jungian personal moral urge and any moral teachings that require conscious, discerning reason.

Three stagings illustrate the psychic development of the child, addressing different states of innocence from learning to direct one's instincts to learning to cope with more intense emotions. Our selection is meant to help contrast different stages of adaptation addressed in the process of familiarizing the child with the unconscious.[11] The first of these, the scene of the masks, helps the child control fear by familiarizing him with situations that may appear dangerous but offer no real danger. Here one operates in the realm of basic instinct rather than emotion. The child must learn to tame basic instincts and adapt to an unknown harmless situation.

> Why … should a child's education not begin before he speaks and understands, since the very choice of objects presented to him is fit to make him timid or courageous? I want him habituated to seeing new objects, ugly, disgusting, peculiar animals, but little by little, from afar, until he is accustomed to them.... I begin by showing Emile a mask with a pleasant face. Next someone in his presence puts this mask over his face. I start to laugh; and the child laughs like the others.... Little by little I accustom him to less pleasant masks and finally to hideous faces. (Emile 63)

If fairy tales contribute to the actualization of innate responses of the psyche associated with the feeling function, here we see a similar process of bringing a feeling—fear—to consciousness to dissipate it. The mask serves as the "image" of the archetype, just as in fairy tales monsters and witches (whether representing parents, feelings, or other forces) personify emotional force so that it does not overwhelm the child. The masks diffuse fear, helping Emile master emotions and instincts.

The garden scene has a more complex agenda aimed at developing the child's compassion by getting him in touch with his inner self, then relating this self to the other. The master has Emile grow a garden. One day Emile finds his garden destroyed. After great disappointment and anger, he learns that he himself destroyed Robert's garden. In a role-reversal, Emile understands the harm he caused. Characteristic here are the reliance on story, the "doubling" that creates identification and compassion, and the lack of a clearly stated moral. Bearing in mind Rousseau's comment that "Reason alone teaches us to know good and bad" and that "Conscience...although independent of reason, cannot...be developed without it" (67), we can see how the staging, like a fairy tale, creates a vivid, active event through which lessons are indirectly drawn. Besides teaching compassion, the experience teaches responsibility, links property rights to survival, and extends sympathy from oneself to the other once Emile seems himself in the gardener.

The last scene again deals with self-protection and awakening compassion, though it also incorporates a lesson on hubris. Rousseau wants the child to learn that pride, or amour-propre, causes misery. The psychodrama is intensified by the child's humiliation following his arrogant display. With the complicity of a magician the master has Emile play a trick in public which involves moving a wax duck toward some bread with a hidden magnet. The situation epitomizes a childish desire for glory, but the child soon learns that the magician knows more tricks, and ridicules himself by putting himself prematurely in the spotlight (173).

All three passages play roles like those played by fairy tales. Through simple plots they provide situations that help the child cope with strong or nebulous feelings. All three put Emile in touch with instinct and primordial urges, starting from an experience that involves a basic instinct and moving to experiences that appeal to his natural moral urge and help him handle pride and shame—conditions which result from increasing ego awareness. Besides appealing exclusively to the child's sense of reality, these scenes actualize unconscious archetypal images, motifs or situations—the power of the magician, the primordial importance of the "first" gardener. This illustrates Rousseau's intuitive understanding of the psychological underpinnings of the self that Freud, Jung, and others first explored a century later.

The stagings and the interpretations of fairy tales we have examined reveal crucial similarities. Through imagery and non-rational teachings, each speaks to the unconscious, and while not incorporating explicit analytical interpretations of moral actions, each reaches hidden or potential parts of the psyche that respond by creating a personal moral reaction which plays a crucial though fantasized part in resolving conflicts or defining the nucleus of the psyche. Fairy tales in fact contribute to the actualization of innate psychic responses associated with the feeling function. Though Bettelheim does not address archetypes, his description of symbolization as a trigger for the child's self-integration recalls Von Franz's description of how fairy tales appeal to natural moral urges. Jung's definitions of the archetype suggest that Bettelheim's description of how to reach the child's emotional world links to Rousseau's, as well as Von Franz's, intentions. Jung writes,

> Archetypes are, by definition, factors and motifs that arrange the psychic elements into certain images, characterized as archetypal, but in such way that *they can be recognized only from the effects they produce.* They exist preconsciously, and presumably they form the structural dominants of the psyche in general.... [T]hey represent a special psychological instance of the biological "pattern of behavior" which gives all things specific qualities. (Cited in Jacobi 31)

Jung also distinguishes "the nonperceptible, only potentially present archetype" from "the perceptible, actualized, 'represented' archetype" (Jacobi 35): "what we mean by 'archetype' is in itself irrepresentable, but ... it has effects which enable us to visualize it, namely, the archetypal images" (Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche," cited in Jacobi 35).[12] When Rousseau describes the infant prior to education, he seems to be talking about just such structures. Education for Rousseau consists mainly of bringing out the child's potential through experience instead of applying lessons.[13] To be able to experience, the child has to learn to use its senses, its only tools for translating experience. But Rousseau does not limit sensorial experience to external stimuli; the senses also present internal urges and responses. To convince us of this, Rousseau cites an infant inappropriately corrected by his nurse who went into a rage. In fact, Rousseau sees the potential individual and his identity as an instinctive sensing unit. His description of pre-educated man directly implies an archetype of the self; he writes that a child who "[had] at his birth the stature and the strength of a growing man...would exist only in the common sensorium, and would have only a single idea, that is, of the I to which he would relate all his sensations...; this idea or, rather this sentiment would be the only thing that he would have beyond what an ordinary baby has" (61).[14]

In his method of education, Rousseau addresses the instinct of survival and the different ways it manifests itself. As the child develops strength, no longer living as a helpless infant under the sway of necessity but now as a child in need, it reaches a stage at which it must be considered a moral being. The gradual development of faculties demands that we look at the child in this light.[15] By tapping into the instinct and its propensity to actualize itself, Rousseau unknowingly speaks of what Jung would call the collective unconscious. Thus, when advocating teaching the child to grow through the use of sensation, Rousseau means to have the child grow in tune with the inner and the outer world, to eventually be ready to act autonomously. Jung defines the archetype as a component of instinct: "to account for the uniformity and regularity of our perceptions, we must have recourse to the correlated concept of a factor...which I call the archetype or primordial image. The primordial image might suitably be described as the instinct's perception of itself, or as the self-portrait of the instinct" (Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious," 136). This self-perception, this "I-ness," is what Rousseau wants the child to consolidate and harmonize with its outer and inner world. We can only admire Rousseau for knowing intuitively how to address the child's psyche by using a method similar to that presented in folk culture, as analyzed by modern psychology.[16]

Notes

1. "[T]he masterpiece of a good education is to make a reasonable man, and they claim they raise a child by reason! This is to begin with the end, to want to make the product the instrument" (*Emile* 89).

2. "[T]o exercise the senses is not only to make use of them, it is to learn to judge well with them. It is to learn, so to speak, to sense; for we know how to touch, see, and hear only as we have learned" (*Emile* 132).

3. "Children's first sensations are purely affective.... Able neither to walk nor to grasp, they need a great deal of time to come little by little into possession of the representative sensations" (*Emile* 62).

4. "[Children] do not have true memory. They retain sounds, figures, sensations, ideas rarely, the connections between ideas more rarely" (*Emile* 107).

5. "[Children's] entire learning is in sensation: nothing has gone through to the understanding" (*Emile* 106).

6. "Action takes the place of understanding for a child, and this becomes increasingly true the more strongly he feels.... Not before puberty do [children] begin to recognize...emotions for what they are without immediately acting on them, or wishing to do so" (Bettelheim 31).

7. "A child needs to understand what is going on within his conscious self so that he can also cope with that which goes on in his unconscious. He can achieve this understanding, and with it the ability to cope, not through rational comprehension of the nature and content of his unconscious, but by becoming familiar with it.... By doing this, the child fits unconscious content into conscious fantasies, which then enable him to deal with that content..." (Bettelheim 7).

8. "Often sanctimonious, sometimes amusing, the fable always explicitly states a moral truth; there is no hidden meaning, nothing is left to our imagination" (Bettelheim 42-43).

9. "[M]yth presents its theme in a majestic way; it carries spiritual forces; and the divine is present and is experienced in the form of superhuman heroes who make constant demands on mere mortals" (Bettelheim 26).

10. "It is not an ethical superego which gives rules of behavior. It is a nature reaction.... [O]ne cannot help feel that it is an ethical reaction.... [T]he unconscious shows that it has many ways of reacting.... [W]ith the feeling function, one can realize that basically there is something like a moral reaction, though it can be difficult to grasp..." (Von Franz 142-143).

11. From a formalist point of view one can identify structures and motifs in their morphology which reflect characteristics of the fairy tale—for instance, repetitions of similar messages in varied ways to stimulate basic responses (see Propp and Johnston). Called dominants in formalist and structuralist studies, these patterns trigger what Jung would call the actualization of the archetype in the psyche. We will not analyze these aspects further, since this paper is not centered on the structural aspects of tales/stagings but on their edifying impact.

12. "The archetype as such is a psychoid factor that belongs, as it were, to the invisible, ultraviolet end of the spectrum..." (cited in Jacobi 35).

13. "[T]he education of man begins at his birth; before speaking, before understanding, he is already learning. Experience anticipates lessons" (*Emile* 62).

14. This description, asserting a certain amount of preformed structure in the psyche before development, recalls pediatrician F. Stirnimann's observations on new-born babies. "According to Stirnimann, the psyche of the new born babe is already structured when it comes into the world.... 'Anticipations,' i.e. modes of behavior which belong to a later stage of development and appear prematurely, as it were, clearly disclose this structured character. 'There is no postnatal psychogenesis...only a development.... There is not only an inherited body structure, but also inherited instincts'" (Jacobi 45).

15. "Able to do more by themselves, [children] need to have recourse to others less frequently. With their strength develops the knowledge which puts them in a direction to direct it. It is at this second stage that, strictly speaking, the life of the individual begins. It is then that he gains consciousness of himself. Memory extends the sentiment of identity to all the moments of his existence; he becomes truly one, the same, and consequently already capable of happiness or unhappiness. It is important, therefore, to consider him here as a moral being" (*Emile* 78).

16. Like Bettelheim, Rousseau understood that fables had a moral purpose and demanded the use of mature reason and therefore could not provide true moral guidance; this realm lies solely in the power of the staging or the folk tale.

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The Fragility of Teaching: Episteme and Practical Wisdom in Educational Reform Rhetoric

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> Metaphors matter: they can help to shape our views and actions. Consider the widespread acceptance of the term "marketplace of ideas" as a metaphor for free speech. This representation emphasizes one's freedom to enter the arena of discourse, rather than one's ability to be heard....If, in contrast, we imagined not a marketplace but a classroom, enabling the quietest voice to be heard would be more important than protecting the rights of the loudest.
>
> —*Jonathan G.S. Koppell*

> Thanks to many who have come before us, we have entered a world where the fundamental commodity of our age is knowledge. Knowing is the coin of the realm, and the way to that commodity is through learning.
>
> —*Curtis, L. McCray, President, National-Louis University*

> What is at risk in our educational formation is not our ability, as the official reports urge, to compete with other nations. That goal can only assert adherence to particular notions of economic development. What is at risk is our ability to reflect upon what we take for granted and determine how such meanings repress the potential in Maxine Greene's words to "make present what is absent, to summon up a condition that is not yet."
>
> —*Deborah P. Britzman*

In 1983 the National Commission on Excellence in Education issued *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform* demanding comprehensive changes in America's schools. Fifteen years later, the Ford Foundation sponsored *The Rise and Stall of Teacher Education Reform* (1998), an American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education (AACTE) publication assessing the contributions of the Holmes Group and other related reform initiatives. In this review Michael Fullan and colleagues concluded, "There is a philosophical, programmatic and strategic convergence of opinion about what needs to be done, and how urgent the problem is" (p. 68). This seems a remarkable statement in view of educators' hotly contested responses to competing reform initiatives including school based management, teacher accountability, state and national standards, multicultural curriculum development and constructivist methodologies. But it has merit in view of the "strategic convergence" of standards, testing, and funding at the state and local levels.

The recent rhetoric of reform can be placed within the context of a classical debate about what constitutes the best approach to practical reasoning, a kind of reasoning that arguably belongs at the center of teaching. In a classic dialogue, Socrates and Protagoras explore the extent to which reasoning can be viewed as a practical techne approaching episteme. The argument continues with Aristotle's contention that practical wisdom can be reduced to neither a specific techne nor a generalizable episteme. The tensions between proposals from Socrates, Protagoras, and Aristotle provide the background for examining assumptions and implications in competing proposals for school reform.

A Classical Dilemma: Seeking a Techne of Practical Reasoning

In Martha Nussbaum's (1986) analysis of techne and practical wisdom in Greek tragedy and philosophy, a quest for an episteme or a "techne of practical choice that can save us" competes with a viable but more elusive alternative, practical wisdom. In the Protagoras, Socrates argues for a techne of practical reasoning that can protect human beings from fortune (tuche) defined as "those things in life that happen not by our own agency" (Nussbaum, p. 8). As Plato tells the story, the gods, seeing proto-humans living in seeming chaos, at the mercy of the elements, give them technai (knowledge) of crafts, arts, and sciences including: house building, shoemaking, weaving (crafts), horsemanship, flute playing dancing, acting, poetry writing (arts), and medicine, mathematics, meteorology (sciences). Techne, a gift from the gods, "provides some control over the future contingencies of fortune" (p. 89). The person who lives by techne approaches new experiences with a systematic way of ordering the subject matter that provides protection against a "blind dependence on what happens" (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 95).

Although it is often defined much more narrowly, in the Protagoras, techne is used interchangeably with episteme and both are characterized by the following:

- Universality: Universal judgments about similar things can be made and defended.
- Teachability: Grouped experiences can be accounted for and communicated before they are experienced directly.
- Precision: Products and performances can be measured according to a set, quantifiable standard.
- Concern with Explanation: "Why" questions can be asked and answered regarding the procedures of each techne.

In this dialogue, even with the great gifts of knowledge (technai), competing commitments and personal passions continue to spark conflict in the public and private realms. As a result, Socrates suggests that decisive progress can only be made in human social life via a new techne, one developed by philosophers to assimilate practical deliberation to counting, weighing, and measuring (pp. 89-90).[1] Both a techne and an episteme of practical reasoning would require the same thing in order to fully protect humans from fortune (tuche): commensurability defined as having a common measure or being reducible to one. In a calculating techne of practical reasoning, human vulnerability to both incommensurability and fortune can be reduced.

As long as there are potential conflicts among incommensurable "goods" (courage, integrity, justice, generosity, loyalty, friendship, love), there is the possibility of loss, vulnerability, and tragedy. Setting truth against appearances, Socrates argues that our attachment to incommensurable, plural "goods" may be a sickness or delusion that only a deliberative techne can cure. If we can agree upon a single "good" under which all others can be subsumed, we can calculate our practical decisions using this overarching standard. With this techne of practical reasoning, we can maximize the good to be enjoyed by all and avoid unnecessary conflicts regarding irreducible, competing values and irreplaceable particulars (p. 118).[2]

Socrates' chief interlocutor in this dialogue, Protagoras, announces that his goal as a teacher is to prepare students to become good citizens. Rather than seeking a techne that weighs commensurable goods, Protagoras claims only that his techne can improve practice, increase self-awareness, offer a degree of communicability, and provide standards (in the form of rough guidelines) for choices among competing interests and alternatives. Rather than teaching universal laws of calculation, Protagoras claims to help students develop "proper rhythm" and "harmonious adjustment." His moral training is like "straightening wood." He explains, "What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters—how best to manage one's household, and in public affairs—how to realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate and action" (Protagoras 318e-319, Cooper, 1997, p. 755). This is certainly not a calculating techne/episteme that would weigh "goods" on a single scale. Nor is it the techne of say, house building, dancing, or medicine. It is a techne that asks a teacher of practical wisdom to follow the "lines of the disciplines," raising students' awareness of current practice and placing ethical choice as well as social excellence within the current context. This systematic understanding offers explanations, connections, and alternatives. But it also recognizes the excellences (plural) as intact and incommensurable. It leaves students vulnerable to the pulls of competing values and the possibility of tragic choices.[3]

A techne of calculation, as Socrates presents it, with an end, goal, or product that is specifiable, single, and quantifiable, appears to have the advantage in this dialogue as the method that yields the most precision, control, and sense of progress.[4] After exploring the tensions between Socrates and Protagoras, Nussbaum (1986) contrasts the proposed techne of practical reasoning with Aristotle's practical wisdom. Unlike a techne that sets episteme against appearances, Aristotle's practical wisdom is rooted in the appearances themselves as they are accessed through both doxa and episteme.[5] In Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom, conflicts between incommensurable "goods" are brought to the surface, not in order to separate truth from appearances, but in order to gain knowledge from those appearances.[6] In Aristotle's view, relevant appearances include ordinary beliefs and sayings (doxa) as well as previous scientific and philosophical treatment of the subject at hand. Once conflicting opinions are identified, they are examined for consistency (with respect to first principals) and then examined again to see if the appearances can be preserved. Practical wisdom must accommodate particulars. Rules (universals) are authoritative only to the extent that they are correct with respect to particulars. The rules do not govern particular appearances. Appearances govern themselves and are normative for the correctness of the rule (p. 301). Thus, Aristotle allows particular cases to have ultimate authority. Rules are descriptive summaries of good judgments. They are only "valid to the extent that they capture these judgments" (p. 296). They are only normative to the extent that we want to be guided by the exemplars they codify.

While Socrates' argument in the Protagoras suggests that universal rules may serve as ultimate authorities for making practical choices, Aristotle proposes instead the "right rule" or "correct account" of the person of practical wisdom—a person who can grasp the salient features (the ultimate particulars) in the appearances of complex situations (p. 305). This wisdom is not explicitly deductive or inferential. It is not and can not be episteme (defined as quantifiable, verifiable, deductive systems concerned throughout with universals derived from propositions) for three reasons: mutability, indeterminacy, and particularity.

1) Deductive methods work best when circumstances are predictable and replicable (e.g. laws of matter and motion). As circumstances in the public and private realm change, practical wisdom is concerned with meeting new situations with "resourcefulness," not with applying deductive methods as agreed upon in advance.
2) Since different contexts influence what is considered "good," practical wisdom requires that "every account (logos or rule) concerning practical matters ought to be said in outline and not with precision" (Aristotle cited Nussbaum, p. 312). Given the complexity that context creates, the character and experience of the person with practical wisdom are needed to "fill in" the outline for any given situation.
3) Unlike an episteme that contends with the universality of laws governing physical phenomena, practical wisdom must deal with the "ultimate particulars" of non-repeatable influences (e.g. history and family) that constitute "good" choices, both in terms of the individual involved and the "general good." For Aristotle, excellence cannot be neatly specified in advance. Instead, "Excellence is a state of character (hexis) concerned with choice, lying in a mean, the mean relative to us, this being determined by a logos, the one by which the person of practical wisdom would determine it" (Aristotle cited in Nussbaum, pp. 298-299).

The person of practical wisdom considers the idiosyncratic and the new as well as guiding and sorting power of the universal (first principles). The particular illuminates the universal and vice versa. Although the particular takes priority, both are "partners" in good judgment. Practical wisdom also requires the discriminating power of passion: deliberation informed by desire and desire informed by deliberation. The passions are not barriers to good choices; nor are they merely instrumental. As they are embodied in the person of practical wisdom, they have intrinsic value. A virtuous choice requires the "right passion" and an action taken without the right "passion" ceases to be virtuous. Passions inform the excellences of character constituting the "best human life" and expressing themselves in courage, justice, friendship, generosity, and love (p. 308).

Where is the teacher here? Addressing questions central to the Protagoras, Aristotle claims that the passions are intelligent and educable. Any struggle between reason and passion points to ethical immaturity and signals an opportunity for further "training" (Aristotle cited in Nussbuam, p. 309). What can the teacher know and teach with respect to practical wisdom? Wise practical choice is not simply a function of episteme, but a way of knowing more closely related to nous—an immediate grasp of ultimate particulars, a perception of the salient features in complex situations. This type of wisdom (immediate knowledge) requires extensive experience with first principles and particulars, which in turn requires time. It is this extensive experience with first principles and with practical choices that develops "resourcefulness and responsiveness" (p. 306). In Kuypers' (1996) analysis, practical wisdom is that knowledge functioning, not in the domain of science where truths can be demonstrated deductively, but in the domain of the variable where "human deliberation or calculation results in probable truth about contingent matters" (Self 1979, 131-132 cited in Kuypers, 1996, p. 458). While young persons may acquire discursive knowledge,[7] they do not have enough experience with particulars for an immediate grasp (nous) of their ultimate authority (Aristotle cited in Kuypers, p. 461). It is this grasp that characterizes practical wisdom.

The Current Doxa: Reformers' Quest for a Techne of Practical Reason

Tension is generated in the educational arena as balances shift between a quest for a techne of practical reasoning and a search for practical wisdom. Debates about the purpose(s) or ends of public education as well as curricular and pedagogical alternatives all arguably involve practical choices. What role does a techne of practical reasoning play in the current rhetoric of reform? Where and how does "practical wisdom" apply? *A Nation at Risk*, which has become a touchstone for subsequent educational reform rhetoric, provides a point of departure. This report, dedicated in 1983 to the graduates of the year 2000 ("those now in school and others to come"), has been praised for issuing a "warning" to the "general public" that "the nation would suffer" without dramatic improvements in education (Ravitch, 2000, p. 411). In *A Nation at Risk,* several aspects of the notion of a techne of practical reasoning are discernible.

The report's most famous metaphors, "rising tide of mediocrity" and "unilateral educational disarmament" characterize the failure of the public schools in fulfilling their mission to protect, sustain, and advance our nation's interests in a global economy. The document's rhetoric suggests that there is a single, specifiable end (student learning) toward which a techne of practical reasoning in education can be directed and against which it can be measured:

> We're in the student learning business, and if we're going to have effectiveness in terms of students learning we've got to have good teachers, and we're got to have sound management.

A Nation at Risk characterizes public education, not as an evolving and hotly contested experiment in teaching and learning that has responded to competing priorities including literacy for nation building, acculturation, moral uplift, the promise of meritocracy, stratification and sorting, social justice, desegregation, preparation for citizenship, skilled labor production, and national security to name a few. Rather it describes education as an enterprise easily subject to a techne of practical reasoning, with specific inputs (raw materials, investments), set measurable standards (scores) and a specifiable end (student learning). This notion still permeates rhetoric at the local level. Speaking to a group of prospective teachers a West Aurora principal recently explained, "The purpose of schooling is student achievement." And achievement is measured by the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (October 19, 2000). Potentially competing educational "goods"—to develop virtuous citizens, to nurture ethical development, to foster cooperation, to increase appreciation for the arts, to build tolerance, to encourage independence, to spark creativity[8]—are rhetorically subordinated or subsumed under student achievement.

Similar notions have shaped recent rhetoric in teacher education. In the August of 2000 newsletter of the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE) President David G. Imig used the contrasting metaphors of Thomas L. Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* to support his call for data driven pre-service preparation and programmatic changes based on student performance. In Friedman's view, the Lexus automobile produced by a lean workforce using the latest in robotics technology represents our high-tech interdependent present and future, while the olive tree represents our nostalgia for "the personal and traditional." How is education to survive in this environment of "high technologies, increasing competition, and low tolerance for the status quo"? Immig's September (2000) presidential brief provides schools of education with the solution:

> Your job is to show that your graduates do a better job of teaching K-12 students than do those who enter teaching through alternative routes. Student learning is the measure to be used—not principal satisfaction surveys of happy parents. Your job is to show that your graduates outperform "alternative route" teachers in raising the level of student performance. Failure to do this puts your school of education at risk. (p. 2)

This "solution" is consistent with the quest for singularity, specificity, and commensurability that characterizes a techne of practical reasoning. Competing "goods" or "virtues" are subsumed under "student learning," become means to that end, or become commensurate with it. Plurality in teacher education is no longer a potential distraction or a possible source of incommensurability.[9]

Elements of a techne of practical reasoning are also inherent in some of the rhetoric supporting standardized curriculum and testing. For example, Barbara Foorman, speaking at the August 1996 Illinois Reading Summit, has asserted that:

> The teacher variable does not contribute significantly above and beyond the curriculum, so what we have here is a powerful mathematical model. My hypothesis is that the teacher variable will be even less significant within the direct instruction group. (Foorman cited in Ohanian, 1999, p. 49)

Here is a curriculum-based techne of teaching reading that is predictable and replicable. It meets epistemic criteria of specificity, precision, explanation, quantification, and verification. It is concerned throughout with universals based on propositions: instruction that can be cast in the framework of a mathematical model and within which the teacher becomes a variable.[10]

CLASSROOM TEACHERS' AND THE QUEST FOR A TECHNE OF PRACTICAL REASONING

How do classroom teachers view themselves within this rhetorical context? How do they respond, if at all, to implications that a techne of practical reasoning can "save us"? How have the rising pressures to pursue a single "end" of education—student achievement—impacted their practices? Alfie Kohn (2000), perhaps the most eloquent critic of standardized testing, has warned:

> [T]he more that scores are emphasized, the less discussion there is about the proper goals of schooling, and the more educators are reduced to finding the most efficient means for what has become the de facto goal—doing better on tests. (p. 323)

To what extent do teachers view student achievement as the purpose of schooling, the de facto goal—the single, specifiable, quantifiable end under which all other "goods" and "excellences" must be subordinated, subsumed or made commensurate? To what extent do teachers view themselves as means to a specified end (student achievement)?

For the past several years, as part of their graduate studies, over two hundred in-service teachers from urban, suburban, and rural districts have been creating metaphors that explore aspects of their professional identities not easily accessible using other sources of information. Teachers have developed metaphors to supplement self-assessment surveys and self/peer/student/supervisor observations. In creating metaphors, they have compared teaching to the arts, crafts, and sciences of techne: sculptor (arts), carpenter, master builder, logger, gourmet chef (crafts), and physician, dentist, horticulturalist, paleontologist, dietician (sciences). They have also created metaphors that seem to incorporate elements of practical wisdom as Protagoras or Aristotle might characterize it: open book, lighthouse (increase self-awareness); forest ranger, compass (provide rough guidelines); orchestra leader (develop proper rhythm, tune "instruments"); coxswain (foster harmonious adjustment); and battery charger, leader of the flock (place ethical choice within current context).

Many of these metaphors combine elements of specificity and predictability characteristic of a techne of practical reasoning with elements of mutability, indeterminacy, and particularity characteristic of the practical wisdom as conceived by Aristotle. Combining such elements within a single master builder metaphor, one teacher described her practice first in terms of precise, specific, measurable standards, then in terms of contingency and progress within limitations:

> Fairly quickly we begin to see the level land where we will erect the footings for the building. I measure the land and consult the city building code enforcement office to learn about standards for each site. These learning standards must be adhered to as I prepare for the building....In planning and preparing for the days, weeks, and

> months ahead in our construction project, I am well aware of possible setbacks. The weather may not hold up. We may have a problem with a supplier. A strike in industry may interrupt transit of our materials The list of possible mishaps is a long one. So it is with the learning environment; one can never be in total control of the situation....Roots or unstable earth may be a life issue that I may be able to influence. But if not, we make progress by strengthening the land below with support or encouragement. (Teacher Metaphor #1)

In the master builder metaphor above, planning and decision making using a clear, single, specifiable, quantifiable goal (student learning that meets state standards) is tempered by an acknowledgement of the unpredictable, uncontrollable forces of nature and the non-repeatable, particular influences of family history (life influences). The "good" choice for this teacher allows for "progress" that is achieved by "strengthening the land below"—an activity which may or may not lead directly to student learning as planned.

In the following example, contingent, unpredictable influences are given an even greater range:

> As a teacher, I see myself as a lighthouse encouraging everyone to keep going no matter how hard it may seem....It's easy to try to steer the students' course to make sure they go the right way. But it's so much more fun to watch from a distance to see how far they can go on their own and observe what new discoveries they can make. (Teacher Metaphor #2)

This teacher seems to feel that it would be easier to direct students along a single path that leads to a clearly specified destination. A techne of practical reasoning with clear, single, specifiable, measurable ends would surely supply a more direct route. The choice not to take the clearly marked path is prompted in this case, not by pedagogical or epistemological considerations, but by the pleasure young people's unique and accidental discoveries can bring to the educational process.

In the final example, a simple set of rules combine some of the specificity of a techne of practical reasoning with the mutability of practical wisdom:

> In a deep and secret way teachers and farmers share many common attributes. These two powerful professions carry meaningful rules that must be followed....The first rule is to carry out precise plans. The second rule is to be flexible. The last rule is to always keep your seedlings engaged down to the roots.

The call for a techne of practical reasoning based on tests, measures, and single or commensurable "ends" continues to shape educational reform rhetoric at the policy level. Teacher metaphors indicate that there may be less "convergence" in practice. If the excellences and human values that are part of education are "goods" that cannot be made commensurable or subsumed under a single "good" by means of calculation, as Aristotle claims, then practical divergence is promising. For those aspects of education existing within the realm of contingency, Aristotle has proposed the use of practical wisdom. This requires that standards be given in rough outline and that rules remain authoritative only to the extent that they are correct with respect to particulars. A teacher must rely upon practical wisdom to fill in the detail for established standards, continuously evaluate the relevance of rules with respect to ultimate particulars, and identify the salient features in the mix of doxa and episteme informing specific situations. When the particular becomes prior, deliberation becomes more fragile, vulnerable to fortune (tuche) as well as the potentially blinding power of passion. Teachers who use the perception (nous) of practical wisdom rather than conformity to set rules or standards remain open to the pull of incommensurable values, "goods" and "excellences" of specific communities, schools, and students. With this openness comes the possibility of both wonder and grief.

In the realm of the contingent, practical wisdom is at the heart of attempts to make a "right account" and take "virtuous action." In this realm, practical wisdom asks that we honor the fragility of teaching, acknowledge its vulnerability to fortune, and carefully consider the limitations as well as the power of techne in the choices we make about our shared lives. It asks that we recognize the possibility that the best life for a human being requires less control and more vulnerability than we might wish. "Strategic convergence" rhetoric, production and mathematical metaphors, standards and testing "solutions" in pursuit of a single "good" in education all promise some measure of control against vulnerability. But when we take refuge from perceived economic, military, social, and political threats in standards, measures, and the single, specifiable "good" of student achievement, we place the notion of practical wisdom at risk.

NOTES

1. In the Protagoras Plato has Socrates argue as follows: "If then our well-being depended upon this, doing and choosing large things, avoiding and not doing the small ones, what would we see as our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement or the power of appearance? While the power of appearance often makes us wander all over the place in confusion, often changing our minds about the same things and regretting our actions and choices with respect to things large and small, the art of measurement in contrast, would make the appearances lose

their power by showing us the truth, would give us peace of mind firmly rooted in the truth and would save our life" (Protagoras 356d-356e, Cooper, 1997, p. 785).

2. This Socratic "solution" to the vulnerability that incommensurability creates can be contrasted with other Socratic dialogues (e.g. Phraedrus) and is by no means to be interpreted as representative of his complex views on this topic. 3. Nussbaum's analysis of this dialogue culminates in a juxtaposition of the broader implications of both proposals for making practical choices. Steven Schroeder (2000), in re-examining Nussbaums's interpretation, directs the reader beyond the projected social-political visions to the power of Socratic dialogue in this context. Schroeder, like Nussbaum, contrasts the "radical, scientific approach – a quantifiable art" proposed by Socrates with the more modest attempt to systematize "the ordinary practice of deliberation" practiced by Protagoras; but Schroeder's analysis explores "just how artful the science Socrates proposes is" (p. 35). While arguing for a calculating techne of practical reasoning, Socrates himself employs a "procedure for dialogue that includes the possibility of improvisation" (p. 35). In the "asking and answering back" of dialogue, Socrates, who starts by claiming that virtue cannot be taught, ends up arguing that "everything is knowledge – justice, temperance, courage – in which case, virtue would appear to be eminently teachable." In contrast, Protagoras, who originally defends the position that virtue can be taught (and that indeed he teaches it), becomes trapped in his own argument that virtue is something other than knowledge. If this is the case, virtue may not be teachable after all. For Schroder, the Protagoras demonstrates the ways in which "the argument is the prosecutor and Socrates and Protagoras are equally tried" (31). The argument also leads those who follow it (speakers, writers, hearers, readers) back to the generative questions: Is all virtue knowledge/wisdom? Can virtue be taught?

4. This techne of calculation approaches episteme as it has been characterized in the current literature where a modern "episteme" comes under heavy post modern attack. From this point forward, the term techne will be used primarily to refer to the systematic ordering of knowledge in the crafts, arts, and sciences, while episteme will be reserved for the modern notion of knowledge grounded in quantifiable, verifiable, deductive systems concerned throughout with universals based on propositions.

5. Episteme is characterized in this analysis as knowledge derived from necessary premises; doxa as knowledge derived from contingent premises, i.e., "that which could be otherwise." Doxa is not characterized simply as knowledge that is incorrect or unfounded; rather, doxa includes the definitions and distinctions "a society recognizes in the course of its history" including established conventions taken as "true opinions" that "may [or may not] turn out to be false" (Wood, 1999, pp. 9-10).

6. When the careful exploration of language shows that Platonism is a "house of cards", Wittgenstein concludes (in his "death of philosophical illusion") that all we have left are "bits of stone and rubble and with the ground to be swept clean of these" (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 262). For Aristotle, in contrast, we are left with the order in our language and in the world of appearances as seen and experienced. In order to know this world, "the place needs to be perspicuously mapped." Aristotelian philosophy improvises the mean "between too much order and disorder, ambition and abandonment, excess and deficiency, the super-human and merely animal" (p. 262).

7. Here discursive knowledge includes both doxa (knowledge derived from contingent premises) and episteme (knowledge derived from necessary premises).

8. For a review of issues surrounding the purposes and functions of public education, see John Goodlad's classic (1994) *What Schools Are For* as well as the more recent (1997) collection *The Public Purpose of Education and Schooling* edited by Goodlad and Timothy J. McMannon.

9. Over the past decade and a half, the shifts in rhetoric regarding schools of education have been dramatic. David Labaree's analysis "A Disabling Vision: Rhetoric and Reality in Tomorrow's Schools of Education" traces the rhetorical shifts in the three Holmes Group

Reports: *Tomorrow's Teachers* (1986), *Tomorrow's Schools* (1990), and *Tomorrow's Schools of Education* (1995). In responding to the political pressure in the aftermath of *A Nation at Risk*, the first report by the Holmes Group, an alliance of about one hundred major U.S. research institutions, *Tomorrow's Teachers* (1986) described schools of education as epistemological anchors. Their mission was to professionalize teaching by grounding teacher education in the "scientific knowledge [episteme] of the university." Schools of education were to incorporate other disciplines in order to develop and transmit the "science of education promised by Dewey, Thorndike, and others at the turn of the century" (Holmes Group, 1986 cited in Labaree, 1995). They were to become sites for developing a professionalizing techne, using a scientific episteme, in much the same way that Abraham Flexner developed a knowledge base for doctors.

Five years later, *Tomorrow's Schools* (1990), characterized schools of education, not as sites of epistemological grounding, but as partners with professional development schools – a partnership consisting of "good people" rallying around a "common purpose." The highly valued university quest for an episteme based on observation, reflection, analysis, and theorizing of *Tomorrow's Schools* was to find common cause with the techne in action of the public schools. With the publication of *Tomorrow's Schools of Education* (1995), the university was no longer a source of epistemic grounding for the School of Education nor was the School of Education a vehicle for transmitting a "science of education." In this report, the School of Education was exhorted to resist the siren call of university disciplines and ivory tower episteme and to hitch "its wagons to public schools" . . . "striving to transform themselves into Professional Development Schools" (Holmes Group, 1995 cited in Labaree, 1995, p. 18). As Labarree interpreted the shift,

> [T]he report is not seeking to add zest from PDSs to the stew of education school research. Instead it is proposing a whole new recipe, which calls for the PDS to supply the main ingredients and also to serve as the stew pot. (p. 20)

Universities were compared to giants in the automobile industry that "took their markets for granted – in turn, giving insufficient attention to quality, costs, and innovation." Schools of Education were criticized for equipping people "for organizing and managing schools as the factories of old" (Holmes Group, 1995, p. 10). To address these shortcomings, Schools of Education were asked to turn, not to research in search of episteme, but to research as R&D. Professional Development Schools became laboratories for new product testing. Research directed away from theory (episteme) and "reconceived as on-site R & D" became the only legitimate vehicle for developing new "educational products." The report concluded:

> Those schools of education that cannot meet these new standards after a reasonable period of time should be closed" (Holmes, 1995 cited in Labaree, 1995, p. 8).

As Labaree views this shift, "It reads as though the country's leading schools of education decided to abandon their own cumulative wisdom about their work and instead impose on themselves a set of reforms developed by the least informed layperson" (p. 15). This third Holmes Group report, trusting neither its epistemological ground nor its own doxa, asked university faculty in schools of education to narrow their focus to a single site of inquiry (PDSs). Both the ends (student achievement) and the means (PDSs) were specified. In effect, this report proposed that teacher educators be judged on their capacity and will to oppose the academy's doxa as well as its episteme.

10. Medical metaphors have also been used to suggest the potential for a techne of practical reasoning within the reform arena. In some of these metaphors, Socrates' suggestion that such a techne "would save our life" takes on literal dimensions. Michael Fullan and colleagues, who followed the progress of the Holmes Group from the mid 80s to the mid 90s, compare teacher

education to the medical profession of 1910, mired in disarray and ripe for reform. They conclude:

> If society can devote itself to decades of energy to solve the many forms of cancer, we could do the same for reforming teacher education and the profession of teaching. (p. 70)

Medical metaphors along with images such as "skill/drill treadmills", "brain races", "raising the bar", "return on investment" and "conveyor belt instruction" have sparked some criticism (Ohanian, 1999, pp. 72-73, 119, 140). Veteran teacher Susan Ohanian, suggests that when (ex-superintendent of schools in California turned phonics entrepreneur) Bill Honig announces that "education must become more like medicine, must become much more diagnostic," he is simply setting "himself up as both chief diagnostician and the drug seller (p. 100)." She concludes:

> I do insist that we should not look at children as a disease that we need to cure. Honig is advocating this same overdosing that responsible medical experts warn against: Give every kindergartner a heavy dose of phonemic awareness, give every first and second grader and even heavier dose of systematic, explicit pho

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Doxic Assumptions, Eurocentrism and the Afrocentric Educational Idea

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Controversy surrounds the teaching of history in American schools from an Afrocentric perspective. As a result, any claim about the falsity of Afrocentric propositions are immediately accepted by the academe as valid and true.

We assume that any article or book written by an establishment member of the academe is best on valid historical truths, erudite scholarship and impeccable research. Although insiders and outsiders alike, sociological research indicates that there are unconscious cognitive structures within each individual hold this view idealistic view of members of the academe that determine how they perceive "reality". These structures are called doxa. Commenting on these schema Berlinerblau (1999) noted that "These types of theories share the assumption that human beings know things that they do not even know that they know; that they "possess" knowledge about the world which exists in some sort of cognitive substrate, beyond the realm of discourse" (p.106).Wacquant (1995) says that doxa is " a realm of implicit and unstated beliefs".

Given the research suggesting that doxa exist, support the view that some researchers allow their hatred of multiculturalism to define their discourse on teaching and writing by multiculturalists. Moreover, it suggest that when topics such as Afrocentrism is attacked by members of the academe, these academics are supported by the "establishment" without any reservation or test of the validity of their claims. In fact, it appears that doxic assumptions relating to the invalidity of Afrocentrism obviates critique of the academics that disparage Afrocentrism. This seems to be the case in attacks on Afrocentrism made by Professor M. Lefkowitz in Not Out of Africa.

Lefkowitz (1992,1996) and Bernal (1991, 1996) have argued about the legitimacy of Africalogical research. Lefkowitz (1996) argues that the Afrocentric claims of African in ancient Greece and the Egyptian influence on Greece are nothing more than "Afrocentric mythologies of the ancient world" in her book Not Out of Africa. And, as a result, the Afrocentrists are not teaching history.

Bernal (1996) on the other hand, argues that although some Afrocentrists, have "failed" to support some of their claims about the role of African people in ancient history, overall these Africalogical researchers of the Afrocentric research tradition are presenting a view of history based on the "ancient model" of historical research.

Bernal (1996), Assante (1996), and Winters (1994) have discussed the classical evidence of an African, and Egyptian role in the rise of Greece. In this examination of Lefkowitz's claims about the ancient history of Greece, we will compare her views about Africans in ancient Greece to the archaeological evidence and determine if her thesis is based on "facts" or the result of doxic assumptions.

Although Dr. Lefkowitz (1996) teaches classical studies her research methods leave a lot to be desired. She declares in Not Out of Africa that, "there is no archaeological data to support the notion that Egyptians migrated to Greece during the second millennium B.C. (or before that)" (p.157).

Because of the errors in volumes one and two of Black Athena, by M. Bernal (1987,1991) Eurocentrist have attacked the Afrocentrist evidence of an African foundation for Grecian civilization (Lefkowitz, 1992; Pounder 1992; Levine, 1992; Trigger, 1992). Lefkowitz (1992, 1996) has referred to this historical fact as "the illusions of Afrocentrists".

Dr. Lefkowitz (1992) and Snowden (1992,1976) perpetuate the myth that the only blacks in ancient Europe were slaves or mercenaries. This is false the Greek historical works make it clear that many ancient settlers of the Aegean came from Africa, especially the Garamantes and Pelasgians. Parker (1918) wrote that:

> "I need not go into details concerning the ethnical relations of the Romans, since they, too are Mediterranean and are closely related to the same African confederation of races as Greece. Aeneas, their mythical founder was in direct descent from Dardanus, the African founder of Troy. The Aenead, like the Illiad, and Odyssey and all other of the world's great epics, is the poetic story dealing with African people" (p.29).

The Leftkowitz (1992) claims that there was "considerable cultural and linguistic continuity from the twelfth century to the eighth century B.C." in the Aegean (p.30). Yet there is no way it can be proven that Indo-European Greeks have always been in Greece. This view on the continuity between the Linear B Greeks and later Greeks held by Lefkowitz (1992,1996) is disputed by Hopper (1976) who noted that " after all, so much which characterizes Minoan Crete seems wholly alien to later Greece, despite the efforts of scholars to detect 'continuity'" (p.xli).

Given the wealth of Afrocentric literature it would seem logical that review these works, by Eurocentrists would use scholarship to point out the scholarly weaknesses within these text to prove that Afrocentrism is a "myth" (Lefkowitz, 1992). But, instead of doing this simple scholarly procedure to disconfirm Afrocentrism, Leftkowitz (1996) simply mentions a text written by Afrocentric scholars and then attack Black Athena, as if Afrocentricism is based solely on this text.

Winters (1994 has made it clear that Black Athena, is not the Afrocentric Bible on Black Egypt.We doubt that Anta Diop would even agree with most of the thesis of this book. Trigger (1992) observed that:

> Although he [Bernal] has acquired an enthusiastic following among exponents of negritude and occasionally describes some of the Egyptian Pharaohs as "black" or "Nubian", he aligns himself not with Sheikh Anta Diop but with more moderate "Negro intellectuals...who...do see Egypt as essentially African (p.121).

Bernal (1987,1991) believes that the Greeks resulted from a mixture of European and (Semitic speaking) Mediterranean people.

In volume 2 of Black Athena, Bernal outlines his thesis that the "Egyptians" founded Greek civilization. But these "Egyptians" are not blacks, they are Semitic speakers. Bernal (1991) makes it clear that he believes that Semitic speaking Phoenicians and the Semitic speaking Hyksos Dynasty of Egypt founded the civilization of the Aegean.

Bernal (1991,p.525) sees the Hyksos invaders as Hurrian, Semitic, Indo-Iranian speakers. As a result he believes that the Danaos and Kadmeans or Egyptian founders of Thebes in Greece, were the Hyksos (Bernal 1991, p.495). In general, Bernal (1991) believes that when the Hyksos were driven from Egypt, they settled in the Aegean and developed civilization.

Levine (1992,p.440) describes Black Athena, as "an extraordinarily interesting and dangerous book...dangerous, because in reopening the nineteenth-century discourse on race and origins, the work, sadly, inevitably, has become part of the problem of racism rather than the solution that its author envisioned". Pounder (1992) objects to Bernal (1991) because "Bernal makes a major contribution to confusion and divisiveness by giving credence to Afrocentrist theories that cannot be supported by historical, anthropological, or archaeological criteria" (p.463).

Bernal's view of the Hyksos as the founders of Grecian civilization has nothing to do with the work of Afrocentric scholars. The problem with Bernal (1991) is that he believes that the "Pre-Hellenes" or Pelasgian people were Indo-European speakers. Afrocentric scholars who recognize that the founders of Athens and Attica were blacks do not hold this view. (Parker 1917,1918; Winters, 1983b) Diop (1974,1991) and Clyde Ahmad Winters (1983b) make it clear that Blacks came to Greece in prehistoric times. Therefore the apparent errors in Bernal's Black Athena, should not be seen as proving that the Afrocentric scholars are wrong. These errors only prove that Bernal (1991) has failed to prove that the Hyksos founded civilization in the Aegean.

Afrocentric scholars are accused of using old and outdated sources. This is true of some Afrocentric scholars who have written books based on secondary sources. Yet, those Afrocentric scholars such as Dubois (1965, 1970), Diop (1974,1991), J.A. Rogers, Parker (1917,1918), Winters (1983b,1985b,1989a,1989b) use up-to-date sources to prove their historical facts of the African past.

Even before Diop (1974,1991) Afrocentric scholars used multiple methods and sources to illuminate the African past. These scholars because of their unique character as a black people unaware of their specific original African home have not been blinded by ethnocentrism to look for the history of blacks in one area of the world. These scholars have sought to illuminate the African past throughout the world. For example Parker (1917,1981) used anthropological, archaeological, historical and classical sources to prove that blacks once lived in the Aegean.

Parker (1917,1981) used the Greek classics to prove that the Pelasgians were of African origin. He also discussed the origin stories about the Pelasgic founders of selected Grecian cities and proved that these men were blacks and not Indo-Europeans (Parker, 1917,337-338). Parker (1917) also observed that "The great Grecian epics are epics of an African people and Helen, the cause of the Trojan war, must henceforth be conceived as a beautiful brown skin girl" (pp.341-42).

In the works of Homer we find that many of the terms have been falsely translated to make it appear that the Greek heroes were a fair skinned race.

Parker (1917) noted that:

> "...let us consider the supposed testimony to the presence of the fair type in Greece and to its superiority over the darker populations ....The truth of the matter is that these translators, like historians, have permitted their prejudices to warp their accuracy....Apollo in Homer is chrysaeros; that is to say, bearing a golden sword; while xanthos, which has been mistranslated to mean fair means brown. Artemis is eustephanos, which has no relation whatever to fair. Neptune is kyanochaites; that is to say, bluish,blackish , like the dark deep waves of the ocean. Neither Hera or Kalypsos are fair from their descriptive adjectives. Achilles is xanthos, which as was said before means brown. Agamemnon is also xanthos, and remember, if you please, that he is in direct descent from Epaphos, the black ancestor of the Pelasgic house" (p.28).

Using archaeological evidence and the classical literature C.A. Winters (1983b,) explained how the African/Black founders of Grecian civilization originally came from the ancient Sahara.

Winters (1983b) makes it clear that these Blacks came to the Aegean in two waves: 1) the Garamantes a Malinke/Mande speaking people that now live along the Niger river, but formerly lived in the Fezzan region of Libya; and 2) the Egyptians and East Africans who were recorded in Greece's history as the Pelasgians. Parker (1917,1981) has discussed the Pelasgian civilization in detail.

The Pelasgians founded many cities. Plutarch (1934\1935) notes the Pelasgian founding of Athens. According to Herodotus (para. vii, 91, the Pelasgians also founded Thebes.

Winters (1983b) makes it clear that the Garamantes founded the Greek cities of Thrace, Minoan Crete and Attica. The Indo-European Greeks also called the Garamantes Carians.

The Garamantes or Carians originally lived in the Fezzan. The classical writers as black or dark described these Garamante as: perusti , furvi , and nigri.

As a result of the research of Parker (1917,1981) and Winters (1983b), when Lefkowitz (1992, 1996) argues that Socrates could not have bee black because he was an Athenian citizen, she fails to prove Socrates' racial heritage because the Greeks made it clear that the founders of Athens were Pelasgians. Lefkowitz (1992) notes that if Socrates and his parents had dark skin and other African features, then it is likely that at least some of Socrates' contemporaries would have mentioned it unless all the Athenians had African origins as well. But then why, Lefkowitz (1996) asks, does the art not depict the Athenians as Africans? This question is easily answered. There are numerous Africans depicted in Greek art, but rather than admit that some of these blacks were descendants of the Pelasgian and Garamante groups they are all referred too as Ethiopian slaves or mercenaries (Snowden 1976).

The work of Diop (1974,1991), Parker (1917,1981) and Winters (1983b) make it clear that the Afrocentric discussion of

the African influence in the Aegean is not based solely on the work of Bernal (1987,1991) as the "extreme Eurocentrists" would have us believe. Use of Bernal (1991) as a method to dispute the findings of the Afrocentrists is groundless because his work fails to acknowledge the African origin of the Pelasgians.

Although Lefkowitz (1996) teaches classical studies her research methods leave a lot to be desired. She declares in Not Out of Africa that, "there is no archaeological data to support the notion that Egyptians migrated to Greece during the second millennium B.C. (or before that)" (Lefkowitz, 1996, 157).

This view held by Lefkowitz is not correct. In addition, to the research of Afrocentrists using classical resources, numerous archaeologist have found abundant evidence of Egyptians settled in Greece long before the coming of the Indo-European-Aryans to Anatolia. Cecil Torr (1896) discussed the inscriptions of Amenhotep found in a Mycenaean tomb at Ialysos in Rhodes and an 18th Dynasty scarab dating to the same period. Torr (1896, 64-65) speculated that there were relations between Egypt and Greece between 1271 and 850 B.C.

The discovery of Torr was only the tip of the iceberg. J.D.S. Pendlebury (1930) has also discussed archaeological evidence of Egyptians in Greece during the 2nd millennium, William A. Ward (1971), and S.W. Manning (1995). Pendlebury (1930, xviii-xix) provides a detailed discussion of the Egyptian material found at Laconia, Argolid, Thebes in Boeotia, and Athens. Pendlebury like Torr, believes that there were close relations between Greece and Egypt between the 12th and 7th centuries B.C.(Pendlebury, 1930).

Pendlebury's Aegyptiaca, has been excellently followed up by N. J. Skon Jedele (1995), in her recent dissertation on Egyptian artifacts found in Greece. This dissertation provides even more examples of Egyptian artifacts found in Greece than those recorded by Pendlebury over sixty years ago.

Manning (1995) gives a well-balanced discussion of the Egyptian material found in the Aegean area dating between the Old Kingdom and Dynasties 10 and 11. The work of Hankey and Warren (1989) indicate that there is archaeological evidence for Egyptians in ancient Greece (Warren, 1980), contrary to the false claims of Lefkowitz in Not Out of Africa.

The question must be asked, if there is this abundance of literature relating to an Egyptian role in ancient Greece, why does Lefkowitz fail to discuss this literature? Lefkowitz must answer this question. Her failure to discuss this relevant knowledge base is inexcusable given her position at a prestigious Eastern University. The existence of a rich literature on the presence of Egyptians in ancient Greece makes Lefkowitz's claims about the ancient Greeks patently false.

CONCLUSION

Granted, some of the critics of Afrocentric ancient history have made some valid points about the use of dated sources for many of the research projects of Afrocentric researchers, but overall much of their criticism is invalid. For example, there is an abundance of evidence that indicates that the Egyptians and other Blacks, known to the Greeks as Pelasgians were settled in the Aegean area long before Indo-European speaking nomads arrived on the scene (Assante, 1996; Parker, 1917,1981; Winters, 1983b).

The problem with Not Out of Africa, is they Lefkowitz assumes that because the classical Greeks were Europeans the only Africans in ancient Greece were slaves. This is a appears to be a doxic assumption. Beginning with G.W. Parker (1917, 1981), and followed up by C.A. Winters (1983b, 1985, 1994) Afrocentrists have made it clear before the Aryans arrived in Anatolia and specifically Greece, the land was already occupied by Africans from Egypt and Libya that the Aryan Greek's identified as Carians and Pelasgians.

In summary, the archaeological research discussed above indicates an intimate relationship between Egypt and the Aegean between the Old Kingdom and 525 B.C. This fact makes Lefkowitz's (1996) claim that Egypt played no role in the ancient history of Greece highly suspect.

The archaeological evidence reviewed above, supports the Greek traditions that Egyptians like Cecrops, Aegyptus and Danaus established many colonies in Greece. This makes it clear that archaeology does provide support for Egyptians settling Greece in the second millennium B.C.

Leftkowitz (1996) makes ridicules the use of dated sources by Afrocentric researchers. Although she criticizes Afrocentrists for using old references, in her research she did not use any references to support her declaration that there was an absence of Africans in Greece, unless they were slave.

This failure by Lefkowitz (1996) to review all of the literature on Egyptian-Greek relations implies two things. One, Lifkowitz is a careless researcher. And two, that the aim of Lefkowitz's book was solely written to attack Afrocentrism, and not give her readers factual information about the ancient history of Greece.

We must assume that Leftkowitz is a competent researcher, so we must accept the view that she deliberately distorted the facts to defame the Afrocentric idea. Leftkowitz's (1996) makes it clear that she believes that there were no Africans in ancient Greece, eventhough the archaeological evidence make this view untenable. The deliberate falsification of historical facts is not unheard of, but given Leftkowitz's alleged mission to honestly disprove the Afrocentric idea makes her view hypocritical to say the least.

We must therefore assume that there is a logical reason for Dr. Leftkowitz's perpetuation of untruths in her discussion of Afrocentrism. The reason for this misrepresentation of the facts regarding Africans in ancient Greece must be the result of the power of doxa. The genesis of Leftkowitz's unthought assumptions in Not out of Africa that Afrocentrism is invalid, may result from the social worldview of many European-Americans that Africans are inferior and historically the chattel porperty of European slave owners. The unthought assumptions that Africans were only slaves Greece (and the prior slavery of Africans in the United States), and the perceived inferiority of Africans by many whites, may have allowed Dr. Leftkowitz to boastfully write a book declaring the mythologies of Afrocentric research, based on these doxic assumptions, rather than the archaeological research.

The archaeological evidence (Manning, 1995; Pendlebury , 1971; Skon Jedele, 1995; Warren and Hankey, 1989; Warren, 1980) confirms the presence of Africans in ancient Greece. We must reject Leftkowitz's (1996) doxic assumptions and accept the validity of the archaeological data that Blacks played an important role in the creation of ancient Greece, one of the foundations of Western civilization.

We have illustrated the role contemporary research can play in the illumination and support of the Afrocentric view of ancient history. It confirms the view that Afrocentric research is a valid frame of reference.

A field of study based on science, and not myths.

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Dewey: The Aesthetics of Pedagogy

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In a paragraph from *Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching,* Jim Garrison writes that classrooms have often become like art museums—sterile, separated from the live conditions of their inhabitants, cut off from the processes of their generation, and commercialized.[1] One implication of this observation is that the critiques leveled by Dewey at art museums and at the reification of art-as-object can be seen as intertwined with Dewey's notions of communicative meaning and effective pedagogy. For these matters, I will look into Dewey's *Art as Experience, Experience and Nature,* "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" and "My Pedagogic Creed." And I will explore Paulo Freire's notion of pedagogy as dialogue and engagement in order to enhance Dewey's communicative and expressive theories of meaning, growth, and learning. We shall see how the similarities between looking at art as an object and seeing knowledge in the same way produce an ineffective and truncated version of pedagogy and aesthetic experience. Through an examination of the Deweyan alternative, we will see how aesthetic-pedagogic experience may be engaging, creative, transformative, participatory, and involving of the live creature in dialogue with others and the world.

I. THE CRITIQUE OF ART MUSEUMS

John Dewey begins *Art as Experience,* with the curious line, "By one of the ironic perversities that often attend the course of affairs, the existence of works of art upon which the formation of an esthetic theory depends has become an obstruction to theory about them."[2] After these words, Dewey quickly moves into his criticisms of art museums, that is, the institutionalization of art. Dewey, however, is not writing against museums *per se,* but rather wants to examine them in their historical and cultural context. The aim, then, is a critique of the tendency to generate theories of art by examining art in museums *as if* museums were not themselves historically and culturally generated. A better understanding of art, Dewey argues, would place (or see) art objects in their generative conditions, and *not* in their museums conditions.[3] Or, if we are going to investigate art in museums, we should at least do so with an understanding of how that art came to be there in the first place.

Dewey is suspicious of art museums for a variety of reasons. The first set of reasons (which shall be discussed last, in the next section) deals with the separation of art from its generative conditions, which leads to the reification of art as finished, complete, and isolated object. But this thinking of art-as-object does not occur in a vacuum. It is greatly abetted by the social role played by museums and collectors.

For Dewey, a democratic culture must have democratic museums. They should exist as part of the educational and aesthetic process of the community, and *not* as part of nationalistic pride, or as a sterilizing and separating force acting upon art. Museums may, and should, act to fund aesthetic possibilities. But museums often have not lived up to this task. Art has become, in many cases, something to be produced solely for museum display. The existence of museums has also tended to create a "high art" crowd, telling us who's in and who's out. Furthermore, Dewey explains, the artist, as art-object producer, must highlight and stress idiosyncrasies to the point of being irrelevant to a broader cultural audience in order to appear interesting and new.[4] For these reasons, art has become a consumer object. As object, art can be packaged and sold to meet the needs of a capitalist society's demands. Thus, the creation and institution of the museum has radically transformed the art object. The aesthetic qualities of an African bowl, for example, are simply not experienced in the same way[5] as such a bowl would be in the environment of its generation. When the bowl is removed from such conditions and placed in the art museum along side a work of Greek statue and post-impressionist painting, it has a radically new meaning. The art *of the object* becomes isolated and reified *as the object* instead of a confluence of the experiences of its creation, its appreciation, and the communicative relationships brought forth.

II. THE ART OBJECT

Focusing solely on the art object severs it from its history, abstracts it from its transactions, and removes the object from its environment. In short, when you make art a "thing," it becomes mysterious. Dewey's empirical denotative method, as explained in *Experience and Nature*, will not abide such a truncation.

Strictly speaking, to denote something is to point to it. In this way, Dewey's method can be labeled "descriptive." He is attempting to point to how it is that we exist in the world. He begins, appropriately, with our everyday experiences, rather than a speculative system. This methodology is an attempt to avoid the "intellectualist fallacy," which is the taking of the products of reflection as having prior existence to that reflection—such as a consideration of the art object as existing as such prior to a reflection upon and abstraction from its contextual web of meaning, creation, and appreciation. The most famous (or infamous) example of such a habit, however, is the regard given to knowledge by philosophers. Knowledge, for Dewey, is not something "given" to us by the world. Rather, it is the worked out product of our reflections and inquiries. We *participate* in its creation. As a result, our interactions with the world are not primarily affairs of knowledge or knowing. Knowledge, as Dewey describes it, is simply one way we interpret the world (albeit a highly useful one in a variety of circumstances). Other modes, however, such as aesthetic sensibilities and our other "feelings" should not be denigrated to the position of second-class philosophical subject matter. Rather, they do, in fact, describe our comportment toward and within the world. In this way, for Dewey, the real is not equal to the known.

Furthermore, this way of understanding the world situates us as always already embodied (or environed), and in relation to social, cultural, evolutionary, and historical forces. These elements are inseparable from our experience. They are context—not in any abstractable sense, but inextricably so. Again, to attempt to reduce our experience to various knowledge claims or sense data is to ignore, and hence miss, the way in which we are environed. To do so gets one off on the wrong foot, and the resulting theory (aesthetic, pedagogical, or otherwise) is necessarily incomplete, and hence flawed. So rather than beginning with knowledge claims and systems, Dewey begins with descriptions of situations and processes. And these situations are necessarily contextual, often (if not always) vague and incomplete, and pregnant with unrealized possibilities. By beginning with descriptions of actual and embodied situations, Dewey hopes to avoid all of the previously mentioned possible pitfalls and dangers of delving into describing the most very general aspects of our experience, including, of course, the nature of aesthetic experience.

Dewey would prefer that we think of art in terms of energies, and not in terms of objects.[6] Because, for Dewey, objects always already are energies—they are flowing and changing, ever in process.[7] So for Dewey art objects are not best understood in their museum environment. We would do better to remember them in the places of their generation, transformation, and communication—as they exist in transaction with each other and with us. For these reasons, art has much greater power and significance than art-as-object theories would allow.[8] Art is our way of creating meaning out of our interactions with the world. In so doing, we satisfy our most deeply felt desires and drives, better nurture the social fabric of which we are a part, and more deeply fund the stock of our experiences. In sum, Dewey explains, art *expresses* meaning.[9]

III. THE ACT OF EXPRESSION

In *Art as Experience,* Dewey writes that the act of expression is not an externalization of an internal meaning. Rather, expression involves interaction with a medium. It goes on between the organism and the world. It is a kind of dialogue out of which meaning is generated. As such, this explanation can be seen as a fruition of Dewey's earlier work in "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." Acts, for Dewey, begin with impulsion, and not stimulus. In short, the basic mode of life is activity, and *not* stasis.

In "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Dewey explains that organisms are centers of activity. They are not, as often thought, passive moments in a mechanistic chain. As an example, the organism begins with the act of looking. The seeing comes later. Primally, the organism is a doing. It investigates its environment as organisms do.[10] Dewey goes on to explain that organisms move outward into the environment in order to grow. Thus, at our very core, we are learning creatures. We inquire to search for stimuli. As such, our uncoordinated activity becomes coordinated: "The stimulus is something to be discovered; to be made out . . . As soon as it is adequately determined, then and then only is the response also complete."[11] In this way, consciousness, for Dewey, is always intentional—it is *of* objects. As he writes in *Experience and Nature,* "consciousness is used to denote meanings actually perceived, *awareness* of objects."[12] And it is active, always searching and growing: "man [sic] is more preoccupied with enhancing life than with bare living."[13]

In the fourth chapter of *Art as Experience*, "The Act of Expression," Dewey continues the line of thought originated in "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." Again, here Dewey describes us as creatures of movement, change, and growth. We are beings, however, who exist in and *because of* an environment: "It is the fate of a living creature, however, that it cannot secure what belongs to it without an adventure in a world that as a whole it does not own and to which it has no native title.[14]" This environment, and our interactions with it, form the medium out of which our experiences grow and meaning is created. Furthermore, when fully engaged with these interactions, we open up the possibility that we may further enhance our future, present, and past doings and undergoings.

In our interactions with the environment, the resistance we encounter is not a tragic fact. Without it, we would have no struggle and no opportunity to achieve: "resistance that calls thought generates curiosity and solicitous care, and, when it is overcome and utilized, eventuates in elation."[15] Aesthetic experience and creation occur when we are capable of understanding and reordering our environment in such a way that growth becomes a possibility. This expression or transformation is not, however, merely a moving outward. It is, instead, a conversation or dialogue that engages or implicates both the live creature and its environment.[16]

My suggestion here is that experience becomes more fully aesthetic as it is challenged and channeled. If the proper resistances to outwardly flowing energies are met, the possibility of growth is created. Such a task befits a good teacher. He or she is capable of structuring an environment in which learning can best take place. An optimal learning environment, however, would probably not take the form of the traditional teacher-student interaction or the traditional classroom environment with pre-digested course work and the students acting as passive receivers of knowledge. In much the same way that Dewey criticizes art museums for their sterilizing and objectifying of art, so too does much teaching sterilize and objectify the learning process. For Dewey, these processes are inextricably linked. To understand art is to understand pedagogy.

IV. CONTEXTUAL PEDAGOGY

Just as Dewey is concerned with the sterilizing of art when it is placed in a museum setting, so too is he critical of our educational systems' tendencies to sever the knowledge, wisdom, and insight gained in pedagogy from the processes and histories of their creations.[17] The meaning and significance of anything learned can only be fully appreciated and understood when its context and generative conditions are left intact—i.e. when knowledge is presented as part of an ever-ongoing process of inquiry. When presented as final and complete, knowledge becomes, like the art object, a commodity to be processed, packaged, and sold. Another important philosopher of education, Paulo Freire, in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, presents the problem in the following way: "Education is suffering from narration sickness. The teacher talks about reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable."[18]

Freire refers to the traditional method of education, practiced by most teachers in most schools, as the "banking model" of education. Here, knowledge is presented as complete and final. The students are mere receptacles waiting to be filled. They simply open their heads and let the information be poured in. The most effective kind of teacher is one who is able to transmit this information the most efficiently. The banking method, in sum, projects "an absolute ignorance onto others," which "negates education and knowledge and processes of inquiry."[19] Obviously, Dewey's empirical denotative method, as explained in *Experience and Nature*, stands in stark contrast to such a methodology. Rather, Dewey explains, we are to come to know things by understanding them through their historical and social contexts. To do any less is to remain in ignorance of the fuller meaning which may be achieved.

One of the results of this banking methodology is that education begins to be thought of as a series of skills to be achieved. We forget that "education . . . is a process of living and not a preparation for future living," in Dewey's words.[20] Much like an art-as-object theory of aesthetics, we come to think of our educational process as a series of discrete bits of knowledge to be accumulated. Just as the conspicuous consumer of art, we are able to think of educational degrees as signs of social standing. Education becomes something you do *now* in order to accomplish these milestones. Once achieved, the education itself can be kicked away—we have achieved the necessary display of our worth and may receive the subsequent pecuniary reward (i.e. a job). But, as Dewey explains, this kind of thought has caused our educational structures to systematically fail its students. We have stripped all the present meaning out of the pedagogical process—and all for some future and removed end.[21]

One of the solutions proffered by Dewey to inject present experience with meaning so that pedagogical transformation may take place is simply to shake up the tidiness of traditional knowledge presentation and acquisition. Instead of compartmentalizing our subject matters into discrete bits to be memorized and regurgitated, we challenge the student to *do something* and not merely *receive something.* In short, we (teacher, student, and knowledge) *participate* together pedagogically. Education can thus become a more active and engaged process. Dewey argues, in *Democracy and Education,* for instance, that traditional subject matters, such as chemistry, can be better taught not through dry digestion of received facts and laws, but by experimenting with and participating in actual empirical conditions. Alan Ryan, in *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism,* gives examples from Dewey's laboratory school in Chicago of students learning about the interrelated processes of agriculture and the aesthetics of cooking: students would grow their own wheat and bake their own bread. Later, as another example, they learn about the properties of metals by building their own smelter.[22] All of this is done, of course, *not merely* as developmental preparation for vocational or practical skills, which would be useful and applicable in the future. Rather, these tactics are employed to show the interconnectedness of the areas of human endeavor and to thus more deeply fund the student's own experiences. In other words, they began to experience connections where none before existed. Furthermore, it creates in the students a sense of their own powers and possibilities. It gives them the creative skills necessary to solve problems and to think critically about their own situations.[23] Students are thus able to come to grips with increasingly sophisticated ideas by means of confronting increasingly sophisticated problems. Instead of building idea on top of idea in an always more abstract way, Dewey shows how ideas are generated out of complex problems. The student, thus, becomes no longer a passive consumer, but instead an active problem-solver.

Again, here we have another striking similarity to Freire's pedagogy. In response to the banking method of education, Freire presents a problem-posing methodology. As such, like Dewey, Freire acknowledges the environing conditions of our situation, and presents a pedagogy that works with, rather than trying to ignore, these factors. This awareness not only creates a more accurate picture of our historical and social being,[24] but also presents real opportunities for the students to learn and grow. As Freire explains, "Banking theory and practice, as immobilizing and fixating forces, fail to acknowledge men and women as historical beings; problem-posing theory and practice take the people's historicity as their starting point . . . people know themselves to be unfinished; they are aware of their incompletion."[25] The method of giving students a real problem to be solved, and not merely information to be learned, not only respects more fully the whole being of the student, but it also more actively engages the powers of the student. It challenges the student to be more active and more interested in the learning process.[26]

V. DIALOGUE

In contrast to the narration, or monologue, of the banking method, Freire proposes his problem-posing mode of pedagogy. This substitutes one-side narration for two-way dialogue. The teacher, as well as the student, must be open.[27] Narration, rather than dialogue, turns students into "receptacles" to be "filled," that the teacher becomes merely a filler of these containers.[28]

Such a method turns the students into mere objects to be *acted upon*. It lays utter waste to their own subjectivity, to their ability and opportunity to contribute to their processes of growth. Dialogue, a conversation between two subjects, does not fall into this trap. With an obvious allusion to Martin Buber, Freire writes, "Dialogue is an I-Thou relationship, and thus necessarily a relationship between two Subjects. Each time the 'thou' is changed into an object, an 'it', dialogue is subverted and education is changed to deformation."[29] Not only does this process emphasize and awaken the active powers of the student, but it also humanizes the relationship between teacher and student. Freire, in fact, even goes so far to use the term "love."[30]

Dewey agrees that the creation and transformation of meaning cannot take place without real dialogue. In *Art as Experience,* the emphasis is upon the dialogue between the live creature and its environment, and in *Experience and Nature,* Dewey explains that speaking alone does not create communication. There is a co-creation also involving hearing in the formation of meaning. There must be a certain kind of mutual transaction, or mutual listening, for real dialogue to take place—and this process involves both risk and a willingness to be open.[31] Or, as Dewey, explains, "Of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful."[32] Communication proves that we are not alone in the world. We can understand things in terms of possibilities. And reconstruction of meaning becomes possible. All of these aspects are perfectly consistent with Freire's notion of dialogue.

Jim Garrison explains, in *Dewey and Eros,*[33] that times of communication and creation of meaning can be termed "teachable moments," "times when spaces open for the student and teacher to interact in a synchronistic and dynamic rhythm."[34] One implication of the necessity for these teachable moments is the destruction of the idea that teacher and student are individualistically separated from each other. If communication, dialogue, is going to take place, there must be a mutual space for meaning to develop. For the process of this creation, Dewey turns to our social natures. He explains, in

"My Pedagogic Creed," that the belief that we are lone individuals separates each of us so that meanings may not be socially created. True pedagogy, according to Dewey, takes place when the processes cease to be about individuals trying to communicate, and when social possibilities come to the fore.[35]

The upshot of this dissolution of strict boundaries between monadic individuals is that the process of education can become more aesthetically rich. Garrison, for instance, refers to teaching as an artistic process. It begins with the teacher as artist and the student as medium, but as roles become more complex and ideas more involved, these roles may repeatedly shift. A good artist listens, responds, and understands his or her medium.[36] In short, the artist is engaged in dialogue. For Dewey, this means that the control of the pedagogic situation ceases to be located solely in the hands of the teacher. And, once again, the social life of all involved in implicated: "under existing conditions far too much of the stimulus and control proceeds from the teacher, because of neglect of the idea of the school as a form of social life."[37] In this way, both the teacher and student can become more aesthetically engaged in the process of growth and the creation of meaningful dialogue.[38]

VI. Themes and Imagination

As mentioned earlier, in "The Act of Expression" and "The Live Creature," Dewey explains that aesthetic experience is possible only in the kind of world that is neither wholly predictable nor wholly random.[39] Aesthetic, meaningful dialogue is possible because the inchoate can be brought into a kind of ordered richness. The student begins with impulsions and one of the teacher's jobs is to order the environment of that student's interactions so that difficulties may be overcome, challenges may be met, and aesthetic possibilities opened.[40] The pedagogue, through dialogue, is able to engage the existential possibilities of the student precisely through this interaction, or dialogue. Transmission of information through banking will not do the job. It does not engage the experience of the student so that meaning may grow. Rather, on a Deweyan model, "education must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience."[41]

And, again, such a methodology is entirely consistent with Freirean pedagogy. Freire advocates submersion of the teacher and student into dialogue and problem-posing tasks so that the student is awakened to the possibility of transforming his or her world. Such a possibility, however, cannot occur if education is thought of as mere transmission of knowledge. The world of the mind and the world of external reality are too far removed from one another in such a model: "Implicit in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between human being and the world: a person is merely *in* the world, not *with* the world or with others; the individual is spectator, not re-creator."[42] (One is reminded here of Dewey's criticisms of the spectator theory of knowledge in *The Quest for Certainty,* in which he rejects the rigid separation between thought and action.[43])

To counteract this model of passive receivership, Freire offers the possibility of thematizing one's world. This is a kind of creative expression of one's own experiences. The internal felt characteristics of the subject are objectively instantiated in the world (a la Marx's *homo faber).* In short, *aesthetic expression is the antidote to the banking methodology:* "As men relate to the world by responding to the challenges of the environment, they begin to dynamize, to master, and to humanize reality. They add something of their own making, by giving temporal meaning to geographic space, by creating culture."[44] This dialogue, between self and world, in the process of thematizing one's experiences is recast by Garrison as a "dialectic of freedom." We free the aesthetic (i.e. pedagogic) possibilities of the student as we structure situations which allow the student to see the interchange between what actually exists and what could possibly exist.[45] That is, we show the student that he or she may imaginatively recreate the world of his or her experience by fully engaging experimentally and aesthetically with it—to see the world in its adventurous potential.

Such a process would require all that has been mentioned previously. The student must be engaged actively in dialogue with his or her experiences and his or her teacher. And the student must be able to escape a banking model of pedagogy. In short, the student must come to grips with the possibilities of his or her subjectivity and active engagement with the world.[46] Only by engaging the world on this level are we able to transform the world, and thus fully fund our experiences. Only by allowing the organism to act upon its impulsions into the environment, that is, through participation, can the possibility for success, failure, and growth be achieved.[47]

So, how, for Dewey, is this interpenetration with the world possible? How does aesthetic engagement unleash these possibilities? It is through the imaginative interplay of the live creature with its environment. The student must actively consider, reject, and adopt those aspects of the world which will fund his or her development. And the teacher is to assist in this process.[48] The teacher is there as helper, as a person who has had more time and opportunity to accumulate experiences with challenging and imaginative ideas, processes, and problems. If structured properly, a pedagogical interaction will allow the student to engage fully with his or her environment by thematically reconstructing it in light of his or her experiences, by engaging it as active participant in dialogue, and by understanding the world and one's self as generative and contextual beings.

NOTES

1. Jim Garrison, *Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1997), 62.

2. LW 10:9. I will refer to both the thirty-seven volume of the critical edition of *The Works of John Dewey,* using standard notion, and also *The Essential Dewey.* When references are made to The Essential Dewey, I will note them as such.

3. LW 10:9.

4. LW 10.15.

5. And thus for Dewey, the bowl is *not the same object,* even if, in many ways, they are continuous with each other. See, for instance, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism."

6. LW 10:189.

7. LW 10:179.

8. LW 10:31.

9. LW 10:90.

10. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," in *The Essential Dewey,* Vol. II, edited by Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 4.

11. Ibid. 9.

12. LW 1:226.

13. LW 1:71.

14. LW 10:65.

15. LW 10:66.

16. LW 10:72.

17. John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," in *The Essential Dewey,* Vol. I, edited by Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 232.

18. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed,* translated by Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1993), 52.

19. Ibid., 53.

20. Dewey, "Creed," 230.

21. Ibid., 231.

22. Ryan, Dewey, 138.

23. Ibid., 141.

24. Again, this is very much in line with Dewey's empirical denotative method.

25. Freire, Oppressed, 65.

26. Ibid., 62.

27. Ibid., 60-61.

28. Ibid., 53.

29. Paulo Freire, Education as the Practice of Freedom, translated by Myra Bergman Ramos, in Education for Critical Consciousness (New York: Continuum, 1973), 52.

30. Freire, Oppressed, 70.

31. LW 1:145.

32. LW 1:132.

33. Note, again, the use of "love" in the form of Eros. Effective teaching does not involve merely skillful transmission, but also open reception and active engagement.

34. Garrison, *Eros*, 122.

35. Dewey, "Creed," 235.

36. Garrison, *Eros*, 72.

37. Dewey, "Creed," 231.

38. Garrison, *Eros*, 45.

39. LW 10:22.

40. Dewey, "Creed," 231.

41. Ibid., 233.

42. Freire, *Oppressed*, 56.

43. LW 4.

44. Freire, *Freedom*, 5.

45. Garrison, *Eros*, 22.

46. Freire, *Oppressed*, 32.

47. LW 10:25.

48. Dewey, "Creed," 231.

Community Virtue, Social Justice, and Education: A Brief Interrogation of the Locus of the Individual in the Moral Theories of Dewey and Kant

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INTRODUCTION

It has become fashionable, particularly in Dewey scholarship, to emphasize the presence and importance of a "gulf" between Dewey and older, more metaphysical philosophers. This is so with respect to Dewey and Kant. Indeed, Dewey actually encourages this gulf, as he frequently inveighs against Kant in making certain claims regarding, but not limited to, the presence of absolutism in ethics and moral philosophy. With the current resurgence of interest in Dewey scholarship, and the emphasis Dewey makes in distancing himself from Kant and Kantian notions of ethics and moral theory, the probability of a resurgence in the traditional dichotomy between Dewey and Kant is likely. Rorty, for one, has recently perpetuated this.[1] Garrision is yet another interpreter of Dewey with Kant clearly in his sights.[2] This tendency needs to be reevaluated, as there are areas of intersection between Dewey and Kant that, with some coaxing, can emerge.

One way to cast the debate between Dewey and Kant in terms of their moral theories is to focus on the place that each accords to the individual. If we do this without much forethought, I believe we should see roughly the following determinations. For Dewey, while according the individual a place in moral matters, does so always with that individual's tie to society clearly in view. A complete, autonomous realm for the individual is nowhere prescribed. Rather, if an individual is to exist in some moral sphere, that sphere is that of the grand social or, as Dewey sometimes calls it, the "great community" (LW 3, pp 143-167); the overarching social realm in which the individual operates clearly has the lion's share of the say on particular moral issues, inasmuch as valuations are taught, learned and habituated, and values are coterminous with habits. What might be better to describe Dewey's rather weak moral individualism, then, if indeed he can be ascribed such an individualism, is an *individuality;* one that clearly exists against the backdrop to, and is subordinate for, the purposes of society (LW 5, p 86).

For Kant, there is clearly a delineated realm in which the individual not only participates in, but also decides upon, moral decisions. Indeed, one might argue that the realm of moral decision-making is wholly predicated by and upon the individual agent. Autonomy to make moral decisions is clearly championed. The social realm appears to be a secondary consideration and the state a "peacekeeper" of individual rights and freedoms (MM 6: 306). Since all moral decisions derive from practical philosophy, and practical philosophy in turn, derives from reason, which is an autonomous individual capacity, the social realm in which morals "fit" clearly takes a distant second, if it even places, in the grand consideration of realms in which and from which to decide moral matters. The education of specific virtues appears to be a mere afterthought.

Keeping these supposed distinctions in mind, it is not terribly difficult to discern that some major identifiable differences exist between Dewey and Kant in terms of their respective moral theories qua the place of the individual. If, as we might argue, Dewey champions a set of moral pronouncements clearly tied to the social realm, while Kant champions those that emanate from an autonomous, subject-centered reason, we have a clear dilemma in any attempt to bring these thinkers somewhat closer together on the task of moral decision-making. But I do not think that the argument is so solid that the issue must be closed. I believe that there are areas of moral decision-making in both Dewey and Kant that are predicated upon the weaker realms of, in Dewey's case, the individual, and in Kant's the social, with the role of education in the cultivation of this decision-making clearly tied to these respective realms.

What I attempt to do here is to challenge the customary notion that Dewey's moral reasoning was predicated exclusively in and upon the social realm, as well as the obverse, that Kant's was exclusively tied to the individual. I want to argue that Dewey maintains a conception of the individual that, while heavily bound by the social realm, is free enough to participate autonomously in moral decision-making to inform, in turn, social and individual action. In Kant's case, I argue that, although no clear social realm participates in decision-making, nonetheless decisions are made that both stem in part from, and inform and affect the social realm. Going beyond the customary view of seeing Kant as championing the social for the purpose of safeguarding the individual's rights only, I want to argue that Kant accords a conception of the social realm predicated on and necessitated by virtuous action, and clearly serving as an end and a means. I wish also to highlight the central role that education plays in both of these respective participations. The point of this exercise is to demonstrate that, some of Dewey's statements to the contrary (MW 5, pp 281-288). planes of intersection between Dewey's and Kant's moral theories exist and further, that education is the means of initial cultivation for both.

Dewey's Communal Virtues

It has been argued successfully that Dewey's desire-based ethics are a variant of both particularism and virtue theory (Ryan, 1998). Accordingly, he is able to be placed in the long line of philosophers who have adopted a particularist conception of what it means to be fully human. Thus, he shares the (rather large) stage with such eminent figures as Aristotle, and more recently, Charles Taylor and Alisdair McIntyre. But does this mean that Dewey is irrevocably prevented from sharing any ground with figures that have traditionally been categorized as supporting universal, justice-based moral theory? Dewey himself seems to think so. He is particularly skeptical of "jural" theories, which he equates with a tendency towards blind submission to authority (MW 5, p 207). More fittingly, he accords "virtue" theories a higher status than "jural" theories, although one must, with Dewey, remain cognizant of the fact that virtues, by their very definition as organized habits, customs and tendencies, derive their particular significance through intelligent, reasoned decision-making with respect to their application, and not from any a priori essential character (MW 14, p 18). To say something is virtuous is to say that it is of particular benefit to oneself and others, as judged by the end (happiness) to which it brings the agent. To say justice is a concern for Dewey is correct. But it is simply to say that it exists as one of many virtues, and that it is brought into being by the generalization of its importance to the individual as manifested first as a social concern. (MW 5, p 371-372). It does not however, exist as an overarching first principle or duty.

Individualism for Dewey denoted a specific approach of liberal economic and social theory that was historically grounded and contingent. Recognizing this contingency, Dewey argued that a preoccupation with the rights of individuals, while once necessary at a particular historical point all suited for the complexities that faced citizens in twentieth-century America (LW 10, p 21). Note that what is being rejected by Dewey here is an old-style autonomous laissez-faire individualism that is argued to inhibit the individual who must function in and under the constraints of today's world. It is not individualism per se that is being attacked: rather a particular conception of it. To be specific, it is an overly autonomous, sprawling and irreducible individualism that is to be guarded against, as opposed to a milder, more socially and communally conscious one that is less set on remaining in an isolated, autonomous realm. "I do not suppose that those who regard socialism and individualism as antithetical really mean that individuality is going to die out or that it is not something intrinsically precious. But in speaking as if the only individualism were the local episode of the last two centuries, they play into the hands of those who would keep it alive in order to serve their own ends, and they slur over the chief problem-that of remaking society to serve the growth of a new type of individual." (LW 5, p 80).

Part of the problem of the erstwhile strong individualism was its insistence on remaining isolated from social concerns. The myth of a liberalism predicated upon an individualism premised in turn upon an association of individuals as autonomous actors was unmasked (LW 10, p 41). Viewing a society as merely the grand associative outcome of autonomous individuals was a clear enlightenment conception that was to be abandoned in favor of a much tighter and more closely-knit community of individuals who, although certainly existing qua individuals in conjoint association, were morally bound through and to each other by virtue of their communicative potentialities, their mutual reliance on education as a mode of social transmission and their common struggle for democracy. "In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse. This is why the family and neighborhood, with all their deficiencies, have always been the chief agencies of nuture, the means by which dispositions are stably formed and ideas acquired which laid hold on the roots of character" (LW 3, p 121).

One of the distressing tendencies of those who read Dewey rather fleetingly is to conclude that he reified society and in effect, discounted or subordinated other realms, and particularly, the realm of the individual. This is an unfortunate conclusion, and as we have seen, proves premature. Dewey did argue that one's morals are in the main inherited from the social group within which one exists, that is, as custom, or habit. But to champion a view of society that was an a priori, metaphysical construction somehow existing separately or beyond the realm of the individuals who constructed it, was strongly challenged. "The only thing which imports obscurity and mystery into the influence of association upon what individual persons want and act for is the effort to discover alleged, special, original, society-making causal forces, whether instincts, fiats of will, personal, or an immanent, universal, practical reason, or an indwelling, metaphysical, social essence and nature (LW 3, p 211). Of course, the acquisition of habits could not simply be left to chance. Inasmuch as there were a bewildering array of potential habits to be assimilated, of customs to obtain, it followed that certain of them were to be accorded the status of having more value than others. In short, it was the goal and purpose of the community in which the individual was raised to help sort out, through the informal and formal process of socialization and education, respectively, which of the customs and habits necessitated integration into the individual's existing schema and which were to be jettisoned.

Education was a moral undertaking, inasmuch as habits, put into action, were values. But it was equally and also to be a community undertaking. Dewey steadfastly championed the importance of the local school in his educational writings (LW 13, p 25). The chief task of education was to assist the individual in her capacity to chose among the various values presented to her via the overarching social and cultural realms of which she is a member. It is well known that the method whereby education was to accomplish this task is the so-called one of intelligence. That is, education is to provide the student with the capacity, through instruction, modeling and real-world scenario, to make intelligent choices utilizing the lauded method of scientific inquiry in the determination as to which habits to cultivate and which to lay aside. What is perhaps less known is that the locus of such a task was to be found in the child's neighborhood school.

What Dewey was in fact aiming for was a specific axis of the social upon which to base value formation and virtuous action. Again, this was the close-knit community of fellow democratic citizens. To be sure, although this community was to have been present-at-hand, inasmuch as it was predicated upon interpersonal, face-to-face interaction between individuals, it was not autonomous: it was never to be viewed in opposition to either the broader social backdrop of which each in the community is a member, or to the individual who existed as a component. Rather, this community was to be viewed in terms of its capacity to provide for intersubjectively shared meaning and to foment closeness to like-minded others on matters of belief and virtue. Most of all, it was to thrive on an ability to communicate conjointly the particulars of those shared intersubjective virtues (LW 13, p 36-7, LW 3, p 211-13, LW 9, p 184). As Dewey might have put it, this community in turn professes a realm of individuality, rather than individualism. Individuality, as opposed to individualism, is a realm that does not implicitly deny or discount other realms. It is perhaps better conceived of as a role that one executes rather than a focal point. And it assumes that one can be part of that realm and still have allegiances to the broader social backdrop of which one is a part. In the main, it is a role that one engages and utilizes rather than an existential position. It allows one to move about more freely between realms than the bare restrictive state of individualism, with its autonomy and irreducibility. But at the same time, it is adamant about the need for and protection of, the individual human agent who moves between the various realms.

Individuals do make moral decisions. But they do so conjointly. That is to say, particular virtues that individuals test their moral actions against do not spring fully formed from the individual whose task it is to act. Rather, as has been mentioned previously, these evolve through social mechanisms, the chief being, of course, education (LW 3, p 152-153). One merely fools oneself when one considers one's moral outlook and decision-making as wholly autonomous (LW 10, p 67). Nevertheless, it is the prerogative of the individual to choose to act according to a particular virtue, regardless of whether he or she be habitually inclined to that virtue. To argue that virtues are completely habitual, unconscious, and automatic, is to argue that the rational human agent who chooses to act according to them has little power over their relative worth or their application in any specific context. Of course, Dewey does not argue that virtue is so ingrained as to result in this. To do so would irrevocably damage the very process of democracy he wishes to have manifest: that is the tendency for conjointly communicated democratic virtues that respond to the changing patterns of the communities that utilize them (MW 9, p 87). If virtues were completely given, habits all-powerful, and individuals were thereby bound to their unconscious, behavioristic whims, then no dialogue on the construction of new or appropriate virtues could reasonably be said to occur, and no changes, including any improvement of existing social conditions, could be undertaken (LW 13, p 219). By arguing that the individual who contemplates social values has the power, developed through the capacity of a formal method of inquiry provided by formal education, to choose which, if any, virtues she will engage, and for what particular reasons and under what circumstances in the setting of the intersubjective, face-to-face family and neighborhood communities which in turn, form larger and larger levels of social strata, Dewey leaves the door open for a realm of the individual in moral, social decision-making.

KANT'S SOCIAL JUSTICE

In order to allay Dewey's suspicions regarding the supposed "strong" individual autonomy of Kant's justice-based ethics, one must attempt a convincing argument that would go something like this. Although in the end it is the moral actor herself who, while participating in ethical decision-making as an autonomous agent, nevertheless she takes her cue from a position of an agent situated squarely within a sphere of decision-making that is predicated upon and by, the needs, wants, desires, and most importantly for Kant, requirements to, others. This I believe, has already been aptly demonstrated by Kant himself, particularly in the *Doctrine of Virtue,* which outlines plainly that a central goal of the ethical decision-maker is to provide for others' happiness, and thereby need only be confirmed. "When it comes to my promoting happiness as an end that is also a duty, this must therefore be the happiness of other human beings, whose (permitted) end I thus make my own end as well" (MM 6: 388: C.F. also, MM 6: 306, 313). Kant's never flagging requirement to treat people as ends not means derives some of its strength from a conception of the person as an autonomous subject. This much is true. But I think if we stop there, we miss the rich texture of social requirements that are implicit in such a position. A duty towards the happiness of others of course implies that other duties as well must be taken into account. Some of these that are spelled out are Love, Respect, Conscience, Moral feeling, and etc. that Kant details as synthetic concepts in the *Doctrine of Virtue* (MM 6: 399-403). These virtues imply in turn that there is at least some shared, interpersonal engagement of individual, autonomous actors who have as there purpose the happiness of each other. Virtues for Kant were not armchair contemplations: they were duties proscribed in action. To be virtuous, to carry out one's "inner duties" as Kant put it (MM 6:380), required one to engage in and with the company of others. Total autonomy equated with isolation: one could not carry out one's duties in isolation. One could not, therefore, complete the necessary requisites that were required, and indeed, demanded, to satisfy virtue. In point of fact, engagement in social intercourse was itself considered a virtue.

> "It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to isolate oneself...but to use one's moral perfections in social intercourse...While making oneself a fixed center of one's principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world-not exactly in order to promote as the end what is best for the world but only to cultivate what leads indirectly to this end: to cultivate a disposition of reciprocity-agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect...and so to associated the graces with virtue. To bring this about is itself a duty of virtue" (MM 6:473).

Kant's intent here is painstakingly clear. To engage socially is a requirement of virtue.

Perhaps the strongest evidence that virtues, for Kant, have social import is the insistence that they can and must be taught. "The very concept of virtue already implies that virtue must be acquired (that it is not innate); one need not appeal to anthropological knowledge based on experience to see this. For a human being's moral capacity would not be virtue were it not produced by the strength of his resolution in conflict with powerful opposing inclinations. Virtue is the product of pure practical reason insofar as it gains ascendancy over such inclinations with consciousness of its supremacy" (MM 6: 477). I want to examine this statement a bit more closely and see if I can tease out some of its implications. First of all, Kant is telling us that virtue is acquired. What he is not saying here, however, is that virtue is an automatic habit. Because virtues are ideals that are often in constant flux, they can never become automatic, hence unconscious to us. One puts one's virtues into play when one puts them up against a (as Dewey might say) felt problem. This implies that there is an act of connection here: there is a linking up of what one has been educated about regarding specific virtues with a more general and overarching duty to act to manifest the happiness of self and others. Thus, what one forms with respect to this is both a situational maxim (that is, it is to be done when a situation requires it) as well as a general exhortation. In all cases, it is duty that, while internalized for the purposes of self-cultivation, is also to be consciously directed towards some specific activity. And this activity is the necessary social activity of helping the other.

Inasmuch as education is required to begin the task of the cultivation of virtues, a social activity is undertaken. For education inscribes what is social in character onto the individual who engages the virtues. In the case of education, one is to proceed scientifically and systematically to cultivate the virtues. What must be taught-and this is in opposition to Dewey-is that the locus of ethical decision-making must ultimately proceed *not* from the modeling of good behavior (although this is certainly necessary and does happen) but from the law itself (MM 6:480). Kant does not deny the power of habit in the formation of virtue: what he objects to is the uncritical acceptance of habits as the way in which to proceed in terms of making ethical decisions.

Thus far, I have outlined one aspect of the social import of virtues. That they are (to be) taught and that they can be modeled is as true for Kant as it is for Dewey. Education of the virtues implies a social activity. The individual who engages in such educational activity is learning the skills for an active participatory citizenship, cultivated in turn, by the proper utilization of the virtues. The task is to take the knowledge gained in the educational setting and link it up with real-world situations involving others. Inasmuch as one contemplates these situational dilemmas, one is further engaging in social activity.

For Kant, the ultimate arbiter for an ethical (virtuous) maxim is its propensity to meet the conditions of self-happiness and the happiness of others. But this is one-sided. Virtue (ethics) must be linked up with Morals (duty) in order to be complete. Virtues not only guide what one might call "general living" but they influence the construction of one's subjective maxims, or principles that one uses to decide on moral decisions. These maxims are a curious blend of social knowledge and practical rule. Kant illustrates the definition of maxim in the following passage: "A maxim is the subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from the *objective* principle, namely the practical law. The former contains the practical rule determined by reason comformably with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations), and is therefore the principle in accordance with which the subject acts; but the *law* is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and the principle in accordance with which he *ought to act,* i.e., an imperative" (GW: 4: 422, footnote).

What Kant lumps together as one's inclinations, I believe, also include those virtuous principles that one learns in a social context. What one is to do in a moral aporia, Kant argues, is to bring one's subjective maxims (complete with what one is taught regarding virtues, as well as one's habits, inclinations, etc.) to the final arbiter of just action-the formal principle of duty known also as the Categorical Imperative. In this view, the imperative becomes a sort of testing ground that, while itself not the content of any particular moral decision, can inform such as to whether or not the subject's preselected choice (in short, his subjective maxim) holds the merit/distinction of being universalizable and hence, just. Looking at it this way, the abstracted imperative functions as a sort of court of law, rendering the verdict as to whether the subjective maxim contains within itself a universalizable content.

The link up of the subjective maxim, complete with all the baggage of habits, customs and virtues, together with the steadfast first principle, the Categorical Imperative, is designed to be an act of completion for any moral decision: an act to determine whether or not one's decision has moral worth (Herman, 1993). By saying one's actions have moral worth, one is saying that they are universalizeable, hence, will not prevent, by the very act of their very being made a principle, all from participating in the principle (GW: 4: 421). The consideration of any particular subjective maxim to the Categorical

Imperative is to be seen as a *final* activity, inasmuch as any moral decision has a history, beginning with the inscription of the virtues of self-happiness and the happiness of others onto the individual through the social context of education. This process is, in the main, what we as human beings bring to the task of constructing individual, subjective maxims. Those maxims as spelled out in the *Groundwork* do not exist in a vacuum. They are the products of a lifetime of the social learning of virtues, and the bringing to bear of these virtues on our moral decisions. These virtues, together with other customs and habits are to be subjected to constant testing against the final principle of duty. This two-fold activity is the product of both Virtue and Justice, with virtue being the dutiful "inner" principle we are taught and come to cultivate through intellectual engagement, and justice being the requirement that constrains us to universalize any of our moral maxims. Individual moral decision-making arises initially from a social and educational context, is internalized and subjected to stringent and rigorous testing, and then is projected back into the realm of otherness as a test for its universalizability. To say that one participates in moral decision-making is thus to say that one participates in the social.

CONCLUSION

What I intended to demonstrate in this paper was the possibility of viewing Dewey's and Kant's respective moral theories and their educational foundations as somewhat more closely aligned than otherwise conceived. In order to achieve this, I have demonstrated that the realm of the individual, considered "weak" for Dewey and "strong" for Kant, could provide some mutually shared ground for both if we loosen somewhat our preconceived tendencies to view, in Dewey's case, the moral sphere as a predominantly social one, and for Kant, a predominantly individual one.

Of course, situating them in this way does not give license to declare that the respective moral theories are thereby coterminous, nor does it exonerate one from demonstrating further linkages, should there be any. But it does, I think, push the requirement that one be less ambitious in declaring that these respective ethical theories and the resultant place accorded by each to education are so incongruent as to be inimical to each other. In addition, I think it forces one who does argue the above to be ready with stronger arguments than perhaps hitherto contemplated, to the charge that there may indeed be some common ground.

NOTES

1. See e.g. Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost," in *Consequences of Pragmatism.* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982). pp 3-18, esp. pp 15-16, as an example of Rorty's critique (using Dewey as an example of one who would agree) of Kant's transcendental metaphysics. C.F. also Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). esp. pp 392-394 in particular, for the view that Kant somehow makes moral and aesthetic thinking derive from epistemology.

2. Jim Garrison, "Reclaiming the Logos, Considering the Consequences, and Restoring Context," *Educational Theory* 49, 3, (1999), pp 317-338. This essay provides a good example of Garrison's problems with Kantian moral theory. Here Garrison inveighs against the Kantian regulative ideal as being dogmatic, inflexible, and acontextual. In doing so he invokes Dewey, who said much the same thing in his classic treatise, *Ethics.* The point here is not to dispute this, rather it is to demonstrate that the critique of Kant is alive and well with neo-Deweyan scholars, including educators. This might lead one to suspect that there are few if no areas of complimentarity between the two thinkers. It is this tendency that I wish to fight.

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Flora J. Cooke: An Early Communitarian

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This article focuses on the methodology that Flora J. Cooke (1864-1953) used as she established a progressive secondary education at the Francis W. Parker School in Chicago, Illinois. Cooke was a disciple of the progressive educator Colonel Francis W. Parker (1837-1902) and was appointed by him to be principle of the newly formed Francis W. Parker School in 1901 just before he died.[1] Colonel Parker had pioneered a concept of child-centered primary education that balanced and integrated individual rights and self-development of the student with responsibility to the school community and, ultimately, to the greater community of which the student would become a citizen. Cooke's work was informed by a large and inclusive vision of the school as a democratic community. Because she made every attempt to integrate and balance rights and responsibilities in the school community as she developed the curriculum of the secondary school, her philosophy and practices seem to exemplify the concepts expressed by modern day Communitarians, eighty-eight years after she began the secondary school.

Amitai Etzioni, one of the founders of the Communitarian approach, stated that the name *Communitarian* was adopted by a group of ethicists, social philosophers, and social scientists in 1990 to develop a new way of thinking about social, philosophical, and political issues, balancing the rights and responsibilities of individuals.[2] Etzioni further states that free individuals require a community, which backs them against encroachment by the state and sustains morality by drawing on the gentle prodding of community members.[3] On education, he states, "...[T]wo requirements loom over all others, indeed are at the foundation of most other needs: to develop the basic personality traits that characterize effective individuals and to acquire core values. We mean by character the psychological muscles that allow a person to control impulses and defer gratification, which is essential for achievement, performance, and moral conduct. The core values, which need to be transmitted from generation to generation, contain moral substances that those with the proper basic personality can learn to appreciate, adapt, and integrate into their lives; hard work pays, even in an unfair world; treat others with the same basic dignity with which you wish to be treated (or face the consequences); you feel better when you do what is right than when you evade your moral precepts."[4] Etzioni wants to articulate a public philosophy that describes how to develop and maintain the communitarian equilibrium between order and autonomy. I believe that what he expressed is parallel to Flora Cooke's educational principles and the practices she developed at the Francis W. Parker School.

Cooke had to work under the constraint of developing a curriculum that satisfied college entrance requirements while maintaining the curriculum of a progressive school, which included non-academic activities such as music, art, presentations, club activities, and social involvement in the community of which the school was a part. She created an educational environment at Francis W. Parker School based on developing whole, creative individuals who could be of service as citizens in a democratic society.

This article will highlight the educational principles that Cooke implemented and developed at the Francis Parker School: 1) inculcate students with the ethics that motivate the citizens of a democratic community by using the concept "social motive"; 2) develop each student's potential by finding the interest that would motivate them to develop themselves; 3) use the categories of "Modes of Expression" as a tool to develop students creatively and socially; 4) continue a tradition inherited from Colonel Parker called "Morning Exercises," to build the social motive and provide a forum for individual expression; and 5) clarify the role of the kind of teachers that are necessary to facilitate these activities and the responsibility required of a student's home to nurture growth.

Many of these progressive elements of the Parker School are detailed in the Parker School's Yearbooks, entitled *Studies in Education.*[5] One of them states, "To be sure, our high-school organization and curriculum are not entirely regulated by college entrance requirements. Art, music, manual training, outdoor play, physical education, and the great number of parties and community enterprises of many kinds, take time and energy for which no credits are given. Nevertheless, college examinations stand before many children as a threat, and interfere seriously with development of motive."[6] Because college entrance requirements dictated the curriculum of the secondary school, Cooke had to incorporate the progressive policies discussed below into the curriculum of the school year by making them noncredit activities but necessary for a Parker school Certificate. This was Cooke's means of including subjects she found important to the education of the whole person in a curriculum shaped by the demands of college entrance exams.

THE SOCIAL MOTIVE IN SCHOOLWORK

Cooke was a very active member of the Progressive Education Association (PEA). The association did not want to endorse a particular philosophy or single method of education, for many years their publications were devoted to child-centered approaches. Cooke considered the social motive to be the more important principal than individual self-development. Patricia Graham, a PEA historian, wrote about Cooke that "A high spot of the 1925 convention was the debate between Carleton Washburne, Superintendent of the Winnetka, Illinois, Public Schools, and Flora J. Cooke, Washburne's former teacher at the Francis W. Parker School in Chicago. Washburne plumped for the training of the individual as the primary task of the school, while Miss Cooke countered that the development of social groups should be the fundamental emphasis of the schools."[7]

In a lecture in 1929, Cooke explained that the social motive "…is not a consciously philanthropic purpose, but rather the feeling that one does not and cannot work alone; that whatever one does is a single unit of a large pattern that is being built by many contributors."[8] Cooke continued "[S]elf-actuated work causes the greatest gain to the pupil,…that freedom, with a balancing responsibility is the best condition of moral and intellectual growth,…one of the most effective and wholesome motives of work is the social motive."[9] The social motive at the Parker School was intended to guide the student to take a responsible attitude toward the school community. The student should not be ego-driven, and competitiveness was to be avoided.

The first Parker School Yearbook stated, "The work of the Parker School was based on the belief that education is a social process, and that educational activities that develop social motives in the individual are those that are most effective in stimulating and activating the student's desire to learn."[10] While the development of the social motive in students was desirable for the community's benefit, the social motive was also a vehicle to motivate the student's individual work.

Cooke sought to develop a community within the school "so wholesome and joyous in spirit—so rich in opportunity for all around activity, so compelling in its demand for individual initiative, for judgment, self control and choice of conduct; finally, so in harmony with the laws of human development—that every child will necessarily respond to its influence and act only from good motives and form only good habits of thought and action."[11] Creating a community that would nurture the student was a primary component of Cooke's vision of the good school.

In 1933, speaking at the Chicago World's Fair, Cooke again emphasized the value of students working in social groups. "[W]hatever the core subject matter may be, the individual pupils learn habitually and unconsciously to appreciate each other's gifts and strengths, and to make allowances for each other's limitations and handicaps. They learn to follow and to lead, to give and to take, as in actual life. They work together and cooperate to accomplish some desired common purpose. Thus the school gives sound practical training in citizenship,..."[12] Thus, as students work together, they learn to appreciate the qualities that each brings to the activity, and these experiences deepen their sense of community.

Writing about a trip she took to Locarno, Switzerland in 1927, Cooke decried the lack of appreciation for the social motive among European progressive educators: "[W]hile we found the theory that the child is the focus of all and his individual development the teacher's objective, we did not find that these Europeans realize that the teacher must also be a student of *society* as it is today - that society is the great reservoir of knowledge and accomplishment which the child inherits, and that he can best be put into real contact with it only through his own experience. In other words, the child finds in his group his great incentive, not only to speech but also to all expression, and learns that it is his responsibility in all his activities, to bring back to the group his best contribution. Only in this way from the start, can he grow in social usefulness and power."[13] For Cooke, the social motive should not only enrich the community, but should also provide an incentive to individuals to be the best that they could be, maximizing their contributions to the small school community, and, later, to the community outside the school.

Furthermore, social motive and individual development are not separate, but are inter-related. A skilled teacher can guide a student's specific interests toward broader interests. Experiencing success, the student is motivated to interact positively with the group. Ever-expanding self-activity leads to larger accomplishments, which can be shared with a larger social community.

DEVELOPING THE INDIVIDUAL

Cooke considered the student's individual development an important goal for a complete education. She stated in a 1905 report to the Francis W. Parker School trustees that the ideal, which the school held for the education of the individual student, addressed all facets of human development, a well-developed body, mind, and sense of moral values. She also stated in the report, as she did many times throughout her career, that self-activity is the engine that helps students realize their potential. The role of the school is to provide the resources to facilitate a student's physical, mental, and moral growth.[14]

Cooke used a student's interest to initiate the desire to learn what the school considered important. Cooke recounted an incident involving John Dewey's son Fred, while the boy was enrolled in the Chicago Normal School. She used his interest in the school's woodshop to motivate him to read. She said, "Fred loved that shop. He wanted to do things and when he was not doing things, he wanted to dream, think his own thoughts. He did not care a rap about reading and writing and those things. They seemed utterly useless things to him...."[15] Because the shop did not have enough equipment for the whole class, she divided the students into groups and told them that they could take turns working in the shop if they knew what to do. She wrote directions on the board for them to follow while they were in the shop and had the students copy them. When it was time for Fred's group to work in the shop, Cooke required them to read back the directions. Fred could not.

She concluded, "Now that was the beginning of Fred Dewey's seeing that reading had some relation with the big group. Many directions had to be given that way. It had some relation to something that he wanted to do, and it took a good many experiences, but by the end of that year he could read almost anything."[16] Cooke applied the technique of tapping into a student's interest as a spur to more advanced learning situations.

During a PEA conference in 1930, Cooke described how she used a student's own interests to motivate him to learn. The student's mother had enrolled him in the eighth grade of the Parker School. He hated school and was accepted into the Parker School on a trial basis. Cooke reported that the student did nothing for the first three months, but then he became interested in *The Parker Weekly,* the school newspaper. *The Weekly* was run by the Parker students and was not criticized by adults until after it was distributed. This interested the new student very much, but the students on the newspaper's staff did not accept him because he did not have any skills to offer them. He made it his business to approach the printing teacher and learn how to set type. He brought up his other schoolwork to an acceptable standard to participate in this extra-curricular activity, and by his senior year, he had become editor-in-chief. Cooke's point was that something "has to be related in the child's own mind to something that he considers worth while, if we are to get the whole child going."[17] Thus, Cooke harnessed a student's personal interests to the other aspects of schoolwork.

Cooke emphasized that it was up to the school "to take these things that are in the world today that make our body of life go forward and to present in the schools problems and situations that give children opportunities to hitch up with the world and understand it in its progress."[18] By discovering those interests that individual students held and using those interests to motivate learning, Cooke helped the students develop their abilities and experience the satisfaction that comes with the use of their own powers. She believed this technique not only promoted a person's individual development, but also developed a person as a useful member of the community. Through a program that created incentives, built on students' strengths, and provided opportunities to make individual contributions in the small community of the school, the students developed the skills that eventually would allow them to make contributions to the larger world community[19]

Fred Dewey's interest in the school's woodshop enabled Cooke to motivate him to read. Another student's interest in the school newspaper allowed her to channel his energy into accepting the school's curriculum. This method of finding students' particular interests and using these to draw the students into larger interests required knowing the students very well, and therefore, required a small teacher-to-student ratio.

MODES OF EXPRESSION

Cooke continued to employ a methodology espoused by Colonel Parker that he had called Modes of Expression. The Modes were ways in which thought and emotion were manifested through the body,[20] that is, through gesture, voice, speech, music, "making", modeling, painting, drawing, and writing.

Among the modes of expression,[21] "[Gesture]...includes all of the changes in the body manifesting thought and feeling excepting the specialized changes characteristic of the other modes of expression. The hand writes and paints and draws and models, but it is also expressive in itself....Pantomime,...requires great intensification and clearness of gesture...Dancing is the gesture of music."[22] Colonel Parker clearly considered gesture an indirect but powerful form of self-expression.

Voice and speech were considered related modes of expression. Voice depended on the quality of tone and the shades of meaning used. Speech as a mode of expression was represented in six different kinds of work, including involvement in plays, oral reading, singing, extemporaneous speaking, dialogue, and the languages.[23]

"Musical expression", said Colonel Parker, "is to cultivate and enhance those emotions which influence in the highest degree the motives of man."[24] Colonel Parker, and later the Parker School, integrated music into the school environment through choral singing, which was included in Morning Exercises whenever possible.[25]

"Making" was a mode of expression that developed bodily co-ordinations. The concept was expressed in an external object. "Making" was not to exalt the spirit, but, rather, to "supply the material basis for life....The motive of making is the practical use of the object made,...there is the whole product, finally, standing for criticism."[26] Manual training developed this mode of expression, using different projects for different grades. Projects varied, depending on materials and levels of skill, in such media as woodworking, rugmaking, and metalworking.[27]

The other modes of expression (modeling, painting, drawing, and writing) Colonel Parker grouped together as art modes, which he considered expressions of thought; unlike other modes, they did not embody a concept, but concentrated and idealized a thought. "Art shows to man things which he cannot otherwise see."[28] Skill in these modes was developed by expressing thoughts, and depended on the medium selected. Modeling, painting, and drawing developed a skillful use of muscular power, while writing developed connection, relation, and expansion of thought. While speakers could take their cues from the audience and moderate their presentation accordingly, for a writer, the effect on the audience would need to be imagined.[29] There were many opportunities for writing in the school environment beyond the class assignments. The school publications, produced by the students, needed a continuous stream of stories, poetry, and editorials. Students wrote short plays, and published the speeches they gave at the Morning Exercise and other ceremonial events.[30]

To become an educated person, Cooke believed, it was necessary to produce works of your own, not just to absorb the works of others. She stated, "The world is full of books to read to one's self, pictures to be looked at, plays to be seen, lectures to be listened to, music to be heard. We spend our days gathering in with not time or reason to give out - outlet of expression becomes choked, natural impulses of expression die. The school should give children an opening into every kind of delightful activity, hard work and worthwhile play. Every avenue to his soul should be open and in use. He should sing and dance and cook and sew and build and construct and act and read and write, and do every other thing that is worth doing in the world, in order that his thinking may be more vivid and true."[31] Once again, Cooke expressed the concept that self-activity is essential for a student's development, and the school should supply the environment where self-activity could take place.

Education was a social and active process at the Parker School. As Cooke said,

> We believe the school as well as the home is responsible for creating a fit environment for children to live and grow in, a delightful field for experiment and training, a place in which children can keep alive interests and satisfy curiosity, outdoors and indoors, in classroom, laboratory, shop, studio, library; a place in which they may learn to choose and to judge for themselves. We believe that both the home and the school should not only stimulate children to use all their varying powers, but that they should also equip them unconsciously but steadily with a growing sense of responsibility for their own actions and achievements. We deem this *sense of responsibility* to be the "balance wheel" both for those who would exercise freedom and initiative of the more irresponsible kind, and also for those children who have a tendency selfishly to absorb conventional education with no desire or ability to express what they have taken in. It is hard to measure tangibly in words the effect of such opportunities and activities upon children, but it shows clearly in the interests, tastes, habits, and attitudes which they develop and use in their daily lives.[32]

Thus, the school was charged with providing an environment to inculcate a sense of responsibility within the students so that they could function as productive members of society.

It was difficult for Cooke to incorporate activities that served to develop many of the modes of expression because most of them could not be developed through courses that would be considered appropriate for college entrance requirements. Consequently, the activities to provided the structure in which students could apply those modes of expression to realize their individual interests, while simultaneously realizing the social interests of the school community had to be in the curriculum as noncredit courses.

Community projects intended to develop both the social motive and individual interest, and to stimulate children, teachers, and parents to cooperate and engage in creative activities, included the Santa Claus Annex Shop,[33] the May Day Festival,[34] and the Parker Fall Fair.[35]

The Parker School had three main publications, *Parker Weekly, Parker Record* (the school annual) , and *The Question Mark* (a collection of student writings). The *Parker Weekly,* the school paper, was published by a staff of high school students, who collected the material, set the type, and issued the paper every Monday morning. The only adult involved was a faculty adviser, who met with the students once each week.[36]

The freedom the students were allowed is evidenced by an article that was favorable toward pacifism, written by a student. This was during World War I, and the parents of the Parker School students were very patriotic about the war effort. When a group of parents demanded the author's expulsion, Cooke said she would not interfere with an author's right to express a point of view; doing so would violate everything that the school attempted to teach. The Parents' Association subsequently sent her flowers, and praised her for her courage.[37]

Cooke did not always support what was written in the *Weekly,* and on one occasion, she took the newspaper staff to task for publishing the names of students who had been censured by the Student Government for school offenses.[38] She said she was interested in the development of social consciousness, but not in the shaming of students.

The Forum, comprising eight groups of high school students, focused on interests such as music, art, dramatics, debating, science, and literature. Once a month, each group prepared, rehearsed, and performed a program. The Forum was handled entirely by the students with a faculty advisor available to offer advice and constructive criticism when these were requested or needed.[39]

Student Government was taken seriously at the Parker School and was considered the most important method of training students for the duties and privileges of American citizenship. With the exception of classroom work, which was performed under a teacher's direction, the student government controlled most other activities. Cooke believed, as did Colonel Parker, that the school community should be a cross-section of life, including representatives of many professions, occupations, religions and economic levels,[40] thus emulating society at large, and allowing the Parker School to teach students respect for the individual.

THE MORNING EXERCISE

The Morning Exercise was a tradition that Cooke also inherited from Colonel Parker. The Morning Exercise was a thirty-minute daily assembly that set the tone for the day; all students and faculty were expected to attend. The program was prescheduled and contained a wide assortment of presentations. There would be a brief opening, possibly a reading from a piece of literature or a song, then a student, or a group of students, would give a presentation, often as the outcome of class work. Presenters were to speak clearly and project their voice so that everyone in the audience could hear. The audience was to listen attentively and courteously; applause was not allowed, so as not to encourage wrong motives, e.g., inflating the ego. Colonel Parker "never uses *motive* in the sense of *end, need* or *use* in the ordinary meaning, but always in the broader and deeper sense, implying the outlook toward the ideal and the personal energy in action,"[41] according to a Parker School Yearbook.

Cooke wrote, "Colonel Parker's reason for the morning exercise was it[s] great educational value:—first, it gave a social unity to the school and taught us to understand and appreciate each other; second, its value to the speaker: to stand on one's feet and think and be able to make one's points understood by an audience is a power which every one needs in life,—an ease and freedom because of their training; third, the value to the audience; the training in courteous attention, to say nothing of the wide appreciation of the many kinds of achievements which one gains. The habit of courtesy is rooted in kindness,—putting one's self in the other one's place. That is exactly the duty of every one in the school audience during morning exercises."[42] This school function was a practical means of individual development through a social contribution.

In the 1913 Parker School Yearbook, Cooke cited a faculty committee report from 1906, which said, "When the Francis W. Parker School was founded, its teachers brought from the old Normal School not only a veneration for the Morning Exercise, but so strong a habit of having it that it was as essential to the idea of a school as was a curriculum."[43] Cooke referred to the Morning Exercises as the "chief unifying center of the social life of the school"[44] and considered them to be important when creating a school community.

Sometimes separate Morning Exercises were held in the upper and lower schools; the upper-school student government would conduct discussions about school problems, or hold town meetings to discuss civic problems. Younger students were assembled separately and discussions were geared to their level. These divided assemblies were not considered ideal, however, because they defeated the purpose of uniting the school community.

Cooke noted that the older students often did not care to listen to the younger ones at the Morning Exercises. After Cooke reprimanded the entire assembly, it was agreed that a worthy Parker student should serve the community, either as a speaker or as a member of the audience, and then the rest of the day would be given over to individual progress. Lack of cooperation in this plan earned a student an appearance before the student government. Cooke wrote that a student who would not cooperate with the Morning Exercises was either weak or selfish.[45]

THE INFLUENCE OF TEACHERS AND THE HOME

While the social motive, individual interest, and modes of expression were exemplified by many Parker School activities, Cooke recognized the dual responsibility of the school and the home to formally educate the student.

Cooke, in an article entitled "Socialized Creative Education", cited Parker's belief that "his objectives could be realized only by a system of education based upon the *needs of society* on the one hand, and, on the other, upon a recognition that the function of both the school and home is to insure to *each individual his fullest possible development.*"[46] To provide this guidance to students, Cooke noted, Colonel Parker felt that a special type of teacher was needed, because teaching was both a science and an art. Parker referred to such teachers as artist teachers. "The artist teachers selected by Colonel Parker," Cooke recalled, "knew that they were expected to exercise their skill in instilling tastes, developing interests, and in establishing right habits and attitudes of thought and action. Their chief function was to give pupils opportunities for satisfying achievement, especially along lines in which the element of social usefulness was inherent."[47] Teachers played a very important role as facilitators of the student's development within the school community. They were responsible for developing the appropriate curriculum and guiding the student through it by using the student's own interest to motivate him.

As Cooke stated, it was "not our policy to make a child responsible for the selection of the subject matter he studies, nor to allow him free choice of activity all day long, because he is not fitted, either in experience or in knowledge, for such selection, and because his intellectual hunger, like his physical appetite, is unsafe as an exclusive guide for his daily nourishment and a well balanced diet. However, it is our policy to offer him much freedom and opportunity for choice and assimilation within the scope of the carefully selected materials which the teacher spreads before him, which should contain all the various elements necessary for his best development."[48] Thus, it was important for teachers to be current with the latest scientific information relating to subject matter and, especially, to pedagogy. Teachers must be "...ready to use, all the new scientific data in the educational field which experimental psychology and research are contributing to our knowledge."[49] To provide guided learning and direction, teachers must constantly be adding to their store of knowledge.

Teachers, Cooke maintained, "...should be people of personality and power, equipped with distinctive qualities for the leadership and supervision of children. It is not enough that they love children; they must understand them sympathetically; they must have vision and wisdom; they must be genuine students of childhood as well as of society and books; they must be flexible enough to adjust themselves to an ever-changing world. Good teachers, and good parents alike, can no more be docile and servile to children's whims than cock-sure, domineering and arbitrary in authority."[50] Thus, teachers were responsible not only for providing intellectual guidance, but for providing emotional guidance as well.

On the other hand, as Cooke stated, "Colonel Parker believed that the school and the home must cooperate actively and intelligently in the education of children; that the parents should assume their full share of responsibility for the child's intellectual education and that the school must be jointly responsible for the child's character and spiritual attitude towards life."[51] Even though teachers played a very important role in the development of the student, Cooke believed the parents also played a very important part in the student's development, and were expected to participate actively in the various programs described in the previous section.

While it was important to deal with students on an individual basis and nurture their progress, the goal was to use students' interests to lead them to become part of a group, to become part of the school community, and eventually to become contributing members of the democratic society.

While Flora Cooke was teaching and writing in the early part of the twentieth century, and the Communitarians are writing at the end of that century, and while there is no explicit connection between them, their expressed concepts are resonant and parallel one another in many ways. Etzioni speaks of the Communitarian belief that "in the multiplication of strongly democratic communities around the world lies our best hope for the emergence of a global community that can deal concertedly with matters of general concern to our species as a whole: with war and strife, with violations of basic rights, with environmental degradation, and with the extreme material deprivation that stunts the bodies, minds, and spirits of children."[52]

Cooke, too, insisted that social events be allowed to shape curriculum, and student projects were developed to address the very issues of war and strife, violations of basic rights, environmental degradation, and stunting social inequities.

Etzioni, summing up Communitarian principles, writes, "As we see it, responsibilities are anchored in community. Reflecting the diverse moral voices of their citizens, responsive communities define what is expected of people; they educate their members to accept these values; and they praise them when they do and frown upon them when they do not."[53]

Cooke used the Morning Exercises for much the same purpose: They were important in giving a social unity to the school community and taught understanding and mutual appreciation. Presentations were of value not only to the presenter, but taught the principle of "courteous attention", and the "habit of courtesy rooted in kindness" –a practical means of individual development through a social contribution. They provided a forum where the diverse voices of students and teachers could be heard, help students develop desired social behaviors, and modeled values. Praise for the desired behaviors was generously given, but far more important—and powerful—was the satisfaction students derived from self-motivated, creative participation in, and contribution to, the community. Behaviors that disrupted the social harmony were discouraged by means of the school community's collective "frown", expressed through open discussion of the principles involved, until harmony could be restored.

Etzioni envisions an ongoing process of deliberation about these principles. Cooke, too, saw the values and principles developed and encouraged in her students as the beginning of an ongoing process of citizenship, to be carried far beyond the classroom, into a larger social context.

Etzioni writes, "Our Communitarian concern may begin with ourselves and our families, but it rises inexorably to the long-imagined community of humankind."[54] Flora Cooke, one can imagine, would wholeheartedly concur, adding, perhaps, that the equilibrium of rights and responsibilities that begins with ourselves, our families, *and our schools,* will make its influence felt in neighborhoods, nations, and, ultimately, in the "long-imagined community of humankind."

NOTES

1. This article is based on documentary research conducted in the Francis W. Parker School records, 1884-1960, Manuscript Collection in the Chicago Historical Society (hereafter cited as Parker MSS).

2. Etzioni, Amitai, *The Spirit of Community,* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 15.

3. Etzioni, *The Spirit,* p. 15.

4. Etzioni, *The Spirit,* pp. 90-91.

5. This ten-volume series was a collective effort authored by the faculty of the Parker School and edited by Cooke, which was published from 1912 to 1934. Because these volumes were edited by Cooke and echoed the ideas she articulated in other documents and articles referenced by this study, it is reasonable to assume that they represented her beliefs. Some ideas were

direct adaptations of Colonel Parker's policies at the Normal School, and others exemplified Colonel Parker's approach as Cooke extended it into a new era and attempted to infuse his ideas into the secondary school.

6. FWPS Faculty, *Francis W. Parker School Year Book: Expression As a Means of Training Motive,* Vol. 3 (Chicago, Francis W. Parker School, 1914), p. 10n.

7. Patricia Albjerg Graham, *Progressive Education: From Arcady to Academe* (New York, Columbia University, 1967), p.48.

8. Flora J. Cooke, "The Social Motive in School Work", (Lecture by Cooke at the Adventure School, Geneva, Illinois), 28 January 1929, box 6, folder 41, p.1, Parker MSS.

9. Cooke, "Social Motive," p.1.

10. FWPS Faculty, *Francis W. Parker School Year Book: The Social Motive in School Work,* vol. 1 (Chicago, Francis W. Parker School, 1912), p. 3.

11. Flora J. Cooke and Carley, Ira, Extract from the 1905 Report to the Trustees, box 1, folder 5, p. 2, Parker MSS.

12. Flora J. Cooke, "Childhood Education 1833-1933," (address given at the Century of Progress, World's Fair, Chicago, IL, 1933, box 10, folder 58, p. 19, Parker MSS.

13. Flora J. Cooke to supporters, undated (but probably 1927), box 6, folder 37, p. 2, Parker MSS.

14. Cooke and Carley, "Extract", pp. 2-3.

15. *Conference on School Methods,* box 7, bound typescript, pp. 169-171, Parker MSS.

16. *Conference on School Methods,* pp. 169-171.

17. *Conference on School Methods,* pp. 161-162.

18. *Conference on School Methods,* p. 193.

18. *Conference on School Methods,* p. 172.

21. *Year Book: Expression,* Vol. 3 (1914), 3.

21. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 11.

22. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 18.

23. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 18.

24. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 19.

25. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 19.

26. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 20

27. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 21

28. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 21-22.

29. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 22

31. *Year Book: Expression,* p. 23

31. Flora J. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education," *Independent Education* (29 March 1929): 14, box 6, folder 41, Parker MSS.

32. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 14.

33. The activity was called the Santa Claus Annex Shop in 1912, by 1920, it was called the Santa Claus Toy Shop, and, later, the name was changed to the Xmas Toy Shop.

34. Marie Kirchner Stone, *Between Home and Community* (Chicago, Francis W. Parker School, 1976), p. 327.

35. Flora J. Cooke, "The Parker School Fall Fair-A Community Project", February 1929, box 6, folder 41, p. 1, Parker MSS. It was intended for publication in *Progressive Education.*

36. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 17.

37. Carol Lynn Gilmer, "Flora Cooke: Grand Old Lady of Education," *Coronet Magazine* (October 1947): 81, box 20, folder 123, Parker MSS.

38. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 17.

39. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 17.

40 Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 17.

41. *Year Book: Expression*, p. 11.

42. Flora J. Cooke, "It is well...," 18 January 1922, box 5, folder 30, Parker MSS.

43. FWPS Faculty, *Francis W. Parker School Year Book: The Morning Exercise as a Socializing Influence*, Vol. 2 (Chicago, Francis W. Parker School 1913), p. 8.

44. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 16.

45. Cooke, "It is well....," p. 2.

46. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 14.

47. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 14.

48. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 15.

49. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 17.

50. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 17.

51. Cooke, "Socialized Creative Education", p. 14.

52. Etzioni, *The Spirit*, p. 266.

53. Etzioni, *The Spirit*, p. 267.

54. Etzioni, *The Spirit*, p. 266.

Learning Not to Be Good: Hannah Arendt, Moral Education and the Subject(s) of Politics

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> The greatest temptation for those recoiling from radical evil was to retreat into personal relations, where morality seemed relatively clear, and to take one's political cues from there. . . . What finally brings Arendt into Machiavelli's ambit is her conviction that personal morality cannot solve the dilemas that arise out of the very nature of politics itself.[1]

> I love my native city more than my own soul.[2]

Arendt's faith in political action sets her apart from the philosophical tradition, which has treated politics as a necessary evil best left to the select few who can protect the rest of us from the vicissitudes and unpredictability of action. Interestingly, her faith in action also sets her apart from her own field of study, political philosophy, which is similarly charged with having contributed to the "displacement of politics."[3] *The Human Condition* is an extended critique of this philosophical denigration of action. It is an attempt to move political action from the margins of human life to the center of human being-in-the-world. Arendt's insistence on the centrality of political action to human existence has been much praised, but it is also much misunderstood. While Arendt is clearly writing in celebration of the human capacity for action, she is equally attuned to the tremendous risks of action. Not only are there limits to what any individual actor can achieve, but there are limits to what action itself can accomplish. What disturbs a number of Arendt's most prominent critics is her contention that these limits can be derived from the conditions of action rather than being imposed on action "from the outside, from some supposedly higher faculty or from experiences outside action's own reach."[4]

As I understand Arendt, action is central to our efforts to constitute ourselves as ethical subjects in a shared world. Indeed, action is how this sharing of the world comes to pass. What is missing from the contention that Arendt is interested in action's "existential supremacy" is an understanding of the connections between the modern retreat from action that she diagnoses in *The Human Condition* and the "moral collapse" that has facilitated the perpetration of political evil in our century.[5] The magnitude of this moral collapse is illustrated not simply in the many examples of deliberate cruelty toward others, but in the failure of so many "good people" to intervene in these instances of political wrongdoing. Arendt suggests that this profoundly disturbing political passivity in the face of practices and ideologies that paved the way for genocide can be traced to the failure on the part of moral and political philosophers alike to confront the degree to which our capacity to live ethically is contingent upon our capacity to take action in the world. More specifically, the traditions of moral and political philosophy have by and large failed to face up to the challenges that the distinctive dynamics of political action pose to efforts to live ethically in the midst of plurality. *The Human Condition* is Arendt's attempt to remedy this shortcoming.

While the conception of action put forward by Arendt has been widely praised for its embrace of the pleasures and possibilities of political action, critics continue to be concerned about a provocative reversal that runs through Arendt's body of work. Arendt maintains that the foundation of political morality is our capacity for action. Risky and seemingly futile as political action is, she contends that the only way to counter the inevitable excesses of political action is not to invoke the familiar moderating precepts of ordinary morality, but rather, it is to act in ways that deflect or counter the actions that have already been set in motion. This apparent championing of the risks of action and her seeming abandonment of moral considerations continues to cause much concern. George Kateb, for example, understands Arendt to be suggesting that "the supreme achievement of political action is existential, and the stakes are seemingly higher than moral ones."[6] Kateb is not alone in this perception that Arendt values action for its own sake. She is often criticized for aestheticizing action, valuing action for its "revelatory character" rather than its connection to overarching moral purposes such as the pursuit of justice, or underlying moral principles such as respect for persons. Arendt's critics are particularly troubled by her apparent enthusiasm for the Greek notion of politics. These critics wonder whether it is possible to temper the "agonistic" elements of politics—the quest for glory and greatness—given Arendt's reluctance to impose limits on political action from "the outside" as well as her resistance to subjecting actors to moral constraints. The aim of this paper is to explore the ways in thich the particular conditions and the distinctive dynamics of political action shape political subjectivity. As I will show, while action as Arendt understands it requires that we let go of a conception of self that is at the heart of the Western philosophical tradition, letting go of this conception of the self is crucial to the creation and maintenance of the shared world.

The Human Condition is frequently read as an idealization of action. I read it differently. While there is no question that Arendt wants to celebrate our capacity for action, she is equally attentive to the risks of action. Kateb is wrong to think that Arendt has too much faith in action. Hers is a tempered faith in the *capacity* to act, and not a blind faith in action per se. Indeed, as Margeret Canovan points out, the book is less a panegyric to action than an exploration of the "other human capacities [that] tend to elbow action off the center stage."[7] Still, Arendt's decision to invoke the Athenian *polis* as an example of political action in its purest form is curious, especially given her recognition of the problematic exclusion of whole groups of people from a way of life that she takes to be fundamental to human existence. Her decision makes sense only when one concedes that she is not reinforcing the ancient Athenian proscriptions on who may or may not enter into *polis* life but is rather attempting to describe the way in which a life of action differs from two ways of life that are antithetical to politics: a life governed by necessity, on the one hand, and a life conditioned by the drive toward mastery of the material—and by extention, the social—world, on the other. As Canovan points out, while the analysis of action in *The Human Condition* is in many ways abstract and appears to have little connection with the practice of politics as we know it, the experiences that prompted Arendt's inquiry into the distinctiveness of action are anything but abstract:

> The central preoccupations of [the section on action in *The Human Condition*] follow directly from her meditations on totalitarianism, Marxism and the Western philosophical tradition, all of which seemed to her to have denied or ignored the most politically relevant characteristic of human beings—their plurality. Totalitarianism represented for her a deliberate attempt to erase all traces of plurality and spontaneity from human beings, while Marxism, she thought, saw mankind as a herd of animals with no individuality or initiative.

> Within the philosophical tradition forged by solitary thinkers since Plato, Man was an abstract subject that existed only in the singular. In defiance of all of them, Arendt insisted that the feature of the human condition from which politics starts is that 'men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world', so that 'we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live.'[8]

Although the notion of plurality is widely recognized as Arendt's distinctive contribution to political theory and there is general agreement about its meaning, there is some confusion about what it means to say, with Arendt, that plurality is a condition of politics. Arendt refers to plurality as "*the* condition—not only the *conditio sine qua non,* but the *conditio per quam*—of all political life."[9] Yet, plurality is both the impetus for politics—the reason why people engage with one another across the spaces that "relate and separate" us—and a distinctively political achievement. Lisa Disch wonders why Arendt chose to use the term *condition* in such an ambiguous way. At times, Arendt suggests that plurality is a *fact* of human existence while at other times she acknowledges that plurality is brought into being only to the extent that individuals and groups have the courage to act in such a way that they make themselves present politically. Plurality is thus in the paradoxical position of making politics possible at the same time as politics is its own condition of possibility. That Arendt grounds our capacity for action on a paradox is indicative of her recognition of the fragility of the conditions of political life.

What makes plurality a distinctively *political* achievement is the recognition that that while each of us differs from one another in society as well as by nature, we are capable of regarding one another as political equals in the face of these differences. Its important to remember that in Athenian life, this condition of equality existed only in the *polis* and not beyond it, and it extended only to those who were qualified to participate in the affairs of the *polis.* Despite these delimitations, the idea that equality is a *political* condition—i.e. that it is necessary for politics to proceed and that it is produced in the course of political interactions—is a profound contribution to political theory. While the ancient Athenians operated according to strict codes governing the grounds for entry into the life of the *polis,* the democratic ethos of the modern era (which functions as a moral imperative as well as a political one) means that any one who has the courage to act politically becomes a participant in the shaping of public life. In the process, they become political equals. This means that equality as Arendt understands it is not a precondition for action; it is a product of action. We become political equals by acting in ways that assume responsibility for the shared world and our own place in it.[10]

The condition of political equality does not mean that we are literally the same or that we need to see things in the same way in order to engage politically . Indeed, to Arendt, such a state of affairs would signal the demise of politics: why would any of us bother to engage with one another if we all experienced and understood the world in the same way? Political equality as the ancient Greeks understood it was not a leveling concept. While it is true that political equality was conceived of as a way of compensating for the "problem" of natural differences in strength and ability, it was not regarded as antithetical to individual distinctiveness. Indeed, political equality was taken to be essential to the cultivation of individual distinctiveness. A number of contemporary feminists have found this aspect of Arendt useful to thinking through issues of difference that undergird the politics of identity, but it is important to note that while difference and distinctiveness are supplementary, they are not synonymous. As Bonnie Honig points out, whereas categories of difference are potentially normalizing, distinctiveness is individuating, which is precisely why Arendt values it so highly.[11] Existentially speaking, we enter into politics in order to distinguish ourselves from our peers. But the nature of action is such that it is almost impossible to predict how we will appear to others. This is the second reason why Arendt finds the polis experience instructive. The peculiar dynamics of political action give us insight into the distinctive nature of political subjectivity.

Arendt's emphasis on distinctiveness and her frequent assertions that politics is motivated primarily by an almost theatrical desire for self-display is one of the reasons why she is frequently criticized for aestheticizing politics. Critics wonder whether this emphasis on the "revelatory quality of political action" is sufficient reason for engagement in politics. Surely, politics ought to be about something other than itself and surely action is about something larger than learning about oneself or proving oneself to others. I take this to be the substance of Kateb's concern that Arendt's emphasis on the existential primacy of political action marginalizes the sorts of moral concerns that ought to prompt and constrain political action. It is certainly the case that Arendt is less concerned about the content of political action than she is with the peculiar dynamics of political action. However, I want to suggest that far from uncoupling action from ethical considerations, Arendt's grasp of the distinctive dynamics of political action has profound implications for our efforts to constitute ourselves as ethical subjects in a shared world. The political ethic implicit in her theory of action is most apparent in her reconceptualization of political subjectivity. Because political agency as Arendt understands it requires political subjects to relinquish autonomy, it is, to say the least, a disconcerting ethic. But this too, is tied to a larger point Arendt wants to make about the ethical dimensions of political action: because action is how "the sharing of the world comes to pass," political subjectivity takes on a distinctive character through which we learn what this sharing of the world requires.

Action illuminates human existence in a number of ways. At the most fundamental level, it enables men and women to "actualize the sheer passive givenness of their being."[12] In the process of acting and speaking with others, we "insert ourselves into the human world."[13] This "second birth" actualizes "the human condition of natality," which is Arendt's shorthand term for the capacity for "beginning something new on our own initiative."[14] For an activity to qualify as "action" in Arendt's sense, it must fulfill several criteria. Most importantly, it must introduce the unexpected into the world, i.e. action is the opposite of routine behavior; it must be public, i.e. action requires an audience for its fulfillment; and it must be disclosive, i.e. action has a revelatory character. But what is it that is revealed? Arendt reminds us that the notion of revelatory action is complicated by the condition of plurality which means, among other things, that action always takes place in a pre-existing "web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions."[15] This means that the initiator(s) of action cannot control either the outcomes of their initiatives, nor what is revealed about them in the course of action. This is not to suggest that self-revelation is the main reason that people decide to act in the world, although it is an important outcome of political action. This is why our actions are existentially and ethically significant. In the course of acting, a great deal is revealed, not only about the kinds of people we are but about the kind of world in which we wish to live.

Arendt reminds us that " most worlds and deeds are *about* some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking subject."[16]

But while the objective dimension of the "in-between" is more recognizably political, the "second, subjective in-between" is as significant. Arendt goes so far as to say that "without the disclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its specific character and becomes one form of achievement among others."[17] This is not to say that the agent "knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word," but Arendt insists that political actors must "be willing to risk the disclosure."[18]

On Arendt's view, the only way to take responsibility for the world is to be willing to act on its behalf. This requires political actors to be willing to show themselves, which in turn means that they have to be willing to give up a measure of self-mastery. This appreciation of the ways in which political action mitigates against our efforts to master who we are and how we appear to others is at the heart of Arendt's conception of political subjectivity. As I will show, this is a decidedly provocative move, one that goes against the grain of the entire Western tradition of moral philosophy. Not only does Arendt critique the notion of the sovereign self that is the heart of the Western philsophical tradition, but she shifts the locus of concern away from the integrity of the acting subject. Indeed, Arendt maintains that our preoccupation with the integrity of the moral self underlies what she took to be the main problem of evil. While evil is often the consequence of deliberate malevolence, the forces of evil are sustained by the passivity of those who are in the habit of not acting politically in ways that might intervene in or minimize the effects of evil. Ironically, those men and women who are preoccupied with their status as "good" people are particularly reluctant to take the risks of action because they are aware that there is no guarantee that their actions will do good. Recognizing that the outcomes of action are beyond the control of the originator, they are weary of unwittingly becoming caught up in wrong-doing.

When Arendt invokes Machiavelli's counter-intuitive injunction that to participate in politics one must "learn not to be good," she is not suggesting that one must learn to be bad, but rather that we need to face up to the inevitable transgressions of action in the midst of plurality.[19] The reason why so many ordinary people—which is to say, people who are neither preoccupied with goodness nor knowingly caught up in evil—are reluctant to risk self-disclosure is that they recognize that there is something about action that makes self-disclosure as we commonly understand it elusive. Because action takes place in an "already existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions" its course is unpredictable. Those who initiate action can neither predict nor control the outcomes of their initiatives; nor can they predict or control how they appear to others. In this sense, while action always reveals an agent, this agent in question is the subject of action "in the twofold sense of the word, namely its actor and sufferer."[20] Arendt calls this "the first of many frustrations by which action, and consequently the togetherness and intercourse of men, are ridden." It is "perhaps the most fundamental" of action's frustrations.[21] She explains:

> Because the actor always moves among and in relation to other acting beings, he is never merely a 'doer' but always and at the same time a sufferer. To do and to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin,

> and the story that an act starts is composed of its consequent deeds and sufferings.[22]

To act is thus in an important sense to relinquish mastery over oneself and the world. This is not to say that one relinquishes the *struggle* for mastery, but it is to point out that actually attaining mastery over the self puts an end to politics.

There are two ways to achieve self sovereignty and both are anti-political. The first is to forsake politics for the safety of the private and the social spheres. While one doesn't have complete control over the ways in which one appears to others in these spheres, the nature of relationships in these two spheres is much less risky than their political equivalents. The trouble is that one is liable to gain this sense of self-identity at the expense of gaining a sense of one's location in the shared world. Invoking the aristocratic sensibility of the Greek *polis,* Arendt finds this sense of self-mastery to be a paltry substitute for the glory of acting amidst one's peers in order to gain their admiration.

Given the contemporary sense that the struggles of political life are far more frustrating and much less pleasurable than private and social relationships, it makes more sense to draw attention to the relinquishing of responsibility signaled by this turning away from the world. Whereas Greek citizens took this sense of responsibility as a matter of course and could thus look to the pleasures of politics as an added bonus, we moderns tend not to have a sense of shared responsibility for the world. This is why Arendt's talk of "public happiness" is so untimely, while her sense of the frustrations of politics is so pertinent to our times. The challenge to us moderns is to foster both a sense of responsibility for the world and an appreciation for the pleasures of political struggle in the midst of the frustrations of action. One way to do this is to recognize that the frustrations of action do not signal action's failure, but are rather a sign of our continuing commitment to engage politically with one another for the sake of the shared world.

The second way to achieve self-mastery is to reconceptualize politics in order to protect the self from the vicissitudes of action and the corresponding exigencies of political subjectivity. This is the route political philosophers have tended to take. They have attempted to "solve the perplexities of action" by conceiving of action as a kind of fabrication, as though the point of action is to fashion cities and selves much as a fabricator makes objects:[23]

> In *The Republic,* the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman applies his rules and standards; he 'makes' his City as the sculptor makes a statue; and in the final Platonic work *[The Laws]* these same ideas have even become laws which need only be executed.[24]

"Men of action" have also succumbed to this temptation to "[seek] shelter from action's calamities in an activity where one man, isolated from all others, remains master of his doings, from beginning to end."[25] For those who are politically minded, the pursuit of mastery means conceiving of politics as rule over others, while those who are not politically minded seek to master their lives through the pursuit of less calamitous, more predictable activities in the *vita activa*. The fact that even democratic societies cultivate these avenues of escape from politics is often taken to be a sign of contempt for ordinary men and women on the part of professional thinkers and professional politicians alike. Arendt suggests that something quite different is at work—a suspicion of action that is shared by rulers and ruled.

Within the philosophical tradition, this suspicion of action can be traced back as far as Plato who inaugurated this "escape from action into rule" in his very choice of language. According to Arendt, the Greeks had two words for action, although they recognized the connections between the two: *archein*, or beginning, and *prattein*, or achieving. Over time, archein came to mean not only "to begin," but "to lead," and finally, "to rule," while *prattein* meant "to pass through," "to achieve" and "to finish."[26] The two words recognize that those who initiate particular actions are not necessarily those who see the process through. In the condition of political equality, those who begin and those who achieve have equal standing, although the fact that action's beginners are not those who see action through to the end means that what is achieved is not necessarily what was initially hoped for. In an attempt to overcome this "failure," Plato essentially moved action out of the political realm, replacing it with a hierarchy of those who rule and those who obey.[27] This was not simply an organizing principle of politics in Plato's republic; it extended to every sphere of life, including the self's relation to itself. Plato maintained that to be fit for rule, one must first have the "capacity to rule one's own self."[28] With Plato, the principle of domination governs the *polis* as well as the individual psyche.

The trouble with the idea of self-mastery that follows from the principle of domination is that it simply cannot be sustained in the condition of plurality. From the moment that one inserts oneself into the world, one ceases to be an autonomous, self-sovereign being. Not only is the nature of action such that the initiator seldom has control over the outcomes of what he or she began, but the nature of the appearing self is such that one cannot control how one appears to others across the spaces of public life:

> This disclosure of 'who' in contradistinction to 'what' somebody is—his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display

> or hide—is implicit in everything somebody says and does. It can be hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never be achieved as a willful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this 'who' in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities. On the contrary, it is more likely that the 'who' who appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person himself....[29]

Action's "self-surprising" character underscores the existential value of political action.[30] Not only might others know us better than we know ourselves in many ways, but we learn about ourselves in the course of our interactions with others across the spaces of political life. Action's revelatory character reinforces the value of plurality, since it is only in the presence of others that we come to learn about ourselves. This is not to say that we relinquish autonomy completely. To do so would simply be to enslave oneself to the opinions and perspectives of others. Instead, one engages with the voices of others, acting in part to learn about oneself, in part to dispel the perceptions others have of one, and in part to see if one can learn to be differently. This is why the governing ideals of self-mastery—integrity, self-sufficiency and self-rule—can neither sustain action nor survive action's unpredictable effects.

The quest for integrity and self-mastery is gained at the expense of the shared world, and the loss is both existential and ethical. Not only do we lose the capacity to undertake activities that are as much self-surprising as they are self-revelatory, but we are also no longer prepared to act in ways that constitute the shared world. This sharing of the world does not simply require us to gather together as pre-constituted selves in order to share our perspectives with others and come to agreement about the best course of action. Rather, on Arendt's view, our actions are the basis of the constitution of the shared world. In the process, we learn a great deal about ourselves. Interestingly, the lessons largely follow from what we have to give up in order to live in a truly shared world. What is at issue, in learning to share the world, is not simply the distribution of material goods, but a different sort of investment in the self, one that is congruent with the conditions of political action. This is what Arendt suggests when she cites Machiavelli's "blasphemous" declaration: "I love my native city more than my own soul."[31] In Arendtian terms, what matters for politics is not the sanctity of one's soul, but the courage "to risk the disclosure" of the self for the sake of the shared world.[32]

Notes

1. Margeret Canovan *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185.

2. Machiavelli, cited in Max Weber's "Politics as a Vocation" From *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (London: Routledge and Kegan Pual, 1948), 126, 78, 121. Arendt cites this often, in her essay "Civil Disobedience" in Crises of the Republic (N.Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1972) and in *On Revolution* (Penguin Books, 1973), 37 and 286.

3. The phrase is taken from the title of Bonnie Honig's book, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

4. Arendt *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1958), 246.

5. George Kateb makes this claim in *Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil* (N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), 6. Martin Jay makes a similar claim in "Hannah Arendt," *Partisan Review* 45, no.3 (1978): 353-364. Jeffrey C. Isaac persuasively counters this view of Arendt's inattentiveness to the risks of rebellion in *Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 140-176 .

6. Kateb, 31.

7. Margeret Canovan *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 149.

8. Canovan, 130.

9. *The Human Condition*, 7.

10. Black anti-Apartheid activists exemplify this conception of the principle of political equality. Formal inclusion of blacks into the political process was not the starting point of political equality. They did not wait to be recognized as political equals in order to act; in the course of acting they became political equals. The right to vote was clearly important to the anti-Apartheid movement, and voting is one way of participating in political life, but it is neither the starting point nor the aim of political equality. On Arendt's view, political equality is harnessed to the much larger and existentially more fundamental principle of freedom that I explore below.

11. Bonnie Honig's "Toward an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity" is an excellent analysis of the differences between the two terms and the significance of this distinction for feminist theory. See Honig (ed) *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt.*

12. *The Human Condition,* 208.

13. *The Human Condition,* 176.

14. *The Human Condition,* 176-7.

15. *The Human Condition,* 184.

16. *The Human Condition,* 182.

17. *The Human Condition,* 180.

18. *The Human Condition,* 180.

19. Melissa Orlie's book, *Living Ethically, Acting Politically* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997) is the most extensive discussion of the inevitable trespasses of political action. See the last chapter in particular. See also Orlie's "Forgiving Trespasses, Promising Futures" in *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt,* 337-356.

20. *The Human Condition,* 184.

21. *The Human Condition,* 182.

22. *The Human Condition,* 190.

23. See section 31 of *The Human Condition,* "The traditional substitution of making for acting," 220-230.

24. *The Human Condition,* 227.

25. *The Human Condition,* 220.

26. *The Human Condition,* 189.

27. Arendt finds evidence of this in Plato's *Statesman*. Cited in *The Human Condition,* 222-3.

28. *The Human Condition,* 224.

29. *The Human Condition,* 179.

30. George Kateb uses this phrase in his discussion of Arendt's various depictions of the political actor. Kateb, 9.

31. Cited in Kateb, 13.

32. *The Human Condition,* 180.

The Freedom to Learn: Socio-Political Currents and W.E.B. Du Bois's Views on Education

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INTRODUCTION

> Freedom always entails danger. Complete freedom never exists. But of all the freedoms of which we think, the freedom to learn is in the long run the least dangerous, and the one that should be curtailed last.

These are W.E.B. Du Bois's closing words in his brief essay, "The Freedom to Learn," published in the *Midwest Journal* in 1949. This essay is an example of Du Bois's seemingly perennial critique of social and political arrangements in American life, as well as an illustration of how any variety and number of currents—be they socio-political, ideological, or philosophical, may inform and/or drive one's views on education.

Du Bois was, throughout his long life and illustrious career, a social commentator and political gadfly. His role as a public intellectual was one that he took quite seriously, and his outspokenness is now legend. For example: 1) In 1903, in perhaps his best known and most referenced work, *The Souls of Black Folk,* Du Bois published his attack on the policies of gradualism and accommodation as espoused by the conservative educator and founder of historic Tuskegee Institute, Booker T. Washington; 2) In 1905, along with 59 others, including such men as Monroe Trotter and George Forbes—co-editors of the radical newspaper, the *Boston Guardian,* Du Bois was instrumental in the founding of the Niagara Movement.[1] He said the movement was "for organized determination and aggressive action on the part of men who believe in Negro freedom and growth," and "to oppose firmly present methods of strangling honest criticism; to organize intelligent and honest Negroes; and to support organs of news and public opinion;" [2] 3) In 1935, Du Bois's massive work in revisionist history culminated in the publication of his landmark volume titled *Black Reconstruction.* According to Columbia University history professor, it was Manning Marable, a "radical reinterpretation of the social and political struggles for democracy in the post-bellum South, from the vantage point of Black Americans;" [3] and 4) In 1947, Du Bois—chief among an interracial group of scholars, co-authored and edited, on behalf of the NAACP, a statement titled, "An Appeal to the World," and presented it to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations, protesting Jim Crow in the United States. In the 155-page document, Du Bois's introduction, in part, read:

> This protest…is a frank and earnest appeal to all the world for elemental justice against the treatment which the United States has visited upon us for three centuries... It is to induce the nations of the world to persuade this nation to be just to its own people, that we have prepared and now present to you this…documented statement of grievances, and we firmly believe that the situation pictured here is as much your concern as ours.[4]

These and many other examples reflect the activist posture that Du Bois assumed, and the application of his intellect to the problems of the world and of this country—as he experienced and understood them. As a public intellectual, the positions Du Bois took were not always popular but he possessed strength and conviction enough to take a stand for what he thought to be appropriate and just. He never allowed himself to be bought or co-opted, or cowed into mindless, obedient alignment with society's dominant forces.[5]

As regards how any variety of currents may inform and/or drive one's views on education, the history of education in the United States is filled with examples of how varying currents influence and control thoughts and practices in education. Barbara Finkelstein, for example, addresses this issue in her essay, "Education and the Retreat from Democracy in the United States, 1979-198?." She points out that "public schools are instruments of state and local rather than national government, and yet, from the time of their origin in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, they have functioned as ideological templates revealing and organizing national aspirations, myths, symbols, and standards."[6] Schools do not exist in a vacuum. They are not immune from the diseases of social circumstance, nor are they independent of the agents who call them into existence. Consequently, schools reflect various interests and prevailing currents of society, at both the national and local levels.

In a chronological sweep spanning many years, Finkelstein presents, in broad outline, certain trends and currents which, over time, have been reflected in what American schools teach and in how they conduct themselves. Among these trends and currents, she includes: 1) the matter of instilling "restraint in increasingly larger numbers of immigrant and native children, while... preparing them for learning and labor in an industrialized society," 2) the move "to eliminate racism, ethnocentrism, ageism, sexism, and sectarianism" from society, 3) a call for more science and math, to better "cultivate scientific literacy and technological skill," to work in support of American superiority in the world, and 4) a call to return to so-called basics—variously interpreted to mean the three R's, school prayer, Bible-based instruction, certain rituals of patriotism, and old-fashioned, well-written if racist, sexist, and class-ridden materials of instruction like the McGuffey readers."[7] More recently, there is also found the ever-increasing phenomenon of schools in partnership with corporations—schools acting, virtually, as functionaries of big business and as vassals to private enterprise.[8] This litany of trends and currents reflected in school curriculum is further highlighted by Maxine Greene. In her book, *The Dialectic of Freedom*, Greene says that " school people are asked to increase academic rigor, ensure the preparation of a work force for 'high technology,' enhance cultural literacy, overcome mediocrity, contain adolescent pregnancies, prevent suicides, [and] educate against AIDS."[9] The list, of course, does not stop here. Other currents could easily include those that favor schools as places that are committed to the broad principle of political democracy, that celebrate pluralism and diversity, or that work to foster among the young, a sense of constructive, critical reflection. To be sure, some currents that affect education are constructive and desirable, and some are more obvious or more blatantly manifested than others; but schools are governed, in the end, by certain currents and forces that operate on behalf of those who exercise the dominant power and who choose to propagate a certain perspective.

In "The Freedom to Learn," the current that Du Bois addresses is both political and ideological in nature. It is a current that restricts free inquiry and that punishes those who dare to think for themselves. It is a current that works to marginalize those who hold ideas and beliefs that differ from the ones sanctioned by the dominant or controlling group, and one that moves to suppress the views of those who are bold enough to voice their dissent. More to the point, the particular current Du Bois addresses is government censorship. It is a current that came into play in the years that closely followed World War II. It was a time in U.S. political history that was characterized in part by government-sanctioned witch-hunts against Communists and Communist-sympathizers, and dubbed the age of McCarthyism[10]—so-called because of the political maneuverings of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Du Bois's response to the political current that restricted free inquiry was typically bold and forthright. This 1949 essay reflects Du Bois's insistence upon the freedom of speech and criticism, and illustrates his ongoing efforts toward achieving full civil rights for all people.

ESSAY SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS

What exactly does Du Bois say in his essay? First, he says that it is a time when anyone who questions the organization and execution of business in the United States could be easily accused by the government of disloyalty to the country. Being so accused, says Du Bois, would be enough to place an individual under a weighty cloud of suspicion. Responding to such a charge would come with great difficulty, and public opinion, impaired by what media makes of the situation, would rise against you, favoring what the government charges as the truth. The risk for the accused extends to the loss of family, friends, employment, social standing, and peace of mind.

Second, that it is in the nature of each human civilization to think that it is the best way, the only way, the way that is superior or supreme, and that it is the last word in enterprise and progress. But such a conclusion, Du Bois notes, is that of those who have the most to lose, if the status quo is upset. Those who are less well off may very well benefit from knowing more, from having other knowledge that differs from what they are told by those in control. Any restriction on education, says Du Bois, is unjust and fatal to the well being of future generations.

Third, that the system by which the economy is organized in the United States, presently, fears that other possibilities for the organization and distribution of goods and services would disturb or upset the established system. Du Bois goes on to say that it is time to study the current state of affairs, that it is necessary to know as much as possible, that the younger generation should be encouraged to "seek truth, and to judge it."

Fourth, that it is a disservice to prevent the study of economic change, to prevent people from seeking knowledge of Marx and Communism; to have the younger generation believe that no one in past centuries in human history has advocated change in our economic organization. Du Bois postulates that the country would benefit from a free and open curriculum, consisting of varying views and alternatives in thought and doctrine; and that if the country fears such "foreign agents" as Marx and Engels, the best solution to resolving that fear is to allow for study and critical examination, rather than the suppression, of other possibilities.

Fifth, that the danger in preventing youth from pursuing knowledge and truth is that it may perpetuate a system that favors the few above the masses. Somewhere, some are living off the advantages of the current situation. Those who own little or nothing, Du Bois says, have no "voice in the organization or conduct of industry." Although it is possible that people who benefit from advantage may do the right thing, it is also possible that their position of advantage may obstruct that choice; and that study, inquiry, and argument are the best ways to determine this, not suppression.

Finally, Du Bois points out that in times of crisis or disaster, it is amazing how the schools are singled out as the place that can make people accept anything. If the school is so highly prized, then it should be maintained as an institution free of constraint, and the last place where learning, debate, and reflection are curtailed. Freedom always entails danger, he argues. The freedom to learn is the least dangerous of all freedoms.

Discussion of Du Bois's Response

How can Du Bois's response to the political current he faced be understood and interpreted? In the first place, it must be made clear what it is that Du Bois is doing. It is the *right to inquire* that Du Bois is defending. He is not advocating on behalf of another political system. He is not acting as a "foreign agent," as he was so charged. Du Bois is defending the right of citizens to engage in free inquiry. This, he says, citizens should be able to do. Du Bois's point is that the suppression of information prevents the unfolding of truth and undermines the principles of freedom and justice. In "The Freedom to Learn," he argues against censorship and in favor of protecting individual access to and examination of information. Du Bois says,

> Of all the civil rights for which the world has struggled and fought for five thousand years, the right to learn is undoubtedly the most fundamental. If a people has preserved this right, then no matter how far it goes astray, no matter how many mistakes it makes, in the long run, in the unfolding of generations, it is going to come back to the right. But if at any time, or for any long period, people are prevented from thinking, children are indoctrinated with dogma, and they are made to learn not what is necessarily true but what the dominant forces in the world want them to think is true, then there

> is no aberration from truth and progress of which such a people may not be guilty.[11]

Forty years before Paulo Freire and Donald Macedo team up to talk about literacy and about reading the word and the world, Du Bois points to the relationship that exists between knowledge and power—between knowing something and having the capacity or authority to act on it. What Du Bois recognizes as a necessity and what he speaks for, is the *right to know*—pure and simple. Contemporary discourse refers to this phenomenon as critical democracy or radical literacy. Du Bois's defense of the right to know, to learn, and to inquire, relates directly to the political and ideological framework that affects how people live. He states,

> It is all the more dangerous to stop the education of youth and the pursuit of knowledge in any direction, because of the fact that practically always some persons, some classes, and some nations are enjoying great advantage in any current situation.[12]

For Du Bois, knowledge has the potential and the power to undercut forces of oppression and disfranchisement.

How interesting it is, to read Henry Giroux's theory of literacy and its relationship to democratization, and to compare it to Du Bois's earlier statements on the freedom to learn. For example, Giroux says,

> Developing a cultural politics of literacy and pedagogy becomes an important starting point for enabling those who have been silenced or marginalized by the schools, mass media, cultural industry, and video culture to reclaim the authorship of their own lives. An emancipatory theory of literacy points to the need to develop an alternative discourse and critical reading of how ideology, culture, and power work within late capitalist societies to limit, disorganize, and marginalize the more critical and radical everyday experiences and common-sense perceptions of individuals. At issue here is the recognition that the political and moral gains that teachers and others have made should be held onto and fought for with a new intellectual and political rigor.[13]

Substituting Du Bois's words, "newspaper and radio filled with false interpretation of fact" for Giroux's "marginalized by the schools, mass media, cultural industry, and video culture," and Du Bois's words, "attempts to keep even elementary learning away from children, away from women, and away from certain classes and races," for Giroux's "the political gains that teachers and others have made, " it is clear that Giroux and Du Bois are on the same page, and it is a reminder of Du Bois's 1949 defense of civil rights and his struggle against the suppression of the freedom to learn. Clearly, Giroux's 1987 statement in favor of a radical pedagogy and for a radical democracy is not unlike Du Bois's earlier radical stance against government interference in the matter of an individual's right to inquire. Further, when Giroux says there "is the need to reconstitute a radical view of literacy that revolves around the importance of naming and transforming those ideological and social conditions that undermine the possibility for forms of community and public life organized around the imperatives of a critical democracy,"[14] he is locking arms with Du Bois, advocating free access to information, and calling for unfettered possibilities for debate and criticism.

A second matter to consider in the interpretation of Du Bois's essay lies in a different sphere. It can be argued that Du Bois's efforts are part and parcel of a larger moral issue he speaks to—namely, that disfranchisement exists in the world and should be struggled against. It manifests itself, certainly, through racism, sexism, and class-ism but its root is in economic systems and structures, and its consequence, inevitably, is war. Specifically, Du Bois says,

> What we need today, then, to ward off the threatened collapse of the civilization in which we live is not only opposition to war as a method of human progress, but also a determination to keep the civil rights which modern civilization has gained at so vast a cost, and the possession of which is the surest preventive of war: the right to think, the right to express one's thought, the right to act in accordance with one's conclusions. Especially we should insist upon the right to learn, upon the right to have our children learn, and upon keeping our schools, uncoerced by the dominant forces of the present world, free to exercise the right to join with the great Goethe in a worldwide cry for 'light, more light.'"[15]

Du Bois speaks of war, the threaten collapse of civilization, and civil rights gained through struggle—along side of such issues as disfranchised peoples the world over, unjust economic systems that advantage the few at the expense of the many, peoples' fight for voice in the affairs that affect their lives, and the insistence on certain other rights. Why so much? Why so great an agenda? It appears that Du Bois sees that no one of these issues stands alone and isolated from all the others. Instead, he understands that they are linked together, one inextricably tied to many. This is the larger issue: the consequences that greed, profit and all forms of control have on the disfranchised everywhere. It is as much a moral question for Du Bois as it is a political one.

Du Bois's view of political life, and of life in general, is holistic. For example: the profits of big businesses and the accumulated wealth of the few who control these businesses cannot be unrelated to the meager subsistence of millions of workers who labor for small wages. Similarly, the major war campaigns of the world, perpetuated and sustained by super-power nations, cannot be divorced from the reality of the existence of colonized peoples the world-over, and the stripping of their native territories of their rich, natural resources. Also, the presence of poverty, ignorance, sickness, and suffering of all sorts should not be viewed as disconnected from the cry for education, literacy, and the tools that promote voice and self-sufficiency. Du Bois calls for the right to think and to learn, and for keeping schools uncoerced. This call is both political and moral in nature, and it is linked to the idea of learning as emancipatory activity. With more 'light' comes less tolerance of suppression and more demand for freedom. It is, therefore, not surprising that Du Bois's life was devoted to what may appear to some observers as disparate activities. He was a professor at a historically black school, a founding-father civil rights activist, a principal organizer and guiding light for Pan-African organization and unity, a crusader for world peace, a one-time candidate for political office, a pioneering social scientist, and an agitator on many domestic issues. All the while, he still found time for voluminous writing and editing; and he sustained interest and energy for mentoring black artists and people of letters, inspiring the Harlem Renaissance. The several levels of activity Du Bois supported so tirelessly in his life, while appearing disparate, were not totally unrelated. One thing affected and influenced another. Du Bois's life embodied his espousal of a moral struggle to resist oppression and disfranchisement, and it was consistent with his overall principles of uplift and achieving full civil rights in all human relations.

Finally, a third matter to consider while interpreting Du Bois's defense of the freedom to learn is that of his repeated emphases on children. For example, he speaks against " attempts to keep learning from children," and for the "free and open curriculum of schools." He also talks of "children having access to the great minds of past centuries," and of "schools as uncoerced by the dogma of dominant forces." He makes constant reference to children and schools, in a way that underscores his moral imperative while also addressing the importance of future generations. Du Bois says,

> The freedom to learn, curtailed even as it is today, has been bought by bitter sacrifice. And whatever we may think of the curtailment of other civil rights, we should fight to the last ditch to keep open the right to learn, the right to have examined in our schools not only

> what we believe but what we do not believe; not only what our leaders says, but what the leaders of other groups and nations, and the leaders of other centuries have said. We must insist upon this in order to give our children the fairness of a start which will equip them with such an array of facts and such an attitude toward truth that they can have a real chance to judge what the world is and what its greater minds have thought it might be.[16]

Du Bois's moral agenda comes more clearly into focus through his words, "fairness of a start," and "attitude toward truth;" and in his call to allow children to "judge what the world is," as well as what it can be. Implicit in his speech is progress—moral and social; and that the freedom to learn, when vested in children and youth, augurs well for a future less encumbered by various forms of prejudice and domination. Knowledge is the key. He sees schools as places where intelligence and growth can flourish, where children can receive the tools of learning—which, in turn, can diffuse poverty and ignorance. Consequently, Du Bois states that schools, in the end, should be the freest of all institutions.

Summary

"The Freedom to Learn" sheds light on certain of Du Bois's views on education. It especially emphasizes the need for fighting to protect the right to engage in free inquiry, to seek new knowledge, and to be free from censorship of thought and expression. Responding to the work of McCarthyism in the United States, shortly after WW II, Du Bois speaks out against how this political movement restricts real education and how it inevitably will have dire consequences for future generations. Children, he says, are affected, both in their ability to seek out new knowledge and in their capacity to judge it properly and without constraint.

In addition, Du Bois's essay also illustrates how political currents can inform, drive, and even inspire one's convictions about education. Du Bois's argument, in many ways, is moral in nature, drawing attention to the relationship that exists or that ought to exist among freedom, education , learning, and social life. The essential element in that relationship is freedom.

Notes

1. The Niagara Movement was the forerunner to the founding of the NAACP in 1909. Du Bois was also among the NAACP's original incorporators.

2. W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of its First Century.* Ed. Herbert Aptheker (New York: International

Publishers Co., 1968), p. 248.

3. Manning Marable, "Introduction" in Julie Nord, ed. W.E.B. Du Bois, *Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1999), p. v.

4. W.E.B. Du Bois, "An Appeal to the World," Philip S. Foner, ed. *W.E.B. Du Bois Speaks: 1920-1963* (New York: Pathfinder, 1970), pp. 202,203.

5. Two of the articles or principles subscribed to in 1905 by the members of the Niagara Movement were those of [in Du Bois's words] (1) "opposing firmly present methods of strangling honest criticism," and (2) "supporting organs of news and public opinion." Nearly a half-century later, in 1949 and after, Du Bois finds himself still fighting for and defending the same principles.

6. Barbara Finkelstein, "Education and the Retreat from Democracy in the United States, 1979-198?," *Teachers College Record*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Winter, 1984), p. 275.

7. Ibid., pp. 276-279.

8. See Joseph H. Boyett and Henry P. Conn (1991), *Workplace 2000: The Revolution Reshaping American Business* and Scott Barbour et al., eds. (1995), Work: Opposing Viewpoints.

9. Maxine Greene, *The Dialectic of Freedom* (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1988), p. 13.

10. A number of responses to and characterizations of this period are extant but noteworthy treatments of this time period include Charles Potter's *Days of Shame* (1965), Robert Goldston's *The American Nightmare* (1973), and Cedric Belfrage's *The American Inquisition* (1973). Fifteen to twenty years after Du Bois's essay, the vocabulary of these titles reflects the same phenomena Du Bois faced, and—for him, the same phenomena that led to his 1951 indictment when he sat as an officer of the Peace Information Center.

11. W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Freedom to Learn," Philip S. Foner, ed. *W.E.B. Du Bois Speaks: 1920-1963*, p. 230.

12. Ibid., p. 229.

13. Henry A. Giroux, "Literacy and the Pedagogy of Political Empowerment," in Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo, *Literacy: Reading the Word and the World* (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, 1987), pp. 5,6.

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. Du Bois, "The Freedom to Learn," p. 230.

16. Ibid., p. 231.

Curricular Theorizing for Democratic Learning: Multiple and Contending Viewpoints

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INTRODUCTION

It can be difficult to get people to step back and take a fresh look at an approach to learning that until now may have seemed a fixed part of the educational landscape. Many of the positions of what I will call the dominant model of learning can seem so preordained, that is, "natural" and not in need of being interrogated, if only because they have become so customary. One obvious and understandable reason for this reluctance is familiarity. For example, by the time most people graduate from high school, they will have spent nine months out of every year for twelve years in a cultural setting heavily influenced by this dominant model—an amount of field time few anthropologists are lucky enough to experience! The dominant model, then, is what most of us grew up knowing best and expecting. Questioning it may not seem very important or even necessary if it seems to have worked well enough for us. However, precisely because this model enjoys such wide acceptance a critical analysis of key components is necessary. I hope to demonstrate how, if not necessarily mistaken, many of its "givens" are at least debatable and not at all fixed. This will call for making a convincing case for choice and change in an area where what is, has come to be accepted at face value as what "obviously" ought to be.

It is not that the dominant model of learning furnishes no valuable insights or serves no meaningful intellectual purpose. But the problem with the dominant model is that we tend to formulate our total perception of learning based on its partial but tacitly-accepted-as-complete outlook. A shift in the alternative direction I am proposing is not only pragmatic but necessary if we wish to avoid sliding into an intellectual rut.

What specific beliefs and practices comprise the dominant model of learning? And how do those belonging to the alternative model that I am proposing differ? Why are these differences significant? Or, to put it another way, what is to be gained in the learning process by a movement away from the familiar, dominant approach? Why is a major shift so timely and essential? To answer these questions, I have selected one key aspect of learning that raises some particularly important philosophical questions (vis a vis democracy and education) and highlights some of the fundamental differences between the dominant and alternative models. I have titled this aspect "multiple and contending viewpoints." This short focus on multiple and contending viewpoints is the first step in a bigger philosophical project on the theoretical connections between democracy and education.

Multiple and Contending Viewpoints in the Dominant Model

In the dominant model of learning, multiple and contending viewpoints are not typically included. Generally speaking, a wide variety of views is not explicitly valued nor sought out, and usually for one of two reasons: certain views may simply be regarded as wrong or harmful/threatening. This tends to be the case, when:

A single, most accurate response is the ultimate goal

Time does not allow for a thorough examination of a variety of viewpoints on the subject, and short-cutting the learning process by telling learners what the experts have already discovered and concluded is seen as the most intellectually expedient thing to do. "Correct" and/or "appropriate" viewpoints are presented to students so they will not have to waste their time drawing what will be predictable and inevitable conclusions. This way, students can expeditiously get on to the bigger things and not squander precious time on what has already been determined by the teacher and other experts to be true and right and accurate about the world.

Learners are regarded as intellectually unprepared or immature.

Since it is highly improbable that students will have spent as much time researching the subject as have the teacher/experts, students are viewed automatically as not yet capable of making up their own minds in what will need to be an accurate and proper manner. Nor are students by definition necessarily ever regarded as having the intellectual "right" to do so, since they—as learners—lack the expertise and experience of the teacher/experts. The first model believes it is actually behaving in sound and virtuous ways by helping its novices avoid any unnecessary pitfalls resulting from their lack of practical experience with and/or theoretical exposure to a wide range of viewpoints. Surely, these students can and may learn about diverse views in the future when they are developmentally capable of handling them in a mature and responsible fashion. Intellectual relativism and nihilism are feared. It is dreaded that exposure to a variety of viewpoints might translate/degenerate into a kind of intellectual relativism. If presented with a wide variety of viewpoints, will not students get the impression that all viewpoints are equally valid or worthy? In their inexperience and ignorance, how will students be able to discriminate among so many views? And furthermore, will not exposure to contrary ideas in particular only confuse learners? Too many competing and compelling viewpoints will just confound them and they will simply respond by tuning out. The first model believes that students only want and need the kind of simplistic analysis that paints the world in "right" or "wrong" terms. If the world is presented to them as too complicated, complex and/or contrary, they will be sapped of any motivation to keep learning about it. Worse, they may even retreat into intellectual ennui or chose a view at variance with the teacher's.

The aim is to promote a particular viewpoint.

A. Sometimes teachers who hold minority viewpoints may feel they owe their students as much time on these views as possible, especially if these same students are unlikely to be exposed to much if any of these alternative views in other places—and probably never with the same amount of respect and insight that supportive teachers could lend to these views.

B. Related to the previous reason, sometimes teachers justify overtly promoting a personal viewpoint for reasons related to social justice. That is, because their preferred opinion is one that has been historically neglected or maltreated or discriminated against, historical redress legitimates not spending time (and especially not equal time) on dominant/majority points of view.

C. Or, when a particular viewpoint enjoys massive support a teacher may not feel it socially necessary or even politically wise to include other views. Being able to dialogue with those who disagree with community endorsed positions or beliefs—or those who would at least question them—is not held up as a valued, useful skill. There is no real interest in, nor a perceived need for, coalition-building or bridge-building. The teacher's role is to transmit culture, not alter or question it.

ANALYSIS

In the dominant model, the focus is all too often on what learners end up thinking and/or believing; how they got there is of little or no consequence. In other words, the dominant model tends to select and justify a particular pedagogy in terms of its ability to guarantee a desired intellectual accuracy and/or high degree of social support.

Unfortunately, teachers operating in this dominant mode are not always aware themselves that there is an alternate perspective. They have not experienced such diversity of thought first-hand nor been led to even expect that it always exists. Thus, certain un-sanctioned views can be easily excluded altogether, while others only briefly reviewed, and this usually to simply point out their "obvious" flaws. If the sad truth be told, teachers in this model are themselves regularly regarded as being as under-developed, that is, as intellectually insufficient, as their learners. And an unfortunate reality about this kind of intellectual travel is that, at least from the perspective of those directly involved, the route will usually appear scenic enough and the vehicle always in such good repair, they will not expect to run into anything requiring that they draw upon knowledge gained from their past experience, let alone continue to develop their own navigational skills among competing claims. Why fiddle with something if it is not broken and/or risk losing their way? Such direct involvement could translate into being held accountable for the choices made and this kind of responsibility is so unfamiliar in the dominant model that it automatically feels too risky. If a direct participant (ie., a teacher or student) does ask about other possible viewpoints (that is, if someone makes things complicated), they are criticized as a trouble-maker. The trip seems satisfactory enough for the majority of passengers; they seem to really enjoy or at least be content enough with the view provided.

When learning becomes primarily a matter of getting novices to adopt a predetermined, particular viewpoint or belief, learning tends to amount to a type of unreflexive training or exercise in indoctrination. One reason for referring to it as indoctrination is that when accurate or appropriate viewpoints are preselected and endorsed in these ways, it is highly probable that learners will remain in the dark about what is at stake in adopting any one position. And, even if they were to voluntarily adopt the same position, the fact that they are not familiar with contrary positions means they know less about their own and cannot dialogue with those who do not think just as they do.

In the end, pockets of likeminded individuals are created and recreated and the personal satisfaction and intellectual stimulation that can result from dialogue among and with a variety of others is not likely to be sought after nor enjoyed. These learners have experts who will have failed to prepare them for the kind of constructive social participation (for instance, coalition building) that requires an appreciation and tolerance of the multiple and ever changing sorts of diversities existing in the world. The dominant model makes little room for openended inquiry. Each of the scenarios above tends to foster false impressions as to what constitutes a consensus. The dominant model implies that all "right" thinking or "intelligent" or "enlightened" people should and do agree, and that either 1) no compromise is needed or 2) since a compromise (by definition, premised on the notion that no knowledge is permanently a fact) would require the ultimate epistemological risk—a sacrifice of a comfortable permanence for an idea or view that is less settled is undesirable and too tenuous.

Finally, the educational message implicitly sent to participants in each of the above scenarios is that learning is an "all or nothing" process of absorption; the stakes are just too high to afford the kind of genuine openmindedness that would make a real compromise between competing viewpoints and ideas possible. Learning in this model is not an intellectual adventure undertaken with a variety of others, since at no point is there really a need to explore, respect or value the viewpoints of those who disagree with one. At best, alternative views are worthy of being examined only when time allows for it or when the "right" way fails.

MULTIPLE AND CONTENDING VIEWPOINTS IN THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL

While the dominant model usually jettisons multiple and contending viewpoints because it regards them as inappropriate or inefficient, the alternative model of learning openly embraces them. In fact, it considers multiple and contending viewpoints essential building-block components in the learning process. This is because in the alternative model: Openended inquiry is valued as both a means and an end

Exposure to an array of multiple and contending viewpoints is one very effective—and, quite obvious-way of engaging learners in openended inquiry. For example, when they become familiar with the variety of discourses surrounding an issue or topic, learners will tend to generate their own substantive questions about it; they will see for themselves that all the important decisions have not already been made, nor have all the exciting things already been done. In other words, learners will experience an authentic need for asking substantive, non-rhetorical questions, and they will want to actively pursue what they realize will not be rehearsed answers for them. The second model does not condescend learners by safeguarding them from the range of social or intellectual views on an issue. It does not regard learners as inherently vulnerable and naive beings. And this is why it can trust them more and expect so much more from them than the dominant model.

In the second model, learners' questions essentially coordinate a process of discovery that cannot operate on automatic pilot, the way the dominant model's educational vehicle seems to be able. Instead of using the questions learner/novices ask to reach an already decided social goal or intellectual end, the second model utilizes their questions as a means of deepening and expanding their future inquiries—so much so that this model self-consciously evaluates itself in terms of the nature and complexity of its learners' inquiries.

Learners are helped to find their own way among the diversity of views and beliefs, even if this way becomes confusing and difficult. Getting learners to adopt one particular end viewpoint—however reassuring or accurate the viewpoint— is not the ultimate goal. The alternative model invites them to think more independently and critically about, for example, the subject matter, a doctrine, or even the learning process itself—right from the start. Everyone is recognized as having some set of resources with which to make sense of new ideas and discriminate among them

Just because novice/learners may not have spent as much time researching the subject as experts probably have, this does not mean they are incapable of meaningful and significant involvement in its analysis and critique. Even the anthropologist must use what she knows in order to make sense of what she does not. One difference between the professional anthropologist and the novice/learner is that the anthropologist engages in this kind of analysis in a more formal, systematic way than the novice typically does. Put another way, the anthropologist is more likely to know when she is doing this kind of thinking. But this does not mean the novice does not, naturally and regularly, do it himself. Teachers in this model take it as a pragmatic given that no one—not even the so-called novice- ever simply and passively absorbs "information" without doing anything with it (ie., drawing conclusions, asking questions, accepting or rejecting it, etc).

True, a teacher usually has and probably should have more formal knowledge than her learners, but this does not mean she should be granted an automatic monopoly on expertise. Instead of thinking of expertise as someone's private possession (i.e., having the right answers), the second model thinks of it more in terms of the ability to ask questions. In the second model, a teacher's expertise comes from her ability to facilitate the complex thinking and conceptual development of her learners. This is why the second model places such a high premium on a teacher's ability (read: her expertise) to facilitate the learning process. Exposure to a variety of competing and compelling viewpoints more truthfully conveys the "fluid nature" of things to learners and is critical, if they are to come to value and actively seek out complexity

Because the second model wants learners to formulate their own opinions and choose positions that best reflect their current understandings and experiences, it engages them in intentional, thoughtful, side-by-side examination of the competing and compelling options. It explicitly aims to develop their abilities to navigate among opposing claims, and it does this first by encouraging them to value and actively seek out complexity. Learners in this model regard complexity as inherent and valuable. They are intellectually invigorated by it, not paralyzed. In fact, as they encounter manifold possibilities and interpretations, they will come to regard overly simplistic and narrow analyses as intellectually patronizing and disrespectful of their abilities to make sense of things.

Learners in this model come to savor the world's unpredictability; they expect to have to continually alter their thoughts and beliefs about it. Students in this model understand that learning can occur even in the presence of confusion. Ambiguity and complication do not automatically mean that they will come away from the experience believing all ideas are equal. In fact, all ideas are not "created equal." And the second model does not always present them this way. But this does not mean that learners should not, as a rule, be exposed to and helped to appreciate or comprehend what each idea consists of.

It is precisely because the second model wants its learners to be versatile, engaged and more or less self-determining that it denounces simple solutions and static explanations, even when these are proffered as an antidote to intellectual relativism and nihilism. In fact, such paralysis is more likely the result of the first model's claim to a static, easily-agreed-upon truth, that is always clearly evident and confirmable. The second model expects learners to be engaged participant/constructors in a world that is ever in a state of flux, and not simply passive observer/recorders of a conveniently unchanging view of it. They may or may not end up believing the same as their teacher. And if they do, at least they know why this is the case and they are better able to articulate and justify their views to others. What is not acceptable is if they were to unconsciously adopt a position or take one without some knowledge of it's pros and cons.

In the second model, learning is not the transferring of facts and skills (and predetermined positions) from "enlightened" experts to "to-be enlightened" novices.

A. Even if a teacher's viewpoint is in the minority, she still feels she owes her students the full range of perspectives, so they can see for themselves where her position lies and what is at stake in adopting it. Furthermore, familiarizing students with the positions of others might actually serve to strengthen the teacher's preferred position because students are then able to articulate what others have compromised or left out of their analysis.

B. Even though a teacher could easily justify overtly promoting a particular viewpoint for reasons related to historical redress, she is uncomfortable doing so since she believes that such promotion tends to lead to narrow, dogmatic or even arrogant thinking. It does not therefore, ultimately, help the students learn to think for themselves, nor does it prepare them to deal effectively with those who either are unlikely to agree with them or who have not yet committed themselves to any one viewpoint, thus ignoring the need for coalition-building/bridge-building.

C. Even when massive support does not exist for a specific viewpoint, students still need to be familiar with the majority/minorities viewpoint(s) even as students work to change them. Students need to be able to dialogue with others who disagree with their espoused positions and those who openly question them. That is, if they are to be effective reformers, students must understand "the lay of the land." They need to be versed in more than their own (or the teacher's preferred) reformist viewpoint. Thus, interaction with a variety of people, materials, information and ideas is still important and needed.

ANALYSIS

While short-cutting the learning process may be necessary on certain occasions, as a general rule and in the long run, simply presenting learners with what experts have predetermined to be "correct" or "appropriate" information is intellectually insufficient and can spell death to the learning process. When the first model presents the world to learners in this way, as though it were a vehicle headed down a sure and permanent road, it is hard for them to imagine a role in determining its direction for themselves. What remains for these learner/novices to think about or do? Because the route has already been set, little if any input will likely be required of them. They are truly just passengers. In the alternative model, what learners end up thinking and believing is important but not at the expense of how they reached these conclusions. Content and process are regarded as two sides of the same pedagogical coin.

If the world is not in total agreement—that is, any world (i.e., the world of feminists, the world of economists, the world of biologists, the world of

Roman Catholics, etc.)—why learn about it as though it were or even should be in agreement? In the alternative approach, part of what learning is about is modeling. The practice of including a variety of viewpoints, especially those with whom we personally do not agree, communicates two key beliefs to learners:

1) That disagreement is natural and often inevitable, not to be dreaded and probably not possible to avoid even between those who "read from the same page" and therefore,
2) People who disagree are not so-called natural enemies.

Why not learn in a way that better helps prepare us to deal with and feel comfortable with the natural and inevitable differences among people? Or to put it another way, why be prepared to talk only to those people who think and believe just as we do?

True, it can be very difficult to listen respectfully to others' viewpoints, especially when these are very different from one's own, however learning that only presents a particular set of sanctioned views encourages polarization. But the presentation of a variety of viewpoints can serve to lessen dogmatic or narrow and ideological thinking. Being exposed to contending viewpoints can lead to less conformity and more independent and original thought. Of course, this may not always be the end goal. There may be times when, for example, the young are expected to follow the intellectual and social lead of their elders. It is important to distinguish between these cases and those in which learners authentically participate in the selection and critique of a wide range of beliefs and ideas.

The Reconstruction of Cultural Experience in Dewey and Winnicott: Notes for further investigation

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One of Freud's interlocuters, D.W. Winnicott, gave public lectures to teachers, social workers and child specialists, and in doing so shed considerable light on the difficult processes of adolescence and the fantasy spaces of children as they relate to the larger environment in which children develop and become adults. Winnicott's greatest discovery was the "facilitating environment," a space that he conceived of as formative to the life of the future adult (Winnicott 1965). Much like John Dewey, Winnicott was concerned with the education of future citizens and wished to ameliorate some of the negative experiences they may have while undergoing the educational process and emotional development of early life. Winnicott was neither a cynic nor a utopian in that he viewed the facilitating environment as a space of possible change. Much like Dewey's laboratory school, as a space where children and adolescents could learn experientially without fearing punishment for failure or transgression, Winnicott also used the facilitating environment as a therapeutic instrument to rectify the injustice done to children that damaged their confidence. Winnicott called the feelings that accompany this restoration of confidence the feeling of "omnipotence." Winnicott, however, goes further than Dewey to describe the importance of the facilitating environment to the development of "healthy" individuals in democratic societies, by actually articulating the emotional processes that accompany experimental freedom in a way that Dewey, constrained by scientific jargon, could not.

In this essay I will briefly argue that both thinkers were concerned with encouraging "creative experience" in democratic societies through similar strategies. The similarities between the two thinkers approaches are numerous, but I will only focus on their shared concern for encouraging creativity through a form of cultural experience that is only available in the free space provided by a democratically-minded society. While on a formal plane, democratic societies respect freedom and experimentation, Dewey knew very well that on an informal plane, convention and culture often overshadow the democratic promise. Dewey's "epistemological realism" is a form of omnipotence in that it examines how experience can be reconstructed in an objective space, free from the judgment of an establishment- oriented society (Dewey 1916).

Similarly, Winnicott's psychoanalytic approach has filled a gap in our knowledge of what motivates human actions in positive ways; moreover, in ways that validate the concept of the human personality, rather than the usual stress placed on individual capabilities that are of benefit to a collective and utilitarian society. The use of an individual (and individuality itself) is of paramount importance to reproductive education (i.e. that education which makes the progress of society as a whole into its sum goal). But, as Winnicott would say, education must make this contribution of the individual in some way meaningful to that particular individual, not just a function of collective action and creativity. Certainly he would argue that we must "know" the dependence fostered by shared or collective experience; in fact, it is necessary that one first identifies or remembers an experience somewhere in their past that reconfirms this phenomenon, possibly with the mother or father. However, it is this shared experience that enables one to be creative because, for Winnicott, the experience of dependence—if it is experienced in a generative way—is what allows creativity to unfold at the individual level. "To be a cog in a machine" he says, is an experience that allows for the creative "doing" that might be required of the individual so highly praised in American political and educational philosophy, particularly that individual described (and potentially sought after) in American pragmatism (Winnicott 1986, 50). There is much in Pragmatism that is ignored or debased by its critics because it cannot explain—in language -what it really wants to achieve, notwithstanding its painstaking attention to critical terms such as semiosis (Pierce), belief (James), subjective deprivation (Addams), doing (Dewey), the locus of values (Locke), (West), irony (Rorty), and so on.

This presentation essay is part of a larger essay in which I argue that Dewey's project for radical democracy and the goal of experimentalism in education, cannot be achieved without the acknowledgment of Winnicott's theories of personality derived from the clinical experience he attained as a psycho-analyst in Britain during the middle phase of the twentieth century.

My argument is based on the insight that Winnicott, like Dewey, had a profound interest in helping children to find the creative impulse in a world that continually deprived them of opportunity to do this. However, unlike Dewey, Winnicott did not exclusively seek this empowerment in the material or even political realm (as did Dewey), but in the interpersonal and pyschological one. It may very well be true that Pragmatism suffers from an inability to distinguish its critical concepts from the context in which they are created. This is important because the Deweyan project of "reconstruction," whether its objective is experience, philosophy, publicity or even "doing" itself, is not attainable as it stands in his texts. Without the acknowledgement that personality is, in many ways, under the exclusive control and ownership of the "I" or individual, Dewey's reconstruction cannot take place without falling under the rubric of utilitarian philosophy with its emphasis on the maximization of self-interest, an interest that we all know is determined by material conditions, not interpersonal or social ones.

Before getting into all this, however, I would like to re-introduce Winnicott to the readership.[1] My introduction will be slightly different from others in that I am using him to highlight a gap in Dewey's philosophy that must be remedied if his thought is to remain useful to individuals. Further, I think that Winnicott's introduction here should be of some interest to those working with students who are deprived emotionally by the educational systems with less funding and material resources to devote to making time for "doing." Severely damaged students often throw up obstacles at school, even though the school feels this as a slight to their generosity since they have made the time and spent the resources to develop creative curricula. But, and this is the critical *but* established by Winnicott, these activities still rely on the overarching disciplinary mechanism of *compliance,* without ever considering what it means to foster creativity. Most of the journals in educational theory and administration naively stress compliance as the ultimate goal of education, not creativity or pleasure. Or, if they are more critical journals they focus on "resistance" to compliance and the many forms it may take, but both leave the student and theorist locked in the dialectic of power created by the ideology of the school. I want to suggest that another useful approach may be to emphasize the benefits of avoiding compliance through creativity and experience. First, we need a common understanding of compliance as it affects the individual, the student and the society. Therefore, I will begin by introducing Winnicott through his understanding of the mechanism of compliance in both its useful and useless capacities. I will then move on to examine how some contemporary thinkers have conceived of compliance in both the school and the society.

Winnicott is a product of what is called the "middle school" psycho-analysis that emerged in London in between the Freudians and Kleinians. As Phillip Cushman has noted, Winnicott navigated between the two schools, taking his own "idiosyncratic" path by borrowing what he found plausible in each theory and abandoning the rest [Cushman 1995, 248]. In a discussion concerning Object-relations theories, Cushman voices concern about the ahistorical and apolitical character of these theories, claiming that the practitioners failed to notice the language and habituations that they used to construct their theories unwittingly reproduced the language of the dominant ideology of the day, consumerism. Klein's emphasis on infants "taking in" or "eating," he interprets as the primary means of an individual's education in consumer activity. However true the language may sound consumerist, in retrospect, its role in mirroring of the material relations in capitalist democracies demonstrates that social constructivism is an important tool for shaping human societies. Yet the claim that the language of psychoanalysis, through its mirroring function, reproduces or validates the status quo is questionable. This type of interpretation makes humans into machines, simply reproducing whatever they consume without processing it emotionally or learning whether it is worthwhile through experiencing its possibilities, consequences and vicissitudes. Psychoanalysis may do some mirroring, but I do not think that this process is meant to make capitalist practices acceptable so much as it is an exercise in descriptive sociology/psychology by which the theorist examines how the individual is experiencing its environment. Winnicott did not think that humans were robots and to claim that attempting to erase an "empty self" by putting things into it, experiences, emotions, memories, scenes, does not invalidate its transformative potential. If that were true then the PC movements in the late 1980s would have already solved all of society's problems. Dewey's thought suffered a similar fate in the late 60s. He was continually mis-read and interpreted as a supporter of consumerism and the status quo, as was William James. In fact, not only Dewey, but also his practical activist colleague and friend, Jane Addams, suffered the same fate. Both were forced into a position of defending their writings against the reactionaries of the day who interpreted their insistence upon ameliorating the negative effects of poverty as a way to justify capitalism and its injustices. But, I will come back to consumerism and the status of Leftist thought under capitalism and globalization, because I think it is important to note how and why the two thinkers are mis-read through these narratives. This means that, initially, we need to understand the environment in which creative experience cannot thrive (i.e. the lack of political and cultural capital that the Left views as indicative of many problems in the U.S., for example, especially in public schools). To do this, I examine the environment from Winnicott's perspective, noting that a society in which a heavy emphasis is placed on compliance, as a common feature of social relations, fosters the void of cultural participation that we witness in the U.S. and its schools. It is not enough to simply state that our curriculum, testing procedures and formal disciplinary structures are responsible for hindering cultural experimentation, we must also understand what blocks the subject of schools (students) from participating in cultural pursuits, except those streamlined by consumer preferences. In other words, we must understand what is making it too easy to purchase creativity instead of using it as a therapeutic societal tool.

TAKING ONE AWAY FROM NOTHING

One can think of several highly criticized metaphors for capitalist education that have been used to explain the lack of cultural experience in North America, but Paulo Freire's "banking" education example immediately comes to mind. It has been used effectively to distance educational philosophy from an unquestioning acceptance of capitalist practices as educational or worthy of using as a curricular model. Of import to this discussion however, is Winnicott (and Melanie Klein's) focus on the emotional consequences of "taking in" representations, identifications and ideas in a healthy manner. For Winnicott, knowing how to take in and process cultural identifications is more important than simply introjecting them. Like Freire, he is concerned with how the information is used and integrated into what is already present in the subject's worldview. If Winnicott truly implies the "empty self" that needs to be filled in a consumerist manner, then the empty self of poststructuralism and its predecessor, existential hermeneutics is even less full. Here it is appropriate to bring in Winnicott's discussion of the self in terms of the "sum." In "Sum, I am," an essay given to math teachers, Winnicott describes the taking in process of the infant as one that entails processing plenitude. First, the child must get to a point in psychological and cognitive development in which they are able to understand the concept of "one" as it relates to bodily integration. This means that the child who successfully understands "one" has managed to make the separation from its mother without relative failures intervening in the process. He notes that a child who cannot comprehend one in more than a conceptual/intellectual fashion is suffering from relative deprivation and still feels an attachment to the mother that is blocking the realization that s/he is an individual.

From one, the child can then proceed to safely process the images of the external environment, making symbols and living creatively. If a child does not have this concept of one psychically understood, they are not in a position to take on cultural symbols and representations except in pieces with no recourse to making meaning. The child who is lacking this wholeness or bodily integration may end up constructing a false self to project to the external world in order to protect the true, interior self from the intrusion of external objects. Indeed, this is the fundamental point that I wish to make here and it coincides with Winnicott's term "false self" which is "basically an immature, socially inauthentic self" whose primary mechanism of survival is "compliance." The false self will never fight authority, in whatever guise it appears, because it is desperately trying to protect its capacity for creativity and individuality. These abilities reside in the true self while the false self acts to protect it and in this protection draws attention away from the true self by complying, because, as every poor sap knows, the way to get the excessive and impersonal demands of others away from oneself is to simply comply. This child simply "gets by" through the false self.

While many bemoan the lack of political engagement on the part of contemporary youth, or, rather, intelligible political engagement, they do not see that the basic emotional demand of contemporary authority structures is compliance, without question. Theorists concerned with agency attempt to describe what blocks people from realizing that they don't have to comply with the exploitation in capitalist society and collude in their own misery, however, few have questioned what people are protecting when they collude. This phenomenon is a by-product of the mass tendency to be always looking for what's "there" instead of what's missing from our collective portrait of human existence as our political pundits and experts often encourage (Phillips 1995). It is always assumed that people are suffering from some version of false consciousness or are engaging in a form of masochism, by which they have learned to enjoy their exploitation and come to view it as gratifying. The insight that Winnicott brings to this discussion is this: what are people protecting when they collude? What is it about the environment in which they reside that forces them to view their creativity as something that must remain hidden away from harm? Another way to describe how one gets to this type of questioning is to remember that Marx believed that after the revolution people would read poetry in the morning and go fishing in the afternoon, but that was all about having free time to be alone with oneself, wasn't it? The revolution makes way, not for collective happiness in the sense that people derive joy from interaction with others, but they collude for something other than misery: individual freedom.

The capacity to be alone breeds the impulse to greater charity when one is in the presence of others. There are countless literary and philosophical references to the need to be alone in order to understand and help others. Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* communicates the need, albeit a classist one, for women have a room and some money in order to write creatively. Jean Toomer enjoyed being alone in a train car full of people, talking to no one as he wrote *Cane.* Winnicott describes the capacity to be alone as one of the greatest infantile achievements that is learned while playing in the presence of the mother, without intrusion. Winnicott's depiction of solitude bespeaks a subtle tolerance of the presence of others much like the repose of Ortega's individual self that escapes, if only for a moment, from the alteracion of the outside world (Ortega 1957, 29). And so I ask the reader to imagine a society making room for solitude in every persons life, especially their work life, without the moral indignation and reprobation of others cropping up to demand compliance for this or that duty to be fulfilled. These are duties, one might add, that can in no way be viewed as productive or even appreciated, but rather are empty duties imposed by bureaucratic systems that insist on strict compliance in filling out forms, revealing personal information without explanation, maintaining the appearance of "busy-ness" or satisfying the needs of others by sitting quietly without participating in the proceedings of the day.

For Winnicott, by contrast, the environment should facilitate the capacity to be alone and enjoy doing creative things without them being recuperated by others to fulfill some duty imposed externally. Furthermore, the environment, in its ruthless periods, should not demand strict compliance without explaining the necessity of such intrusions. But, in contemporary educational systems, compliance is assumed to be "normal" even in its most excessive and traumatizing forms. As one of my students remarked in an essay about the self-directed educational promise of the Internet, "Schools are the only places where students are asked to sit still, pencil in hand and pay attention." She is right. What about the world that we inhabit leads us to believe that training students to sit compliantly prepares them for their futures in the world of work or life? As educational theorists begin to think about the effects of globalization on education, they should also be thinking about the child who never gets to "Sum, I am" because of the excessive demands for compliance that globalization breeds and because of the lack of attention paid to emotional factors in the educational process under contemporary pedagogical schemes. I can think of two theorists who have described this phenomenon of compliance in detail, noting how it affects the subject's orientations towards these two areas.

Thomas Popkewitz describes how the insinuation of material destitution breeds the compliant behavior of students in our schools. As students are inundated with the notion that they may not have a job in their future, they are forced to model their cultural and educational pursuits along the lines of a very volatile and narrow division of labor. He writes that today's educational reform is centered on the "regulation of the soul" in the interests of instilling "capabilities and dispositions" and that the ideal student/worker with the following attitude is considered fully educated for a participatory society, "I understand it + I can do it + I care about it = capability" (Popkewitz 1998, 554). This equation for work reliability/capability makes the site of student knowledge the personality. It is at the level of personality, according to Popkewitz that educational reform is deployed in order to make students have a more favorable disposition towards work (the external world) without regard for how this affects the student's emotional integrity. For Popkewitz, this educational reform, which he labels "constructivist" is responsible for recent changes in both student and teacher subjectivity in the classroom. We can also think about how this re-vamping of the old site of educational reform, what Popkewitz will call, in Foucauldian fashion, the regulation of the soul, may intervene in the emotionally sensitive developmental stages that each student must experience if they are to be able to use external reality to forge cultural experience. In the scheme that Popkewitz identifies we can see that students are worked upon by the external reality in the form of the labor market (a particularly volatile and unstable medium) with no regard for how they process it. Instead, external reality is processing them.

As for life, specifically the life of emotions and identifications, Judith Butler's description of contemporary melancholia in *Psychic Life of Power* describes how a primary subjection is constituitive of the subject's attitude in "post-liberatory times." Butler uses Foucault's account of power that argues that the regulatory mechanisms of modern institutions form subjectivity, but goes further to argue that these mechanisms are also what underwrites the subject's existence. As she writes, "Subjection consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on discourse that we never choose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency" (Butler 1997, 2). Butler complicates Foucault's notion of power by combining it with an examination of the psyche and this produces an analysis that argues that not only does the normalizing mechanisms of society form the subject, they are also responsible for the subject's desires. This means two things: first, it means that the subject is normatively conditioned to desire and identify with objects in the cultural sphere that are inscribed in the powerful discourses that shape it; second, it means that this discourse of subjection is also perceived by the subject to guarantee its continued existence. Consequently, it is not a matter of the subject simply "realizing" his/her subjection and then getting over it, but a matter that the subject has a passionate attachment to the form of subjection by which it is formed. The norms that underwrite these powerful mechanisms are taken in by the subject and become internal objects and they inhabit the inner world of the subject effecting a "melancholic turn." Butler concludes that this melancholic turn "fabricates" a division between the external and internal worlds of the subject, creating a psychic space that is both regulated and ambivalent to prevailing social norms. At this point we can see clearly that Butler's fabricated worlds look a lot like Winnicott's true/false self dichotomy, perhaps even more clearly stating the performative effect of the binary (/). The internalization process that Butler describes produces the melancholic subject: "Melancholia appears to be a process of internalization, and one might well read its effects as a psychic state that has effectively substituted itself for the world in which it dwells. The effect of melancholia, then, appears to be the loss of the social world, the substitution of the psychic parts and antagonisms for external relations among actors" (Butler 1997, 179).

In this section I have described several theorists explanations for a lack of cultural experience and participation based on the relationship between the individual and the social world in which it lives. The next section takes these explanations under advisement while showing that the compliance these theorists describe can be overcome if only a significant amount of attention is paid to the problem of cultural experience.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE 3RD SPACE OF CULTURAL EXPERIENCE

In this section I will rehearse the necessary steps outlined by Dewey to reconstruct experience and, thereby, reform social life. In doing this I will note the places that Dewey's theory gets stuck and can be aided by Winnicott's emphasis on overcoming the compliant disposition that blocks reparation and recovery. My reading of Dewey's concepts is by no means to be interpreted as exhaustive, but should be taken as a reading of the Deweyan impulse that can be found in each and every one of his writings. There is no Deweyan text without the word "experience" or the imperative to "do" over and above the boring (and complicated) dictate to "know." From this cursory depiction of Deweyan philosophy, I will reconstruct

Dewey's own idiosyncratic path to change, forged between British utilitarianism and American pragmatism.

As early as his "Essays in Experimental Logic," Dewey was willing to accept the pragmatic claim that there need not be any reference to value when discussing experience or practice. In this, Dewey attempted to show that logically, notions of good and bad had no place in understanding the motives for action since most of them were, according to him, habitual. He argued instead that we constantly fail to repeat an act in exactly the same way because the aleatory nature of social life undermined our ability to be the regular and predictable subjects that we aim to be in our practice. "Constant failure" he said, "is a queer name for progress" (Dewey 1916, 332). We can't help but be creative as the world will force the difference upon us whether we like it or not. For the later Dewey, nature came to supply the variation that would jar the human subject out of his habitual aims and put him on the path to a more vital and diverse form of experience. Even going so far as to acknowledge the idea of the "instrumentality of the individual" whose lapse in practice would eventually supply him with the necessary irregularity that showed his creativity. Yet rarely in Dewey, except perhaps *Art as Experience,* do we find any detailed recognition that emotion has a role in fomenting creative experience. Much has been made of the idea that the public sphere should be revitalized through art and imagination to foster increased participation in collective life. One of the functions of education is to help students to learn how to make symbols, that is, to take their own experiences, thoughts and feelings and express them creatively in public, whether for enjoyment or educational purposes. So, the question becomes, if Dewey acknowledged that convention blocks political participation (the public and its problems) and, the social world presents the public with variation whether it wants it or not, how is it that progress moves at such a slow and uncreative pace? Why is there no genuine appreciation for art in the U.S. (as in Europe) except that which is commodified or housed in museums for the very contemplation and inactive appreciation that Dewey condemned? Why isn't more value placed on cultural experience, even when Deweyan pedagogy is acknowledged as an important educational model? I think it is because Deweyan pedagogy is formulated from the mass perspective (it has more generalized problems to solve), and this is also because of his overt reliance upon scientific categories to secure the validity of his claims. Had Dewey been willing/able to view cultural experience from a less "objective" point of view- yet one that still fell within the purview of his pragmatism—he would have been able to acknowledge more directly the importance of experiencing dependence as an emotive state, rather than as a habitual aim. As a radical democrat, Dewey was concerned to theorize how a majority of students could be introduced to less degenerate forms of education (e.g. *The Child and the Curriculum*). He did not want education to be concerned with memorization of facts, instilling the ability to recall another person's experience (history), or with turning them into a productive member of the economy (not society) by inducing them to specialize in field of work. Dewey was not interested in reproducing the division of labor in society without improving it at the same time (of this we are certain). However, his gamble or risk that nature (which he later called culture) would somehow unsettle the sedimentation of social life (or civil society whichever one prefers) does not take into account the fact that culture became fodder for consumption and commodification. Dewey will discuss "vitality" and he will mention that emotion is part of experience, but does not describe the role that it plays in detail. While Dewey does acknowledge that symbolism is an important part of cultural life, the way that he describes it makes it seems almost magical to the reader of his text, especially when it is couched in language that is excessively scientific. As he writes of this symbol formation in *Experience and Nature,*

> Rites, designs, patterns are all charged with a significance which we may call mystic, but which is immediate and direct to those who have and celebrate them. Be the origin of the totem what it may, it is not a cold, intellectual sign of social organization; it is that organization made present and visible, a centre of emotionally charged behavior. It is not otherwise with the symbolism uncovered in dreams and neurotic states by psychological analysis. Such symbols are not indicative of intellectual signs; they are condensed substitutes of actual things and events, which embody actual signs with more direct and enhanced import than do the things themselves with their distractions, impositions and irrelevances" (Dewey 1957, 83).

Dewey also did not elaborate upon the extent to which will, imagination and creativity were located somewhere in between the individual and the culture. The locus of imagination is found in the subject's ability to hallucinate a space between itself and objective reality and this is where Winnicott's theory becomes of vital importance to Dewey's project for the reconstruction of creative experience. Further, Winnicott can aid Dewey in realizing that experience comes in shades of good and bad and that the subject does experience them in de-vitalizing and permanent ways, especially when the subject is a child.

Winnicott's concept for this space in between the individual and the culture is the "transitional object" which is an object chosen and "created" by the child while s/he is becoming an individual during the maturational phases. Winnicott notes that there are three areas of experience for a child:

(1) the inner or psychic reality of the individual which is where s/he "creates" or "hallucinates" objects (of interest, desire, etc.). These objects and dreams are "clothed in the material of external reality."

(2) External reality. This is experienced as the NOT ME by an infant who is learning to become independent from its parents.

(3) The cultural life of the individual which is a combination of the first two, and if successfully lived, a continuation of the transitional phenomenon.

According to Winnicott, an infant chooses an object from external reality and gives it meaning by imagining or hallucinating that it stands in for the dependence s/he knows from a parent. The infant does this in order to get back the experience of dependence s/he craves but also to feel the omnipotence that follows because of the knowledge that the object is created by him (say a blanket or a bear). This is also similar to what virtual psychologists call "telepresence" or the ability to imagine a scene or image with minimal help from external reality (Winnicott 1989, 53-58). He writes, "But I do think we really do find a third area, an area of living which corresponds to the infant's transitional phenomenon and which actually derives from them. In so far as the infant has not achieved transitional phenomena I think the acceptance of symbols is deficient, and the cultural life is poverty-stricken" (Winnicott 1989, 57). For Winnicott, the ability to be able to imagine and use external reality in a creative way is the basis for the use of culture in later life. As an example of this third space of cultural experience he writes,

> "Put rather crudely: we go to a concert and I hear a late Beethoven string quartet (you see I'm high-brow). This quartet is not just an external fact produced by Beethoven and played by the musicians; and it is not my dream, which as a matter of fact would not have been so good. The experience, coupled with my preparation of myself for it, enables me to create a glorious fact. I enjoy it because I say I created it, I hallucinated it, and it is real and would have been there even I had been neither conceived of nor conceived" (Winnicott 1989, 58).

Winnicott is describing the ability, not only to symbolize or "use" external reality (cultural experience) to enhance his enjoyment of it, but is also describing the value of being able to anticipate (create?) an experience for himself. His experience of the quartet will, of course, be different from someone else's, but I ask you to consider what happens when educational reform does not take this process under advisement and by-passes the emotional development of children to transmit information to them and regulate their disposition without regard for their capacity to use imagination.

Dewey acknowledges that there exist a variety of experiences ranging from the good to the bad and even falling into the category of the unforgettably traumatizing. Time was Dewey's answer for getting over the bad because, as he saw it, only the bad experiences created obstacles to living a vital, progressive life. But, while I am certain that Dewey was a vitalist, I am uncertain that his philosophy has a vital quality of its own. His philosophy describes the vitality that should exist in social life, but does not perform it for the reader. I am therefore skeptical that Dewey's pedagogy can serve to defend students from the increasing commodification of reality in contemporary schools, as well as the increasing forms of discipline that are favored by administrators and lawmakers. I am tempted to say that we need a more poetic Dewey to keep alive a sense of progressive education while at that same time never losing site of the ultimate prize: creative experience, cultural experience and simple pleasure.

NOTES

1. See MacGilvray, Eric. 2000. "Five Myths About Pragmatism, Or, Against a Second Pragmatic Acquiescence," Political Theory. 28(4): 480-508.

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Off with Masks: Alastair MacIntyre on Morality

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In 1998 Kelvin Knight edited a Reader of Alastair MacIntyre's work. That publication signalled the fact that MacIntyre was now more than accepted as one of the premier ethical theorists in America. His latest book, *Dependent Rational Animals* (1999), is clearly a watershed in discussions of the human condition, only somewhat less important than *After Virtue* (1981, revised in 1984), its sequel, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (1988) and the Gifford lectures, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990). Knight's publication invites us to study the thought of MacIntyre in depth and to realize how that thought has developed, but developed in continuity with his earliest thoughts. I've always been interested in starting points. Aristotle for instance warns us that a small error in the beginning can develop into something much more substantial. And we may suppose that a good beginning bodes well for future developments. For this reason I want to begin a large scale examination of MacIntyre by my reading of his 1958–1959 article, "Notes from the Moral Wilderness."* It represents a summing up of his earlier books and articles on Marxism and is followed by a period of thinking in silence before he is ready to give the mature fruits of rethinking his philosophical position. We see the Marxist in MacIntyre first advocating taking off the arbitrarily chosen eighteenth century mask before he himself makes a definitive turn toward Aristotle and Aquinas.

What do we find of substance here at the beginning of his career? First, MacIntyre criticizes both Stalinists and liberals: Stalinists because their view of history makes human agency impossible; liberals because they have rejected moral argument and have elevated the individual and individual choice above the fray on the basis of the is/ought distinction. Secondly, MacIntyre rejects means–end morality which depends on a mechanical view of life, and he chooses a biological model which explains the past but leave the future indeterminate. Thirdly, he views human nature as something essentially unrealized because people in any given society are limited. For instance, the essential questions about human nature are: What am I, what can I be, what do I want to be, and what ought I be? (40) And the answers change with time. Fourthly, the project is to reconnect morality and desire. Morality is not determined by a set of extrinsic moral factors, nor does it arise by arbitrary subjective choice.(42) There are stages of development in human history, though they are not always for the good; progress is never assured. For instance: Aristotle's "do this because it will bring you happiness" becomes the Jewish and Christian's "do this because God enjoins it as a way to happiness" which in turn becomes the Reformers' "do this because God enjoins it", and ends up today's "do this because you choose it." Lastly, we can only regain the complete individual "I" by asserting the "we." (43) It is Marx's great achievement to insist that men share in a common humanity and therefore have common desires.

In summary, MacIntyre carries on a two–headed polemic against the Stalinists and the liberals. He advocates a biological rather than a mechanical model. He presents a view of changing human essence in which desires play an important part. Perhaps most crucially he opposes the "we" to the "I." I will now discuss each of these points in turn. Then I will attempt to show their relevance for educators.

I.

MacIntyre, like many other philosophers, is a polemicist. One of his targets are the Stalinists. In a historical sense, they are an easy target. Stalin died in 1953; he was followed by Nikita Krushchev who denounced him and by Gorbachev's program of perestroika but only in 1990, many years after MacIntyre's article. In 1958 the world saw the execution of Imre Nagy by the Stalinists, which occasioned this article. Even according to the theorists and many committed members of the party, Stalinism had run its course. In that atmosphere MacIntyre faults the Stalinists for their reliance on history to bring about what is necessary and ineluctable. They say that the morally right is what is going to be the outcome of historical development. Technology and the forms of production are the basis for and cause of a predictable form of social life. There are no moral absolutes in the world of the absolutes of

Stalinism. What has been left out in this type of theorizing is human agency, which a mechanical theory cannot admit.

The other of his targets are the liberals. Stalinism died within forty years; the liberals are still regnant after more than two hundred years. Arising as a reaction to a decadent Aristotelianism, liberalism set its course right from the start. If we take David Hume as a model case of the Enlightenment, the liberals founded their theory on the separation of the "is" from the "ought." That is to say, we cannot argue to a moral conclusion from a factual base.[1] Those dissatisfied with Stalinism refuse to hold Hume's distinction. For them the 'ought' of principle is not swallowed up in the 'is' of history. (32) And society in general makes the same distinction. That is to say, we cannot argue to a moral conclusion from a factual base. If we take Immanuel Kant as another model case, Kant sees the logical result of Hume's dichotomy to be that human morality must be autonomous, for it has nothing to do with the world of fact. And therefore individualism reigns, for we can learn nothing of morality from the world of fact or from others' experiences. What began as a turning away from myth and irrational desires to the purely rational[2] ends having a romantic side, each person seeing himself as a hero. The gulf between morality and history, between value and fact, according to MacIntyre, leads to a quixotic tilting at capitalist windmills. We cannot argue with each other on matters of morality; all we can do is choose the direction our own life should take. So say the liberals.

The Stalinists hang on to one part of the liberal creed, its Newtonian view of the empirical world. In such a world the relation of one thing to another is causal. The world consists of determined causes and effects. A given level of technology and form of production produces a given form of social life and consciousness. The substructure or base determines the superstructure.[3] The crucial word is "determines." The world is a network of means and ends and can only be explained in just those terms. But Marx himself holds a wider view.[4] Marx says: "The nature of the concept of a given class may . . . [may, not must!] determine the concept of membership in that class." (38–39) Their relationship is neither mechanical nor causal. Since human beings are involved, a means/end morality will not work because it fails to explain relationships.

These relationships are better explained by a biological model.[5] In an evolutionary theory the present can always explain the past.[6] What it cannot do is predict the future.[7] The future is underdetermined by what is.[8] There are causal factors at work, but "the basis as such" is not related to "the superstructure as such." (39)

The human is more complicated than the mechanical model allows. When humans act, they act for reasons, with a purpose. They are trying to satisfy human wants or needs. We make both individual deeds and social practices intelligible as human actions by showing how they connect with characteristically human desires and needs.(41) There are several ways to misinterpret this fact. We can see desires and inclinations as outside the moral ambit and plump for Kantian autonomy, which ignores a crucial part of the human person. Or we can follow Diderot's hedonistic dream of a new Polynesia where we can do what we want. Diderot ignores the fact that our wants and desires can conflict with each other. Kant ignores the fact that over the centuries, through trial and error, we have come to see morality as an expression of the more permanent and long–run of human desires. We discover that, though rules sometimes survive,[9] the reasons for which have disappeared, morality is not meant to repress our desires. It is not therefore an "alien, eternal, disembodied yet objective [and repressive] law." Not is it an "entirely arbitrary subjective choice." (42) Trial and error reign which is not to say that morality becomes "anarchic and amoral." (43) Nor is it to say that morality is like the respectability enjoined on people in a class society where any advance or change is considered a sacrilege. As the biological model suggests and working conditions in the nineteenth century make inevitable, change is omnipresent.[10] We learn from our history; we learn from our experience. Human nature is still emerging.

Another reason for seeing human nature as emergent is that an individual is an abstraction.[11] What can be learned from Marx moves beyond concern for the individual: mankind is meant to be one.[12] Of course, reality demands plurality, but to overcome the alienation from person to person is part of the human task. And also from Marx we can learn that classes in society inevitably not only prevent the "we" from being a moral force but submerge the lower classes and make for oppression and, indeed,for revolt.[13] Morality becomes identified with a ruling class.

II.

Thus far Alastair MacIntyre. Can he help the philosopher of education see the enterprise of education in a new and helpful way? If one looks at his entire corpus, there is no doubt that he expects to make a difference. But I would maintain that even is his early period he has things to teach us.

Let me organize my remarks around three themes: the human and rationality; the underdetermination of our actions by any theory; and humanity as a "we."

What does it mean to be rational? The liberals restrict it and human argument to the factual. The factual and the moral have a chasm between them. And that makes the school into a fact factory, because morality becomes a matter of individuals choosing arbitrarily how they should live. Children are, like the rest of us, schizoid. Children at home and on the playground are one thing; their stay in school is another. Arguments must be about matters of fact, and there are rational ways of settling the factual argument. Arguments at home or on the playground can at best be settled by contractual agreements or by force, for rationality has no part to play.

But MacIntyre refuses to buy the distinction between the "is" and the "ought" and the theory of entailment it needs. And he would not be happy with a theory of coherence, such as value clarification which allows teachers to admit internal coherence as the only rational factor in choosing. It is true that MacIntyre offers practically nothing to support this view, though he does in later publications, but what is plain is that the whole child goes to school and must be addressed by teachers and administrators. But such a program, he would insist, is rational, which is to give some foretaste of MacIntyre's devotion to Aristotle, to practical reasoning and to human agency.

But MacIntyre does not think that rationality is all that is involved in human actions. Our actions are underdetermined by any theory or any thought process. What finally determines what we do? On the one hand our desires and wants are operative. What MacIntyre later call telos or end is necessary if one desire or want is to have priority over another. These factors do not leave rationality behind. Their combination with theoretical principles is an apt way of speaking of practical reasoning. But this combination leaves the action still underdetermined. Note that these factors cannot handle the following two questions among others. Which theoretical principle is to be invoked? Which desire or want is to be satisfied? The act's telos will help make the determination, which MacIntyre introduces to good effect. But even that is not enough. Creative imagination is the missing link, though not explicitly mentioned.

Childen then need exercise in practical reasoning, which involves moral considerations as well as factual data. And children need exercise in the use of creative imagination.[14] So lectures as the main food of schooling are never enough. And children cannot exercise creative imagination if every moment of the school day is set in stone. Leisure, which is what schole means in Greek, is an essential ingredient. And depending on one's own theorizing, reasoning and imagination need to be supplemented with cooperating with others.

Which leads us to our last point. Humanity is a "we" and not a congery of individuals. Is saying this a plea for the socialist state? Not necessarily. But neither is it a plea for a capitalistic one. Is it a plea for the public school,in either the British or American sense? Such questions are left undetermined, indeed never asked. But clearly the school is a corporate enterprise of teachers and of students. Which on the one hand means interactions of people and consequently an enterprise whose activities cannot be calculated beforehand. And I would say that the essay leaves open the curriculum and the administration of schools except in broad outline. Individual teachers will inevitably teach in ways different from other teachers. Individual students will learn in ways different from other students. But the group will also be something other than a summing up of individual teachers and students. Means/ends, though present, hardly describes what is going on. The group experience transcends such a description: the sharing of human life is both end and means.

Just a few closing remarks. As with most philosophers, MacIntyre excels as a polemicist.[15] It is always easier to say what one is against than what one is for. He is clearly against the lockstep of Stalinism and the voluntarism of liberalism, both masks for philosophy. Philosophy deals with theoretical questions. Real–live institutions seldom exemplify that theory in its totality. Pragmatists try to escape this condition. MacIntyre just doesn't look, at least in this essay, in that direction. It is justification enough for MacIntyre, like the moral critics of Stalinism,"to speak against the stream . . .even if the morality in question seems somehow irrational and arbitrary." It is justification enough, at least for the time being. (34)

NOTES

* The page numbers in parentheses refer to Alistair MacIntyre's "Notes from the Moral Wilderness" in Kelvin Knight, ed., The MacIntyre Reader (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 31–49. In the endnotes below, M refers to *MacIntyre's Marxism. An Interpretation.* (London: SCM Press, 1953); CAM refers to *MacIntyre's Marxism and Christianity* (New York:Schocken Books, 1968). CAM is a revision and augmented version of M.

1. "Not only are the moral attitudes of Marx, or the analysis of past history, or the predictions about the future abandoned; so is the possibility of any doctrine which connects moral attitudes, beliefs about the past, and beliefs in future possibility. The lynch pin of his objection is the liberal belief that facts are one thing, values another—and that the two realms are logically independent of each other." MAC, 123–124; but see MacIntyre's critique of three perspectives on Marxism, MAC, 123–143

2. "Secularization has not resulted . . .in the working classes—or indeed any other social group—acquiring a new and more rational set of beliefs about the nature of mind and the world." MAC, 111.

3. Again a dualism. "The political forms part of the superstructure of society while economic activity constitutes its basis. Since basis and superstructure stand in an external, contingent, causal relationship to each other, they must be separate, and separately identifiable realms." MAC, 137.

4. MacIntyre finds the Stalinist mechanistic theory deriving from Engels rather than Marx. MAC. 93–94.

5. The biological model was also advocated by Engels: "This proposition . . . in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology". M, 72; MAC, 71. But see MacIntyre's demurrer on MAC, 88.

6. "In Hegel's view the philosopher understands history after the event and not before." M, 31; MAC, 20.

7. "The future of which Marxism speaks is not a future determined by laws and predicted by passive spectators of the law–governed processes of history; it is a future that will be constructed in accordance with the intentions of those same self–ëconscious agents whose consciousness is articulated by Marxist theory." MAC, 98.

8. Though the future is underdetermined, the past always includes factors that are causal of the present. MacIntyre quotes Franz Mehring: "Our social relations have to some extent already commenced before we are in a position to determine them." M 37; MAC, 29–30.

9. According to MacIntyre, Marx holds that "political constitutions do not, as an observed fact, change with the changing society and desires of society."

10. Engels gave concrete form to the indictment against "industrial capitalism and the living conditions it created." M, 44–45; MAC, 39–40.

11. Marx in this regard echoes Feuerbach. MacIntyre says about Feuerbach: "Where the Hegelians placed an abstract subject and object, Feuerbach put the concete I and Thou." He then quotes Feuerbach: "The true dialectic is nowise a dialogue of the solitary thinker with himself, it is a dialogue between the I and the Thou." But,as MacIntyre says later, "Feuerbach's view of man is too abstract." Feuerbach writes: Man is no abstract being, squatting somewhere beyond the world. Man is the human world, the state, society.'" M,34–47; MAC, 24–25, 43.

12. Paraphrasing Marx, MacIntyre writes: "When man becomes a being divided against himself, able to envisage himself as a commodity, he breaks the community of man with man." M,50; MAC, 48. Community cannot exist as long as man is estranged from himself and therefore from the other.

13. In the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx and Engels write: "The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association." M. 73; MAC, 72.

14. Creativity is tied to being free, in MacIntyre and in Marx. In Marx, unalienated man is a free man. "It will be a liberty to create his life in a way analogous to that in which an artist creates. 'Man also creates according to the laws of beauty.'" MAC, 92–93.

15. But MacIntyre is more than a polemicist. Like Marx he is hopeful that the negative will be followed by the positive. "Marx is clearly advancing a general philosophy of history according to which all forms of social order are in the end likely to be self–destructive and at the same time creative of new social orders." M, 121–122; M and C, 81. On the nature of this hope, see MAC, 89–90, 115–116, 141.

An Epistemological Argument for the Inclusion of Religion in Public Schools

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The place of religion in public education is in no way a new concern to educators. Recently, philosophers such as Nel Noddings, Warren Nord, Eamonn Callan and John Rawls have written extensively on the subject. Looking even farther back, one may note Dewey, Locke and Mill's concern for this subject. These thinkers reason for or against the inclusion of religion in public schools from, either a moral, social, political, historical, existential or multicultural point of view. While each of these thinkers have made important contributions to the religion/public school debate, one point of view has been given little, if any, attention. None of these perspectives seem to address what is arguably a central concern for educational curricula—epistemology. That is, shouldn't those most interested in educational matters be concerned with what, if any, truthful knowledge can be brought to bear from a subject or discipline? Shouldn't an important marker of how we decide what to include and what to exclude from curricula be based, at least in part, on the epistemic strength of the subject matter? Even if one holds that epistemological matters are not the primary concern when constructing educational philosophies and curricula, surely one cannot say that epistemological concerns bear no relevance.

This paper seeks to provide an alternative way of looking at religion and public education. The project is to offer a rationale for the inclusion of religion in public education based on epistemological criteria. An epistemological defense of the inclusion of religion in public schools will be successful if it can be shown that religious claims have some degree of epistemic strength.

To have epistemic strength religious claims must be rationally assessable. This paper seeks to show that not only is it possible to rationally evaluate religious claims, but also that there are significant, positive, educational consequences that may result when one engages in such an enterprise.

Arguably, a central component in traditional Western religions is the claim of the occurrence of religious experiences. Many of the beliefs, doctrines and customs of these religious traditions emerge from the occurrence of religious encounters. The concern in this paper rests with the truth of the occurrence of these experiences in the ways they are reported by the subjects alleged to have had them.

The philosopher of religion, Richard Swinburne, asks, "is the fact that [many different kinds] of religious experiences have occurred evidence for the existence of God?"[1] To answer this question we begin with the principle of credulity. This principle as a principle of rationality asserts that in the absence of special considerations, if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present, then x probably is present; what seems to be perceived is probably so; how things seem to be is good grounds for a belief about how things are.

For example: My seeming (epistemically) to see a table over there is good evidence for my supposing that there is a table over there. Having the experience of talking on the phone with Smith is good grounds for my supposing that I am talking on the phone with Smith. My seeming to experience God speaking to me is good evidence for my supposing that God is speaking to me.

While the principle of credulity might provide us with a rational basis for an initial acceptance of a subject's claim, special considerations must be reflected upon, which might serve to invalidate the experience as being evidence for what the subject claims to experience. For example, while seeming to see a table is generally good evidence for there being a table, it might not be good evidence if I had ingested table-seeming drugs, or if I am known to make false reports of what I claim to see. These examples serve to point out a key similarity between religious perceptual experiences and ordinary perceptual experiences: that unless something "rules out" the experience, both kinds of experiences should be taken as genuine experiences and hence, as substantial grounds for the existence of their apparent object. While this principle can be used as evidence for the existence of the apparent object, it cannot be used as evidence for the non-existence of the apparent object. My seeming to see a table is good reason to suppose that I do see a table and that entails that table do exist. My seeming to see a table when there is no table only shows that I was mistaken in my belief that there was a table, not that tables do not exist.

Critics might, and oftentimes do, challenge the force of experiential claims, relative to religion, on the grounds of special considerations. In other words, they argue that the special considerations are so vast and occur so frequently as to rule out religious experiences being evidence for anything. It is worthwhile then to take a closer look at the special considerations that limit the principle of credulity.

Swinburne lists four kinds of special considerations, which defeat perceptual claims (both religious perceptual claims and general perceptual claims):[2]

1. One may show that the apparent perception was made under conditions or by a subject found in the past to be unreliable. For example, one may show that perceptual claims are generally false when made under the influence of LSD.
2. One may show that the perceptual claim was to have perceived an object of a certain kind in circumstances where similar perceptual claims have proved to be false. For example, if it seems to me that I have heard sounds well above the normal range for audibility, we can test that claim in many other instances. If I cannot hear at those same levels, we have good inductive evidence that my original claim was false.
3. One may show that on background evidence it is probable that X was not present. This background evidence has to outweigh the force of my experience sufficiently to make it more probable than not that X was not present. For example, I seem to see my fourth grade teacher at the beach. This is good evidence for supposing that my fourth grade teacher is at the beach unless background evidence is substantial enough to outweigh it. (Such as my fourth grade teacher died several years ago).[3]
4. One may show that the claim to have perceived X may be challenged on the grounds that whether or not X was there, X was probably not a cause of the experience of its seeming that X was there. One way of doing this is to show that something else caused this experience. Whether or not my fourth grade teacher was at the beach, the cause of my seeming to see her was actually caused by my seeing her twin sister. Thus a causal explanation linking the twin sister to my seeming to see my teacher explains why I have no evidence for believing that my fourth grade teacher was at the beach.

Consider the following example as a comprehensive review of these special considerations. Suppose I am walking in the forest and claim to have seen a person, dressed only in foliage, staring up at a large oak tree, then disappear as soon as I am heard approaching. A challenger can deny both my claim to have seen such a person and my claim to see such a person disappear in several different ways. First, he might claim that I had taken LSD an hour earlier, which led me to see things, which were not there. Second, tests on other occasions show that I have an inability to recognize foliage or oak trees, or if it can be shown that the perceptual claim to have perceived this experience occurred in circumstances where similar perceptual claims have proved to be false. Third, that my hiking partner, standing right next to me, did not see this person leading one to believe that he probably was never there to begin with. Fourth, there is good inductive reason from long experience to believe that people do not just disappear. Fifth, perhaps the sunlight was shining through the trees in such a way as to create a pattern, which made it look as though there was a person dressed in foliage.

If the challenges, however, cannot provide enough positive evidence against my claim to have had such an experience, then there are far stronger grounds for accepting my experience as true. If any of the challenges do hold up, the burden of proof would switch from the challenger to the believer. I would then have to offer more positive evidence in support of my claim in order to outweigh the positive evidence posed by the challenger against my claim.

How might a claim to have had an experience of God fare under these challenges? The first challenge might rule out some claims, but many accounts of religious experiences are made by people who are not under the influence of a hallucinogenic drug and are not psychologically unbalanced.[4] The second challenge would have to show that the perceptual claim to have perceived God occurred in circumstances where similar perceptual claims have proved to be false. For example, having inductive evidence that I have misidentified experiences of God in the past. The third challenge would consist in a demonstration that God was not present for God to be perceived. It is worthwhile to note that presence in this challenge means direct or immediate presence. The reason this is important is because one might try and argue that God is omnipresent and so, on this basis any claim to have perceived God would, at least on this challenge, pass. In any event an argument from omnipresence is insufficient for our purposes, since God's existence is in question. One cannot simultaneously attempt to provide evidence for God's existence and use a quality of God as evidence for the veracity of the experience. The fourth challenge would consist in showing that the religious experience had a cause other then God. As in the case of the third challenge, causality refers to direct or immediate cause. This is important for the same reason suggested in the third challenge. One could claim that God is omnipotent and therefore has the power to cause anything He chooses. The challenges to the veridicality of apparent experiences of God highlight what is perhaps the greatest strength of Swinburne's principle—it puts the onus of proof on the shoulders of the skeptic, rather then the believer. The believer has fulfilled his epistemic obligations if he recounts his experience as accurately and truthfully as possible; after that, it is the job of the skeptic to refute the experience as being evidence for what the believer claims.

Even if one accepts the principle of credulity (if things seem to me to be X that is good grounds for supposing they are X), must one also accept that the subject has accurately recounted the experience of X? That is, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept, based on the principle of credulity, that if I seem to see a table in front of me, that is good reason for my supposing there is a table in front of me. However, on the other hand, it seems to be a different claim to trust that when I recount my experience of seeming to see a table, I am recounting that experience accurately. Could we not rule out religious experiences on the grounds that given their nature, they are difficult to describe and more likely than not will be descriptively inaccurate? What reason do we have to believe what some other person has told us?

Coupled with the principle of credulity is Swinburne's normative principle of testimony. The principle of testimony says that, other things being equal, we believe to have occurred what other people tell us they have perceived occurring. By other things being equal, Swinburne means in the absence of positive grounds for supposing someone has misreported or misremembered the experience. Why should we consent to such a principle? As Swinburne points out, we already do. We function through our every day lives on the basis of what other people tell us. To illustrate, we tend to carry an umbrella when the meteorologist tells us it is going to rain, we tend to take an alternative route when the traffic reporters tell us of an accident, and we tend to eat at restaurants that come highly recommended by friends. Not only do we consent to the principle of testimony, but we consent to believing what other people tell us, even where they have not had direct experience themselves. Our education process is a perfect example. We gain much of our knowledge and information about history, geography and science by way of the principle of testimony. For example, we employ the principle of testimony when we accept as factual or truthful the information taught to us by our teachers and through our textbooks when there is little or no possibility of each of us having our own actual experiences in those subjects (Ancient History, Astrophysics).

On the basis of the principle of testimony, Swinburne claims that many people have religious experiences—that is, based on what they tell us. However, there are special considerations that lead us to doubt a subject's report and hence, limit the report as evidence. These limitations consist of moments when the subject has misremembered or misreported (exaggerates, lies), or when it is known that the subject has the disposition to habitually lie or exaggerate. In the absence of such evidence, we have good grounds to believe what others tell us about their experiences.

Combined, the principles of credulity and testimony provide us with the criteria to rationally assess religious claims from religious experience. These principles suggest that it is in fact possible to rationally assess religious experiences in much the same way as one rationally assesses ordinary perceptual experiences. However, there are those who doubt the efficacy and rationality of these principles and the entire enterprise of taking religious seriously (epistemically). A look at some of the challenges to the argument from experience is therefore useful.

The first challenge is stated by Swinburne as follows, "supposing that the way things seem is the way they are is not an ultimate principle of rationality but itself requires inductive justification and that inductive justification is available in ordinary cases, but not in religious cases"[illegible].

For example, S' seeming to see a table over there is good grounds for supposing there is a table over there only if we have evidence that when in the past it appeared that there was a table over there, there was in fact a table over there. Since our experiences have shown that seeing tables over there is not misleading, it is all right to take what looks like a table to be a table. Challengers to the argument from religious experience doubt whether we possess the kind of inductive justification necessary to take religious experiences seriously (epistemically).

The question then, before Swinburne and other defenders of the argument from experience, is whether we do in fact have the kind of inductive justification necessary to take religious experiences seriously, and if we do not, is this justification, even necessary? Swinburne contends that challengers require that persons be able to recall past experiences of tables over there. In other words, it is not enough for persons to be certain that were they to think about it long enough and hard enough, they would be able to recall their past experiences of tables over there, but persons must be able to *actually* recall their experiences of tables over there. Yet he contends that we normally allow that persons are justified in taking what looks to be a table over there as a table over there, even if they cannot recall their past experiences of tables over there. Furthermore, and perhaps more philosophically powerful, an inductive justification demands not only that we recall the past experience, but also, that we recall it correctly. There can be no non-circular inductive justification for our past experiences because any justification would be reliant on another experience, which, in turn, would need justification from yet another experience. On these grounds then, it seems legitimate to take the principle of credulity as a principle of rationality.

The second challenge allows that the principle of credulity holds in ordinary cases (without needing inductive justification) but denies that (in the absence of inductive justification) it holds in less usual cases (religious cases being less usual).[6]

According to this view, the only good grounds for believing something is a table is in terms of the 'common-sensibles' that characterize the table: it looking brown, square and solid and in terms of things which look like those having appeared in the past to be used for writing upon. One cannot have good grounds for believing the table is a farm table, a drafting table, a Victorian table etc…because these types of characteristics involve some degree of interpretation and understanding of farm, architectural and Victorian furniture. In other words, one is justified in believing something to be a table based on common physical qualities that characterize an object, but not on any interpretation of the object.

Swinburne's response to this challenge is to question the line that is drawn between experience and interpretation. According to Swinburne, unless one can back up perceptual beliefs about objects having non-sensible characteristics (A Victorian table), with beliefs about objects having sensible characteristics (A brown table), one does not have good grounds or is not justified in claiming the experience to entail the existence of the object perceived.

For example, S claims to be drinking tea. How does S know that he is drinking tea? According to the challenge, S would have to be able to describe the sensible characteristics, which convince S it is tea. One would have difficulty providing a sufficient answer because any description of the tea given could fit many other liquids (hot, brown or sweet). Yet, our inability to describe the characteristics of the liquid which makes us believe we are drinking tea casts no doubt on our justification for believing that we are drinking tea. The fact that it tastes like tea is good reason in itself for supposing that it is tea.

Other philosophers concede that while a person might arrive at his beliefs by means of a religious experience (or even an ordinary perceptual experience) without using inference, it is not true that a person could justify those beliefs without using inference or argument.[7] While ordinary perceptual beliefs can be justified through inference, the same cannot be said for religious experiences. This challenge rests on the contention that since religious claims are based on religious experiences, and; since religious experiences involve more complex elements then do ordinary perceptual experiences, there has to be some justification for the religious experience itself. The philosopher Michael Martin argues that there are two routes to take to arrive at this justification. He says that religious experiences are either caused by a reality external to the person having the experience (external cause hypothesis) or by the workings of the person's own mind (psychological cause hypothesis). The external cause hypothesis fails according to Martin because, "religious experiences are like those induced by drugs, alcohol, mental illness, and sleep deprivation".[8] Since we do not use the external cause hypothesis to explain the experiences that result from the use of drugs, alcohol, mental illness and sleep deprivation, we should not use the external cause hypothesis to explain religious experiences. His justification for comparing religious experiences to experiences that result from the use of drugs, alcohol, mental illness and sleep deprivation is because, "they tell no uniform, coherent story, and there is no plausible theory to account for discrepancies among them".[9] Martin argues that the fact that religious experiences differ and conflict from one culture to the next, and that there is no way for all to be veridical or to check for the veridicality of any of them, is further evidence that the external cause hypothesis is not correct and that the best explanation for religious experiences is the psychological cause hypothesis.

Martin's challenge fails in several important ways. First, the use of drugs or alcohol only calls the veridicality of the experience into question, not the object of the experience. As Keith Yandell candidly points out, "the fact that alcohol consumption can produce hallucinations of insects does not serve to call entomology into question".[10] Martin makes the stronger claim that religious experiences, like experiences occurring under the influence of drugs and alcohol, do not provide evidence for the existence of the object of the experience because there is no coherence and uniformity to such experiences. In fact, according to Martin, there is considerable disagreement across cultures in the descriptions of religious experiences. However, one cannot rule out all religious experiences prima facie because they are unusual, private and difficult to describe. Furthermore, according to Yandell, there seems to be "considerable agreement in descriptions of numinous experiences, once one allows that different metaphors, similes, symbols, and even literal descriptions may vary greatly from one culture to another even while predicting roughly the same sort of characteristics".[11] This point is important because critics like Martin argue that, unlike sensory experiences, there is no way to compare (and sometimes falsify) religious experiences publicly. There are cross-cultural and cross-traditional comparisons to be made and if the important epistemological point behind public assessment is that it provides experiential testability for claims based on sensory experience, there seems to be considerable experiential testability for claims based on religious experience even if they lack the same public test used to assess sensory experiences.[12]

The central point and major contribution of the argument in this paper is that it places the onus of proof on the shoulders of the skeptic. As long as the subject has reported his experience accurately and has not violated any epistemic obligations, the experience should count as evidence for what it is an experience of. Thus, a religious experience, which meets the criteria established by the principles of credulity and testimony, and is not invalidated by any of the special considerations, qualifies as epistemically forceful. That it is possible for religious experiences to meet these criteria offers a strong reason for treating religious experiences as possibly knowledge-bearing and thus provides us with an epistemological rationale for including religion in public school curricula.[13]

Not only do the principles of credulity and testimony substantiate an argument for the rationality of religious belief, but they also provide us with an example of how religion might be incorporated into public school curricula. Assessing the veracity of religious claims along the lines of these two principles of rationality allow students to develop their ability for rational, intelligent and critical thinking. The fact that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of the skeptic provides students with an alternative way to work towards taking religion and religious believers seriously—something that is notably absent in many discussions on tolerance. It also demands that religious believers do harder, more critical work then is traditionally thought necessary. Studying religion in this way affords these students an opportunity to appeal to reason and not just authority in order to substantiate their doctrinal beliefs. An epistemological point of view is not only relevant and important to educational matters, but it provides a unique way of incorporating religion into public education—one that takes both religion and education seriously.

NOTES

1. Richard Swinburne, *The Existence of God,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 253.

2. Ibid., 260-64.

3. Another way of showing that the claim is not justified is to show that there are other reporters who would have likely seen what X saw but did not. This way can always leave doubt because it may be that the other reporters were not paying attentions or their visual abilities were not functioning normally at that time.

4. This is a common critique leveled against people alleging to have had mystical experiences.

5. Richard Swinburne, *The Existence of God,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 255.

6. For a further elaboration of this challenge see R.M Chisolm *Perception,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957) Chapter 4.

7. Michael Martin, "Critiques of Religious Experience" , *Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings,* Michael Peterson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 43.

8. Ibid., 44.

9. Ibid.

10. Keith Yandell, *The Epistemology of Religious Experience,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 267.

11. Ibid. An example of some of these characteristics would be God's benevolence, omniscience and omnipotence. Additionally, many proponents of religious pluralism use precisely this point as the basis for their positions. See for example, John Hick, *An Interpretation of Religion,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

12. Ibid., 268. For example, if God's benevolence is a characteristic widely shared across many religions, then an apparent experience of God's malevolence could be rejected on the grounds of positive, shared evidence to the contrary.

13. It is granted that some may argue that epistemological considerations are not sufficient for including religion in public schools. I do not dispute this point. Rather, my claim is that epistemological concerns are relevant to educational matters.

"Deweying it Together"

Carol Olsen, Angela Kaufman
Columbia College

Using a problem based learning model in a college classroom and applying Deweyan principles in a Core Curriculum of a Liberal Arts College. Our assumptions and hope is for the students to welcome learning with this model and flourish as individuals and students. Six weeks into the course here is what we have found after incorporating Deweyan principles and constructivist learning into our classrooms.

The application of Deweyan principles is not an easy task; first the relevant principles must be defined to the best of you and your colleagues' understandings, second, appropriate applications and methods must be found to implement the process. Third you have to make the commitment to do the work needed in order for a successful outcome.

The Core Curriculum used in the course Foundations of Computer Applications is as follows:

THE CONTENT

The existing course consists of fifteen weeks:

The concepts and topics to be covered are:

Computer operations, the Internet, using the Internet to research, word processing, concepts, hardware, spread sheet concepts and building a spreadsheet. Computer history and society database concepts and building a database.

Using problem-based learning, as the model to incorporate the Deweyan principles as stated. During the Progressive Era, Dewey (1916) saw the tackling of significant problems as the ultimate way to engage learners in meaning making and problem solving. He further believed that learning should be situated within the context of community (Dewey 1943). Interest in such open inquiry, activity-based, and integrative approaches in our classrooms has increased in recent years, and today, these types of approaches are sometimes called constructivism (Torp & Sage, p.30).

Using Fishman's and McCarthy's book, John Dewey and the Challenge of Classroom Practice we applied the Deweyan principles as listed below:

UTILIZING DEWEYAN PRINCIPLES

Philosophy of Process: Dewey's approach leads us to ask: What are the dichotomous activities at work in our situation? How might they be better integrated and balanced (Fishman & McCarthy, p.17)?

The dichotomous activities at work in our situation; wanting to coach and lead these students to be able to understand the value of the computer in their work and school lives, but by using didactic task orientated methods the students are disinterested and non participatory most of the class time. In using the constructivist method, namely problem-based learning, the students are quickly engaged because now they can make connections with the use of computers from their own experiences and be able to add the connections to which the problem will lead them.

Students' Active Participation In Learning: It follows that learners, for Dewey, are never passive, neither disinterested spectators of ideas nor idle absorbers of sensations. They are always active between tradition and practice, emotion and reason, doing and thinking. If learners are not always physically interrogating their environments, Dewey says, they are, at least, experimenting with the theories they use to analyze their environments (Fishman & McCarthy, p.19).

Utilizing problem based learning, the students were actively involved in learning first about the problem and then working together to find solutions to solving it, while using the computers and the software applications to document their work and to do research. Evidence of this involvement was seen often in the past six weeks of school, students talking to each other working out their ideas and using the computer to document their work. " Often students would stop me in the hall on our break to further discuss their ideas for the project", Olsen. "this never happened last year when I taught the same course". "I also had several students tell me that they were so excited to learn computers in this way they felt that they were going to be able to use what they learned from the project in their other classes and their futures as well", Olsen.

Helping Students Use the Curriculum: Dewey wants instructors, not to present already established truths via lecture, but to teach indirectly, to structure classes so that they and their pupils identify genuine problems, use the curriculum to investigate and discover solutions to these problems, and as a result, establish connections with course subject matter. To borrow Deweyan terminology, he wants instructors to help students build their own continuities and interactions with the curriculum (Experience and Education Ch. 3) (Fishman & McCarthy, p.20).

This is hard to establish with the learners who are so often told what to do when and how to do it especially in a task orientated subject such as the computers. Teaching indirectly gets easier when you have the focus of a project for you can use that as an excuse to find similarities by examples of other real life situations. "Often the students and I would have discussions that helped them and me to understand more about what we were trying to do. One example is when they were presenting their first phase of their projects to the class, we discussed how one student was able to sell us on her proposal by the way she explained her rational for each and every idea she proposed", Olsen. When the students were given the problem I was not ready to provide the answers, rather I thought of myself more of a guide to aid them in their own searches and inquiries. I thought of myself more of in the role of consultant or coach.

Borrowing From Non-School Learning: His strategy is to emphasize continuities between school and non-school life as a way of adding *emotional intensity* and *relevance* to formal instruction, promoting methods of *discovery* as opposed to *mere training, use of knowledge* as opposed to *mere acquisition of it.* When continuities between student and subject matter are established, pupilsæas in informal instruction have a stake in the educational situation. They are able to remember what they master of the curriculum because they use and care about it (Fishman & McCarthy, p.22).

The first stage I needed to pay attention to was to build a community in the classroom and to provide a environment for students to share themselves in and to learn in. I have seen my students grow as a result of this, here are some of the reflections I asked my students to write about what they felt they have learned from this type of learning.

> *"As a graduating senior, signing up for a required basic computer class was not among the most exciting or fruitful option one could comprehend. As an individual who has both work and computer experience the idea of learning list of basic commands and functions holds very little interest. The project-based computer literacy, which is being implemented in this class, is an excellent way to deter such cynicism and boredom.*

> *To the contrary, many of the students, myself included, find this project very exciting. It gives us a chance to use our prior worldly and educational experiences, even expand on them, while learning or teaching classmates in an atmosphere which promotes team moral. In short, the project-based curriculum in this class promotes positive attitudes while allowing people of varied ages and backgrounds to have a more positive educational experience"*
>
> *—Dan L.*

> *"This class is teaching me not only computer skills, but also business skills. It was the first time that I have ever done a resume so that helped a lot. I also think doing one big project for the semester is better because it can be more complete, not rushed. It won't be thrown together like junk. I can now have a better feel for Microsoft Word and also Internet access"*
>
> *—Dominique C., freshman*

For myself I did reflections after each class and started to feel like a coach I was able to see the parallels to my coaching experience of eighteen years to the classroom. I now found myself wanting to really find ways to help each student realize his or her goals and I wanted to help them as future parents and workers and citizens also, I really started to care for them as people in our society, maybe that's what Dewey knew would happen how could that not help in the learning process.

Additionally Dewey tells us that learning involves interacting processes, energy moving in a variety of directions: from student to the curriculum and visa versa, from teacher to student and visa versa, and from student to student as well. As a result Dewey wants instructors, not to present already established truths via lecture, but to teach indirectly, to structure classes so they and their pupils identify genuine problems, use the curriculum to investigate and discover solutions to these problems, and, as a result, establish connections with course subject matter (Fishman & McCarthy, p.20).

I have seen evidence of all of these processes happening as a result of the project based learning, the students are actively involved in the work helping each other seeking out answers using the internet and other media sources as well as asking questions and joining in discussions. I hear a much richer quality to their conversations amongst themselves as they try and figure out how to solve the problems not only for the project but for the use of the software programs as well.

UTILIZING PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING TO EXPERIENCE DEWEYS' PRINCIPLES IN THE CLASSROOM

Carol used two different problems for her two classes; both problems involved the saving and renovation of an existing historical landmark in a town thirty miles west of the school. One class was to find a way to save this theatre and the other class was asked to develop a plan to put a satellite of their college at that location. This location had an Internet site already in place along with a significant amount of information about the town, the demographics and so on. The students were placed in groups of two and three and given a letter explaining the dilemma of the town wanting to keep the landmark or in the other case from the school asking to help them design the satellite facility. I did explain that this type of learning is not always used but the power of students' own ideas are so powerful that they prove that to teachers over and over and I used the Northwestern University Law Students getting the men off of death row as an example of how powerful their thinking can be.

Using These Recommendations for a Constructivist Model of Learning, Based on Numerous Authors:

Posing learning around larger tasks or problems relevant to students, *saving a town's landmark or designing a school setting.*

Structuring learning around primary concepts; computers as tools, *using the software to develop your ideas and to build your business plans.*

Supporting the learner working in a complex; authentic environment, *by making the classroom a think tank the students are treated as small design groups.*

Seeking and valuing students' points of view; *as the students presented their ideas the second week of class and each subsequent one they grew more comfortable to voice their opinions because I welcomed them.*

Assessing student learning in the context of teaching and incorporating self-assessment; *we talk about doing your best work as opposed to just get it done and also about going the extra mile for you own learning.*

Supporting and challenging student thinking through cognitive coaching; *team members each wrote on the board what they knew about the initial letter given to them about the project, then they had to figure out what else they needed to know to solve it. This process was repeated throughout the first and second phases of the project.*

Encouraging collaborative groups for testing student ideas against alternative views; *the students were able to see the other group's ideas and this helped them to see their own ideas and re-arrange them if they needed to.*

Encouraging the use of alternative and primary sources for information; *the students are encouraged to use the internet, newspapers, interviews and other resources to find out all they can to do their projects.*

Adapting curriculum to address student questions and ideas (Torp &

Sage, p.31); *this has to be done because some of the students learn differently and at different paces so this is a continuous process but a necessary one so the student does not feel left behind.*

The students will be placed into small groups and given a real world problem to solve hence utilizing the entire core curriculum in the process. The teacher will take on the role of facilitator; coach or guide and the students will carry the brunt of the learning. The collaborative portions of the class will allow the students to share their ideas and findings from week to week with their classmates and the instructor will then be available to move their thinking deeper and more thoughtful as needed. The teacher will help aid them in the technical challenges of the computers, by conducting weekly seminars in the different areas of technology.

A web site will be established for the students to find links to the problem and shortcuts to learning the software and concept sections. *Using visto.com, a free web portal I was able to allow the students to upload their work and to interact with each other in their groups and I was able to post messages for them.*

Visual aids, books and videotapes will be available for students to use for additional support.

A timeline will be distributed with key dates for the students to follow. *I did not do this as much as I posted to the web-site weekly and I would pass out sheets with the deadlines for documents they needed to do for their projects for example their proposals deadline was in the initial letter I gave them, I wanted it to be as close to a real situation as I could make it and if I gave them a syllabus it would look once more like school and another college class.*

A field trip will be taken to bring realness to the problem. *Field trips are planned to Chicago's tourism and development offices and DePaul's Music Mart building to see how Chicago changes itself.*

After we chart out the course by collaborating ourselves we then plan to discuss weekly our findings and observations within our classrooms. As Fishman & McCarthy point out that by studying our classrooms, this too is a particular model for productive teacher inquiry (Fishman & McCarthy, p.10). *We were able to meet and talk several times during the course of the first weeks of the class, it helped us to compare notes and discuss what we found was helping the students get engaged and motivated and what hadn't.*

We then plan to show our work and discuss our findings including the pros and cons of switching pedagogy's from traditional to constructivist and how we are "Deweying it Together".

CAROL'S FINDINGS & PRO'S:

- I found the students were excited from the start that the class was not going to be in the traditional setting.
- I saw my students engaged in meaningful discussions trying to find ways to solve the problems given to them.
- I saw students helping each other to use the computers and to dialogue about the project from class to class.
- I heard students excited when they figured out the software and were able to show a classmate how to do it.
- I saw on the web-site that students were able to post their resumes and group proposals successfully.
- I read in the proposals how the students were very innovative and thoughtful learners. I saw the use of the computer software by their documentation of the project.
- I found myself looking forward to working with them and wanting to know what new ideas they would come up with that week.
- I found myself having a respect for them as learners and as co-learners in this project as well.
- I found myself feeling fortunate that I would have this time with these students to help guide them in the learning process and I felt like a coach again instead of a taskmaster!
- I felt like a good teacher. "Good teaching constantly asks about old understandings in new ways, calls for new application, and draws new connections",(Shepard, p.4)
- Attendance was up from last year the average student missing a week is one last year it was three or four.

ANGIE'S PROS

- Communication—Due to the collaborative nature of the problem-based team projects, there is an increased amount of regular communication among students, thus creating stronger bonds among individuals than in a traditional class structure.
- Trust and Responsibility—Because of the collaborative team problem solving, trust is built among students and each student develops a unique sense of responsibility to themselves and their team.
- Self-discovery—This model allows for self-discovery in a holistic manner. Students assess their talents, skills and areas of knowledge and how they work best in relation to the particular problem.

- Regularity—in this model students get a sense of regular community and routine in the team work and progress towards solutions.
- Individualism to Community—Students move from a model of my individual progress to outside of classroom ideas of us progress -- the progress of a team, a class and a community.
- Visualization and Creativity—using a problem based model instead of narrow, isolated lab examples, students were able to discover that there could be many answers to one problem.

Carol's Cons

- Some students were more bewildered because of the switch and that was hard to watch at first, part of me wanted to change back for them but I just explained the process over to them instead.
- Some students are not ready to learn no matter what they have too many other problems, commitments standing in their way and even the most engaging course can't keep them in school.
- Some students are not that well equipped to be socially engaging and this can at times hinder group's goals.

Angie's Cons

- Misdirected energy—Students can mistakenly get caught up in the content of the problem to such an excessive level that they use focus of the skills and objective needed to solve the problem.
- Continual Need for High Flexibility—students and teacher alike both need an increased flexibility when adapting the class syllabus and self-directed student work. This is often due to the fact that student teams and individuals make progress and solve problems at a variety of paces and timetables.
- Student Assessment—Teamwork and Collaboration can make it hard for a teacher to assess the actual skill/content learning of each individual since many portions of a project or problem are solved in groups or in community.

In the book Educational Reform A Deweyan Perspective, Simpson & Jackson tell how Dewey kept his social objectives in education always in evidence, how the potential to reforming society through the thoughtful reflection that characterizes education. That to meet his objective of helping society find "a better way" through curriculum that combines student interest with important content, while providing a reason and a plan for drawing on the collective wisdom of the traditional disciplines. These disciplines have three independent values: one of culture, another of information and another of discipline. I wanted to use these in my classroom and this is how I developed the three C's (Simpson, p.95) I developed a chart that would help me to check myself after each class to see if their was evidence of the values in my classes. From this chart I found that if I had these three areas at work in my classroom, I would be providing the opportunity for the values to occur. I saw these areas significant to foster Deweys' values they are community, content and commitment.

THE THREE C'S I FOUND WERE:

Community—In order to have the independent value of culture; I needed to create a community in the classroom that would foster learning and exploration for my students. They needed to build a community among themselves and by putting them into groups right away, I now see how interdependent they have become and the culture in the classroom is one of trust and mutual respect

Content—To address the value of information I needed a curriculum that addresses sustainable growth in the students learning of the intended subject. Since it was established by the department what content would be used, I needed to pay attention to what I was showing my students with content that was important to them but not necessarily to me. I wanted to help foster inquiry and growth through the content and for this I had to put hooks into the content so they world seek out more for themselves.

Commitment—The value of discipline commitment was needed from the students to enable them to work through problems. If I could coach them and help them gain the discipline to do the projects and to stay in the process of learning the skills needed then the students would benefit by becoming better learners.

In conclusion, I have found a bigger vision for my students learning I no longer feel un-connected to their lives or their learning, like Fishman recounts in Chapter six "after more than 15 years working in the same institution, he was bored and frustrated" (p.222) I felt that way only after one year, I found that I needed to read form the Fishman and Simpson books daily in order to keep my motivation and determination to pursue this change in my teaching. Since I really wanted to stay in line with Dewey I needed to remind myself of what Dewey was asking from educators and of schools and I would have to stop myself from slipping back into my old ways and remind myself that it was worth every uncomfortable moment if I was to help change education to align with those whom visions I believed in. I know it sounds noble but it is really a state of mind I had to get into so I would stay true to my beliefs and I needed all the support I could get. . I am so grateful for having the support from Angie, the authors, my department chair and John Dewey's wisdom to pursue learning with a passion and a purpose to help others on their journey as well.

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Johann Amos Comenius: Moral Education through Age Appropriate Virtue Formation

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The spring of 1992 Europe celebrated the 400th anniversary of the birth of Johann Amos Comenius, the first Czech scholar of international reputation, with a conference in Prague. The conference was entitled "Comenius: Heritage and Education of Man for the 21st Century". Over 2000 scholars attended this event which could not have taken place if the communist regime had not fallen just two years before, allowing a new independent Federal Republic of Czech and Slovak to emerge. Libraries and original works of Comenius were now open to scholars who were free to reveal the essentially ethical and religious orientation of Comenius' educational thought. This led to many excellent papers delivered at the above mentioned conference and to an outstanding work on Comenius by Daniel Murphy published in 1995 by the Irish Academic Press. In this paper, I will present an analysis of Comenius' ethical and moral thought in his work *The Great Didactica* with reflections on the relevance of his theory to today's character education movement.

HIS LIFE

Jan Amos Komensky—in Latin, Johann Amos Comenius—was born in the southeastern corner of the Czech State on March 28, 1592, the youngest of five children. His family was devout members of the Church of the United Brethren and lived simple, peaceful, pious lives. When Jan Amos was ten years old his parents and two of his sisters died because of the plague. Jan and his two surviving sisters, Margaret and Catherine, were entrusted to guardians. Jan attended an elementary school which was harsh and used physical punishment on the students. Later, he deplores this type of discipline in The Great Didactic.

Jan attended a Latin secondary school in Prerov run by the Unity of Brethren when he was sixteen. Altnough later he also critiqued the teaching methods used here (excessive rote learning, memorization and harsh discipline), he learned a lot and came to love Latin and scriptures. At this time he decided to devote his life to the promotion of the Christian faith.

He went to the Naussau Academy in Hebron to take up studies to become an ordained minister. The scholars he studied here influenced him in the formation of his educational principles: 1.) the unity and integrity of all knowledge and 2.) that a second language can most easily be learned when using the mother tongue (Murphy, 1995:8-12).

In 1613, he went to the University of Heidelberg to complete his theological studies, but left the university to take up a teaching appointment at his old school in Prerov. Here he strove for "a more pleasant method of educating children." He began writing a Latin textbook. On April 16th 1616, at the age 24, Comenius was ordained a priest of the Brethren and appointed pastor of a parish at Fulnech. He went there with his wife Marilyn Vizovska and became rector of the local school. His wife and two children died tragically due to the plague that spread in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War. Comenius had to go into refuge as all Protestants in Bohemia were banished.

Comenius sought refuge in various estates. During this time, he wrote *The Labyrinth* considered the greatest Czech work of literature of this period. He also tutored young children and formulated his pedagogical principles while doing so. After years of hiding from persecution, in 1628 the Brethren decided to leave the country. Comenius and his second wife, Maria Dorothea went to Leszno, Poland where they spent the next 12 years. Comenius was appointed co-director of the Gymansium where he began to implement his pedagogical ideas. It soon became known as the best high school of its kind in Poland. Comenius began writing *The Great Didactic* in which he presented a systematic exposition of his principles of pedagogy and his philosophy of education(Panek, 1991:25-33).

He also wrote a book on how to teach Latin—*The Gate of Tongues Unlocked.* This book was very well received. It became a "best seller" textbook and was translated into almost every European language. Comenius tried to extend his innovative and successful idea for the teaching of languages to the whole curriculum and wrote *The Gate of Things* and *A Reformation of Schools* during this time. Comenius proposed the idea of "pansophism" which was the idea of the organic unity or integrity of all knowledge.

On October 6, 1632, Comenius was ordained a Bishop of the Unity Church and he dedicated himself to trying to unite the Protestant Churches. He sought also to reconcile the worlds of science and religion showing that there is a harmonization in all knowledge. Comenius was invited to England, Sweden and Hungry to reform their educational system and their schools. Between 1641 and 1655 he worked in these countries and wrote textbooks for the teaching of Latin. *The World in Pictures* was famous for its use of visual illustrations to teach Latin. Not able to reform the schools to his satisfaction in either of these countries he returned to Leszno in 1655. There he found the Brethren were no longer welcome. His house was destroyed and he lost all of his possessions—his money, his library and his manuscripts—over 40 years of work.

An exile once again, Comenius went to Amsterdam with his third wife, children, and son-in-law. Here he published all of his educational writing in four volumes—*Ooera Didactica Omnia*. In 1665, his third wife died and on November 4, 1670 Comenius died.

COMENIUS' CONTRIBUTION TO EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

Comenius' was considered the foremost educator of his times and has been characterized as one of the greatest educators (Gundem, 1992: 43-55). He developed a complete philosophy of education. He believed in universal education for all, no matter what their social background, religion, sex or intellectual ability. He was one of the first to promote education for the deaf, the blind and the retarded; all could be educated to some degree.

Universal education implied holistic development of the human; i.e.the integration of learning, virtues and piety. In the Great Didactic (DIDACTIC signifies the art of teaching) Comenius tells us that Let the main object of this, our Didactic, be as follows: To seek and to find a method of instruction, by which teachers may teach less, but learners may learn more.

Comenius outlines nine principles of teaching which are remarkably similar to what we call today principles of "effective teaching."

These principles are:

- "Whatever is know must be taught and taught as being of practical application in every day life.
- It should be taught straightforwardly, with reference to its true nature or causes.

- If anything is to be learned, first the general principles should be explained, and then the details.
- All parts of an object should be learned, in order and in due succession.
- We should not leave any subject until it is thoroughly understood
- Stress should be laid on the differences which exist between things in order that knowledge of them is acquired in a clear and distinct way(Comenius, 1896)."

Education should be modeled on the natural development of a child with instruction proceeding from the known to the unknown. All learning should be related directly to the everyday experiences of the pupil. Comenius proposed stages for the years of conventional learning:

1. Infancy (ages birth to 6 years) in which education was informal and in the home
2. Boyhood (ages 6 to 11 years) in which learning takes place in the *ludus literarius* or vernacular public school. The vernacular school should be found in every village.
3. Adolescence (12 years to 17 years) The students are now to learn Latin in the Latin School or *Gymnasium,* found in every province.
4. Youth (18 years to 23 years) The student attends the university, found in every kingdom or large province and travels(Comenius, 1896:131).

These stages are similar to those proposed by the ancient Roman educator Quintillian. Comenius also suggests that all learning proceed through the senses so teachers should present students with objects they could hold, feel, smell and sense or at least provide them with pictures of objects.

Teaching should begin in the mother tongue. The curriculum should thus be a systematic sequencing of content with order, depth, range, and coherence. Universal education implies a moral unity of all knowledge, so Comenius was opposed to specialization al all stages of education. He really envisioned a true liberal education, i.e. the cultivation of the whole range of human potentiality—spiritual, religious, moral, emotional, aesthetic, intellectual, social and physical.

Comenius put emphasis on the value of child's play. He advocated the abandonment the barbaric discipline he himself had experienced while in school. He encouraged instead the fostering of disciplined learning. All of this was the practical aim of education.

The ultimate aim of education was, according to Comenius, the religious and moral formation of the child. He believed firmly in the role of parents as the primary educators and especially in their crucial role in character formation. The teacher is essential though and has to be a moral exemplar. Every teacher was to make the school a workshop for the virtues in order to help each student to develop themselves. Teachers should encourage, be kind, give individual attention to students, and be open to all learners, creating a non-coercive atmosphere in which the subject matter is presented with variety and practicality. Teachers should be paid much more than they are as their job is of such value and demands a high level of competence. The teacher has to combine moral integrity, enthusiasm, and diligence with pedagogic efficiency(Murphy, 1995:91-110).

What then is our true work?" Comenius asks in Chapter 23 of *The Great Didactic* entitled " The Method of Morals." "It is the study which elevates us and makes us steadfast and noble-minded, the study to which we give the name of morality." There is a system to instilling true virtue for Comenius just as he had a system for good teaching:

All virtues should be implanted in the young and those called cardinal should be instilled first. Comenius gives guidance on how to teach boys prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. There is a striking similarity between Comenius' moral theory and that of Aristotle. "Virtue is practiced deeds and not by words," Comenius echoes Aristotle. "The virtues are learned by constantly doing what is right."

Two principles are central to moral education for Comenius. First, all aspects of school activity need to be integrated around moral and religious objectives; second, the process should be experiential learning, not didactic advocacy of axioms or norms. Virtues should be promoted through three main methods: example, discipline, and instruction.

Comenius presents a program for moral formation integrating it into the curricula of each level of schooling.

"Virtue needs to be inculcated at a very early stage before vice gets possession of the mind..." "Indeed, he says, it is of the greatest importance that children be well trained in early youth." "Examples of well-ordered lives in the person of their parents, tutors and school fellows must continually be set before children." Education in the pre-primary years was seen concerned predominantly with moral formation. *The Great Didactic* lists the virtues that need to be foster in young children: obedience, truthfulness, industriousness, patience, politeness, temperance and love or charitable behavior towards other students (Comenius 1896:118-121).

Primary school children should be taught friendship, modesty, sociability, politeness, trust, wisdom, service to others, understanding, hard work, and self-discipline. Adolescent(or post-primary) education should seek to integrate moral education and ethico-religious formation into all knowledge, teaching and learning.

Ethics should be studied as a discipline and include a history of morals. These students need to learn now the fine distinctions between the various kinds of virtue and vice and how to follow the one and avoid the other.

Finally at the university one should only find students who are diligent and of good moral character. There they will study philosophy and traverse the whole field of truth, of existence of human life and of divine wisdom, that which is true, good, pleasant and useful. They will learn to argue and debate ethical issues.

Those involved in character education would do well to study Comenius' ideas. There is great value in exploring more in depth an developmental approach to moral education. Not the developmental approach suggested by Lawrence Kohlberg which posits cognitive reasoning stages through which one develops, but a development approach to virtue formation, similar to that proposed by David Issacs (1982) in his book *Character Building*. Are there some virtues that are more appropriate for students to develop at certain ages given their cognitive, social and moral development level? Would this kind of virtue stage theory help schools to sustain a more substantial moral education program—one which has scope and sequence, a spiraling curriculum which goes into more depth and breadth at each age level? These are questions for further research, which can be successfully completed with help from Comenius.

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A Correspondence Course in Education and Distance: Anne Conway and Henry More

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Anne Conway, born Anne Finch in 1631, came to know Henry More through her brother John, who was a student of More's at Cambridge. The Finch family had broad and deep political connections, evident in Marjorie Nicolson's collection of the Conway correspondence, first published in 1930 and expanded by Sarah Hutton in 1992.[1] Conway's lifelong struggle with debilitating migraine headaches brought her into contact with leading medical practitioners, many of whom were also at the cutting edge of scientific inquiry. More went to Christ's College, Cambridge, as a student in the year of Anne's birth and was associated with the College (where he was elected fellow in 1639) until his death in 1687. He is generally recognized as a leader in the introduction of Cartesian thought to England and (along with Ralph Cudworth) as a principal architect of Cambridge Platonism.[2] Both More and Cudworth have also long been associated with the movement in Anglicanism generally (though problematically) labeled latitudinarianism, a movement that is inextricably connected with Platonism's Cambridge variety and its pedagogical implications. From the correspondence collected by Nicolson and Hutton, it is evident that Conway should be accorded a prominent role in these philosophical, political, theological, and ecclesiological developments—each of which is passionately concerned with distance (understood in terms of both space and time), the construction of places and persons, and the relationship of all three (distance, place, and person) to human knowledge and to truth.

Reading the correspondence is sometimes like listening to one end of a telephone conversation, since so much of what has been preserved was written by More. But Conway's voice is strong in the letters that do survive, and one can hear it behind More's response—particularly with the aid of Conway's posthumously published *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*.[3] Conway's voice shapes More's response in significant ways, which he often explicitly acknowledges. It should come as no surprise that a philosophical approach which chooses to self-identify as Platonist would proceed conversationally, would include implied voices in the conversation, would direct the conversation toward recollection of truth, and would understand the recollection pedagogically as a turning of the soul with aesthetic and moral as well as physical dimensions.

In this essay, I focus on the roles of teacher and student in the turning, associated here with an emerging voice that contributes to a developing conversation. From the roles, the turning, the emerging voice, and the developing conversation, I believe we can derive important practical suggestions for discussion of education and distance in our own time.

I

The first fragment of the Conway/More correspondence, a letter from More dated 21 February 1650, refers to a pamphlet in his controversy with Thomas Vaughan, part of the running criticism of religious "enthusiasm" that he developed throughout his career, and to a translation of part of Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy*.[4] These pieces are emblematic of the dual foundation of the program of study that developed in the Conway/More correspondence: on the one hand, a theological interest in the relationship between reason and passion in religious claims, and, on the other hand, a philosophical interest in method thoroughly conversant with the new mechanism. More claims a "rustick aversation" from sending letters but assures Conway that he is not so uncivil as to fail to answer when she writes. Six months later, after thanking her for her kind reception of the translation of Descartes, More suggests a rule for her study of philosophy: "Though I would have you to habituate yourself, compos'dly and steddily to think of any thing that you think worth the thinking of, and to drive it on to as clear and distinct approbation as you can, yett do not think of anything anxiously and solicitously, to the vexing or troubling of your spirits at all. What you would force at one time may happily offer it self at another."[5] More encourages Conway to write when she encounters difficulty, suggesting a program built around encounter with Descartes, facilitated by conversation, and founded on the conviction that truth is present to those who seek it: think steadily about anything you think worth thinking of, but stop when the inquiry shades over into anxiety or worry. Ask questions when you don't understand. What you are seeking may present itself voluntarily when it cannot be forced. By September, More is writing substantive responses to Conway's objections, specifically to Descartes's proof of God's existence and to his comments on the difficulty of distinguishing the dream state from waking consciousness.[6] In May of the following year, he responds at length to Conway's objections to Descartes's contention that empty space implies a contradiction.[7] This is significant in that Conway's substantive criticisms of Descartes evidently predate More's abandonment of his enthusiastic support for Cartesian philosophy. Early in this relationship, Conway begins to function not only as student but also as teacher.

In a letter dated 6 September 1651, More expresses his surprise and sorrow at John Finch's departure for the Continent—but proposes that he and Anne can mitigate the sorrow they share by way of their study of Descartes.[8] More touches here on the superiority of virtual interaction (via correspondence) to corporeal presence—which, he says, is sometimes distracting. Two months later, he expands on his encouragement of Conway's study and effectively acknowledges her as his student.[9] On the one hand, she is so much like her brother John that she serves to take his place—but on the other hand, she is a worthy student in her own right. More describes her as a student of religion as well as of philosophy. Speaking of passion, More interprets Plato: "every pleasure and griefe transfixes the soule and as it were nayles it to the body, which is not true unless it be ment of either giving a mans self up to them, or being carry'd away with them. But both those are sure signes (and causes) of a soul as yett really miserable." While accepting Conway as a student, More insists that his willingness to do so "does not proceed from any confidence of my abilityes in any grand points of Religion, as if my judgement were consyderable: but as a friend I shall discuss with you what you shall be pleased to propound, but yourself must chuse according to the present Light of your own minde. For those that seek for truth in singleness and freeness of spiritt, are as well to judge for themselves, as to see with their own eyes, and not by anothers." This letter ends with logistical details that will make the correspondence reliable. Because Nicolson gathers the correspondence as a record of Platonic romance, she excises some of the most extensive philosophical and theological discourses they contain—including some that she takes to be repetitive (either with other material in the correspondence or with published work). The romance of redundancy may not be apparent, but attention to logistics includes allowance for missed connections. Allowance for missed connections demands redundancy in a system that is to survive them: what is most redundant is most characteristic of the system. Take it out, and the system's character vanishes into the bare bones of its content. More's characterization of this relationship between teacher and student as a friendship in which those who seek for truth in singleness and freeness of spirit discuss what is chosen according to the present light of the seeker's own mind is indicative of how important what is chosen is to our encounter with that light in retrospect.

John Finch functions in this correspondence as a philosophical matchmaker: recognizing Henry More as an exceptional teacher and his sister Anne as an exceptional student, he gets the two together before he absents himself. He sometimes functions explicitly as Anne's academic advisor, as when he writes, "I think it be much better to defer your Arithmetique to the spring then to sett upon it alone for that which you gett comes hard nor will your definitions be so good as an experienced master. Tis a proverb among the Italians, He that teaches himself hath a foole for his master, for unlesse he was a foole in what he taught himself, he need not to learn. Dearest, I know not how to give you better advice then for you to free you from trouble which this will doe, at least in my apprehension who am confident with a guide you will learn as much with halfe your paines in a moneth as you will otherwise in two."[10]

As he responds to Conway's objections to Descartes, More begins to develop a theory of perception.[11] Conway's response is a modification of this perceptual theory that anticipates Cudworth, Leibniz, and Goethe.[12] She maintains (against both More and Descartes) that color is a *real* thing—not just a result of the internal motion of nerves. This response is early evidence that Conway is developing an active understanding of perception that contrasts with the passive understanding of sensation often associated with Descartes and (later) with Locke. Like Cudworth, she develops this active perception in tandem with a realism that is distinct from empiricism. The soul is not simply nailed to the body by externally imposed experience, nor is the world simply experienced as an artifact of internal operations of the mind. An active mind continually interacts with an active world: truth is internal to the system of interaction, and the distinction between mind as internal and world as external is a sham. One of the most important implications of this, for Conway as for Cudworth, is that "moral" philosophy and "natural" philosophy cannot be rigidly separated without doing violence to both.

In 1655, More recommends *Theologia Germanica* to Conway.[13] We can surmise from More's end that she responded positively.[14] As it turns out, this book would become a major influence, often cited, in the philosophical and theological direction of their conversation. The presence of this work as a constant influence in their conversation—particularly when combined with the growing interest in experimental science that is most pronounced on More's side under the influence of van Helmont and Boyle—recapitulates and deepens the dual foundation introduced at the beginning of the correspondence. Philosophical interest in method is translated into a confidence in reason that is as evident in the Rhineland mystics as in the new experimentalists. In Cambridge Platonism, this confidence in reason is coupled with passionate openness: the background is constant expectation both of order and of surprise.

II

In almost three decades of correspondence with Henry More, Anne Conway developed from student to colleague—a movement initiated at the beginning of their relationship, when More's "rustic aversation" put the burden on Conway, not at its end; this is one of the most important pedagogical dimensions of the correspondence. Ralph Cudworth's reading of Socratic method is an apt description: "Socrates altogether shunned that dictating and dogmatical way of teaching used by the sophisters of that age and chose rather an aporetical and obstreticious method. Because knowledge was not to be poured into the soul like liquor, but rather to be invited and gently drawn forth from it; nor the mind so much to be filled therewith from without, like a vessel, as to be kindled and awakened."[15]

Under More's guidance, Conway begins with a four part framework:[16]

- Think steadily about anything you think worth thinking of.
- Stop when inquiry turns into anxiety or worry.
- Ask when you don't understand.
- Wait to be surprised by truth.

Within this framework, Conway and More pose a series of specific problems of mutual interest that are also of interest to the broader intellectual community to which they both belong: a metaphysical/theological one (the existence of God), an epistemological/perceptual one (the nature of consciousness), and a physical one (the possibility of a void or the necessity of a plenum). The posing of problems rather than the problems posed in this particular correspondence constitute the syllabus: choose according to the present light of your own mind. See with your own eyes, not by another's. That the present light of Conway's mind (and More's) is formed by the aforementioned community is critical. (More goes so far as to claim that he is an aggregate of his friends.[17]) Conway sees with her own eyes, but she does not see alone—hence both a deepening correspondence and an expanding circle of friends.

Conway comes to the correspondence with a method of discernment that precedes formal entry into philosophical/theological study with More. It is outlined briefly in an exchange with her father-in-law included at the beginning of Nicolson's collection:[18] distinguish knowing from believing, but honor both. Test everything and hold what is best. Suspend assent until what you hold is confirmed by experience. She also brings an attitude toward the past that is important in the progress of her study: an act is valid even if it ought not to have been done.[19] The validity in question is not a moral but a social/epistemological one, a recognition of ideas and their inscriptions as acts, and of the association of acts with rules. Both the poet who follows rules and the poet who intentionally violates them act in rule-governed ways. This anticipates Leibniz by attending not to content/substance or to form as distinct from content/substance, but to substantial form understood as act. This enables the distinction between content and principle/ground suggested in Conway's correspondence with her father-in-law. Errors in content do not invalidate principle/ground; philosophical inquiry seeks knowledge according to cause; and progress in philosophy is measured by backward penetration toward nature, into causes. This exposes an often neglected aspect of distance, important for memory and history as well as identity: how is past related to present? Later, Leibniz would characterize his philosophical project as bringing Plato and Aristotle together and cite Conway—as a kindred spirit if not as a source.[20] A methodology marked by digging back toward nature is common not only to Plato and Aristotle, Conway and Leibniz, but also to the broader circle of Cambridge Platonists and their heirs. In terms of the relationship between past and present, it enables a formal connection where no continuity of content exists.

It is significant in this regard that More identifies corporeal presence as a necessary distraction when he weighs the relative merits of correspondence and face-to-face interaction. Pleasure and grief, characteristic of corporeal presence, nail the soul to the body. This insight, forged in response to Conway's chronic pain, is a more adequate answer to the question concerning the unity of body and soul that Elizabeth of Bohemia posed in her correspondence with Descartes than the one Descartes offered in response.[21] It underwrites both the indirection of Socratic method and More's understanding of identity as an aggregate of friends. Both support Leibniz's later criticism of Descartes' identification of body with extension.[22] Body and soul, nailed together, are present not as extension in space but as act. In this correspondence, the subject of Anne's chronic pain is central: suffering, too, is active. The ordinary is the stuff of relationships, woven together with the extraordinary. Philosophical inquiry is a disciplined rhythm not of activity and passivity but of active inquiry and active anticipation—waiting on truth. In this context, attention to logistics is not a diversion. Correspondence of any kind requires correspondents to know what means are available for delivery of messages and when—but it also requires correspondents to make allowances for missed connections. No redundancy, no relationship. No relationship, no romance.

Active perception forges a connection between moral and natural philosophy. For More and Conway, this connects expectation of order with openness to surprise. What comes comes as a gift. That mind and body are nailed together requires perpetual watchfulness over the motions of the mind. Passion nails our soul to our body, but reason brings our action and our mind together in conformity with what More understands as the spirit of Christ. This anticipates Leibniz's often caricatured preestablished harmony and stands Santayana's often quoted phrase on its head: those who repeat history are condemned to learn from it.

III

Contemporary discussion of education and distance often characterizes distance education as a new problem precipitated by technological innovations unique to the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. But the seventeenth century correspondence between Anne Conway and Henry More is among the most spectacular examples of its successful implementation. The technology in their correspondence is pen and ink; a postal system that depends on private travel under intermittently uncertain conditions; and a language that is undergoing rapid orthographic transformation. Where we stand, the technology is more likely to be computers at various levels of sophistication; a commercial internet with often impenetrable traffic patterns and conflicts among competing protocols; and languages so thoroughly separated from users by multiple layers of code and graphic interfaces that users may not even be aware of orthographic questions. In both places and both times, we are confronted with the simultaneously technological, personal, and political question of how to connect.

From Conway and More, we may learn at least the following:

1. Academic/intellectual connections often require academic matchmakers like John Finch—particularly in programs outside

established channels, where informal advisors are likely to play a crucial role in bringing students and teachers together. Bear in mind that Anne Conway, though she was indisputably privileged in many ways, could not simply join her brother John at Oxford or Cambridge. That she, like other women of her time and place, was cut off from established educational channels amounted to a distance more critical than any distance simply of space or time. John Finch played the matchmaker role, but what makes this correspondence significant for other discussions of distance education is the care and facility with which More and Conway constructed bridges across the critical distances that separated them even after they had been introduced by Finch. Given the state of established education in England at the time—both in "grammar" schools and in institutions of higher education, particularly (if we are to believe Milton, e.g.) at Oxford and to a lesser extent at Cambridge—one could argue that Conway's unconventional education worked to her advantage. The same argument might well be made today, and a variation would be that liberal education always demands unconventional connections even in established channels.[25]

2. Building successful bridges across critical distances begins with a text and a question, both proposed by a student with some knowledge of a professor's interests and abilities. Titles have to be worn lightly. Knowledge of a professor's interests and abilities requires acknowledgment that s/he is also a student. A "professor" who is not actively engaged in learning will not be of much use to a "student" who is—and a "student" who is not actively engaged in learning will not be of much use to a "professor" who is. Participants on either side of this relationship might devote some time and energy to lighting fires—but one of the reasons the Conway/More correspondence was so successful is that sparks were already flying on both sides when the correspondents met. This poses a potential problem, related to the comment about Anne Conway's relatively privileged position. It is important to ask whether distance education is available only to privileged and gifted students. But this question extends beyond what is generally understood as distance education: critical distances impede access to all kinds of education for a variety of communities in ways analogous to the exclusion of women from universities in seventeenth

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century England. That Conway successfully bridged it in her correspondence with More is a rule violation that establishes a new rule—thereby confirming the promise if not the reality of a bridge.

3. A text and a question alone will not bridge a critical distance. Building successful bridges across critical distances requires that a professor approached by a student with a text and a question respond with an argument, not an answer.

4. But an argument from a professor is hardly a successful bridge. It is also necessary that the student engage the argument. As More and Conway suggest, there is a sort of academic courtship that follows John Finch's matchmaking. Until both participants engage the argument, this correspondence is nothing more than a formal introduction and an exchange of notes.

5. Moving beyond a formal introduction and an exchange of notes requires careful attention to logistics. In the Conway/More correspondence, this began with the framework described in the previous section. More laid down ground rules: no deadlines, no exams. Contact me when you have a question. I won't write first, but I will respond. The logistics also make use of available technology and pave the way for face-to-face meetings. As already noted, More implies that virtual contact is sometimes superior, since face-to-face contact can be a distraction. At no point does he proceed as though virtual contact were impersonal. This is crucial. The personal is constructed, and we make social/political decisions regarding which media are compatible with our construction of ourselves as persons. Exclusion of any medium from such construction limits resources available for bridging critical distances—and it may establish distances that did not exist before.

6. Once logistics have been addressed, there is a rapid transition from a master/student relationship to a relationship of collegiality. I would go so far as to say that until that transition is effected, no learning takes place—certainly no adult learning.

7. Once the transition to a collegial relationship takes place, a mature academic relationship—guided by questions, marked on both sides by thought that is simultaneously independent and engaged—develops. In this regard, the end of the Conway/More correspondence is exemplary. It is not broken even when the intellectual trajectories of the correspondents sharply diverge—as in Conway's decision to join the Society of Friends, one of the groups

that More routinely included in his criticism of "enthusiasts." Both Conway and More wait on truth to the end, and in that active anticipation they remain, to the end, friends.

NOTES

1. *Conway Letters: The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their Friends, 1642-1684.* Edited by Marjorie Hope Nicolson. Revised Edition with an Introduction and New Material, ed. Sarah Hutton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

2. See, e.g., *The Cambridge Platonists,* ed. Gerald R. Cragg (New York: Oxford, 1968); *The Cambridge Platonists,* ed. C.A. Patrides (London: Edward Arnold, 1969); Claud Howard, *Coleridge's Idealism: A Study of its Relationship to Kant and to the Cambridge Platonists* (Norwood Editions, 1976); *Philosophical Writings of Henry More,* ed. Flora Isable Mackinnon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925); *Henry More* (1614-1687) *Tercentenary Studies,* ed. Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990).

3. Anne Conway. *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy.* Edited by Allison Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Cited in subsequent notes as Principles.)

4. *Conway Letters,* 18, p.51. (References to letters in the Nicolson/Hutton collection will include the number assigned to the letter, followed by the page number.)

5. Ibid., 19, pp.51-52.

6. Ibid., 19a, p.484.

7. Ibid., 19b, p.486.

8. Ibid., 20, pp.52-53.

9. Ibid., 21, pp.53-55.

10. Ibid., 23, pp.58-61.

11. Ibid., 22a, p.489.

12. Ibid., 24a, pp.493-494.

13. Ibid., 65, pp.108-109.

14. Ibid., 66, pp.109-110.

15. Ralph Cudworth, *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality,* ed. Sarah Hutton (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.78.

16. Cf. n.5 and the discussion of the first fragment of the More/Conway correspondence on pp.1-2.

17. *Conway Letters,* 104, pp.104-105: "For I profess if I know myself aright, I am nothing els but an Aggregate of my friends so that they are the best and choicest of them are the greatest part of myself: and that you are the chiefest of all I must with thankfullnesse acknowledge, nor can any one deny it."

18. Ibid., 14, pp.30-32; 15, pp.32-34; 16, pp.34-36; 17, pp.36-38.

19. In a discussion of Lucan, Conway's father-in-law writes that we should "iudge as Lawyers doe sommetimes, That an Act is valide although it ought not to have bin done; therefore imitable by another if he can doe it as well." Ibid., 15, pp.32-34.

20. Leibniz writes: "My philosophical views approach somewhat closely those of the late Countess of Conway, and hold a middle position between Plato and Democritus, because I hold that all things take place mechanically as Democritus and Descartes contend against the views of Henry More and his followers, and hold too, nevertheless, that everything takes place according to a living principle and according to final causes—all things are full of life and consciousness, contrary to the views of the Atomists." Cited by Carolyn Merchant in *The Death of*

Nature (San Francisco: Harper, 1989), p.257. The complete correspondence is contained in the third volume of Leibniz's *Philosophischen Schriften*.

21. The question and the response are both included in *Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period*, ed. Margaret Atherton (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), pp.11-17. Cf. Albert A. Johnstone, "The Bodily Nature of the Self or What Descartes Should Have Conceded Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia," in *Giving the Body Its Due* (State University of New York Press, 1992).

22. Cf. Robert Merrihew Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1998; *Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion*, ed. Alison P. Coudert, Richard H. Popkin, and Gordon M. Weiner (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). On More's criticism, cf. *The Cambridge Platonists*, ed. Cragg, op. cit., p.12; *Philosophical Writings of Henry More*, op. cit., p. xxi; Richard H. Popkin, "The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway," in *Henry More (1614-1687) Tercentenary Studies*, pp.97-114.

23. Elizabeth of Bohemia suggested as much in her response to news of Conway's conversion. When Robert Barclay writes Princess Elizabeth in 1677 to inform her of van Helmont's, then Conway's conversion, she responds: "I cannot submitt unto the oppinion or practise of any other, though I grant that they have more light than myself. The Countess of Conoway doth well to go on the way that she thinks best, but I should not doe well to follow her, unless I had the same conviction, neither did it ever enter into my thoughts to do so"—a statement of independence and respect that matches Conway's rather than simply following her. *Conway Letters*, p.435.

Responses to School Violence

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> "Peace is not the absence of conflict but the presence of justice."
>
> —*Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.*

Much of the recent clamor about school violence has focused on the more dramatic headline grabbing incidents like school shootings. In 1995 in the United States more than 400,000 crimes were reported in U.S. schools; 270,000 guns were brought to school on a typical day.[1] In response to these alarming statistics school personnel have initiated a variety of violence prevention measures that have helped lessen the rate of some of the most drastic forms of school violence. Between the years 1993 and 1997 school crimes have declined 29%;[2] the number of fights and gun possessions in school has lowered;[3] and school killings have dropped from 52 in 1992 to 13 in 1999.[4] This paper will examine the policies used to deter youth violence in terms of their ability to promote peace both in school and in the broader society.

In response to attention grabbing media stories about school violence, school personnel have initiated violence prevention activities geared towards creating safe schools. Peacekeeping strategies attempt to deter more serious crimes from occurring in schools. Such "peace through strength" strategies involve developing a plan of action should a violent incident occur in a school and a wide variety of get tough policies that include having police patrol the halls, metal detectors, zero tolerance policies, student searches, drug testing, and locker searches. Many promoting violence prevention programs in schools assume that a few violent children cause of l violence in schools and attempt to provide safety by strictly policing those children so they do not disrupt the school environment.

Strategies that rely upon the use of threats and force to control youth can be categorized as "peacekeeping" strategies. Other strategies that are less punitive include peacemaking and peacebuilding approaches to the problems of youth violence. Currently, most of the efforts to create safe schools are focused on peacekeeping and peacemaking strategies (referred to in peace theory as "negative peace," because they are trying to stop violent behavior). Negative peacemaking may enforce mutual distrust among members of school communities and marginalize people suspected of violence. Discipline in schools provides an important learning for future citizens in social rules. Control oriented discipline promotes distrust. Positive peace, on the other hand, tries to build engaged communities by providing nonviolent ways to manage conflicts.[5] Whereas negative peace strategies have the immediate goal of stopping the violence, positive peace strategies have the goal of building in children the foundations of a peaceful society.[6]

VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS

While schools on the whole are fairly safe places for children, young people can experience in school a variety of different forms of violence—pushing, bullying, shoving, grabbing, slapping, verbal insults and threats—that make their lives in school miserable. Schools are plagued by a variety of different forms of violence that can be categorized into four different categories: Physical, normative, environmental, and structural sources of violence. Physical threats can include assaults, fights, and petty hassles that erupt among students concerning looks, turf, allegiances, and jealousies (over boy- and girlfriends).

Normative problems of violence concern students behaviors in school that don't fit the category of serious crime. They include racial and ethic stereotyping, taunting because of sexual orientation or disabilities, and sexual harassment. These forms of violence can be as subtle as in group and outgroup behavior that was cited by Erik Harris and Dylan Klebold, the mass murderers at Columbine High School in Colorado. Although teachers should not and do not tolerate these kinds of behaviors, they often go unregulated. They take place in the hallways, the bathrooms, playgrounds, and other remote sites not directly under adult supervision. These normative types of violence do not make the headlines but can disrupt learning, making it hard for schools to achieve their goals.

Environmental problems of violence are those violent behaviors that exist in the larger community and spill into the school life. They include gang violence, poverty, domestic violence, media violence, sexual abuse, self-mutilation, and street crime. Children in the United States live in a violent culture where they are exposed constantly to images of violence in entertainment, dysfunctional role models of parents who don't resolve well their disagreements, and national leaders who rely upon militaristic solutions to conflicts. In a society where the use of violence is viewed as legitimate, children will learn to resort to violence to resolve their conflicts. Young people who act out violently in schools have learned well the lessons they are taught on the news and in the violent entertainment they watch. Many of them have experienced trauma.

Structural violence concerns acts of violence condoned by school authorities. Schools are established in ways that reinforce violence and domination. Students are taught at an early age that they are in competition for scarce resources in the form of grades. Tracking decreases students self esteem. In almost half the states in the Unites States school officials use corporal punishment with their pupils. Dictatorial administrators make children resentful of authorities. Authoritarian teachers make children feel powerless. These forms of violence mirror competitive practices from the larger society and provide an aggressive school climate that does not promote peaceful behavior.

Peacekeeping in Schools

Strategies that rely upon the use of threats and force to control youth can be categorized as "peacekeeping" strategies. A 1998 U.S. Department of Education survey indicated that 68% of schools in the United States have some kind of violence prevention or violence reduction program or effort that includes a review of school wide disciplinary practices.[7]

Schools in which a serious crime has taken place are more likely to have violence prevention efforts that attempt to avoid the onset of violent behavior, terminate involvement in violence, and reduce the frequency of violent behaviors in school. School officials try to protect students from the violent behavior of a few deviant students by having zero tolerance policies for weapons, drugs, and alcohol. Zero-tolerance is defined as "a school or district policy that mandates predetermined consequences or punishments for specific offenses."[8] In 1996–97, 94% of schools had zero tolerance policies for firearms, 91% for weapons less than firearms, 87% for alcohol, 88% for drugs, and 79% for violence and tobacco.[9] Recent studies demonstrate that students of color receive a disproportionate percentage of expulsions under these zero tolerance policies.[10]

Children who carry weapons to school are expelled, but because the state has to provide education for them, they are often located in "alternative facilities" that can vary from juvenile detentions centers to alternative schools for at risk students. Students who commit a variety of other violent infractions are suspended from school. Researchers have shown that African-American youth were suspended at nearly two times the rate of white students and expelled at 2.2 times the rate.[11] Furthermore, children who are suspended from school drop out at least three times the rate of their peers; while many youth who are expelled often end up in the juvenile court system.[12] In 1997 three million students were suspended, up from 1.7 million in 1974.[13] Such policies may make the school safe but the society more dangerous. They do not necessarily promote peace.

School officials who promote peace through strength strategies in schools often rely upon police to provide safety. Already six percent of schools in the United States have police stationed in them,[14] causing alarm that schools are more and more resembling prisons. Police take a legal approach to the problems of schools violence, often involving young children in court systems that forever brand them as criminals.

Peacemaking in Schools

Peacemaking strategies are invoked in school settings to help young people resolve their disputes and keep them from acting out violently. Educators using these strategies attempt to teach youth a variety of alternative dispute techniques that empower them to manage their conflicts without using force. These strategies for dealing with the problems of youth violence began twenty years ago through the Community Boards program in San Francisco and has been carried out through the Resolving Conflict Creatively Program in New York[15] that has gone international, being implemented in schools through out the world. It is estimated that 10% of our nation's schools have peer mediation programs[16] that teach young people how to manage their conflicts without using force. Such programs try to resolve conflicts between parties through a third party, a mediator, to help the parties in conflict resolve their differences. The mediator helps disputants reach a mutually agreed upon solution to their conflict. Mediation provides a vehicle for de-escalating violent behavior in schools. One study showed that fights were reduced as much as fifty percent in a school that adopted mediation.[17]

Peacemaking seeks to avoid violence in schools by teaching communications skills to children so that they can resolve interpersonal conflicts constructively. School personnel bring conflict resolution programs into schools to enhance communication, negotiation, and mediation skills and to promote resiliency in youth. They see the problems of violence as residing in young people and hope to solve these problems by providing youth with skills that help them avoid violent behaviors.

Teaching students to be peacemakers involves creating a cooperative context that encourages disputants to reach mutually acceptable compromises and not dominate each other.[18] It relies upon concrete mediation procedures and training, where children learn to negotiate as opposed to bully. Mediators help end hostilities, ensure that disputants are committed to a mediation process, facilitate negotiations, and formalize agreements. Children who are playing these roles in school need formal training in anger management, social perspective taking, decision making, social problem solving, peer negotiation, conflict management, social resistance skills, active listening, and effective communication. Approximately twenty percent of schools in the United States have some sort of socio-emotional program to boost their "EQ—their emotional intelligence, or how a person works with peers, deals with stress and anger."[19] Educators using these peacemaking strategies teach a variety of socio-emotional skills that enable young people to manage their anger and respond to others in ways that don't provoke confrontations. Social emotional programs in schools promote people's capacity to understand, process, express, and manage social and emotional aspects of their lives.

Opponents of conflict resolution emphasize that difference in cultural styles and goals can lead to acceptance of unjust agreements.[20] Cultural identity, language skills, gender, and self-concept can all influence conflict communication in diverse groups. The productivity of conflict mediation can be affected by several characteristics of disputants. Student compliance with school rules does not indicate that mediation is helping students build more positive relations with each other. Failure to identify the sources of the conflict and change them, typically results in repetition of conflict behaviors. Schools that rely upon peacemaking strategies have been emphasizing behavior control more than relationship building.

There is a tension within the field of conflict resolution education between controlling children and teaching values to children. Although most of its emphasis is upon creating safe schools, many conflict resolution education programs stop with peer mediation programs because they are tied to disciplinary systems. They do not, as do peace studies programs, address the larger questions of why so much conflict exists in the broader society and what can be done to address the roots of violence. Teachers utilizing peacemaking strategies to address problems of youth violence neither teach peace strategies to address problems of violence that exist in the larger society nor emphasize nonviolent traditions.

PEACEBUILDING IN SCHOOLS

A third approach to school violence concerns trying to make peace attractive to students. This peacebuilding approach sees that the problems of school violence are a reflection of a violent culture. A former Secretary General of the United Nations defines peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[21] In an educational context this would mean attempting to build in children's minds a strong commitment to peace. This would imply skills they can use to resolve disagreements nonviolently as well as a motivation to act peacefully. All children can become violent unless they are taught the ways of peace. Peacebuilding in schools assumes that young people make decisions about how to behave and will choose to be peaceful if they know about alternatives to violence.

> "There are four components to peacebuilding--addressing the sources of violence; filling young people's heads with images of peace, so peace will be attractive to them; helping young people recover from violence; and constructing a peaceable school climate." [22]

A key component of peacebuilding in schools is instilling within children a passion for justice. The goal is build what Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. called "the beloved community."

Those interested in a peacebuilding approach to the problems of school violence encourage teachers to teach young people about peace.[23] Developing a peace consciousness is a sophisticated task, equally as important and difficult as becoming proficient mathematically, but schools tend to neglect this important learning. Students who are peaceful know about alternatives to violence. Their teachers encourage them to be cooperative and tolerant. They challenge their own prejudices and are respectful of others. They are open minded and empathetic. They have a concern for justice and an understanding of universal human rights. These complex skills require a comprehensive curriculum.

If young people are going to grow into adults who appreciate and promote nonviolence, they must understand the negative impact of violence upon their lives. Why is our society so violent and what can they do about it? Teachers interested in using their professional skills to build a peaceful social order emphasize the evils of a militaristic social order and question structural inequalities that lead to violence. This approach is controversial because it calls for disarmament.

The cutting edge of peacebuilding in schools in the United States is helping young people who are suffering from posttraumatic stress disorders. Many come from homes where they are abused and neglected. Others witness or experience acts of violence in neighborhoods and families. Many adults are in denial about how damaging violent events are for young children. Children who experience the devastating effects of violence are at risk in schools.

Trauma circles, peer counseling, and support groups can help young children manage some of the grief, fear, and anger caused by violent events in their lives. Anger management groups in secondary schools help adolescents deal with some of the deep-seated rage children have who come from abusive and/or dysfunctional homes.

In a peaceable school students can learn and teachers can teach in a warm and welcoming environment, free of intimidation and fear of violence. Security has two meanings. The hard sense of security is impersonal. It implies using force to deter youth from violence, while the softer sense evokes images of warm places and people who care. This requires nurturing behavior on the part of teachers and school administrators. High levels of safety in schools are associated with a prevailing sense among students that teachers care about students. Such caring behavior on the part of the adults in schools helps children who have experienced the devastating effects of violence. Trauma circles, peer counseling, and support groups can help young children manage some of the grief, fear, and anger caused by violent events in their lives. Caring interventions by teachers are essential components in the prevention of antisocial and violent behavior.

A peaceful school should not just have little conflict, but must encourage its members to engage a whole variety of communication skills that are not being taught in the broader society. Teachers have a key role to play in the creation of a safe and just social order. They can instill in their students a strong sense of justice and critical thinking skills, so they can contribute to solutions for the many problems of violence that plague our postmodern world.

Peacebuilding in schools provides a climate that fosters a spirit of care and acceptance for every child. Behavioral expectations are clearly communicated, consistently enforced, and fairly applied. Lasting and sustainable peace in a school requires the rearrangement of hierarchical relationships into democratic decision making structures. Peacebuilding must be modeled by administrators if it is to be endorsed by staff and learned by students. The leader of a school where children are to learn about nonviolence must be a good listener and show deep respect for all people in it. Respect is the key to influence, insisting on mutual responsibility to solve problems. When there are problems, the administrator must be careful to address the problem and not the person. The goal is to engage in a dialogue for self examination that does not seek to create winners and losers.

Currently, the majority of the responses to school violence involve peacekeeping strategies while peacemaking strategies are also being implemented. School officials have not embraced peacebuilding, probably because few adults even know enough about nonviolence to teach it to the next generation of leaders. Lacking this knowledge of peacebuilding, they rely upon war systems to create security and blame youth who have learned well the ways of violence that dominate our social order. A peacebuilding approach to the problems of school violence is more comprehensive. It sees the aggressive behavior of youth as a symptom of violence cultural norms and attempts to teach youth how to achieve peace.[24] If we are serious about ameliorating the problems of violence in schools, schools personnel need to adopt comprehensive peace curricula and restructure schools to be more cooperative. Through daily participation in constructive efforts at peacebuilding in schools students can develop an appreciation for the value of peace.

CONCLUSION

Another response to school violence that has not been touched upon here is after school programs for youth. These programs, simply by keeping youth in schools as opposed to them being home alone or wandering the streets looking for excitement, have been shown to reduce violence in troubled inner city neighborhoods.[25] This response, which is not punitive, mostly focuses or academic remediation, cultural awareness, and recreation, but does not directly deal with problems of violence in young people's lives. Teachers in community based after school programs productively fill young people's time at a time of the day that typically has higher crime rates because young people are hanging out with nothing to do.

The problems of violence are so complex, that they require a holistic approach. All three approaches to the problems of school violence—peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding seem to be necessary. As attractive as softer approaches to the problem may sound, hard approaches are also necessary. Fights must be broken up, by force if necessary, before conflict resolution can be used to reduce tensions. Weapons have to be kept out of schools, and adults may need to conduct locker searches and employ metal detectors to make sure that their schools are safe. All children need clear limits, but some children respond well to tough disciplinary measures and take advantage when adults are soft, caring, and loving.

It is up to educators to evaluate these different approaches to demonstrate to the public which works best and in what situations. Peacekeeping strategies may be most effective in dealing with direct forms of violence and averting disasters like school shootings. Recent research is showing that peacemaking responses may be reducing various forms of normative violence in schools and having a positive impact on school climate.[26] Studies on the impact of socio-emotional learning in schools have reported a decrease in aggressiveness, violence, dropout rates, student suspensions, and victimized behavior.[27] Conflict resolution education results include improved academic performance, increased cooperation, and positive attitudes towards school.[28] Whole school programs have been shown to reduce bullying and school violence.[29] The attempt to establish peaceable schools addresses problems created by structural inequities within schools. These programs work best when there is a change in school culture away from punishment towards using positive communication to establish a peaceful school climate.

Many approaches to the problems of youth have particularly adverse effects upon children. School personnel who relying upon a war paradigm that says the world is full of dangerous enemies that have to be conquered, are alienating young people from the very norms and institutions their teachers are trying to prepare them for. The youth of this world are not our enemy. They should be our salvation, but we will continue to fear them unless we teach them to be peacemakers. School personnel need to take a more compassionate approach to distressed youth who are acting in hostile ways in schools and teach them how to achieve peace. Many of them have experienced trauma in their own lives that has made them angry, hostile, and antisocial. Children involved in school crimes have received powerful social messages that condone and glorify violent behavior.

Some of the draconian policies implemented to reduce conflict in schools may be teaching unwanted consequences. Because of powerful headlines about school shootings, policy makers may be overreacting to a problem and making it worse by blaming the victims, who in this case are Black males who are being suspended at higher rates in an attempt to restore order to schools. Through zero tolerance policies, their basic rights are being denied. This at-risk population is made more vulnerable by hard policies of exclusion that make it difficult for them to succeed both in school and in society.

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The Aesthetics of Dangerous Style: Curriculum and Culture

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The making of one's life is an art form. As I move, gesture, interact, act upon, look forward and remember back, I am weaving together the intangible threads of an un-nameable but not unknowable substance called "living". Every conscious moment is sparked by a flame from the periphery of my mind where memory burns like a fuel and lights the dark of new experiences. As I continuously step toward the "edge" of unknown worlds I bring with me the constructs and frameworks of what has filled the space of my life so far. But every moment is also one filled with a multitude of ongoing sensory perceptions and minute choices, irretrievable gestures, and non-repeatable pulses of energy that intersect across material contexts of time and space. "Reality" is a translucent veneer covering and containing the fragmented shards I collect from each moment as it washes over me. Waves of experience continuously shape the contours of mind and being, leaving remnants like sea glass and dissolving foam to hang scattered along the shoreline of my awareness. I selectively gather them in the palm of my hand to bring home and arrange them so that I may look to them and recall, to re-create and to know.

Charles Bukowski recites from one of his poems that:

> Style is the answer to everything
> A fresh way to approach a dull or a
> Dangerous thing
> To do a dull thing with style
> Is preferable to doing a dangerous thing
> Without it....

To do a dangerous thing with style
Is what I call art.

Style and form are the constructs of all creative actions. Nothing can be done or completed without them. Taking Bukowski's words to heart, style might become an articulation of meaning- making about the self and the world around us. We employ style in order to align, associate, and express. If we consider knowledge and experience as "objects" of our understanding, images through which we "see" our constructed realities, then style becomes "the way they (objects) are formed and the way in which they operate" (Prown, 1982, p.15). Style becomes the framework for what information might be revealed or constructed, and how that information is transformed into knowledge and understanding. Meaning making is a process that requires the arrangement of knowledge and experience in a particular fashion. Essentially, we design the ways in which we understand our realities and how we interact within them. Scheffler (1999) argues, "human beings are symbolic animals. They are creators and creatures of culture because they are able to construct and use symbolic systems-systems of action and interaction, of communication and thought, of imagination and memory "(p. 296).

As a human-made product and practice, curriculum is primarily concerned with the creation and design of knowledge with the intent to convey various and multiple patterns of meaning within an educational forum. It serves as both a reflection of the material objects that it helps to shape as well as being the shaper of cultural interpretations. This idea is supported by Berger (1988) who, according to Pinar et. al. (1995) "posits aesthetic experiences as material production and lived experience" (p.580) which when applied to the field of education would require "several curriculum changes" (p. 580). The relational value between the production of knowledge and the qualities of aesthetic experiences are infused within the self and embedded within the larger socio-political context.

"The underlying premise" says Prown "is that objects made or modified by man reflect, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, the beliefs of individuals who made, commissioned, purchased, or used them, and by extension the beliefs of the larger society to which they belonged" (1992, p.2). Curriculum is a collage of collected and re-combined "objects" and experiences from the immediate surroundings arranged to present certain ideas. Products of our educational system including assessment, pedagogy, and classroom design are the materials that students as metaphorical pastiche artists re-arrange to render both unconscious and concrete visions of reality.

In contrast to the traditional Western concept of curriculum as a linear and fixed body of knowledge to be transferred from point A to point B, Carey (1999) illustrates that looking at curriculum through a critical aesthetic postmodern lens enables us to re-examine the methods and aims of education and to consider how knowledge is constructed, and to what ends. He writes:

> Postmodern thought advocates the provisional, constructed natures of belief, knowledge, and value. It recommends a suspicion of the arrogance inherent in regarding truth claims as objective and timeless. Postmodern thought also questions the implications for and tacit associations of such truth claims with various potentially oppressive power structures that influence human experience (p. 7).

A fluid postmodern framework leads us towards kaleidoscopic and relational forms of knowing and being. Like the myriad of dynamic relationships between knower and known, "postmodern art reveals an abiding impulse to challenge power and authority in all forms" (Carey, 1998, p.339). I parallel curriculum to this definition of art in that both might "contest exclusionary versions of reality and truth claims as final and ultimate" (p.339). Diamond and Mullen (1998) write that in "venturing further into postmodernism" they "welcome the anxiety of leaving uncertainties and conflicts unresolved, and some questions unanswered" (p.124). Taking this idea further, curriculum as "art" within a post avant-garde frame (Gablik, 1991) ". . . .is a kind of art that cannot be fully realized through a monological mode; it can only come into its own in dialogue, as open conversation, in which one is obliged to listen to other voices " (p. 157). The post avant-garde as a form of postmodern art theory suggests that "art", and I argue curriculum are "way(s) of seeing others as part of ourselves" (Gablik, 1991, p.106).

Furthermore, "when art is rooted in the responsive heart, rather than the disembodied eye, it may even come to be seen, not as the solitary practice it has been since the Renaissance, but as something we do with others" (Gablik, p. 106). What we do, how we see, and ultimately how we live suggests the employment of style. The gathering of relics from our contemporary lives, cultural mediums and contexts are "cut" from experience and "pasted" onto our conscious mental, emotional, and mental frameworks into an image; a collage of recreated moments transformed into perceptual reality. If, as Greene writes, that "the form of representation feeds the life of meaning" (1995, p. 96), then style and artistic representation become the outward expressions of this postmodern critique. Curriculum from a postmodern perspective in part provides the structure for what shall be cut, what shall be left out, informs what is of value through presentation of materials and provides ways in which those cultural materials shall be arranged:

> The "creation" of knowledge is like painting still lifes and figure pictures that use newspapers and books as accessories, work(ing) with the idea of gluing found paper elements into their works. . . rerouting the printed ephemera of the cafe table and the city streets into the studio and onto the easel (of our lives *my emphasis) -- incorporating , among other things, news headlines, movie bills, cigarette wrappers, package labels, and ads for razors, furs, lingerie, lamps and liquers. (Varnedoe and Gopnik, 1990, p. 23, re-quoted in A. Block, 1998)

In its broadest definition, curriculum can be defined as a "style" of arranged elements and actions built upon a specific structural design that shapes, and is shaped by, its context, resulting in various perceptions of reality re-presented through knowledge and experience. After all, "education in both a structural and processual terms is, in all its various forms, intimately connected with the production, organization, and dissemination of knowledge" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 3). Much like the aesthetic arrangement of color, texture, shapes, line, and form in a work of art, our mind's eye engages with the "outside" world to form imagistic patterns of organized thoughts and beliefs. To that end, curriculum may be considered an "aesthetic text" (Pinar, 1995), through which we employ visual or aesthetic forms of literacy in order to structure meaning. Our educational practices are avenues towards desired ends, designed and implemented with the aim of manipulating the perception and experiences by which we construct society and ourselves.

Grumet (1978) believes that an "aesthetic critique of curriculum" might ideally "lead to a transformation in the way that situation is experienced" (p.286). She continues, "curriculum comes to form as art does as a complex mediation and reconstruction of experience" (p. 286). An aesthetic critique of curriculum design and artistic composition might either lead to the conclusion that curriculum is a dull or static "thing", or rather it might lead to a re-conceptualization of learning that presents a vision for change. I envision curriculum as an active arrangement of style and meaning, a dangerous thing that may be defined as art.

Because "education is perhaps the most important way we relate to the world and to the ways in which we understand ourselves and our relations with others" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 4), design of curriculum and styles of teaching (as constructed patterns of associated meanings), become repositories for personal and cultural values. Speaking of human-made devices in general, of which curriculum is but one Prown (1982) indicates that:

> If the cultural significance of a device is perceivable in its style rather than its function then there is reason to conclude that for the purposes of material cultural analysis, the aesthetic aspects of artifacts are more significant than the utilitarian. . . . (however) all products of creative human activity reveal intention (p. 15).

The relation of compositional elements; the line, shape, and form of how we know things, conveys larger pictures or concepts that are variously interpreted through the "eyes" of its beholders. jagodinski (1992) states that "social existence, as communication with action, is always informed by one of its appearances" (p. 159) such as sensuous aesthetic interpretations. Curriculum, as an "object" of social existence, he continues might be felt through "six layers of an aesthetically embodied skin" (p.159). Those six "layers" include: line, color, texture, mass, size, and space. According to jagodinski, we are the artwork being created through each lived experience and interaction with the aesthetic world around us. We are informed by the various roles of the aesthetic and these moments become "part of the arch -writing on the body, part of the body's recollection of being" (p.159). He blurs the boundaries between self and the outside world, erasing distinctions between "'thing' as an object or 'thing' as a person." (p.160). He continues that this distinction has been blurred purposefully "to try and eliminate the mind/body dichotomy prevalent in positivist thought where res extensa is distinguished from res cognita." (p.161). Curriculum becomes not an act of doing, but an act of being (or living). The dichotomous distinctions between self and the work disappear and are replaced by a series of complex shifting and living relationships among the various "pieces" of knowledge and experience.

The first three qualities: line, color, and texture deal with the individual within his or her individual lived experiences. According to jagodisnki (1992) "one's personal biography is informed by them. One might think that aesthetic consciousness is continually formed and reformed by movement from a point of rest toward a creative explorative journey fueled by desire" (p.168).

Line is the direction of our experiences or "the spatial-temporal experience" which is "continually informed by the body's negotiation between becoming lost and finding direction" (p.160). Color is the "lived experience of mood". He goes on to define a mood as a "blanket that covers us when we reflect upon a conversation that has been completed. It is a recalled memory that vivifies life" (p.163). Color contextualizes our visions and reflections, becomes the language to speak of concepts and ideas that have no literal tongue. Texture, as the third aesthetic dimension is "the exposed history of the 'thing' embodied on its patina, worn like our skin." (p.165). Texture is the layers, ruptures, injuries, scars, and lines of knowledge written upon the surface of our being. Texture reveals the traverses and the travails (terrains) of existence.

The other three aesthetic layers: size, mass, and space address the ways that individuals and groups inter-relate within the context of a larger community and how such engagements shape our systems of knowing through the use of particular aesthetic dimensions. Size is defined as the "lived experience of scale" (p.171) and mass is "the lived experience of gravity (permance) and lightness (moveability)"(p.171). Finally, space is defined as "the lived experience of the cosmos" (p.175). Art as the form and product of curriculum, using these six aesthetic qualities, allows us to become aware of the movements and experiences within the constructs of our schools and societies in ways that peel back the layers of traditional modes of discourse. It creates a language and space for transformative learning (and being) to take place.

Having determined that curriculum can be considered a deliberately constructed aesthetic text with specific functions, and then it perhaps serves as more of a text to be read as a work of material culture. In writing about methodology for interpreting objects of material culture, Prown (1982) writes, "the word material in material culture refers to a broad but not unrestricted range of objects. It embraces the class of objects made by man or modified by man" (p. 2).

Similarly, Grumet (1978) argues that although curriculum may be examined from an aesthetic perspective, her definition points to the suggestion that curriculum is not simply an artistic text. The artistic elements inherent in the creation and enactment of formal education signifies more than just the expressive intent of an artist. She distills out three major ideas regarding to make this illustration:

> Curriculum is an aesthetic as well as a technological product, belonging to both the cultural and natural order. As a product of aesthetic activity it creates and encompasses both figure and ground. Curriculum, by providing a new gestalt, stands out against the ground of daily experience, both revealing and transforming it. Curriculum, once presented, tends to sink into the ground of daily experience, to mingle with it, and become confused with the natural order. This aesthetic critique requires that we acknowledge that curriculum is the world of meanings that we have devised and that as teachers and students we assume responsibility for and for the action it admits. (p. 286)

Therefore, it follows that curriculum is more than simply a "self-referential" work of art but rather embodies some inherent use or function whose purpose is to be applied not unlike any other tool used to manipulate or construct ones external or internal world. Furthermore, if one considers curriculum as a device for structuring multiple meanings, its intent may be revealed through the aesthetic relationship between the various parts. Form, according to Summers (1989) "is thus not only the means by which artists (and styles) interpret the historical and natural worlds. It also follows that form must be the agent through which this interpretation is expressed" (p.375).

To apply the methods of material cultural analysis to examine the formal styles applied in the design and practice of learning within an educational setting is to better understand what the functions and purposes of curricula are and to raise the critical questions: When does knowledge become useful and to whom? What role does style play in constructing meaning and shaping its function? In designing a curriculum, who is the creator and who is it designed for and to what end? Curriculum as an aesthetic construction of material culture can reproduce ways of knowing which "simply reinforce general conformity" (Carey, 1999, p.60). However, looking at curricula and aesthetics through a critical postmodern lens (Carey, 1999) replaces the traditional concept of aesthetic experience as a "heightened experience evoked by objective qualities with a concept of aesthetic experience as a consciously constructed cognitive reality that pervades lived experience and is manifested as social justice, peace and freedom from poverty, political systems' oppression, and so forth" (p. 304).

In its more traditional form curriculum has been defined as "the overall design, plan, philosophy, or set of guiding principles about what is taught and why" (Cornelius, 1999, p.30). In keeping with Western epistemes of linearity and fixed Cartesian dualities "curriculum has been described as including rationale, implementation, and evaluation; as content to be studied; as a textbook; as a series of courses; or as a set of planned experiences" (p. 30). Also evident is the idea that knowledge moves in one direction, from instructor to learner, rather than a more reciprocal or circular style that might express exchange and mutual shaping between all of the respective "parts".

The stylistic construction of curriculum as a technical framework leads to a presentation of knowledge as "static images", which we try to preserve in some "rational" state rather than the complex and ever changing combination of experiences that make up our human condition. Nor does this traditional approach take into consideration the possible ways in which this interchange may mutually shape both the function of a material object, and the individual engaged in the activity:

> We seem to have broken threads of our connections with the past almost beyond repair and are left only with fragments or 'relics'-usually cleaned up and adjusted for the edification of a heritage market which seems to want to preserve static images of the past in aspic. (Molyneaux, 1997, p.18)

The design and structure of a standardized model for learning during the 20th century has served as a signifier towards "underlying assumptions" about our Western ideologies reflected in the style of education:

> The education industry . . . produces an endless supply of textbooks, teaching materials, learning kits, and lesson plans that define subject content. They organize information, package it for presentation, and provide practice drills and tests to determine if the children 'get it'... Every subject is broken down into sub-categories of facts and skills, bits of learning. The entire world, it seems, has been rigorously processed and packaged for student consumption. (Levy, 1996, p.19)

The visual/aesthetic composition of a curriculum to this end acts a microcosm for its content and visa versa. The style of presenting knowledge, as a discrete series of "facts" which can be learned and reproduced in mass form, is a technique fashioned after and for our industrial society. The philosophy of this type of education was to model students' patterns of thinking and perceptions after the fashion of the curricular framework under which they were taught. In this sense, students themselves might be considered "objects" of material culture. Baudrillard writes, "it is not a question of being objective, it is a question of becoming an object" (1997, p.10). Students become signs whose forms and external compositional properties, made evident through modes expression and interactions, reflect back the value laden residue of dominant social practices, "a mirroring of the order of vision in the world" (Singerman, 1999, p. 93).

The historically predominant design for learning as "a rational sequencing of materials of plan of instruction" (Grumet, 1978. p. 295) creates a style that is static and unchanging. Greene (1995) describes this style of schooling as being "preoccupied with test scores, 'time on task', management procedures, ethnic and racial percentages, and accountability measures, while it screens out the faces and gestures of individuals, of actual living persons" (p.11). The standard "Tylerian" rational of curriculum (Tyler, 1949), technical and linear, objectified and absolute, should give way to a more fluid and dynamic co-creation of form and substance. The practice of objectively representing knowledge as a string of discrete factual lists and absolutes, regardless of audience or context, to be unilaterally experienced by every student needs to be transformed.

The design of a curriculum, the structured presentation of knowledge and the techniques employed to teach that content are each re-presented by means of aesthetic elements with an intended purpose or end. Style shapes both what shall be presented and what shall be left out of any given product or experience. The traditional view of the teacher as harbinger of official knowledge and student as recipient to be acted upon overlooks fundamental issues related to the nature of how we construct our realities. Slattery (1999) reflects that, "along with Dewey, I believe that education must enhance the lives of those who are marginalized and create social consequences of value" (p. 203). He concedes, "that society is a function of education and that my job as an educator is to be a prophetic voice in the wilderness of modernity that ignores the autobiographical and cultural context of human persons" (p. 203). The role of aesthetic analysis and artistic production in education in a postmodern sense is to "offer an opportunity for multiple cultural art forms to inform the thinking process, evoke understanding, arouse passions, and inspire 'social consequences of value'"(Dewey, [1934] re-quoted in Slattery, 1999, p.205). In discussing the importance of finding one's voice in education Clayson (1995) admits that the position of teacher as active agent and student as passive recipient only reinforces the idea that curriculum as a technical tool and student as object to be acted upon. It conjures images of a linear movement in one direction. This design shapes students thinking about their own sense of agency and identity within the classroom:

> We already implicitly stage our authority in the classroom with every word uttered and gesture made; we should openly stage objectivity's funeral at the same time. The challenge is this: we need to convey to students what our interest is in the material we are adjudicating, but without overwhelming pedagogy with parti pris. But candidly acknowledging a stake in the topic at hand, while perhaps simultaneously foreswearing autocratic teaching modes that embody objective professional authority, can have unsettling (undesirable?) consequences. (p. 370)

Rather, like the artist, material, and end product, this process should evolve as reciprocal and shifting events influenced by aesthetic properties arranged within a series of correspondences between the three agents. Although it is critical to always keep in mind that "the design of curriculum is not independent of the designer" (Pinar, 1978, p.319) aesthetic properties shape and are shaped by the learners as agents of their own realities and perceptions. Within these correspondences, the aesthetic representation of knowledge in a curriculum discloses "meaning" through "design of selections" (p.319). Knowledge becomes a continuous thread of construction and re-construction throughout our lives

Apple (1992) addresses the relationship between content and form in the aesthetic design of knowledge in this way. First, he states that "aesthetics is that part of knowledge concerned with pattern and appearance" (p.52), with the look of things and with what it means for something to be called "art". In keeping with this definition we may assume that material objects have inherent aesthetic properties in their making as well as in their usage. Furthermore, if we are to speak to the value or purpose behind or as the result of the creation of a material object, such as curriculum, then we need to also consider the second tier of Apple's definition. He explains, "the history of an artifact or artistic procedure is present in the work" (p. 53). He adds, "it cannot be otherwise, for artifacts are sediments of cultural history" (p.53).

One example that demonstrates the aesthetic relationship between design, context, learning, and style is the *Kunstkammer*. As a precursor to the modern day museum the *Kunstkammer* serves as an example of the ways in which a cultural context arranges knowledge according to dominant modes of perception and understanding. Bredekamp (1995) explains how the "ideas of using the *Kunstkammer* as active laboratory rather than just a passive collection corresponded to the Promethean practice of perceiving the actions of collecting, researching, and structuring as a unit" (p.51). The *Kunstkammer* re-combined "natural" and man-made objects in accordance with their visual or aesthetic properties in order to convey a certain associative meaning through the deliberate arrangement of intended correspondences. As a curriculum "with walls", the *Kunstkammer* "brought different collected objects into a visual exchange with one another" (p.110). The *Kunstkammer* emphasized the various and intentional ways in which language and visual images through their associated designs provoked meaning, understanding, often times far removed from the objects original context. In this same manner do we present systems of knowing and learning in education?

Like artifacts in the *Kunstkammer*, knowledge and learning are cut loose from their points of origin (situated within the students own experience), to be presented and perceived as fragments that are re-combined with deliberate style so as to produce an intended result. Museums, cites designed with the intention of presenting arranged information, demonstrate how we recombine various elements, artifacts and ideas about our world to make references, to create a conception of our collective past, present, and future. This requires "focusing less on the 'what' and the 'who' of representation" and attending to issues of that "foreground the 'why' of representation itself...and what it means to represent something" (Clayson, 1995, p.368). Museums present a "narrative" of the human experience.

Schools, like museums and the *Kunstkammer,* can become places to display artifacts of dominant cultural ideologies and "agents of social reproduction" (Carey, 1999, p. 51). By peeling back the layers of museum (and education) design, we might acknowledge, "museums are sites of cultural production and that they possibly offer points of re-construction and agency (that) does not detract from their inherently conservative nature" (Daspit, 1998, p.27). From this perspective, "museums even in more postmodern contexts are still 'keepers and preservers'"(Daspit, 1998, p. 27) of traditional modes of thinking and knowledge construction including the modernist notion of the "grand-narrative" of history.

On the other hand, using the lens of critical aesthetic analysis, they might also become sites that lead to "reveal unnoticed truths through creative expression, self-reflection, and cultural connections . . .providing the motivation and means to resist oppressive forces" (Carey, 1999, p. 65). Museums, as physical embodiment of curricula indicate how aesthetic elements and techniques of style can reinforce and reproduce cultural ideologies, or they might act as windows for possible social transformation.

Representation creates meaning to the extent that it "functions in specific, geographical, temporal, spatial and visual contexts" (Daspit, 1998, p.3). Similarly, one aspect of curriculum is the "collection" of constructed and displayed information with varying points of origin and a multitude of references:

> As Gadamer (1990) and many others have suggested, the forms we use to give expression to our selves become influential in creating those selves. And as we all know, any form of representation is always an interpretation and a revelation of what is known and what is not known but always influential. (Sumara & Davis, 1998, p.3)

The aesthetics of language, vision, memory, desire, place, and placement continuously recombine themselves in our experiences both as larger macroscopic conceptions of created reality and as the medium that both shapes the human experience and is simultaneously shaped by our manipulation of it. Therefore, one might question to what extent are facts really a form of "fiction"? This suggests that they are created or re-constructed as a product of human perception and manipulation of external and internal events, objects and experiences rather than as "natural" phenomena that we falsely take to be measurable and unchanging. Outside the framework of our imagistic landscape "both science and popular culture are intricately woven of fact and fiction" (Haraway, 1989, p.4). Haraway asks us to consider that as a "fiction" even:

> scientific practice may be considered a kind of story telling practice-a rule governed, constrained, historically changing craft of narrating the history of nature. Scientific practice and scientific theories produce and are embedded in particular kinds of stories. Scientific practice is the sense of historically specific practices of interpretation and testimony. (p.4)

"Knowledge" can be considered a relic, or fragments of relics of past experiences or meanings that are continuously re-presented as facts from which we create or re-create revelatory formations of present "realities". As a signal towards understanding and the re-creation of experience, knowledge like other signals, reveals a message that "is neither here and now, but then and there" (Kubler, 1962, p.17). However, what Tylerian-style pedagogy deletes, or dismisses from the educational landscape, is the recognition that "each relay (or signal) unwittingly or willingly deforms the signal according to the learners own historical position" (Kubler, 1962, 22). The "space" of an individual in turn, shapes knowledge into "archeological artifacts" of individual cultural and autobiographical origins. This requires us to consider that "what counts as knowledge, of course, necessarily begins with knowledge of who the subject thinks she is" (Sumara & Davis, 1998, p.4).

In our modernist, and so-called objective academic world we are like the realist painter separating the "I" in the eye of their work to reconstruct an image with absolute realism, depicting the "true" nature of the object as it stands outside the artist. The craft of teaching, such as it is in the Tylerian design of curriculum, creates a technical perspective similar to the realists paintings in which certain perceptions maintain the illusion that knowledge can be painted exactly as it is "seen" from some external source, and that it must maintain its "pure" state regardless of the learners subjective interpretation. In the design and practice of education, these Cartesian binaries between subject and object reify the modernist notion that "reality" is fixed and somehow independent of our subjective landscapes. This perception removes the "I" from the eye of meaning making and offering conjectures that there is one Truth "out there" to be known.

For example, one of the aims of standardized tests is to ensure that all students convey understanding of material each in exactly the same fashion, much as observers might be expected to view a painting through one single window of meaning. This fallacy then leads to the assumption that "means of representation are vehicles of content and are historical only insofar as they are vehicles for content" (Summers, 1982, p.388).

Therefore, the value behind such a technical design is to shape knowledge and students towards a form of understanding and expression that guarantees accountability and homogeneity.

Style, as Bukowski's poem has already suggested, lends itself doing a "dangerous thing". Carey (1998) in his discussion of critical arts pedagogy defines "style" in educational praxis as being similar to "style" in art in that "styles of both art production and knowledge production amount to perspectives or tendencies toward action or dialogue instead of prescribed steps to follow" (p.184). He adds, "style implies engagement in processes of making or becoming or happening" (p. 184). Curriculum as dangerous "style" might "assume different meanings at different times" (Carey, 1998, p.184). If doing something dangerous with style is art, and if, as Carey argues "education values one form of knowledge over others in education, and the difference creates and supports a hierarchy" (p. 4), then dangerous style might also elicit "dangerous memories" (Carey, 1998) to shatter such hierarchies. Reflecting on the power of art and memory Carey writes:

> A dangerous memory-recall that Henry Giroux coined the expression- is the critical awareness of the historical roots of a discipline, including all the implicit and explicit influences that shaped current conditions. This form of memory often establishes the rationale for a radical re-conceptualization of education and a new visualization of its possibilities for the future. (p. 63)

Certain theories of material culture analysis argue that form cannot escape its cyclical relationship between the intent and technique, which in turn shapes the values that inspire intent. Yet, this is only part of the larger dialogue between "object" and "subject". Aside from original intent (if there is such a thing), there exists the ongoing correspondence between cultural and personal ideas and beliefs about the world and the designs we intend for imparting these worlds to students. In this aesthetic conversation of meanings "educators can encourage multiple conversations in the classrooms through literature and other aesthetic practices that encourage the interaction and intersection of multiple voices and discourses . . ." (Luce-Kapler, 19998, p. 157). Curriculum serves as a representation, or a window, into ourselves, an intersection between audience and autobiography, where we might arrive at a point of new visions.

Students experience curriculum, interact with it, transform it, by merging various and unique contextual realities within a multitude of frameworks of time and space/place. Like our understanding of material objects, how and why they were created, and their possible functions, they (students and understanding) cannot be separated from the unique context in which they are being understood. They are always perceived; their meaning re-constructed, from a particular angle or reference point. "Art, like the curriculum" Slattery argues, " is the process of becoming, and recreating in each new situation" (1999, p. 208). Learning, like art/objects, must be interpreted through a fluid process in which the "I" or eye becomes fused with the object, creating a third construct which exists in the process in between the two.

This process requires that we consider what "must be done with the students relational identification with text?" (Sumara & Davis, 1998, p.3). A methodology, or better yet, "style" for better understanding curriculum, one that emphasizes the correspondence between the object and the self, becomes a way to re-consider the relationship between learner and curriculum. We might re-consider a design and interpretation of learning so that it is "situated and dynamic, changing as the material and social landscape changes" (Molyneaux, 1997, p.113). Like the art historian examining an object we must ask, "But what of the students relations to the selected objects of curriculum?" (Sumara & Davis, 1998, p. 4).

This relationship, using aesthetic terminology, is one of figure to ground (Grumet, 1978) through visual representation. The "boundary" between what is seen (or created) as figure from what is ground becomes the intersection towards change. Grumet writes that "the relation of subject and object, of figure to ground", is parallel to that "of student to curriculum" (1978, p. 289). It is a pedagogical concern as to whether the student is "seen" as the figure or the ground in education. Typically it is the student that represents the ground, and the official knowledge that becomes the figure.

She adds that, "the figure/ground analogy demands a third term, the perspective from which it is viewed" (p.288). However, she counters this position with the thought that "artwork's, like curriculum's, 'meaning' is not fixed (and) that it's message depends upon the investments of the onlooker (student)" (p. 369). This is the sort of dynamic interaction that occurs between various fragments of knowledge. It also exists between the learner and the presented text. It exists between origin and situated moments, memory and present experience. It is in the relationship between two objects or experiences that meaning emerges. In other words, "two things added together do not produce a third thing but suggest some fundamental relationship between them" (Bellgrad, 1998, p.45). That "third" (perspective) creates meaning, an infusion of experiences that produce a unique re-combination at the point of intersection. Learning becomes an alchemical re-arrangement of substances to form an understanding intrinsically threaded to memory and place, and cites of sensory experience, yet completely transformed within the alembic of space and time into some new fluid form. We look at meaning and style as a process of correspondences towards the creation of the emergent product. Style predicates what may be perceived as figure and what shall be selected as ground within the image created through our "I" and eyes called "understanding". To me this is but a beginning to the more critical step of drawing up the correspondence between the two.

In his poem "Correspondences", Baudelaire attempts a move to tear "off the veil that covers the true nature of objects thus to reveal the identity behind the illusory appearances"(1989). In the following passage, Baudelaire beautifully depicts the experience of self to sense and knowledge, where the figure and ground perhaps become inverted and bear forth meaning through the transition, or rather transformation:

> As distant, verberating echoes can resound
> Together, mingling deep and shadowed harmony
> As vast as midnight and as vast as clarity,
> So can each scent and hue and sound
> To each respond. (p. 16)

These correspondences become an ever- emerging virtual space of shape shifting, where the aesthetics of meaning and the construct of experience hold the power to transform. In terms of curriculum, such a correspondence elicits a move towards a fluid interactive multi-textual conception of interactions. The object and the person become mutually shaping elements in the development of socio-cultural beliefs and practices. Like T.J. Clark (1982):

> I want to discover what concrete transactions are hidden behind the mechanical image of 'reflection', to know how 'background' becomes 'foreground', instead of analogy between form and content, to discover the network of real, complex relations between the two. (p.12)

Critical aesthetic analysis of design might also reveal the complex relations between the conscious and unconscious, the visible and invisible, the tangible and intangible, the personal and the social; all dynamics that merge to shape our educational paradigms. The aim here is to apply an analysis of aesthetic design of knowledge and learning within their material contexts in order to redesign the structure and evoke change. Material objects are sensory, experiential, and visual. Curricula, as virtual "objects", inform us through the senses, and in our experience with and through them. They flow into and out from our abstract logical or linguistic modes of knowing. Furthermore, aesthetic interpretations reinforce the suggestion that "perhaps the redemption of the imagination lies in accepting the fact that we create much of our world out of the dialogue between verbal and pictorial representations" (Mitchell, Harrison & Wood, ed., 1992, p.1108).

The reciprocity between those creating curriculum as a cultural tool and the meaning makers, between knowledge as an object with distinct style and design and the "audience" evokes a dialogue that may reveal much about our cultural landscape, to say things that might not otherwise be said or heard. By re-examining the design and presentation of material knowledge within the educational context using an aesthetic lens, we can stand back from the familiar, and the "taken for granted" assumption that certain values and perceptions are fixed 'natural' realities. We might instead consider the following questions: Who benefits from this specific codification and arrangement of knowledge or experience?

Using the imagination, we rupture the glossy veneer of the "taken for granted" and respond to Maxine Greene's reminder "to recognize that the events that make up aesthetic experiences are events that occur within and by means of the transactions with our environment that situate us in time and space" (1995, p. 130). By aesthetically re-conceiving of curriculum as an object embedded in material culture we might witness the familiar becoming strange:

> In a certain sense, this work often feels like a voyage out, from the habitual, the customary, the taken for granted, toward the unfamiliar, the more spontaneous, the questionable. The experimental posture in its most profound meaning suggests this openness to what is not known, a willingness to attempt action the consequences of which cannot be predicted fully. (Pinar, 1998, p. 349)

Pinar is acknowledging the power of curriculum to reveal not only our views about the world but to reveal new revelations about how we see ourselves. An analysis of style peels back the layers hardened over by our "taken for granted" ways of seeing ourselves and others.

This process, in effect, "un-skins" (Sumara & Davis, 1998) structures that reinforce patterns of social behavior. Sumara and Davis propose that curriculum "un-skin, recasting self -images"(p. 2). As the fixed (either in the guise of absolute knowledge or systems of pedagogy) breaks its static form we begin re-naming, and un-fixing old forms. Instead we can allow for transformative and re-combinant aesthetic arrangements that lead to a curriculum that "feels risky, dangerous, forbidden-for within it, we are able to imitate nothing but who we are" (p. 2). Singerman (1998) emphasizes this notion in writing that specific expressive arts based programs such as "Child Art" that revealed a model in which "Teaching was de-schooling, uncovering, taking off the lid or peeling back the veneer" (p.107). Engaging with the "arts" as way of seeing living and creating our lives reveals ways of seeing differently.

As with the study of material culture, educators need to consider that "we are pervaded by the beliefs of our own social groups-nation, locality, class, religion, politics, occupation, gender, age, race, ethnicity- beliefs in the form of assumptions that we make unconsciously" (Prown, 1982, p. 4). By engaging in a formal analysis of the aesthetics of curriculum design, examining styles of meaning making both as a process as well as a product of our material culture, we can uncover layers of assumptions, transforming the unconscious into the conscious:

> (E)ducation must be understood as the process by which we produce knowledge from the materials that we are given. The curriculum must return knowledge to its center, within the de-centered identity. Education must reveal the process of production in the exercise of consumption. (Berger, 1985, 159)

Educational settings become excavation sites for retrieving the memory, experiences and perceptions of others and ourselves in which we use curriculum as a tool, a material object to achieve a desired end. Here, space emerges as a multi-layered tapestry of immediate contexts and abstract realities interwoven into patterns of meaning making. Knowledge and understanding are constructed through the images, words and movements:

> In the move from instruction to construction, learning involves neither simply the replacement of one view (the incorrect one) with another (the presumed correct one) nor simply the stacking, like building blocks, of new knowledge. Transformations, in turn, occur not through the child's passivity...he gets it himself by his own action, he achieves, he invents it. (Kahn & Friedman, Bromley & Apple, (eds.), 1998, p.164)

The aim of critiquing curriculum design and practice as a material art object is to reveal the ways that cultural sediments emerge and are extracted and experienced within the aesthetic context. The perceptions and practices applied to material culture analysis in which " the exploration of patterns of belief and behavior in an intellectual borderland" (Prown, 1982, p. 7) dissolve fixed ideas of curriculum as a static objective text.

Teach dangerously, and implement curriculum with style, and learning becomes an esthetic experience, dangerous style forged within a material culture. The learning process, like art should "draw on and from the materials of their (students) daily world, and working with them idiosyncratically, produce in the process a new relationship between art and the world, a new way of being in the world" (Berger, 1985, p.159). We transform ourselves into agents of change through the artistic application of technique and aesthetic analysis. Education becomes a dangerous thing. But more than an object of "art", curriculum is a visceral map of our cultural and social landscape, a metaphoric and literal representation of particular values and beliefs.

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Rethinking the Ground of Pragmatic Aesthetics: Dewey and Heidegger

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In what follows I seek simply to shine a little light on the ground of a problem. Specifically, I want to call attention to the predominantly verbal way we come to terms with art; and, by extension, with other closely related domains of inquiry and endeavor, like philosophy and like education. But I would issue a warning: this essay is extraordinarily careful in its precise use of words. Also, by the self-conscious use of repetition, this essay seeks to turn the tables on a dominant—and predominating—view of pragmatic aesthetics that (1) focuses on products and measurable outcomes to validate and verify artistic activity, and (2) is superficial in its conception of truth as being causal, consequential, and essentially mimetic. Alternatively, this essay insists, albeit in a way that seeks intentionally to short-circuit traditional discursive strategies, that (1) process needs to be balanced into the equation of assessing the value of work, and (2) truth gets concealed in the folds of fair approximations and faithful representations of what is held up as being the standard, which, we are told by experts and public opinion alike, we should be seeking to follow, reproduce, and imitate.

Repetition, unlike imitation, can help us see things, like ideas, in several ways at once—especially things we think we already know. According to Heidegger's analysis, whatever and however we may try to think, we always think within the sphere of the tradition.

> The assumption of the tradition is *not* necessarily traditionalism and the adoption of prejudices. The *genuine repetition* of a traditional question lets its external character as a tradition fade away and pulls

> back from the prejudices. ...Thus, the contact with the tradition, the return to history, can have a double sense. On the one hand, it can be purely a matter of traditionalism, in which what is assumed is itself not subjected to criticism. On the other hand, however, the return can also be performed so that it goes back *prior* to the questions which were posed in history, and the questions raised by the past are once again originally appropriated (Heidegger, 1992; § 14a).

In the critique that follows, I too am working from within, even while striving to twist free from, the sphere containing and conceptualized in terms of the tradition. I want to show how the words we use to express arts related activities, no less than our educational goals, determine (and, in effect, predestine) what we end up discovering time and again in our students' work, and thus what we end up teaching. By having us reflect critically and carefully on these small things, I believe we can become more alert to the larger scope of our actions. My goal then, more particularly, is to call attention to the power that words can have over our actions to affect change in and through education, whether for good or for ill.

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Once while passing through an elementary school hallway, I overheard an exchange that stayed with me: *"Today you have Art?"—"We go to Art today."*

In what context can we imagine this being said? Certainly first in the innocuous way it was originally meant: regarding a class, an activity, a special event. But it also implied something more: an endeavor. What if an accomplished artist like Louise Nevelson, or an influential philosopher like John Dewey, and not a second-grader, had uttered those words? What meanings would then accrue? This is no mere exercise in analyzing speech acts, for the stakes remain high no matter the status of the speaker. Six-year olds, no less than women and men of accomplished skill and learning, are valid disclosers of the truth that art allows to happen in the world. But so are ten-year olds and thirty-year olds; so why is it that agents of the school systems cease rewarding all students for creating works of art after they leave elementary school? Why is art so quickly coded as being mere decoration, or made the province of what a handful of gifted draftsmen can do because of their innate abilities to represent recognizable things? I will pass over these and other conceptions of the place of art and artists in schools and in contemporary society, and will observe several things that I will flesh out further in what follows: There is something about art and aesthetic experience, that is once enduring and ephemeral, that at once marks a trace of something that someone left behind and also projects what remains to be done next; there is something about the truth of art and the authentic aesthetic experience that pays no heed to age or schooling or background. This is not to say that art is universally recognizable as such. After all six-year olds, no less than women and men of accomplished skill and learning, are valid disclosers of the truth that art allows to happen.

Therefore, it is vitally important that we, as educators, learn to listen more carefully to what else is being said a sentence like *"We go to Art";* and, in doing so, let us consider that: "Erudition about the form does not guarantee a knowledge of the words. ...We must hear the literally taken word in such a way that we heed its directives in their pointing to the dictum. In such heeding we then hearken to what the word is trying to say. We exercise attentiveness. We begin to think" (Heidegger, 1994; 15). What better word to launch our effort to begin thinking than "art"? Through art let us begin to exercise our attentiveness.

* * *

"Today you have Art?" In this question let us hear the infinitive form of the verb come through as well: "to have Art." Here art is implied to pertain to one's character, as something one can have as part of oneself, and even which can be integral to one's life and perhaps to human-life, to humanity, itself. In the answer *"We go to Art today,"* let us also hear the infinitive "to go to Art." Here art is understood not only to be somewhere (a table, an alcove, a basement, a studio) someone can go, but also something that one can approach; a state of being at which one can arrive, something one can enter and be a part of, and in time inhabit and come to dwell. In such a dwelling some, for a time, can find shelter. Through such dwelling, not only is thought preserved, but also, in so doing, truth is sustained. Going to art, in preserving thought, sustains truth. In and through one's going to art, truth is sustained. Put more directly and less subjectively: Going to art sustains truth.

"We go to Art today."

In returning to the elementary answer to the question of whether one has art, we return to the direct and superficial sense of the sentence which establishes a fact regarding a place at a designated time: *"We go to Art today."* But after one has gone to "Art," and after whatever has taken place there subsequently has become part of one's experience, someone might well then ask: *"What did you do in Art today?"* Or to inflect it passively: *"What, in Art, was done?"*

Answers might include, depending on the medium used or lesson attempted or core-curriculum assignment assayed, answers might include: painting, drawing, sketching, sculpting, or any of a number of verbs of doing and making that imply creating. To what end? To what end is such art done and spoken of as having been done? To what end do we do art? To what end is art done? Can art truly be said to be done? In the verb "done" here I would urge us to attend to the deeper resonances, for they speak beyond the simple idiom "I am done," used for example to indicate that you have completed an assignment, like home-work problems or your grading for the term. Something else is happening here in this saying of done.

What can happen, and what a teacher of art or philosophy or literature, can let happen—I propose—is nothing less than the coming to presence of truth (which may or may not have anything to do with learning). When one does art so that truth is allowed to happen, what is it, really, that one is doing, or has done? Let us think about this, and dwell on it, and allow ourselves to build on this idea that the doing of art—when art can be said to be happening—opens up a world in which the truth of the work of art shines forth. In this shining, truth happens.

Before proceeding though I should clarify that the term "the work of art" can be used in several senses, and I would urge you to hear in the phrase, each time I use it in this essay, more than one meaning. The work of art, used as a noun, implies a finished product; something that has been done and can be shown on its own—namely, an artwork. If art is seen as the subject of the phrase though, then the work of art connotes something else; something that is furthered or brought into being by virtue of art; that which art does. Art, of course, cannot make or do anything on its own; it requires an agent (as do many artists). Art works through us, even as we use art to work things out.

As must be clear, I am concerned, in my work, with attending to language. My focus in this essay concerns the power of words to shape what we do—especially when we are involved with art, when we engage art, and even when we are engaged in the *doing* of art, in *making* art. And so if my language at times in this essay does not sound like ordinary speech, it is because I am trying to circle back and get inside of commonplace terms, so as to hear in them what they have all but ceased to disclose precisely because they are so much a part of everyday speech. If I have been extremely careful in my choice of words, it is because I am concerned, in general, with the path of language. To put it more emphatically: I am concerned with the way words tend to give us a *destination,* the way they can be said to *predestine* what we subsequently come to ask about and to know. More particularly still: I am interested in the extent to which words can predetermine what we end up finding in and through art (or philosophy or literary criticism or pedagogical theory) insofar as they set before us a course or track or path—for it is along just such a way, cut through the everyday, that art happens.

The image of a way or path is a common enough figure of speech; and, in a most telling way, it is taken up and followed by both Martin Heidegger and John Dewey in their discussions of the end of art. For both of them, "end" is understood more as a goal or projected aim rather than as a curt terminus. Although, to be sure, that sense must be heard in their use of the term as well, because, after all, it is firmly entrenched within Western cultural history: voiced in some circles as a lament ("there is no real art being made anywhere today"), voiced elsewhere as a celebration of what has and is being overcome ("the break from traditional, representational, art has freed the artist to..."), and in philosophical circles, the idea of the end of art is being voiced as part of the on-going discourse of metaphysics ("art, as conceived by the Enlightenment, is no more"). But to return to the metaphor as used by Heidegger and Dewey; the former wonders, "in what way *[weg]* does truth happen in the work-being of the work?" (Heidegger, [1935-1936] 1971; 50); and the latter seeks to describe the indeterminate "path the work of art pursues" (Dewey, [1934] 1980; 133). Although their writings on "the way" of the work of art, concerning the path taken toward authentic aesthetic experience in the world, appear at roughly the same time, neither sought to engage the findings of the other. Despite this, and notwithstanding the ever-widening ideological and political rift between Germany and America in the 1930's, their influential conclusions about the power of art and education to affect lasting social change are remarkably similar. Their determinations regarding the path pursued by the work of art might be stated: the aesthetic experience *can be said* to open up onto a world of truth.

The truth thus disclosed by the work of art, and the way it can be said to come to shine as a result, both happen to have been sketched out by Heidegger and also by Dewey, though each did so for reasons that are deeply imbedded in the course of his own lifework—and each did so in his own characteristic way and words. After all, philosophy, like educational theory, depends on discursive strategies to give coherence to aesthetic experience as well as other predominantly non-verbal activities. And yet, traditionally, we have come to rest easily with this mismatch of ways and means, of using words to characterize and disclose the truth of non-verbal experience and events. As ours is a culture that values visible marks, signs, tokens, and symbols, it is no wonder that words have been given pride of place. Heidegger and Dewey though, each in his own way, sought to confront, if not overcome, the difficulty presented by this immemorial state of affairs, by taking into account the texture and history of language in the process of expressing his ideas. For, like any medium, words have a materiality that is undeniable. It is a materiality, though, that sticks out into the world like a beam of light whose source is concealed, for what we can see is but a part of what gives rise to that which lets philosophy, like art, happen; and, in happening, happen as, and in terms of, shining truth. Such is the relationship between the medium and what it bodies forth when art happens. The materiality of language comes to our attention most often in the form of acoustic events or as graphic signs. But, by virtue of the way words never quite lose a trace of their nonmaterial status, they tend to take on another, in some ways more authentic, dimension of reality—thus we can speak truthfully when we speak proverbially of being able to see past the surface to glimpse the immensity, perhaps even the extent, of an iceberg.

Words, one can argue, shape how we conceptualize, and subsequently come to engage, art. Words affect us: our feelings, attitudes, and choices. They affect how we come to know things, and how we make our way in the world. And, ultimately, then, words affect how we do things...things like art, like philosophy, like cultural theory, like teaching. *"What did you do in Art today?"*

In returning to, and repeating this version of our question, let us hear in it something that has come to abide there. Let us hear something that we can dwell on, and, in time, come to dwell within—as a place of refuge, where things get preserved, things like truth; where art can be said to happen. Let us listen to what is carried on along within that phrase, for we stand to learn a great deal about how we consider art by reflecting on how we speak of art. First though, we need to attend to how, as children, we are taught and made to speak of art (and literature, and later philosophy), which often begins innocently enough by repeating what we hear. And there are rewards for this mimicry and punishments for falling behind in doing what is expected. But in time, even though we may take issue with this or that tenant and revise it a bit here and a bit there, the socially sanctioned discourse has already become so much a part of our speaking and indeed our thinking, that we cannot help but repeat and reproduce it. Necessarily it shapes and characterizes how we come to art, and come to do things through, or with, or to, art (or philosophy, or literary theory)—"the tradition."

"What did you do in Art today?" As stated—and thus as conceived—the question, as posed, presumes a process and, potentially, a product. Therefore in the "do" let us relocate an implied "make." The basic assumptions remain

the same: *"What did you make in Art today?"* Doing collapses into making. Of the many ways we might go about construing this, allow me to posit (in the next paragraph) three basic senses regarding the doing of art, regarding the making that makes "making art" a thing that one does and then is done with doing. Again my precise, if recursive, use of language is not intended as an exercise in semantics. I have adopted this way setting up words, hyper-attentive to syntax, to provide a way to rethink the terms, especially the verbs, we use in speaking of art so as to get at what we are really doing when we say we are speaking of it (or of philosophy, and, by extension, of education). *"What was made in Art?"* By returning to, and turning about, the initial terms of the question in this way, we can glimpse shades of difference and meaning. We do so as if by accident, through the repetition—genuine repetition. This is a visual strategy appreciated fully and applied amply by, among others, Andy Warhol with his multiple Marilyns and Maos, his soup cans and soapboxes. (This would be a good place to include some FIGURES to illustrate my point, but I have decided that, in the spirit of my approach to art through language, there can be no pictures in this essay. I would invite you instead to imagine the examples just mentioned, whether from your own experience, or from what I am telling you about them, or from some combination of the two; or, not at all—if the last possibility is possible at all). *"What was done in Art today?"* Something was done. Something was made. *"What was made in Art?"*

The three main senses provisionally describing, and thus illustrating the doing of art, can be conceptualized as having various charges—like the old model that was used to explain atoms. First, the positive charge, which corresponds to putting something where nothing was. Second, neutrally charged: altering, arranging, connecting things ready at hand. And third, the negatively charged particle, corresponding to taking away something that previously was there. Even with that model of "the building blocks of life," each type of charged particle was thought to keep the others in check.

In the first sense, the positive, we have verbs like those mentioned already, those considered the most elementary: painting, drawing, sketching. The second sense, the neutral, involves shifting, composing, or constructing; verbs like pasting, welding, tying, twisting, weaving, gluing. The last sense, the negative, calls on verbs like cutting, chiseling, sculpting, erasing, burning, dynamiting.... All three—whether adding, shifting, or subtracting—imply doing things to or through a particular medium. And all three might well come into play when it comes to the work of art opening up a world of truth, of possibilities. All three might well be preconditions for aesthetic experience. The truth of the work of art is disclosed through all three modes of engagement with the process of making or doing art; as such they can be said to be what lets art come forth, as shining truth. Recourse to all three modes of engagement in the making of art, can be seen in the light of what was said in the Introduction about the relation between order and chaos in teaching: Learning can happen even when we are not seeking to put something where we presume nothing previously was.

The verbs commonly used to describe activities relating to teaching, no less than those relating to art, do not pay proper tribute to the conceptual work involved. They tend to favor the activity part of the endeavor on the way toward realizing what you get in the end. Although the verbs primarily are process terms, ostensibly describing what was done, they tend to dwell on what someone in general did to make something in particular. The artist (the subject of this sentence which already is in motion and is well on its way toward a predetermined end) somehow acts on some material (verbs are words of action, even if that action is passive) to create something (the object, the product, the end). The process does not stop here though, since it is determined by the status of the product. What ends up getting made, the artwork, becomes something to which others (and the artist is included among these others) then can react. But where in all activity are verbs like "imagine" or "design," verbs bespeaking the contemplation and planning that is fundamental to the doing of art? This was a point not lost on Dewey: "It is significant that the word 'design' has a double meaning. It signifies purpose and it signifies arrangement, mode of composition. ...The characteristic of artistic design is the intimacy of the relations that hold the parts together" (Dewey, 1934 [1980]; 116-17).

Traditionally, it is the "idea" that mediates (not precedes) "form" and "content." Here we can imagine, as has historically been the case, a split between art and craft, between art for art's sake (say, a collage or painting or wire sculpture) and the creation of something manifestly "useful" (say, a belt, a jug, a blanket) though it need not actually be used. It was Immanuel Kant who gave what was to become the standard treatment of this theme in the West (Kant, [1790, §43] 1987; 171). Dewey in turn gave a decidedly modern spin to the traditional formulation of the split when he wrote:

> Objects of industrial arts have form—that adapted to their special uses. These objects take on esthetic form, whether they are rugs, urns, or baskets, when the material is so arranged and adapted that it serves immediately the enrichment of the immediate experience of the one whose attentive perception is directed to it. No material can be adapted to an end, be it that of use as spoon or carpet, until raw

> material has undergone a change that shapes the parts and that arranges these parts with reference to one another with a view to the purpose of the whole. When this form is liberated from limitation to a specialized end and serves also the purposes of an immediate and vital experience, the form is esthetic and not merely useful (Dewey, [1934] 1980; 116).

Heidegger was likewise alert to the way works were potentially aesthetic. In his early work he argued that there is no such thing really as a useful thing (understood in terms of "something in order to," which is comparable to Dewey's "with reference to"). He argued that since there were different kinds of "in order to," such as serviceability, helpfulness, usability, and handiness, they constituted a totality of useful things. As the structure of "in order to" always contains a *reference* of something to something, he concluded that these things never show themselves initially by themselves. "A totality of useful things is always already discovered *before* the individual useful thing" (Heidegger, [1926] 1996; 64). Words too were included among useful things, for words—as both a medium of communication and a means to do and make things (like points in philosophy)—also tell us what we have been thinking over time, including such an understanding of a traditional mode of making:

> We think of creation as a bringing forth. But the making of equipment, too, is a bringing forth. Handicraft—a remarkable play of language—does not, to be sure, create works, not even when we contrast, as we must, the handmade with the factory product. ...[The Greeks] use the same word *techne* for craft and art and call the craftsman and the artist by the same name: *technites*. ... However usual and convincing the reference may be to the Greek practice of naming craft and art by the same name, *techne* ... signifies neither craft nor art, and not at all the technical in our present-day sense; it never means a kind of practical performance. The word *techne* denotes rather a mode of knowing (Heidegger, [1935-1936] 1971; 58-59).

Irrespective of the assumed validity of what the Greeks may or may not have meant by the word, contemporary assumptions about the difference between *ars* and *techne,* based on medieval uses of the terms which persist well into our own day, is the difference between a divine mystery and a menial skill. On the one hand, a gift from the gods or a natural ability; and, on the other, the concerted learning of a process that enables one to *manu*facture something (recalling Heidegger's allusion to the etymology of "handicraft," springing from the Latin for "hand" *[manus]*). Of course there are seemingly infinite degrees of difference between the poles of art and craft thus defined (an accomplished craftsman is indeed an artist, and some artists are but tradesmen; just as Nietzsche insisted on a distinction between academic laborers and philosophers—the latter role which he claimed for himself only after resigning his university post), but still, these distinctions preserve in our language, like flies in amber, something quite telling about our culture regarding the status of doing and making. Significantly though these are not the verbs that we would consider auxiliary, as being "helping verbs" which make possible the construction of compound tenses (building on verbs like "to have" and "to be"; as in the for example: I have been meaning to make sense).

A subject does something and then something is created. Heidegger, too, will want to insist upon a distinction between "being created and creation" and "making and being made" (Heidegger, [1935-36] 1971; 57). Creation, as discussed here, covers the extent of the three "charged" senses outlined above; and yet creation need not be conceived of as being generative: one can create by breaking, removing, or obliterating something. Even "adding as creation" can be "destructive," for example in Duchamp's mustachioed *Mona Lisa* we find a supplement that is a kind of crossing out of, and thereby calls forth a reevaluation of, the original, and thus calls forth a new, composite meaning. This fits the definition of, but may not be exactly, what Dewey had in mind when he referred to "the esthetic experience" as just such a path that the work of art pursues toward its coming into being, along which path "it keeps alive the power to experience the common world in its fullness. It does so by reducing the raw materials of that experience to matter ordered through form" [Dewey, [1934] 1980; 133).

It was Nietzsche who ironically derived from within the tradition of philosophical inquiry the view that we create what is greatest by crossing out what has been—and this includes philosophy, and all that accompanies the highest achievements of Western rationalism. Both Dewey and Heidegger are writing in the shadow cast by Nietzsche's Zarathustra, though each may interpret their preferred brand of overcoming in different ways. Both, however, see the necessity of our embracing the power and will to affect changes in how we go about learning what we need to learn next. For as Dewey would have known, and as Heidegger studied intently, Nietzsche made us aware, through the words and character of his Zarathustra, that our true humanity begins when we recognize the creative and productive power of negation and destruction (a concept which translates powerfully into authentic approaches to teaching geared to let learning happen, as well into the true work of art).

> "*I teach you the overman.* Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All beings so far have creat-

> ed something beyond themselves. ....For must there not be that over which one dances and dances away? ... There it was too that I picked up the word "over-man" by the way, and that man is something that must be overcome—that man is a bridge and no end. ...I taught them to work on the future and to redeem with their creation all that has been. To redeem what is past in man and to re-create all "it was" until the will says, "Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it!" (Nietzsche, [1884] 1978; 12, 196-197).

To illustrate this as applies to the end of art (where end implies both a goal or aim, and also a terminal moment, or at least turning point, in the history of art), I would invoke the case of Rauchenberg's 1953 *Erased de Kooning Drawing*. Rauschenberg requested that de Kooning give him one of his most cherished drawings. Once he had it, he spent two months trying to eliminate the traces of de Kooning's original marks (Betti and Sale, 1980; 163). The result was a work of art, but can it be said, properly speaking, to be a new creation? Rauschenberg brought something into the world of art that had not previously been there. Can we say that something was made insofar the process was on of meticulously unmaking? Erasers have long been considered tools of the trade for draftsmen and for any artist using pencils, graphite, or charcoal; indispensable for rendering shadows. But still, was something done, or was something undone, in this endeavor? What was made or done; unmade or undone—or was it all of these at once?

Would the truth of art disclosed by Rauschenberg's endeavor be any less diminished if a six-year old erased pencil marks made by a peer—or a line drawing by Reubens? The world probably would never know about the former, though it would undoubtedly hear about the latter, which would be deemed scandalous since it took out of circulation something never again to be rendered by the master's hand (or that of his workshop). Rauschenberg's notoriety, and the public display of what *he* had done is what makes the general concept into an event in the history of art never again to be repeated with the same force. Though, to be sure, one can repeat this stunt over and over again to understand the mechanics of the exercise; but to do so would not to be furthering the trajectory of the arrow of the concept of the work of art toward its own overcoming. The same applies to educational methods: year in and year out the same sorts of exercises can be assigned to every student to impart a specific target skills, and yet there are other more vivid approaches that could be attempted so as to leaping beyond the confines of routine, imitative learning. Mere imitation preserves a superficial understanding of the truth of whatever is being learned or made, whether a five-paragraph essay or a work of art. Imitation can be the basis for future learning, but only if it is undertaken with the understanding that it is done *to be overcome*—that it is done so that it might be transformed into something more, into something beyond what it already is and otherwise is destined merely to be.

What keeps most people from such attempts, if not habit and satisfaction with the way things, is the fear of not succeeding. For the security and safety that comes from not doing anything to draw attention to or criticism about one's work the one pays the price of foregoing a potential leap of genius—and in that leap, overcoming the tradition and traditionalism. The verbs used to describe how we respond to the work of art can be seen to apply to students' class work (whether using the spelling words in sentences or one's conduct in the hallways) as well as our peers' professional work (whether articles or how she discharges her administrative duties): assessing, criticizing, admiring, approving, rejecting—in a word, *judging*. So too the painter steps back from her canvas and the dancer may watch himself on videotape, the better to judge what should come next, to determine what needs to be undone, done differently, and touched up. What grounds such judgments? Obviously, as Dewey indicates, previous experience and the degree of one's training and professional expertise. But what else? What underlies our recourse to, recognition of, and knowledge about those previous experiences? Such judgments to a large extent are conditioned and determined by relative skill level. They are qualified by the parameters of an artist's conceptual project and by the judge's relative degree of expertise in that field of endeavor. And since judgments cannot help but be made, even by those who may not have the time or inclination to learn how best to assess what he is being called on to evaluate, often they are predominantly subjective—or, more often still, dependent on what the judge takes to be public opinion or the prevailing conception of standards then in vogue. And this brings us but a short step away from "taste" as being the final arbiter (with which there can be no disputing). The next step is a declaration of standards that legislate what "should be known" in the world of education, and what "should be made" in the world of art. In either realm the terms used to assess those on either side of the divide (good students as opposed to bad one; good art as opposed to bad art) are supercharged with moral determinants, and imbued with standards reflecting often traditionally derived views of what is "in line" or "out of line," with what is within acceptable norms and what is not. It is an accepted tenant of the physical sciences, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, that the act of measurement influence the phenomenon being measured. How tests are constructed, and what they are designed to test, invariably will affect the resulting evaluation, whether a review of an exhibition or a student's final exam. Tests and grades do not just happen: we create them. Insofar as they are our creations, we alone are capable of overcoming them.

The step taken toward declaring standards of what others should be doing is a characteristically human thing to be done. That step toward positivism (and away from overcoming) is part of the built-in survival instinct. Such tendencies may well be encoded in our DNA and thus are natural to us. If this is the case, and if turning this set of positive values on its head can be shown to produce a laudable end product, then, even by the terms of the tradition, it becomes the task of philosophy to educate us—to train us away from what is merely natural toward a higher kind of rational, sensible, and sane living. Natural urges most often are what the educating environment seeks to tame and to sublimate (stay in line, raise your hand when you want to speak, no more than two boys to the bathroom at a time, no firearms on school grounds). Rough behavior befitting the outlands is identified and modified, and then channeled and redirected into acceptable expressions of those instincts—or else the "un-teachable" student is disciplined and made part of someone else's workload. So much for schooling; education, on the other hand, has to do with transforming students into something more than they were, and helping them realize what more they can be; what they might become. The task of philosophy then is very much akin to, and perhaps overlaps with, that of education: to lead us away from ignorance. It becomes the task of philosophy to lead us away from such natural tendencies (understood here as being damaging to society no less than the spirit) toward imitating, and making our own, judgments about what should be known by others based on superficial understandings of truth that have been enshrined as standards. It is the task of philosophy to lead us toward reflective thought and aesthetic action that pushes us beyond mere survival orientation and ultimately toward overcoming what is natural (and naturally harmful) to ourselves.

Thus continues, in a new guise, the age-old rift between of art and nature. To what extent though, if at all, does the articulation of what one will do to, or make of, a work of art (or of, say, a third-grade portfolio, college term-paper, journal article, or NEH grant request) give us a standard, universal or otherwise, for reliably and responsibly assessing *processes* and *products?* We can move toward an answer by paying attention to verbs relating the creation, to making and doing (even, and especially, where the doing might be an undoing). For the art or act of creating is primal, archetypal, and fundamentally human—we might even say natural to us. The biological term "conception" finds it echo in philosophy; thus disciplines concerning the body and the mind come together in this. This circular trick of language, where ideas like offspring are conceived, is played out in many cultures. "Let there be...light." Here are words that are said to call into being life...and light—understood as a shining forth in contrast to darkest oblivion; bring into being something as opposed to nothing. Conception brings forth even as it is brought forth, it too called into being in the world—through language. And what of the root-word which draws life from the soil of language, "concept"? Let us consider the place of *concept* especially as it relates to arts related activities. Let us consider, in passing, the art of forming, inventing or fabricating concepts—as something done or made.

Philosophy is the discipline that involves *creating* concepts, which is to say (if somewhat circularly) of conceiving concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, [1991] 1994; 5). What does this mean, to conceive or create a concept? Can such a thing be done, let alone conceptualized? Can a concept be made? How is such a thing to be depicted, how marked, how modeled, or represented in or by means of art—or science? To be sure, science, art, and philosophy are all equally creative, but there is something about philosophy in the strict sense that makes the creation of concepts the province of that discipline, which is not to say that those who are engaged in arts-related activities are not to some extent philosophers. And certainly, scientists are working with theories everyday that require conceptual leaps. At all events though: "Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their creator's signature" (Deleuze and Guattari, [1991] 1994; 5).

Nietzsche is credited as well with this conceptual breakthrough. In one of his more direct challenges to "re-evaluate all values," he outlines the rigorous task of anyone who would be a philosopher and not merely an academic laborer: "We must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing. Hitherto one has generally trusted one's concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland" (Nietzsche, [1904] 1968; 409). This famous passage is also cited and discussed by Deleuze and Guattari on their way to disclose the root of Hegel's powerful rendering of the idea of a concept as the philosophical reality of sense, where the concept is defined "by the Figures of its creation and the Moments of its self-positing" (Deleuze and Guattari, [1991] 1994; 5, 11).

We could dismiss Hegel entirely from this discussion were not for the remarkable influence that his ideas—and this one in particular—have had on generations of philosophers and art historians (whatever the extent to which they have been, if ever, truly understood as Hegel intended). And so, since I have been speaking of (and, perhaps, doing) philosophy, it is fitting at this stage in my analysis (regarding how we have come to speak of arts-related activities in the West) to turn to Hegel. And, although this essay makes no pretense to be a rigorous report on the history of Western metaphysics, but simply to be an exposé on the way words can conceal essential meanings, two things that need to be clarified before I can cite Hegel at length. First, for Hegel, beauty is a complex concept. Essentially, though, beauty is understood to cut across and move beyond the sensual and the perceptual. Second, in adopting the expression "fine art," Hegel excludes the beauty of nature from his discussion altogether.

> Therefore the proper element of poetical representation is the poetical imagination and the illustration of spirit itself, and since this element is common to all the art forms, poetry runs through them all and develops itself independently in each of them. Poetry is the universal art of the spirit which has become free in itself and which is not tied down for its realization of external sensuous material; instead, it launches out exclusively in the inner space and the inner time of ideas and feelings. Yet, precisely, at this highest stage, art now transcends itself, in that it forsakes the element of a reconciled embodiment of the spirit in sensuous form and passes over from the poetry of the imagination to the prose of thought.
>
> This we may take to be the articulated totality of the particular arts: the external art of architecture, the objective art of sculpture, and the subjective art of painting, music, and poetry. But poetry is adequate to all forms of the beautiful and extends over all of them, because its proper element is beautiful imagination, and imagination is indispensable for every beautiful production, no matter to what form of art it belongs (Hegel, [1835] 1975; 1, 89-90.

I would apologize for having to include so long a quotations, but it is fundamental to what comes next—both with respect to the Western philosophical tradition, and also my ensuing analysis. What we need to take with us though, as we proceed, is the notion that poetry (by which he means, *poesy,* the poetic imagination—the universal art of the spirit) is capable of embracing and taking on and animating all forms of the beautiful because it is the universal art of the spirit; it is not tied down to external sensuous material, the usual mediums of artistic endeavors and related worldly stuff, for its realization. Through poetry then, art transcends itself. Its destination is the beautiful imagination, and, on its way, toward transcending itself, it leaves impressions of its passage on certain forms to be seen here in the world.

Hegel developed these ideas at length in his monumental lectures on aesthetics. For our purposes though we need keep in mind that, for Hegel and thus for those who followed him, art is not the mere imitation of an inert nature. Art is something else, and the work of art stands somewhere in the middle, as it were, between immediate sensuousness and ideal thought. This concept made Hegel's later work much easier, and, as it happened, he found it ready-made in Kant. As part of his careful description of the distinctions between agreeable and fine art, he asserted that "it is fine art if its purpose is that the pleasure should accompany presentations that are *ways of cognizing.* …Fire art, on the other hand, is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to [facilitate] social communication. The very concept of the universal communicability of a pleasure carries with it [the requirement] that this pleasure must be a pleasure or reflection rather than one of enjoyment arising from mere sensation. Hence aesthetic art that is also fine art is one whose standard is the reflective power of judgment, rather than sensation proper." (Kant, [1790] 1987; 172-73).

The overly precise language may seem a bit stilted to modern ears, but it does succeed in conveying very distinctly a concept that came to be an indispensable part of the tradition: the work of art comes between, and in some cases can be said to mediate, immediate sensuousness and ideal thought. From here it becomes possible to build a case for the cognitive importance of art, which is precisely what Hegel did, by emphasizing art's historicity. In real terms this means that art can be seen to develop teleologically, along a path ever toward its consummation—and in this it mirrors the principles of syntax underlying the construction of sentences. In the conclusion to this essay, we will return to Hegel's idea of history, though perhaps not in a way he would have approved.

Hegel's ideas are still very much with us, whether or not we have read (let alone understood) them, for they have influenced generations of philosophers (and not a few academic laborers), critical theorists, and art historians. Erwin Panofsky, who revolutionize twentieth century art criticism by promoting an historically grounded approach to iconographic scholarship, put his spin on an essentially Hegelian view of the work of art in this way:

> In the case of a work of art, the interest in the idea is balanced, and may even be eclipsed by, an interest in form. However, the element of "form" is present in every object without exception, for every

> object consists of matter and form. ... Anyone confronted with a work of art, whether aesthetically re-creating or rationally investigating it is affected by its three constituents: materialized form, idea (that is, in the plastic arts, subject matter) and content ...It is the unity of those three elements which is realized in the aesthetic experience, and all of them enter into what is called aesthetic enjoyment of art (Panofsky, 1955; 12, 16).

It was not so much the potential pleasure to be derived from the work of art (evident from Kant on) that troubled Heidegger, as it was the triad of form, idea, and content. He maintained that "form and content are the most hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything may be subsumed" (Heidegger, [1935-1936] 1971; 27). So too Dewey was cautious in his use of such terminology: "The external object, the product of art, is the connecting link between artist and audience" [Dewey, [1934] 1980; 106].

Concepts like form, idea, and content were not invented by Hegel, of course. And yet his veneration and polishing of them endowed them with a sheen that many still see today, and see in a way that eclipses the truth disclosed in and through the shining of work of art. Still the concepts of form and content, at some juncture in the Western intellectual tradition, like any concept (as Deleuze and Guattari remarked), had to be invented, fabricated, created. With an eye toward personal experience within a community of those who create works of art that thus enable "esthetic experiences," Dewey maintained: "There can be no distinction, save between reflection, between form and substance. ... The fact that form and matter are connected in a work of art does not mean they are identical (Dewey, [1934] 1980; 109, 114). Further, according to the analysis of Herbert Marcus: "Aesthetic form is not opposed to content, not even dialectically. In the work of art, form becomes content and vice versa" (Marcuse, 1978; 41).

Such a view accords with the notion often attributed to Heidegger that there are no fixed centers or concepts such as "self" or "other" or "world" to which we can authentically anchor our philosophical systems. He takes another course; he chooses the middle ground, typical of the "middle-voice" he adopts when speaking of how things happen to be. Fundamental to his project is the creating of the concept naming the being of Being, *Dasein* (literally, "being-there"). For our purposes it is enough to remark only that *Dasein* pertains to active engagement in the world, which is conceived of as primarily a world of equipment or tools to *use* rather than a world of objects to *know*. It is here that we can begin to see with greater disclosive clarity Heidegger's originality in his effort to enable philosophy decisively to begin the overturning of itself—especially when we recall Kant's dictum that "fine art if its purpose is that the pleasure should accompany presentations that are *ways of cognizing.*")

As it happens, the conceptualization of the end of art that comes out of Heidegger's self-conscious philosophical project is not far from Dewey's democratizing vision of the order of things: "A new poem is created by every one who reads poetically—not that its *raw* material is original for, after all, we live in the same old world, but that every individual bring with him, when he exercises his individuality, a way of seeing and feeling that in its interaction with old material creates something new, something previously not existing in experience" (Dewey, [1934] 1980; 108). We are reminded here of Heidgger's understanding of *techne* denoting a mode of knowing, where knowing means to have seen in the widest sense of seeing, "which means to apprehend [to take hold of] what is present" (Heidegger, [1935-1936] 1971; 59).

In line with this, Heidegger rejected the notion of truth as correspondence. And Dewey replaced the idea of truth as correspondence to reality with "the idea of truth as what comes to be believed in the course of free and open encounters" (Rorty, 1989; 68). Despite the different and often convoluted paths they took to reach this conclusion, in the end, both Dewey and Heidegger rejected the notion of truth as correspondence. Dewey did so on his way to the determination of a pragmatic conception of objectivity. Heidegger did so in his following up the consequences of the truth in art as a truth that happens, that takes place in being set into the work of art, a truth therefore that is not of knowledge, and thus a notion of truth that more rightly could be called "double-truth" (Sallis,1995; 69). Even if the double ought not be called truth, still what remains decisive is the turn to that which grants truth: namely, the truth and the non-truth of disclosure that marks the condition of possibility of the truth or falsity of our propositions.

On this pivotal movement in Heidgger's thinking, John Sallis wrote: "It is this doubling that decisively breaks the bond of truth to knowledge in its traditional determination as intuition. For disclosedness is a matter neither *of* intuition nor *for* intuition. The originary phenomenon of truth, truth as disclosedness, is a truth that is not of knowledge" (Sallis, 1995; 68). This determination applies to words, no less than the work of art, for in everything that gets disclosed about the truth of the word, or the work of art, something else gets concealed or otherwise is allowed to recede. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" it comes out that "truth happens as the primal conflict between clearing and concealing" because every decision "bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision.

The earth is not simply the Closed but rather that which rises up as self-closing" (Heidegger, [1935-1936] 1971; 55). And later in that landmark essay on aesthetics, Heidegger talked about truth as disclosure—where there can be a "happening of truth at work" in a work of art, which opens up and discloses a world.

As we work through the following passage then, let us keep in mind that Heidegger's concept of double truth, in the end, enables him to gesture toward overturning traditional metaphysical speculation, and thus toward rethinking art outside the metaphysical end (where truth is conceived as correspondence, and art as being essentially mimetic). Also, Heidegger, with his characteristic philosophical rigor, acknowledges his starting point in Hegel's *Aesthetics.* Accordingly what is called "poesy" (or "poetry" as it is translated here), which runs through all of the arts, is to be understood as the universal art of the spirit. These are the terms he had inherited and through which the discourse on the aesthetic experience and the origins of the work of art historically had been carried out.

> The nature of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth. We understand this founding here in a triple sense: founding as bestowing, founding as grounding, and founding as beginning. Founding however is actual only in preserving. ... The founding of truth is a founding not only in the sense of free bestowal, but at the same time foundation in the sense of this laying grounding. [...] Art is the setting-into-work of truth. In this proposition an essential ambiguity is hidden, in which truth is at once the subject and the object of the setting. But subject and object are unsuitable names here. They keep us from thinking precisely about this ambiguous nature....Art is historical and as historical it is the creative preserving of truth in the work. Art happens as poetry. Poetry is founding in the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning. Art, as founding, is essentially historical. ...To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap—this is what the word "origin" means [*Ursprung,* literally, means "primal leap"]. We inquire into the nature of art. Why do we inquire in this way? We inquire in this way in order to be able to ask more truly whether art is or is not an origin in our historical existence, whether and under what conditions it can and must be an origin (Heidegger, [1935-1936] 1971; 75-78).

From here we can see our way more clearly toward turning the tables on traditional ways of naming art and arts-related activities. Taking our lead from the careful analysis of the origin of the work of art as it relates to aesthetic experience, both on the part of Dewey with his social concerns and Heidegger with his historical ones, we can discern that the making of art is the happening of truth. Further, we catch sight of the possibility that: Even as we may teach art (or philosophy, or biology, or Sanskrit, or English literature, or feminist theory, or liberation theology, or what-have-you), and even though works of art may end up getting created (whether as a consequence of our class assignments, by accident or design; whether as a result of our own creative endeavors or those of our students), it is art that ends up creating us, historically, as a society that values what art is said to be and what art has to say about us.

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Were it not for the work of John Sallis, I would not feel justified speaking of truth, let alone shining truth, in this exposé of the way words can conceal essential meanings. Likewise the very use of terms like "conceal" take on new resonance when seen in terms of the double truth that comes out of Heidegger's work—which Sallis has explicated with great acumen (Sallis, 1995). Before his study of double truth though, Sallis performed another important service to philosophy by reviving and resuscitating terms that had been all but banished from serious aesthetic studies decades ago, namely the terms "beauty" and "truth" (Sallis, 1994). He accomplished this by virtue of his decisive and critical marking of the term "shining" that belongs to art, and to philosophy, and to the ways we have come to speak about art and philosophy—and by extension education.

The crux to understanding his analysis is explained in the opening chapter of *Stone,* through a philological discussion of the Greek and German designations for beauty and light and shining. Hegel explicitly defined the beautiful as "the sensible shining of the idea *[das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee]*"; shining, therefore, names the way in which something beautiful offers itself to sense. Art is the sensible presentation of truth—that is, the presentation of truth in and through the shining of the work to sense (Sallis, 1994; 3) Building on Hegel's work in this field, from which Heidegger ventured to derive "the *truth* of art" where beauty is to be thought "as a way of shining," the work of art gives place to truth, indeed it "provides the place where truth can appear, can shine" (Sallis, 1994; 4). Sallis leaps on ahead further by invoking the question posed by Heidegger in *The Origin of the Work of Art* about Hegel's *Aesthetics,* the unsettled question of whether art is past—or, put differently, in the words of Heidegger's Epilogue: "is art still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character?" Hegel had concluded that art's form, in the emergent Industrial Age, had ceased to be the highest need of the spirit, and that: "In all these relationships art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest vocation, something past."

Maurice Blanchot likewise sees this as the ground zero for any future any inquiry that seeks to get beyond the posing of the question. And so he asks "But why this question?"—namely: *L'art est-il chose passé?* [Is art something that is done ?] (Blanchot, [1955] 1993; 282, 288-89). Blanchot takes Hegel at his word, and hears in his words a dictum; as such he seeks to hear in the French verb "passer" something that is over and finished, and which is marked as such both by grammar (the *past* tense) and by culture (for us, now, it is done): "L'art est pour nous chose passée" (Blanchot, [1955] 1993; 284). What is it about this question that marks it as being fundamentally a question of and about our culture—or rather of what has passed, and passes now, as our culture? To ask whether art is something that for us is passed, returns us to the pragmatic perspective of art as a thing ("something in order to"). But why is it that we have not overcome this way of thinking and speaking about art? Has language alone kept it in the realm of useful things? Does language draw culture?

After all is said and done, is art something that is for us over and done? And, if so, then what manner of thing is it that we are talking about? To say *"We had art yesterday"* implies that the event, the experience (like a class session, or like a conference session from which published proceedings derive), lasted for a span of time and then was over. Does anything linger? What part does being finished with a work (of art or philosophy) play in its life? To what extent is the prospective "being finished" present at the inception, in the very conception, of a work of art, so much so that it is irrevocably conditioned and shaped and informed by this legacy? What, if anything, lingers from the experience? What makes possible the sensible shining of the idea? What sustains the shining in and through the world that is opened up by virtue of the work of art, which gives place to truth and provides the place where truth can appear, can shine? Through its shining, the work of art can let truth be, can let truth appear; and yet it is the sensible shining character of the art-work that destines art to have become something past (Sallis, 1994; 43-44).

It is in this light I pause to consider that learning outcomes essentially are things that are done; a finished product is by its very definition (and mandate) over. It is the character of work-products to call to mind, though it may leave no discernible trace of, the process that brought it into being. For whatever the reasons, *products,* often interpreted as "results," are what tend to be valued in our culture—whether in juried art-shows or institutions of higher learning. What is done, and that which is shown, tend to take precedence over other kinds of shining forth and bringing to presence the truth of art. Correlatively what are we to make of the fact that the sanctioned aim of the doing of art (or of philosophy, of literature, of theorizing critically about any or all of these normative disciplines), that the prized end of the creative process, tends to be a finished product to which others, in turn, can react, can respond—whether they revise, celebrate, deride, confirm, reject, co-opt… ?

Perhaps this is the result of a confusion regarding the end (or goal) of what is done in the doing of that which enables and discloses the happening of truth in a work of art. It is characteristic of art to be involved with what is past, with what is over and done. In German the word is *vorbei* and as a noun *das Vorbei* is the name of death (Sallis, 1994; 30-31). In the doing of art then, art keeps running up against its own prospective passing, its own incipient gone-ness. Even so, in and through the doing of art also comes the possibility of the sensible shining that is truth; the possibility of art that comes to pass (and yet which is thereby destined to pass away) as the happening of truth.

Art in involved with what is over and done, with what already has been anticipated and completed—whether on the one hand a product that becomes part of one's *oeuvre,* portfolio, or resume; or, on the other, something like a bold conception, a cunning design, a fleeting image, a concept created…. Perhaps then, keeping in mind the notion of double truth and the possibilities is allows, we can celebrate rather than fear what may well be the most paradoxical of our many conflicting charges as artists, as teachers, and as scholars: to make sure that art is not done.

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As a way to reach for a conclusion that remains true to the terms and content of the exposé just presented, I would loop back to, and ask you to recall, what was said about decoration at the opening of this essay. With this in mind, I end by recycling the words of another regarding what is to be done with the work of art that we ourselves are. Each one of us "must organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs. His honesty, the strength and truthfulness of his character, must at some time or other rebel against the state of things in which he only repeats what he has heard, learns what is already known, imitates what already exists; he will then begin to grasp that culture can be something other than a decoration of life, that is to say at bottom no more than dissimulation and disguise; for all adornment conceals that which is adorned" (Nietzsche, [1874] 1999; 123).

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Fairy Tale as Literature, Fairy Tale as Psychological Document

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Last winter, I taught a focal point seminar called "Psychology of Fairy Tales" in the Liberal Studies program at DePaul University. Focal point seminars are designed for first-year students to teach them to think and read critically. Through studying a specific topic or genre from different critical perspectives and different disciplines, students in this program are meant to develop a well-rounded view of a particular area of study. The program thus provides in-depth treatments of topics presented in complex ways.

I chose the topic "Psychology of Fairy Tales" because I thought it would appeal to students' childhood experience while letting them know that the class would touch on more complex issues than those at the surface level of narration. Indeed, besides looking straight-forwardly at fairy tales, the course reflected on the impact these tales have on their audience, an area we explored through works acquainting students with different cultural systems. From a practical point of view, fairy tales readily involve students since they are easy to read, yet touch on many fundamental structures of the human psyche (self, ego, id, etc.) as well as on basic emotions. Their unrealistic component tends to bewitch the reader while taking him or her on a journey of self-discovery. Also, since they presage the art of poetics, fairy tales often explore the universal themes that appear in the greatest works of literature. Unlike novels or other kinds of literature, fairy tales rely more on universal motifs than on elaborate plots or detailed character development, inviting the reader vicariously to share the ordeals of the protagonist. They can be cathartic, since they cross literature and psychology and provide drama and human interaction in a way that leads to introspection and resolution. They also carry the heritage of different cultures, and so invite readers to question cultural values. Finally, from a theoretical point of view, fairy tales give rise to complexities concerning their didactic and ethical function, particularly from a multicultural perspective. This paper is an account of the strategies I used to lure students into self-analysis and critical thinking via gradual, elaborate readings of fairy tales and class interactions.

So as not to limit students to too basic of a reading material, I incorporated theoretical writings on fairy tales as well as the tales themselves. I chose the critical writings of two authors from different schools of psychology, Bruno Bettelheim *(The Uses of Enchantment)* presenting a basically Freudian point of view, and Marie-Lousie Von Franz *(Shadow and Evil in Fairy Tales)* presenting a Jungian one. I chose Von Franz's *Shadow and Evil* because along with offering a different outlook, it analyzes non-European or less traditional European tales than those widely available in our culture. These works enable the reader to attain a state of estrangement as far as moral practices and ethical behaviors are concerned, leading him/her to question the meaning of morals at both the individual and the collective levels.

Because of the itinerary I had planned, I chose to devote the first session of the course to a clarification of literary and psychological concepts as well as to general definitions. I started by asking students what fairy tales are, and what they are supposed to achieve. Once past the obvious answers that they are meant to entertain and edify, our conversation shifted rapidly to a discussion of the purpose and use of morals, and to whether we could think of fairy tales as essentially moral. Students brainstormed ideas on these topics to come up with general definitions. On purpose I accepted broad interpretations while pointing out the contradictions that seemed to pop up. Two main points of contention were whether morals were individual or social, and whether fairy tales were moral. I avoided providing definitive answers and told the students we would come back to definitions at the end of the quarter.

In order to make our readings less overwhelming, I alternated between types of reading for each session. Students read fairy tales for one class, theory for the next class, and so on. For the first readings I selected very well known tales such as "The Frog King," "Hansel and Greatly," "Cinderella," "Little Red Cap," "Snow White," and "Bluebeard." The reasons for such choices were multiple, including that students already knew these tales, and that rereading them might help students see whether their adult responses were the same as their childhood responses. Another reason was that these tales come in different versions, and the alternate versions could bring food for thought as far as the purposes for the changes go. Also, many of these tales have been cinematized, thereby changing completely the medium by which they were traditionally available, thus raising questions dealing with imagination, censorship, control of interpretations, etc. Finally, to expose students to a very detailed and controversial point of view, I made sure that most of the tales had been analyzed by Bettelheim. However, I arranged it so that students would read the text and write reactions to it before reading Bettelheim. To generate interaction, students had to hand in one- or two-page response essays on their readings to be read in class. They also had to come up with three questions for each session.

Letting students put forward and defend their ideas allowed for a period of crystallization. The fact that many responses were read in class exposed students to varied interpretations and reactions. One of the idiosyncrasies of fairy tales is that since their plots are not developed and since they appeal to the imagination and the unconscious, students would often select different details or situations to highlight. There would be some consensus, yet it was not overwhelming. After letting them expose their points without question, I would ask students to read the interpretation Bettelheim offered of the tale. This approach let the class gradually build up strategies by which they could analyze the text in a more scholarly fashion while not spoiling their initial response to it. It also simultaneously guaranteed more determination and opposition in points of view expressed in the class, since students did not swallow Bettelheim's points before reading the text. A situation I had not envisioned, however, was that not all students had had a parent, friend or relative read stories to them. Many students' knowledge of the stories was limited to their exposure to a Disney movie rendition. What initially seemed a great handicap turned out to be enriching, though, since even before reading Bettelheim and his interpretations, students were already baffled by this version of their favorite tale that they were reading now, as they came to say, in "an unclean version." Why would the princess throw the toad against the wall instead of kissing it, and be rewarded with the love of the creature she attacked? Why mention the opening of the wolf's belly? Why talk about sisters cutting their feet and eyes being plucked out? Why all this unnecessary violence when children are already exposed to violence in this cruel modern world? Why change my favorite story into something gruesome?

Bettelheim's writing would provide answers, yet answers that were not always easily digestible for students. According to Bettelheim, fairy tales use diverse means to appeal to the child's unconscious. They are not supposed to be primarily realistic, reasonable, cautionary or moral. Fairy tales are not directly about punishing evil or rewarding goodness. The characters and situations they present are symbolic and enable the child's psyche to deal with inner conflicts. These conflicts are inner, i.e. unconscious, because quite often they pit the child's desires against the socialized norms of behavior we call morals. Fairy tales are violent because they reflect violent inner conflicts and enable the child to find an outlet for overwhelming feelings of impotence that arise when he or she confronts the adult world.

Along with learning how to accept another person's point of view and terminology, some students really had to ask themselves if they had actually ever been exposed to a fairy tale as opposed to a stereotypical story presented as a glamorized ad. Further, they had to ask if they had spent their childhood viewing rather than reading these stories, and if so, what impact it had had on their mental and emotional development. From a practical point of view, learning the meaning of Freudian terms such as unconscious, id, ego, superego, pleasure/pain principle, reality principle, oral stage, oedipal stage and so on gave students the beginnings of an analytical background. We agreed that the Freudian approach was a convention among many, yet a convention nonetheless. Interestingly, one of the most difficult aspects for some students to accept was the use of symbols, more specifically sexual symbols. When Bettelheim equated the fitting of the shoe in Cinderella to initiating the child and unconsciously preparing her for future intercourse, some students protested that this was dirty thinking and nothing else. I was amazed to find that students had difficulty grasping that a ring put through a finger can symbolize not only commitment but also sexual union. Accustomed to the explicit, it was hard to deal with the implicit. I purposefully did not try to convince students of the validity of such interpretations, yet insisted that they bear in mind the possibility that this was the actual meaning.

Though Bettelheim's book was controversial and difficult to read, students ended up liking it because it was challenging. The most thought-provoking interpretation was Bettelheim's analysis of "Snow White" as a tale that enables the little girl to cope with her Oedipal complex and her negative projections on her mother. At first many students could not imagine that a child could be jealous of a parent, let alone that as children they fell in love with one parent. Yet in the next reading, when Bettelheim analyzed the text from the side of the parent's jealousy because of the Oedipal feelings of the child, students came to accept that such feelings could actually exist. Many of them did not know the myth of Oedipus.

For closure of the first part of the quarter, and also to diffuse some of the disillusion that a few students faced in finding out the "real meaning" of their favorite fairy tales, I gave the assignment of rewriting a fairy tale to change an ending they did not like, provided that they respected the definition of fairy tales we had reached and explained the reason for their change. This became an edifying exercise, since some students wrote fables or stories more closely related to the definition of myth, thus enabling the class to come back to actually trying to define the genre of the fairy tale in opposition to two similar other forms. This assignment also provided a perfect transition to the study of Von Franz's writings. By questioning the purpose and definition of the fairy tale while reading Von Franz's reflections on fairy tales as reservoirs of collective unconscious material, we added several new dimensions and interpretations to the original definitions that students had put forward. Once more, moral issues came to the fore. For Von Franz, fairy tales present material that is too raw to be considered moral, and their contents and resolution often seem contradictory when viewed rationally. Thus, Von Franz sees fairy tales more as reflections of the taboos and fears of a given society than as accounts for children to stimulate personal growth and ego development. Tales deal more with good sense and sensibility. Von Franz advises the reader approaching a tale to ask who the story addresses before even venturing an interpretation. Only the context in which the story appeared can help in deciphering its meaning. In Shadow and Evil Von Franz selects stories dealing with the puzzling side of nature. She devotes many chapters to studying the primitive levels of evil that man sees or imagines in nature. Unexplained phenomena in unknown situations occur to people who then have to deal with taboos or possessions while the human spirit is being overwhelmed or disturbed.

The second half of the quarter was spent with interpretations of tales dealing mostly with superstitions. I chose tales that Von Franz had analyzed as a means of comparison. We read two Chinese stories ("The Horse Mountain Ghost" and "Spirits of the Hanged"), three South American Indian stories ("The Spear Legs," "The Outwitted Wood Spirit," and "The Rolling Skull"), and some less-known Nordic, German and Russian tales ("The Giant Who Didn't Have His Heart with Him," "How the Woodcutter Outwits the Devil and Gets the Princess," "Getting Angry," etc.). These tales had common themes related to human projection, possession and fear. One tale which fascinated students was "The Spear Legs," the story of two brothers going hunting and one being possessed by the spirit of the great rain frogs. The story describes the progressive transformation of the elder brother into a relentless killer of animals. He kills with his legs, which have been burnt by the campfire and which he has whittled into spears. Eventually, with the help of the villagers and a cunning little squirrel, the younger brother kills his older brother.

Far from developing a moralistic overtone, this story addresses survival. Its focus is on killing the evil spirit in the brother who starts to kill so recklessly that he becomes unsensitive and possessed. Killing the brother appears sensible, given that the ecological balance has been altered by his gratuitous slaughtering. In this story as in similar ones she selected, Von Franz points out that in primitive societies, evil in nature is personified, turned into a demon: "[the] personification of [the] phenomenon of evil in nature...is supernatural" (152). Killing the brother is not understood from a conscious, moral point of view, but instinctually. "There is no ethical problem, it is simply a question of fighting" (152). According to Von Franz, possession means assimilation by a numinous archetypal image, as in the case of the brother who gradually becomes dehumanized by his actions.

I was surprised to find out that students did not object to Von Franz's interpretations, and seemed to enjoy the stories even more than the ones analyzed by Bettelheim. If both psychologists saw mainly unconscious material in fairy tales, an irrational form of telling not meant to be moral, it seemed that Von Franz's approach appeased students more than putting them up in arms. Her views were certainly not as categorical as Bettelheim's, as she only suggested possible interpretations and pointed out traits similar to all cultures dealing with the primitive in us. Though Bettelheim claimed that fairy tales were not supposed to be moral, his interpretations dealt with highly touchy grounds, since sex and growth along with learning how to fit in the family structure and be properly socialized seemed to underlie the structures of his analysis. A Jungian might talk here of the shadow side of the writing, which, while denying a moral purpose to a form, constantly interprets it within morally tinted concepts and infrastructures such as the war between the super-ego, ego, and id. On the other hand, while Von Franz did not exclude the relevance of a collective moral code as well as the presence of a personal moral urge, she kept her interpretations flexible, perhaps allowing the fairy tale to keep its integrity in that it did not have a specific mold attached to it. The reader could project his/her own interpretations, allowing for dreaming.

It is possible that because students already knew the tales selected by Bettelheim, it was harder for them to be receptive to his approach. I can still hear one student declaring that mothers should get together and burn all copies of "Hansel and Gretel," since killing the witch symbolically represents overcoming the mother for saying no to the child's endless hunger at the end of the oral stage: the house in the forest symbolizing home and the apprenticeship of independence. By studying Von Franz after Bettelheim, students were exposed to a less one-dimensional and systematic theory. The comparative essay that they wrote at the end of class about the approaches of these two writers gave them more insight into different types of analysis and into their own responses and preferences.

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Why Art Education Mattered: Ernest F. Fenollosa, His Philosophy of Art Education, and Its Impacts on Meiji Japan

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The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was a direct product of the military pressure Japan experienced from the western powers' increasing presence in the Far East. Politically active, young low-ranking samurais were the primary force that brought about this revolution. By the early 1860s, it became obvious to them that China was suffering gradual but steady colonization by western powers. An increasing number of samurai activists, who realized that Japan would be the next target of western aggression, found that their Shogun's centuries-long, politically inflexible government could no longer effectively handle this national crisis. After a relatively short civil war, those samurai activists established a new government (the Meiji Government) under the emperor's authority. Modernization (which technically meant westernization) naturally emerged as the most important, urgent mission for the Meiji Government. Japan had to restructure itself into a modern state as soon as possible; it needed a western-type, more rationally organized decision-making system; it needed a modern military to secure its independence; and most importantly, it needed modern industry to finance its entire modernization projects. Failure in modernization meant that Japan would inevitably fall into colonial subjugation, like its neighbor Ch'ing dynasty already did.

Why did art education matter for the Meiji Government? The primary reason was economic. From the Meiji Restoration until the early twentieth century, Japan had been struggling for urgent modernization and industrialization. But the national resources available for the new government were extremely limited. The government's efforts to institutionalize modern industries did not seem to bear any immediate fruit. The Meiji government seriously suffered lack of tariff autonomy, which it was forced to inherit from the previous Tokugawa shogunate. Foreign products thus came to flood the Japanese market. Japan's international trade balance was always in the red. The government had no means to offset the western powers' economic invasion.

Art seemed to be the only field where Japan could compete with the western powers. The Paris World Exposition of 1867, the Vienna World Exposition of 1873, and the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition of 1876 demonstrated that the western demand for Japanese artistic curios was rapidly increasing. The American market was especially important for the Japanese art industry. Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, so called the "Japan Craze" remained a major cultural phenomenon in the United States. More and more American upper- and middle-class families turned their eyes to Japanese-flavored artistic materials for interior decoration, creating a large mass market for Japan's art products. The Meiji government naturally tried to turn this trend to its advantage.

Ernest Fenollosa took primary responsibility for strategizing the overseas sales of Japanese art during this crucial period. But he did not remain a mere policy planner. He not only blueprinted Japan's nationally institutionalized art education system, but also practiced art education himself. His primary method was the public lecture. During his almost twelve-year sojourn in Japan, Fenollosa made a considerable number of public lectures, by which he tried to convince the Meiji Japanese that art industry would be an economically promising field for Japan, as well as that art education would be essential for promoting art industry.

As a public educator, Fenollosa initially had to face people's indifference to their traditional, native art. The early Meiji period was the age of extreme westernization. Not only the government but the entire nation was also obsessed with blind worship for western culture and civilization. Virtually no Japanese cared for their traditional art. A variety of art works, many of which had been considered as treasures, now flooded the market and sold at rock-bottom prices. Innumerable, less valuable artistic materials were thrown away or destroyed, simply because they occupied extra space.

During the previous Tokugawa period, Japanese artisans and artists enjoyed a constant, high demand for their products from feudal lords, Buddhist temples, and wealthy merchants. Now these art producers found that a tidal wave of westernization washed away this centuries-long patronage. Fenollosa described the disastrous effect this sudden change caused on not only art producers but also the entire traditional art world in Japan, as follows:

> The great patent fact was that the nation's demand for its own art products suddenly ceased. Art, speaking from an economical point of view, is a luxury, and that part of a nation's income which goes to its support is expended unproductively. But with the abolishment of the feudal system in Japan, the delicate machinery of adjustment between income and the details of expenditure was dislocated with a violent wrench. The question became not one of luxuries but of necessities. Henceforth artists found their patronage at an end. ("Revived?" 2)

The end of the feudal era and the beginning of nationwide westernization thus brought about great transformation, which almost extinguished Japanese traditional art. Japanese people now came to think that their native art was simply irrelevant for their present and future. The first task Fenollosa had to tackle was to change this public mindset. "Where…is [Japan's] wealth to come from?" ("Future" 7)—Fenollosa asked his audience, whose mind was occupied with immediate necessities. His answer to this question was designed to convince the audience that Japanese native art was far from useless; on the contrary, it would be a key necessity for the new nation's economic success:

> Since the one great general advantage of Japanese over Westerns lies indisputably in their artistic capacity to design, it follows that they will achieve their best result in that class of article of which the artistic excellence is the chief element of value. ("Future" 7)

Notably, Japanese art as an economically promising resource for national wealth was not the only point Fenollosa stressed to his audience. The commercial value of Japan's art products would depend on the collectors' demand for them. Mere consumer curiosity could not be a permanent, reliable basis of art demand, because such curiosity would often vanish with changing trends. Therefore, the commercial demand for Japanese art had to be rooted into a more essential necessity than mere economic profits Japan's overseas art sales could produce. Fenollosa's argument naturally gravitated toward the moral necessity of not only Japanese art but also art per se, as follows:

> Art elevates human nature, and makes man contended with his lot. There are other ways of elevating man, such as moral teaching and ascetic discipline. But these make man feel that he is like a soldier engaged in an eternal struggle with evil, parallel to his eternal struggle with nature for the means of subsistence. It is necessary for him to get glimpses of that which he is struggling for: i.e., perfection, not the

> perfection of an industrial or moral machinery which points beyond itself, but to perfection in itself. ("Importance" 8-9)

In the above quotation, Fenollosa regards art as almost identical to religion. But the major difference he points out between ordinary religion and art is that the former "may give us in another world" ("Importance" 9), and the latter "one of the chief means of rendering in this [world]" ("Importance" 9). "Art objectifies the spiritual result which man from time to time has reached," continues Fenollosa, "and embodies the inspiration of its best moments in a permanent environment" ("Importance" 9). Fenollosa believes that art is a religion as long as it connotes morals. However, this religion can exert a much stronger power than other ordinary religions to elevate its believers spiritually. "Men instinctively love beauty," he argues, "because it is a revelation to themselves of the better selves" ("Importance" 9). Art thus becomes "unconscious every day religion" ("Importance" 9). It presents the morals in specifically visualized, worldly forms, which people can appreciate in their daily life.

When Fenollosa thus stresses the moral effect of art, his argument naturally gravitates toward education. What is the purpose of education? What role should art and its moral power play for achieving the purpose of education? Fenollosa's answer is quite clear-cut. "The result of moral, mental, and physical education," says Fenollosa "is not the promotion of a standard uniformity among men, but of a more decided individuality" ("Revived?" 6). Fenollosa believes that art is an especially useful educational tool for fostering individuality, because it is individuality that constitutes a core value of art. "Art was not a mechanical product pointing to some utilitarian end beyond itself," he continues, "but efflorescence of an individual creative spirit" ("Revived?" 6).

Why are individuality and individual creativity important themes in education? Fenollosa's answer to this question went beyond mere confession of his personal belief in individuality. The uniqueness of his argument lay in the fact that he tried to integrate individuality and art as its flowering with the commercial success of Japan's art industry, as follows:

> A great and thoroughly sound work of art is such a rarity in this world, that when it occurs, the market value it commands bears no relation whatever to its cost of production. This latter cause of value, as everybody knows, acts as a cause only through the power of indefinitely increasing supply; but when this general freedom of supply is for any reason ineffective, the value of an article takes its own course, and advances up to the very limit of intrinsic worth—that is to the

> amount which some one would rather sacrifice than lose it. Conspicuous objects of fine art, like paintings and statuary, fall naturally under this head. The individuality of creative genius embodied in such work is a monopoly of the author. And when the author is dead, the monopoly becomes absolute. In such cases no one thinks of asking after the cost of the materials and the time employed in the work. ("Future" 7-8)

The above quotation clearly shows why Fenollosa opposed mechanical production of art. He saw the western wealthy patrons of Japanese art as a key factor to the success of Japan's art industry. Since mechanically produced artistic materials were inevitably based on the same, standardized formats, such materials would never satisfy the wealthy connoisseurs' demand for original art works. "No matter how beautiful the work may be," he said in another occasion, "if the wealthy patron suspects that he is going to meet the duplicate of it in the houses of every other friend he visits, he will prefer tō go elsewhere" ("Future" 24). Therefore, art products had to command their particular individuality and originality for their successful sales. Mechanically produced materials could neither have any power to attract the beholder, nor be considered as art. "Perfect art," asserted Fenollosa, "...ought never to repeat itself" ("Revived?" 6).

Fenollosa's insistence on both individuality and rarity of art thus led him to reject the mass production of art. But this did not necessarily mean that he opposed maximizing the industry's production output. In fact, so that art production could add to national wealth, art works had to be produced in such abundance as to maximize the profits. Quantitative increase, as well as qualitative improvement, of Japanese art production was thus an essential issue Fenollosa had to consider in promoting Japan's art industry.

How would it be possible for Japan to secure its maximal output of high-quality art works?—Fenollosa had to answer this question in blueprinting his art promotion project. Mechanical production was out of the question, because it would kill rarity and individuality, both of which he considered as core values of art. As an alternative to mechanical production, Fenollosa emphasized Japan's needs for more artisans and artists in order to produce individualistic original art works to the maximal amount. Especially, he stressed that a nationally institutionalized art education system would be essential to train and recruit future art producers. "[G]eneral art education in schools" thus emerged as an important issue "[t]o aid in developing Fine Art in Japan" ("Advantages" 2).

Fenollosa considered school art education as essential not only for increasing the number of art producers. In order to establish Japan's art industry as an economically promising field, the commercial demand for Japanese art products had to be secured and promoted. The overseas market was beyond the Japanese government's control. As a stable basis of the industry, the domestic market had to be cultivated. General art education was necessary for this purpose; it would improve the Japanese people's artistic sensitivity enough to appreciate art works. "Such education," argued Fenollosa, "is required for the widespread diffusion of good taste," because "[w]ide and intelligent art-patronage is essential" for steady growth of Japan's art industry ("Advantages" 3). "[T]he majority of men," he continued, "grow up in ignorance of what is good in art, merely because their attention has never been called to it. A certain moderate amount of art-practice is the one great thing for opening the eyes of the people to the nature of beauty" ("Advantages" 3).

Improvement of public artistic taste by general art education was not the only issue; the improved public taste then had to accompany the establishment of common standard for art criticism. In order to maintain and increase the supply of high-quality art products, the market demand for the best kind of art would have to be stimulated. If art collectors were satisfied with mediocre artistic materials, then art producers would never aim high in creating their works. Low-quality art products would inevitably cause the collectors' increasing indifference, undermining the commercial basis of the Japanese art industry. Therefore, the general public needed sufficient education in order to possess the good artistic taste, which would motivate them to purchase high-quality art works over mediocre ones. Fenollosa considered general art education in schools as a key to fostering a standard of criticism in people's mind. "Such education," said Fenollosa, "is required for establishing a common standard of criticism" ("Advantages" 3). "Without something like a common standard," he continued, "the art environment cannot stimulate sufficient competition between artists" ("Advantages" 3).

General art education, a common basis of art criticism, and qualitative improvement of art products were thus inseparable issues. But it should not be forgotten that what Fenollosa regarded as primarily important was art education's role in "stimulat[ing] spiritual improvement of the people" ("Advantages" 1). While he kept stressing the commercial profits both art education and art industry could create, he never forgot to assert that the "prime fact" Japan had to remember in institutionalizing general art education was that "the development of Fine Art in a nation [was] an important requisite of its spiritual improvement" ("Advantages" 2). "Spiritual excellence includes all kinds of refinement which raise man above the condition of a mere economical machine," continued Fenollosa; art "softens and purifies man's heart" ("Advantages" 3).

Fenollosa naturally expected artists to play a significant role in his general art education plan. General art education would be a "primary means of bringing about... a healthy unity" ("Advantages" 3) between artists and people; it was through general art education that artists should lead the rest of the nation toward spiritual excellence and commercial success. Artists were producers, who would create the nation's wealth; artists were educators, who would teach good artistic taste to the general public; most importantly, artists were reformers, who would contribute to the nation's spiritual improvement. "Artists then become like statesmen of high rank," argued Fenollosa, "who have always the eye and ear of the whole people upon them" ("Advantages" 3).

Fenollosa thus projected nationally institutionalized general art education as a primary method to bind "the scattered art forces of a country" into "a progressive powerful national school" ("Advantages" 3). But it should not be forgotten that he planned general art education especially in order to promote Japanese art, rather than art in general. "True art," said Fenollosa, "is a part of and springs out of the spiritual life of a people; and this life must necessarily differ from country to country, and from time to time" ("Advantages" 6). Art education must not be a method to teach students any universal criteria of what art is. In fact, Fenollosa never considered that such criteria would exist. "There is no international standard of art," he said, "any more than there is an international standard of poetry" ("Advantages" 6). The purpose of general art education was to promote the nation's artistic originality. "What a foreign nation admires and honors in another is its national flavor," continued Fenollosa; "It is to render possible such fame to Japan, by aiding in establishing a national school. That is one raison d'être for national system of art education" ("Advantages" 6-7).

In Fenollosa's art philosophy, we can see a happy unity of the nation's commercial success and moral education. This unity was something, which Japan would come to forget when it finally succeeded in establishing itself as a modern, industrialized state. Fenollosa's project of promoting both art industry and art education as a national policy quickly lost its actuality during the latter course of the Meiji years. Today, not many Japanese remember Fenollosa's name; few know that he created a significant epoch of the history of modern Japan's art education and art industry.

Is Fenollosa worth remembering? For many, the answer is probably no. Maybe yes for some scholars, as long as his life and thought catch their professional attention. As a historian, I have to admit that Fenollosa's art promotion plan functioned as an influential discourse only under very limited, historically particular conditions. But this conclusion, although it sounds scholarly accurate, would terminate all the other intangibles Fenollosa's words and deeds imply. To me, his art philosophy still sounds fascinating in the sense that it suggests a major alternative to what has actually happened in history. If Fenollosa's plan had been realized, the history of modern Japan might have been entirely different. Imagine the whole Japanese nation transformed into a giant art workshop. If we admit that this vision still pleases us, would it not be true that Fenollosa's ideal has not completely lost its compelling power to action? Every historical alternative always looks more or less like an unreal castle standing in the air. How can we put a foundation under it?—Not to forget this simple question is, I believe, one effective way of saving what we call scholarship from falling into vulgar objectivity.

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Ogbu's Cultural Ecological Theory and the Case of Vietnamese Students: Theoretical Issues and Educational Implications

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The aim of this paper is to examine the cultural ecology that affects Vietnamese students in the United States. The paper consists of two main parts. First, it addresses theoretical issues related to Ogbu's cultural ecological model that has been used to explain differences in minority school performance for over two decades. Second, it discusses the cultural ecology that affects Vietnamese students with practical recommendations for educators and counselors who work with this group of students.

In the second part of the paper, after a brief review of the literature about the Vietnamese population and a historical overview concerning Vietnamese students' migration experience, the paper focuses on the difficulties facing the students in their school adjustment. The paper then proposes the Vietnamese cultural model of schooling in an attempt to explain what has facilitated Vietnamese students' adjustment and performance in schools. This model includes four community forces, two key cultural values that emphasize educational achievement and interdependence, and collective solutions and strategies. The four Vietnamese community forces are a dual framework of reference, a folk theory of social mobility, a pragmatic trust in school authority, and symbolic beliefs about schooling. Suggestions for future research are also discussed in the conclusion.

THEORETICAL ISSUES

Ogbu's explanations of differences in minority school performance

Ogbu's cultural-ecological theory suggests that two sets of factors influence minority school performance: the system (the broad societal and school factors), and community forces (the dynamics within the minority communities) (Ogbu 1987, 1993; Ogbu & Simons, 1998). To explain differences in school performance of different minority groups, Ogbu (1987, 1993) focuses on the minorities' community forces, i.e., their perceptions of and responses to schooling. Ogbu hypothesizes four factors that constitute community forces: a frame of school comparison (how minorities compare schools "back home" with schools in the U.S.), beliefs about the instrumental value of schooling (how minorities perceive the role of school credentials in social advancement), relational interpretation of schooling (the extent to which minorities trust school authority in mainstream America), and symbolic beliefs about schooling (minorities' perceptions of the effects of school culture on their ethnic identity) (Ogbu & Simons, 1998).

In his explanations, Ogbu classified minorities as voluntary (immigrant) and involuntary (nonimmigrant) groups (Ogbu, 1987, 1993, 1994; Ogbu & Simons, 1998). Voluntary (immigrant) minorities are those who have voluntarily moved to the United States for better opportunities than the opportunities in their homeland. Involuntary (nonimmigrant) minorities are those who were brought to the United States as slaves (e.g., African Americans), or those who have become minorities against their will as a result of conquest (e.g., American Indians, Native Hawaiians or early Mexican Americans in the Southwest) or colonization (e.g., Puerto Ricans). In short, Ogbu classifies a group as immigrant or involuntary according to its initial terms of incorporation into a society.

The issues of refugees and generational differences

Two issues have been neglected in Ogbu's theory of minority school performance. First, Ogbu did not include refugees in his cross-cultural studies, and has given less attention to them than those who have migrated to enhance their economic opportunities or voluntary minorities. He viewed refugees as those who were forced to leave because of civil wars or other crises in their countries of origin (Ogbu, 1994; Ogbu & Simons, 1998). However, he also speculated that refugees are more likely to share the attitudes and behaviors of voluntary minorities, which lead them to success (Ogbu & Simons, 1998).

According to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (1986), a refugee is "a person who flees his/her country to escape persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion." Like those who have come to the United States from around the world, refugees are faced with enormous change in adapting to a new cultural setting. Unlike immigrants who have resettled voluntarily, refugees have little preparation for their departure, and usually suffer from losses of family members during their migration. Immigrants may visit their native country as they want, whereas refugees may only dream of returning to their homeland for fear of persecution.

Recent ethnographic research reveals that variability in school performance of immigrant and refugee children is far more complex than what Ogbu's theory can explain through dichotomous typologies of accomodation versus resistance, or voluntary (immigrant) versus involuntary minorities (Banston, 1997; Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Caplan et al., 1991; Gibson, 1997; Rumbaut, 1995; Zhou & Bankston, 1998, 1994). Researchers have suggested a number of different factors that interact to shape the immigrant/refugee student's attitudes and behaviors in school. Among these factors are the reasons for the minority group left their homeland, the context they encountered upon arrival, the resources available to the group, including the support system within the family and the ethnic community. Although knowledge of the dominant language and culture is an advantage, it is clearly not sufficient to promote academic achievement and upward mobility (Gibson, 1997). Individual and family variables as well as the nature of discrimination/racism experienced by the individual person, the family and the group are also predictors of the minority student's behaviors and attitudes toward school and his/her school outcomes and social mobility.

The second issue which has been neglected in Ogbu's analysis is variability in minority school performance from one generation to the next. The needs and vulnerabilities of those who began their schooling in another country (the first generation) differ significantly from those of the second generation and beyond. Research on first-generation immigrant youth has focused on explaining how these students are able to overcome the cultural, linguistic, social and economic barriers in order to succeed in school (e.g., Caplan et al.'s 1991 study about Vietnamese boat people). Research on second-generation immigrant youth has suggested that the educational barriers faced by immigrant children are not always transitory in nature. According to this body of research, many U.S.-born children of immigrants and refugees are at risk of school failure and downward assimilation when they feel pressure to Americanize more rapidly than their parents and when their family and ethnic community lack the cultural and social resources needed to guide them (Gibson, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Some scholars (Gibson 1988, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Zhou & Bankston, 1998) postulated that the best course for second-generation immigrant and refugee youth appears to be one that encourages them to remain securely anchored in their ethnic communities while pursuing a strategy of selective acculturation.

Literature about the Vietnamese

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of scholars began to pay attention to the Vietnamese population in the U.S. (Charon & Ness, 1981; Kinzie, 1981; Montero, 1979; Nidorf, 1985; Simon, 1983; Velasco et al., 1983; Vignes & Hall, 1979). While there were some studies about the refugees' adjustment strategies (e.g., Simon, 1983; Velasco et al., 1983; Vignes & Hall, 1979), most of the early empirical studies on the Vietnamese focused on their mental health and were conducted by psychiatrists or psychotherapists who worked with the refugees in health institutions (Kinzie, 1981, Kinzie & Fleck, 1987; Kinzie et al., 1988; Nidorf, 1985).

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s scholars in the social sciences have explored various aspects in the Vietnamese refugees' and immigrants' daily lives (Caplan et al., 1991; Freeman, 1989; Hein, 1995; Kibria, 1993, 1994; Lee, 1988; Matsuoka, 1990, 1993; Rumbaut, 1991; Rutledge, 1992). Most of these studies relied on interviews and self-reports for data collection with the help of Vietnamese students or social workers for translation. Besides reflecting the refugees' and immigrants' traumatic and harrowing experiences in their homeland and during migration, these studies also included some aspects of their adjustment to life in the U.S. Only recently has there been more research about normative development in this population with an emphasis on Vietnamese youth's school adjustment and performance (Bankston, 1997; Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Bemak & Greenberg, 1994; Do, 1998; Nguyen, Messe & Stollak, 1999; Park, 1997; Rumbaut, 1995; Zhou & Bankston, 1998). However, the number of such studies is still very limited despite the growing number of the Vietnamese in U.S. schools and work force.

Historical Overview of Vietnamese Students' Migration Experience

The Vietnamese came to the United States in three waves (Freeman, 1989; Haines, 1988; Hein, 1995; Nguyen, Messe & Stollak, 1999; Rutledge, 1992). The first wave occurred around the mass exodus of 1975, when President Ford authorized the entry of 130,000 Indochinese refugees, 125,000 of whom were Vietnamese, into the United States (Bankston, 1997; Kelly, 1977; Hein, 1995; Montero, 1979). This wave consisted mostly of Vietnamese who worked for the South Vietnam government and the U.S. government (Kelly, 1977). The second wave took place between 1978 and 1982 when more than 600,000 Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese sought escape by boat (hence, they are also called "boat people") (Caplan et al., 1991; Gold, 1993; Grant, 1979; Hein, 1995; Rutledge, 1992). Finally, the third wave, also called "legal emigration" (Hein, 1995, p. 37), started in 1979 and lasted until 1995 (Hein, 1995; Rutledge, 1992). Third wave Vietnamese entered the U.S. through the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) (Allen & Hiller, 1985; Nguyen & Organista, 1997; Leung & Boehnlein, 1996; Rutledge, 1992). They were either refugees or immigrants, and included close family members of Vietnamese Americans, Amerasians (those born in Vietnam and fathered by Americans during the Vietnam war), and former U.S. government employees or persons who had allied themselves with the political and military goals of the U.S. in Vietnam (Rutledge, 1992).

By 1990 there were 614,547 Vietnamese in the United States (Hein, 1995). Most of them were foreign born and admitted as refugees. The Vietnamese have become the fifth largest Asian group in the United States (Bankston, 1997), and probably the youngest population with a median age of 18 years (Rumbaut, 1991). The Vietnamese have not only grown in numbers but also have formed definable communities. The communities allow the Vietnamese in the United States to retain some aspects of their familiar ways of life back home and to adapt to a new and strange environment (Bankston, 1997; Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Kibria, 1993, 1994).

Difficulties in Adjustment

Research revealed that the Vietnamese experienced greater psychological distress and had more difficulties in their adjustment than other immigrant groups (Bemak & Greenberg, 1994; Kinzie et al., 1990; Kinzie & Leung, 1993). The reason is probably that most of them suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder associated with their experiences of war and violation of human rights, and unimaginable grief due to separation from or loss of family members prior to and during their migration. Loss of professional role and identity, low self-esteem, and social isolation were major factors complicating the Vietnamese adjustment (Matsuoka, 1993; Vignes & Hall, 1979).

In their resettlement the Vietnamese faced various adjustment problems. As a group entering the U.S., the Vietnamese share the same nationality and similar motives for migration. However, regarding the context of departure from their homeland and the context of arrival to the U.S., individual refugees' experiences varied from person to person, and from one migration wave to another. Besides the hardship due to migration factors, in their adjustment to the new country, particularly to the new school environment, Vietnamese youth have to overcome difficulties caused by the language barrier, age at the time of arrival, intergenerational conflict within the family, or lack of a family support system for unaccompanied children, and cultural differences in school settings.

Context of Departure and Context of Arrival

Scholars have noted that the context of departure (how refugees and immigrants left their countries) and the context of arrival (how they were received by the host country) may impact the adjustment of settlers in the new land (Kibria, 1994; Ogbu, 1993; Rumbaut, 1991; Ward & Kennedy, 1994). With respect to the context of departure, the Vietnamese had many characteristics of both acute and anticipatory refugees. Acute refugees are those who flee in the wake of massive political and military upheaval (Kunz, 1973). Anticipatory refugees are those who leave home in an orderly departure with some preparation (Kunz, 1973). While a few Vietnamese were "pulled" by perceptions of a better future and attractive economic opportunities in the U.S., the majority of them were "pushed" by threats to their lives and coercive political conditions in their homeland (Freeman, 1989; Hein, 1995; Rutlege, 1992).

The Vietnamese who came to the U.S. during the first wave and the second wave were acute refugees. Although they left in a hurry, many of the first-wave refugees were well-educated, could speak English and came with their intact families. The second wave refugees experienced more economic hardship and violation of human rights in their homeland, and were forced to escape in small boats. During their long and dangerous escape, many lost their family members. After waiting in overcrowded refugee camps throughout Southeast Asia for months or years, they were allowed to enter the United States. The Vietnamese who came during the third wave were anticipatory refugees, though they are often called legal immigrants sponsored by humanitarian programs. Some were educated in their homeland; others never had an opportunity to complete high school.

With regard to the context of arrival, the Vietnamese relied on their ability to speak English, their family support, church support and public assistance for smooth resettlement (Gold, 1993; Kibria, 1994; Montero, 1979). The U.S. government created large-scale programs to assist first wave refugees to find jobs and American sponsors (Gold, 1993). Vietnamese from the second and third waves received much less assistance than the first wave, for large-scale programs had been phased out by the time of their arrival.

Most school-aged Vietnamese are in greatly disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances. They have limited human capital and economic resources within their families, and have to find other sources of support to overcome such limitations in order to succeed in school and later in society (Zhou &

Bankston, 1998). Vietnamese adolescents whose parents have trouble obtaining stable employment have more difficulty in school adjustment, and may have to curtail their educational ambitions in order to work and support their families. The lack of active government support, a receptive labor market, and social support from family members and an ethnic community may make the adolescents' adjustment to schools more difficult (Fuligni, 1998).

The majority of Vietnamese refugees settled in urban areas where they shared the same neighborhood with African- and Hispanic-Americans. They rarely lived in Euro-American communities. Over a period of time, they gradually formed their own communities. If they live in their own communities, such as Little Saigon in Orange County, California, they can function for years without the need to speak English. However, even those who live in their own communities have to learn English and mainstream skills in order to be successful socially and economically.

The Language Barrier

The inability to speak fluent English at the time of arrival appears to be a major obstacle to school adjustment (Caplan et al., 1991; Nguyen, Messe & Stollak et al., 1999; Nguyen & Williams, 1989; Rumbaut, 1991; Rutledge, 1992; Vignes & Hall, 1979). Factors that affect Vietnamese students' English proficiency are age at arrival, parental social class of origin, and the need or desire for exposure to English. The language barrier hinders many Vietnamese from expressing themselves and fitting well into American society. Furthermore, lack of bilingual teachers and bilingual education denies many Vietnamese students who cannot speak English well the chance to accommodate to the new school environment (Nguyen & Organista, 1997). In 1993 the California State Department of Education reported 10,000 bilingual teachers, of whom only 83 were Vietnamese in sharp contrast to the 48,890 limited-English-proficient (LEP) Vietnamese students in the state (Rumbaut, 1995).

Failure to communicate aggravates students' low self-esteem and perceived isolation. Bemak and Greenberg's (1994) study of Southeast Asian refugee adolescents reported that 63% of the participants had mild to severe depression because they could not express themselves freely. The adolescents with inadequate English skills were twice as likely to experience depression.

Age at Arrival

Age at the time of arrival is very crucial in the Vietnamese refugees' adaptation process. Researchers have categorized foreign-born Vietnamese into three groups (Rumbaut, 1991; Zhou & Bankston, 1998). The second generation includes those who arrived as preschoolers, or before their fifth birth-days. This group shares many psychological and developmental traits with their U.S.-born counterparts. Those who arrived between the ages of 5 and 12 belong to the 1.5 generation, and are in many ways marginal to both the old and the new worlds (Rumbaut, 1991). Finally, the first generation consists of those who arrived in adolescence or as adults. First-generation Vietnamese tend to retain their affinity for the Vietnamese culture, whereas those who are younger are inclined to absorb the host culture which, in turn, helps them to adjust more quickly in school settings and daily activities. Research has revealed that younger Vietnamese students usually adapt well to their school environment and have higher grade point averages (GPAs) than their older counterparts (Rumbaut, 1991; Rutledge, 1992).

Intergenerational Conflict

Within the family context, different Vietnamese generations sharing the same household have to face unavoidable intergenerational conflict. There are three possible reasons for these conflicts. First, Vietnamese families have moved from a hierarchical society that is age-graded and respectful of elders to another society that stresses individual equality and glorifies the youth (Gold, 1993). Parents' reliance on their children as interpreters or translators in difficult language situations creates a role reversal from the Vietnamese traditions. This role reversal contributes to intergenerational conflict (Haines, 1988; Leung & Boehnlein, 1996).

Second, differences in acculturation rates between the old and the young widen the generation gap and worsen parent-child or between-sibling communication. While the old cherish their old traditions, the young embrace the culture of the host country. The young are more likely to pick up values and customs from the host culture which may not agree with the elders' older traditions (Bellah et al., 1985; Gold, 1993).

Third, the young are confused and frustrated with different expectations from their own family and the host society. While their family emphasizes the values of a collectivistic culture, the host society stresses on the values of individualistic interest. The young find it difficult to integrate the two cultures (Matsuoka, 1990; Nguyen & Williams, 1989).

Vietnamese parents may be willing to grant their children some Western freedom (e.g., freedom to leave home to attend college or freedom to decide when and whom to date). At the same time, they expect their children to adhere to traditional Vietnamese values such as filial piety and obedience to parental authority (Nguyen, Messe & Stollak, 1999). Vietnamese students are frustrated with these ambivalent messages. On the one hand, they are told to be successful in the United States and to be grateful for the freedom they have. On the other hand, they are expected to avoid the American individualistic way of life (Nidorf, 1985). Such ambivalent attitudes imposed from their parents may evoke resentment, leading to intergenerational conflict and prolonged family stress.

Vietnamese students are also caught between the desire to maintain strong family ties with their parents and the need to establish successful relationships with their American peers at school. Research indicates that failure to get along either with their parents or with their mainstream American classmates predicts emotional distress in Vietnamese students (Charon & Ness, 1981; Nguyen & Williams, 1989). Their mental health appears to be linked to both their family ties and their social relationships at school (Nguyen & Williams, 1989).

Lack of Family Support

Though there is intergenerational conflict within Vietnamese families, children who have remained with their parents show much less psychological disturbance than those who were separated from their parents and came to the United States without any family support (Bemak & Greenberg, 1994; Ressler, Boothby & Steinbock, 1988). These unaccompanied children's parents might have died during the escape, or could not reunite with them afterwards. Since it was difficult to arrange for the whole family to escape at the same time, many children were forced to migrate by themselves. The migration experiences of these unaccompanied children were underscored by difficulties in refugee camps and generalized trauma. Life changes at early developmental stages produce profound reactions, and the potential for trauma-induced problems. In many instances unresolved psychological issues remain, then emerge at a later developmental stage in the new environment.

Cultural Differencs in School Settings

With their experiences of interrupted schooling due to migration and cultural differences in school settings, the transition of Vietnamese students into American public schools is not an easy one. School policies such as mainstreaming (rapidly integrating students into regular classes regardless of their English-language skills) and age-grade matching (matching the ages and the grades of the students as closely as possible) also aggravate the serious adjustment problems that Vietnamese students already had struggled with before entering school (Kibria, 1993). In addition to the language barrier which prevents them from participating in school activities and understanding the lectures, many find themselves unprepared as they are placed in a grade above their academic level. The majority of these students did not have an opportunity to complete their formal education because they had experienced interrupted schooling prior to and during migration.

Furthermore, there are differences in learning style. Vietnamese students encounter an American learning style that is quite different from what they experienced in their country of origin (Park, 1997; Rumbaut, 1991; Rutledge, 1992). In Vietnam the classroom is teacher-oriented with an emphasis on obedience and memorization. Questioning teachers is considered inappropriate. Learning involves listening and observation rather than experimentation. In contrast, American students are encouraged to raise questions, for teachers are not considered the only source of knowledge and may even be incorrect.

Some Vietnamese students fail to adjust to the school policies and the new learning style. They are below average academically and have no motivation to advance their academic efforts beyond the high school level. To these students, the sense of failure in schooling can be overwhelming and very intense, particularly to those who have dreamed of succeeding but are not academically prepared or still struggle with the English language.

Those who cannot succeed academically often find inner-city schools less friendly and sometimes threatening. Some have complained that they were often verbally harassed with racist remarks (Rutlege, 1992) or were physically harassed by other students (Freeman, 1989; Kibria, 1993; Rutledge, 1992). These perceptions discourage them from attending classes regularly. Some have dropped out of school to work for very low pay or become gang members.

In short, Vietnamese students initially experienced difficulties in social adjustment and academic learning mainly because of the language and cultural barriers. However, research has revealed that they rarely display behavioral problems and adjust well in school (Bankston, 1997; Caplan et al., 1991; Rumbaut, 1991; Vignes & Hall, 1979). To understand more about Vietnamese students' struggle over the barriers, in the following section we will examine the Vietnamese cultural model of schooling that facilitates the students' adjustment.

THE VIETNAMESE CULTURAL MODEL OF SCHOOLING

From the cultural-ecological perspective, cultural models reflect the ways members of a minority group understand or interpret their world, and include attitudes and values that guide their actions in that world (Ogbu & Simons, 1998). The Vietnamese cultural model of schooling refers to the Vietnamese refugees' understanding and perception of the American educational process. This understanding helps Vietnamese students and parents interpret their experiences, and guides their attitudes and behaviors in American schools. The Vietnamese cultural model of schooling consists of four Vietnamese community forces, two cultural values that affect the Vietnamese educational socialization and the community forces, and their collective solutions and strategies (Figure 1).


Cultural Values
Educational Achievement
Interdependence
Community Forces
Dual frame of reference
Folk theory of social mobility
Pragmatic trust in school
Symbolic belifs
Collective Solutions and Strategies
Individual
Family
Community
Diligence
Resiliency
Ethnic identification
Nuclear family support
Resiliency
Ethnic identification
Extended family support (from peers, family friends and relatives)
Community support (from organizations & socializing forces)

Figure 1.

Vietnamese Community Forces

Four Vietnamese community forces are a dual frame of reference, a folk theory of social mobility, a pragmatic trust in school authorities, and symbolic beliefs about schooling. First, the Vietnamese refugees have a *dual frame of reference* for school comparison. One frame of reference is based on their situation in the United States; the other is based on their situation back in Vietnam. By comparing their current situations with their earlier experiences in Vietnam, the Vietnamese believe that their children have better educational opportunities in the United States (Caplan et al., 1991; Kibria, 1993, 1994). The parents, therefore, are willing to make sacrifices so that their children can attain this opportunity and improve their social status. With this dual frame of reference, the students are more likely to accept less than equal treatment and are motivated to study hard for success.

The second factor is the Vietnamese *folk theory of social mobility.* Before they left their homeland, most Vietnamese had formed their cultural model about how to succeed in the U.S. school system and achieve upward mobility through orally transmitted ideas and beliefs. Vietnamese parents perceive education as an avenue that leads to success in the United States. They believe that the same strategies (e.g., hard work, following rules and getting good education) employed by Americans will also work for their children. They are willing to invest in their children's education and expect to reap rewards in the future (Kibria, 1993, 1994). They remind their children that the future of the whole family depends on their academic success. The parents' encouragement and aspirations create a context in which the stakes for doing well at school are emphasized. This support from families, together with the influence of achievement-oriented peers, is especially important to Vietnamese students' school adjustment.

Successful role models have positive influences on Vietnamese students. Some Vietnamese have worked hard, attained a higher education, and achieved economic success. Research has documented these successful Vietnamese and their increasing contributions to the American society (Caplan et al., 1989; Rumbaut, 1991; Rutledge, 1992). Vietnamese parents usually advise their children to look up to these models, and expect their children to become successful professionals like them. Some Vietnamese communities collect information and even publish books about these role models as a way to motivate their children.

Third, the Vietnamese have a *pragmatic trust in school authorities.* In other words, they have positive relational interpretations of schooling in mainstream America. Because they see education as a route to social mobility, they do not question school authorities, but appreciate their relationships with American teachers and school personnel. Vietnamese parents generally encourage their children to conform to school rules and respect teachers and school administrators.

Vietnamese parents are more concerned with their children's educational progress than with issues of racial discrimination. Although they encounter and resent discrimination in schools and in society, the Vietnamese do not perceive such treatment as institutionalized or permanent. Besides, as new-comers, they have not been exposed to discrimination long enough to internalize its effects.

The fourth factor is the Vietnamese *symbolic beliefs about schooling,* or their perceptions about the effect of mainstream American school culture on their ethnic identity. Viewing education as a vehicle for social advancement, Vietnamese students and parents deem it necessary to accommodate to the American school culture. To them, this is an additive process which does not harm or replace their ethnic group identity (Rutledge, 1992). They believe that learning the school curriculum and the English language will facilitate their adjustment, and provide them the key to social and economic success in the new country. Even when Vietnamese parents find socialization in school at odds with Vietnamese culture, they may still encourage their children to become competent in the American ways as long as they do not bring shame to their family and community (Kibria, 1994).

An understanding of the Vietnamese community forces rests on recognizing crucial cultural values that Vietnamese parents and students apply to interpret their experiences and understanding of the American educational process. We will now discuss the significant role of cultural values in Vietnamese students' schooling and educational socialization.

Vietnamese Cultural Values

The Vietnamese's perceptions of and responses to schooling in the U.S. are profoundly influenced by their traditions and cultural values. The refugees brought with them a mixture of Buddhism and Confucianism, which has become a source of motivation and guidance for their new life in America. Vietnamese traditions and cultural values are deeply embedded in the community and family contexts. In their educational socialization Vietnamese students benefit significantly from internalized cultural values with family and community supports (Bankston, 1997; Bempechat, Graham & Imenez, 1999; Caplan et al., 1991; Kibria, 1993, 1994; Rutledge, 1992). The internalized values protect the youth from risk factors, and help them focus on academic achievement.

Two key cultural values are particularly crucial for Vietnamese youth's successful school adjustment. One is the Confucian emphasis on hard work (effort) and educational achievement. The other is the spirit of interdependence, especially within the family.

First, the Vietnamese highly value hard work and educational achievement. Education to the Vietnamese has always been important, and the learned have traditionally been given an honored place in their communities (Rutledge, 1992). Within the family, there is a high consensus between parents and children regarding the values placed on hard work and academic success. Caplan et al. (1991) found a correlation of .83 between samples of Vietnamese parents and adolescents on measures of importance attributed to these cultural values. Vietnamese parents encourage their children to strive hard, expect them to do their homework and follow instructions at school. The ultimate goal that refugee parents set for their children is to become successful in school, and to attain at least a college degree.

Second, the Vietnamese collectivistic culture emphasizes interdependence among in-group members. Interdependence helps refugees and immigrants adapt to new environments successfully, for it encourages cooperation and group efficacy, rather than competition and individualistic achievement. The needs of the group, social norms and duties toward the family are more important than the individual's pleasures. Vietnamese youth consider high performance in school to be their filial duty and responsibility (Bempechat, Graham & Imenez, 1999; Caplan et al., 1991; Kibria, 1993; Rumbaut, 1991; Rutledge, 1992). Through parents' encouragement and aspirations, the youth are aware that the future of the whole family depends on their academic success. Besides this sense of responsibility, family honor, guilt and shame are salient in Vietnamese family socialization (Freeman, 1989; Leung & Boehnlein, 1996). Children's achievements bring status and honor to parents and family in the community (Caplan et al., 1991; Kibria, 1993; Rutledge, 1992). Children perceive that their parents have sacrificed themselves as a transitional generation by accepting low-pay jobs so that they can move forward and achieve educational and occupational accomplishments. This perception motivates them to strive harder at school (Kibria, 1993; Rutledge, 1992). Vietnamese students also feel guilty and ashamed if they cannot fulfill their parents' aspirations. Those who fail in school feel that they have let their family down and have undermined the family's dream for a better future.

In the Vietnamese cultural model of schooling, the two key cultural values discussed above interact with the four Vietnamese community forces and affect the refugees' behaviors and attitudes to the American educational system. Based on these cultural values and community forces, the refugees have developed collective solutions and strategies to facilitate Vietnamese youth's school adjustment.

Vietnamese Collective Solutions and Strategies

This section discusses some solutions and strategies that the Vietnamese have used in their contact with the American educational system. Facing multiple issues and difficulties in their transition into the new system, Vietnamese students, the nuclear family, the extended family, and the ethnic community have developed a number of ways to help one another cope and adjust successfully.

First, at the individual level, most Vietnamese students with internalized values of hard work and education study diligently and regulate plans and actions to attain academic goals (for more about students' self-regulation, see Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994). Spending more time on the English language and homework is one way Vietnamese students often use to overcome the language barrier and other initial difficulties in school. Good study habits or learning strategies, and a positive explanatory style that attributes school success to hard work rather than in-born ability are at the heart of the students' successful adjustment.

Like other refugee and immigrant children, Vietnamese students have been exposed to stressful situations, and have developed resiliency (Do, 1999; Rutledge, 1992), or "the ability to recover from or easily adjust to misfortune or sustained life stress" (Laosa, 1989, p. 6). This ability positively affects the students' self-efficacy or judgment of task performance given the skills the students possess and the circumstances they face (for more about self-efficacy, see Bandura, 1993). High resiliency and self-efficacy significantly contribute to the students' school adjustment.

In addition, research has suggested that a strong sense of group or ethnic identification (as indicated by native language ability, self-description, friendship networks, and involvement in ethnic community activities) positively affects the students' psychological well-being. Bankston and Zhou's (1995) study of 387 Vietnamese adolescents in New Orleans found that this strong sense of ethnic identification, especially the students' Vietnamese literacy, helped to enhance emotional ties between parents and children and reduce intergenerational conflicts. As students can share ideas and feelings with their parents in the native tongue, they feel strongly anchored in the support of the family, and also the ethnic community, in order to cope with the poor disruptive environment of urban schools. Similarly, Bankston (1997) found a clear, positive and linear relationship between academic achievement and ethnic community involvement in a sample of Vietnamese youth. Those Vietnamese adolescents with stronger connections to their community scored high on academic performance.

Such findings among the population of Vietnamese youth reveal the significant role of native language use in ethnic identification and parent-child relationships within the refugee or immigrant family. Since immigrant children's poor command of their parents' native language has been positively associated with high levels of parent-child conflict (Rumbaut, 1994), encouraging the practice of the native tongue, especially native language literacy, among the younger generations seems to be a helpful strategy to reduce intergenerational conflict and to increase the bonds between the youth, the family and the ethnic community.

Second, within the family context, family bonding and security helps protect youth against stress reactions and disruptive behaviors in school. 77% school-aged Vietnamese children are living with two parents (Hein, 1995), have access to family support, and, thus, retain a sense of security. Research has revealed that refugee children who remained with their parents showed fewer signs of psychological disturbance (Ressler, Boothby & Steinbock, 1988). Members in refugee families that stay together usually develop stronger bonds due to shared experiences of hardship in time of war and crisis. Vietnamese children are often reminded of the sacrifices their parents made in order to come to the U.S.. The desire to assist their family and the feeling that achieving in school is an important family obligation motivate Vietnamese students as well as other Asian youth to study hard, and seem to be associated with good developmental outcomes (Caplan et al, 1991; Fuligni, Tseng & Lam, 1999).

In addition to emotional bonds, cultural factors in parent-child relationships are also important in motivating Vietnamese children to obtain school success. In the San Diego metropolitan area Vietnamese parents who scored high on their sense of ethnic resilience and solidarity within family and community structures usually had children with higher GPAs (Rumbaut, 1991). This finding challenged the traditional assumption that the more acculturated or Americanized the immigrants become, the greater their success will be either in school or at work.

Vietnamese parents influence their children's education through encouragement and aspiration as well as positive attitudes toward American teachers and education. Discussions about children's activities at school at the end of the day have been common among siblings, parents and other family members who would like to express their concern and interest in the education of the young. Since many Vietnamese parents have to work hard and are often unfamiliar with the American educational system, they are less likely to be volunteers in school activities. It is through family educational socialization that the refugee parents convey their high aspirations, expectations and positive attitudes towards schooling in the U.S..

Furthermore, using the family as a resource for learning is particularly useful for the Vietnamese who have a strong sense of family interdependence. Vietnamese parents try their best to provide their children with a supportive learning environment in which older siblings help younger ones with their homework and other academic activities (Bempechat, Graham & Imenez, 1999; Caplan et al., 1991; Rumbaut, 1991; Rutledge, 1992). These strategies help Vietnamese students learn as much from tutoring as from being taught. Those parents who had good training in the U.S. usually spend time helping their children with their homework. Hence, education within the Vietnamese family has become a collective affair, and a continuity of the refugees' family tradition in the new country.

Besides the nuclear family, Vietnamese students also receive the encouragement and support from the extended family, which includes peers, family friends and relatives residing in close proximity. This network provides social, emotional and practical supports which the students need in time of family crisis. Peer groups who hold similar family and educational values provide Vietnamese students with fulfilling relationships. Like other adolescents, Vietnamese students are more likely to turn to close friends for advice on personal concerns, such as dating or sexuality (Cooper et al, 1993). Regarding school achievement, the support which Vietnamese students receive from academic-oriented peers seems to outweigh that from their parents who have to work long hours and who are unfamiliar with school curriculums.

Day-to-day contact with kin (relatives and family friends) who are ethnically similar to the refugee child facilitates social learning, and provides a source of continuity in identification. The presence of additional adults, including wage-earning kin, in the household not only helps to monitor children's activities (a role often played by grandparents), but also provides role models and contributes to the economic stability of the family (as in the case of aunts and uncles sharing the same household). Research revealed that, like other Indochinese refugee children, unaccompanied Vietnamese children who lived in a home with an ethnic adult had substantially lower depressive scores, higher GPAs, and were more likely to see themselves as successful at making friends than those who were placed in a nonethnic or fostered home (Porte & Torney-Purta,1987). Thus, the extended family is another protective factor contributing to Vietnamese students' successful adjustment.

Finally, at the community level, the formation and development of Vietnamese communities is a helpful coping strategy that can provide networks of supports and restraints for their students. Organizations and other socializing agents within the community can become effective forces to intervene in the school system, teach the parents how to build learning environments that are more congruent with the school's culture and expectations while allowing the refugees to maintain their ethnic culture and identity (Rutledge,1992). Research has found the social support from an ethnic community to be instrumental in reducing the depression and facilitating the adjustment of the Vietnamese as well as other Indochinese refugees (Beiser, 1988). Indeed, belonging to an ethnic enclave is one way minority members cope with racism and prejudice (Garcia Coll & Magnuson, 1997). Some researchers have suggested that, ethnic enclaves could become "a staging ground" for the development of minority children (Brody, 1990).

Across the U.S. the Vietnamese have developed a variety of community organizations, ranging in scope from language schools to community centers and religious organizations. Some are funded by state government with additional aid from the Catholic Church or non-Vietnamese agencies. Others are private, nonprofit organizations that are managed and operated by the refugees. Mutual Assistance Associations (MAA) have assisted mainstream organizations in doing case studies, set up English classes for Vietnamese new-comers, native language classes for refugee children (such as the Van Lang Vietnamese Language Center in San Jose, California), and facilitated the development of other community and religious organizations. Overall, these centers and organizations promote mutual understanding and friendship between the Vietnamese and Americans while providing basic services to help the refugees in their resettlement (Do, 1999; Hein, 1995; Rutledge, 1992). For example, the Vietnamese-American Association in Oklahoma City even offers counseling programs dealing with matters that touch Vietnamese refugees' daily lives in the U.S. (Rutledge, 1992). Another example is the Vietnamese Educational Association in Versailles Village, New Orleans, which runs after-school classes at the Child Development Center, and an annual awards ceremony for Vietnamese students who have excelled in local public schools (Zhou & Bankston, 1998).

The distinctiveness of the Vietnamese collective solutions and coping strategies lies in their adaptability to the new society and their retention of ethnic values. The ability to use cultural elements both from Vietnamese culture and tradition (as a way to maintain ethnic identity and continuity) and from mainstream American society (as a necessary ingredient for survival) is a catalyst to success for both the family and the student's adjustment (Caplan et al, 1991; Rutledge, 1992). In their transition into the new American educational system, the Vietnamese approach could be described as accommodation, not resistance or assimilation.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the cultural-ecological theory of minority school performance is chiefly about voluntary and involuntary minorities, this paper suggests the applicability of the theory to Vietnamese students in the U.S. school environment. Vietnamese students are different from other students attending American school in many aspects. Most of them were foreign-born, and came to the U.S. as refugees. They entered American schools with little or no knowledge of English and the American culture. It is important to notice the influences of historical and cultural-ecological factors on the Vietnamese students' school adjustment. Among these factors are how and why they left Vietnam, the context they encountered upon arrival to the U.S., cultural differences in school settings, and the social supports or resources available to the students and their families in the new country.

Regarding their perceptions and responses to schooling in the U.S. (or the Vietnamese community forces), Vietnamese students share many similarities with voluntary or immigrant minorities. They have a dual frame of school comparison and positive attitudes toward the instrumental value of schooling for social mobility. They respect American teachers and school authorities, and strive to accommodate well to the school mainstream culture without fear of losing their ethnic identity.

To explain Vietnamese students' successful adjustment to U.S. schools, this paper has proposed the Vietnamese cultural model of schooling which consists of three main components: the four community forces discussed above, two key cultural values pertaining to educational socialization (i.e., an emphasis on educational achievement and the spirit of interdependence), and collective solutions and strategies developed by individual students, the nuclear family, the extended family, and the ethnic community. The four Vietnamese community forces and the Vietnamese cultural values interact and form the basis on which the refugees develop their collective solutions and strategies to cope with the difficulties facing them in their transition into the American educational system.

Family and community play an important role in Vietnamese students' school adjustment. A *cohesive* family and ethnic community can provide social, emotional, and instrumental supports that facilitate smooth adjustment and help the youth maintain cultural values and an ethnic identity. The constructive partnership between the family, the community and the school appears to be crucial in educating Vietnamese refugee and immigrant students and in promoting their long-term social and economic advancement.

Vietnamese cultural values, especially those that pertain to hard work, educational achievement, and a cohesive family, are very essential to Vietnamese students' school adjustment. The cultural values and practices have provided Vietnamese parents and their children with the means by which they could direct the course of their lives successfully through the early difficult stages of resettlement in order to adapt smoothly to the new environment.

Although overall Vietnamese students are adjusting well in school, there is considerable variation within this population due to diverse family and educational backgrounds and migrating experiences. The stereotype of Asian Americans as model minorities is erroneous, for it subsumes all Asians without the consciousness of individual Asians (Lee,1996). Just as "Asians" is too global to be truly meaningful, so apparently is the category of "Southeast Asians" or "Indochinese" refugees/immigrants. The lack of distinction among distinctive groups often leads researchers and educators to overgeneralize. It is necessary that researchers clarify the unit of analysis in their studies of Asian Americans (Mizokawa & Ryckman, 1990).

Throughout their schooling, Vietnamese students have come into contact with new behaviors and perspectives and have various responses to the American culture and society. With regard to their views of social identity, schooling and the opportunity structure, foreign-born Vietnamese students are significantly different from their U.S.-born counterparts. However, as a whole, they are acquiring independence while retaining family ties (Rutledge, 1992). So far Vietnamese students have maintained respect for their families and their collectivistic culture.

Implications and Recommendations for Education and Counseling

This paper has several implications for teachers and counselors who work with Vietnamese students as well as with students of other minority backgrounds. In educating and counseling Vietnamese students, four issues require our attention. First, understanding cultural and contextual influences on Vietnamese students' school adjustment would be valuable for educators and counselors who attempt to involve Vietnamese parents with their children's learning process (Bempechat, Graham & Imenez, 1999). Vietnamese family approaches to educational achievement are influenced by their culture and folk beliefs, and reinforced by the role models within their communities. Furthermore, Vietnamese parents and community's attitudes toward their cultural values strongly correlate with patterns of achievement among Vietnamese students (Bankston, 1997; Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Rumbaut, 1991, 1995).

Second, schools should recognize the important roles of family and community as contextual determinants in Vietnamese students' school adjustment, and tap into these social supports and resources. A *cohesive* family and ethnic community can exercise a greater influence than other determinants of educational success (such as individual characteristics, social class, and family structure) that sociologists and educators have traditionally measured.

Third, teachers and counselors should be aware of Vietnamese students' learning style and other cultural behavioral differences in order to prevent miscommunication and conflicts. Building trust between Vietnamese students, families, communities, and American schools while setting high standards and expectations for these students will facilitate their adjustment and improve their performance.

Finally, for Vietnamese students who cannot meet high expectations that parents and teachers have for them, school counselors could provide them with opportunities for open discussions and strategies for dealing with their academic anxiety and pressures. Among these underachievers, unaccompanied youths are more vulnerable, and need the most help from school authorities. For these adolescents, culturally appropriate interventions may prevent their ongoing problems of depression and isolation (Bemak & Greenberg, 1994).

In short, the school has the potential not only to facilitate the personal adaptation of individual students, but also to play a key role in the harmonious integration of immigrant communities into the economic and social systems of the host society (Ready, 1991).

Suggestions for Future Research

Future research about Vietnamese students could take into consideration the following issues. First, there is a need for studies about normative development of Vietnamese children and adolescents with large sample sizes drawn from across the country. Studies conducted by clinicians and social service professionals often give the reader an inadequate view of Vietnamese youth's normative development, for these studies usually overemphasize the difficulties the youth face in their adjustment. We need more studies about the general population of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants, rather than patients in health clinics. Also, it is erroneous to lump all "Southeast Asians" or "Indochinese refugees and immigrants" together in one category for research purposes. Researchers studying the "Indochinese" or "Southeast Asian" populations need to clarify the unit of analysis, and should be cognizant of the historical and cultural differences among the Hmong, the Vietnamese, and other groups from Laos and Cambodia.

Second, the importance of social support in Vietnamese students' education suggests the need for further investigation into family and community involvement in their schooling. There is a lack of empirical studies about specific strategies the Vietnamese parents and communities use to enhance their children's academic and social advancement, or to prevent and restrain their children from harmful effects of substance abuse and gang involvement. The Vietnamese extended family and its role in the youth's adjustment is yet a topic to explore for researchers who are interested in family relations and family processes.

Third, with the gradual appearance of second- and third-generations of Vietnamese in the U.S., this minority could be an interesting population for researchers to investigate issues related to generational differences, which have been neglected in Ogbu's cultural-ecological theory (Gibson, 1997). So far research about generational differences in adaptive behavior and intergenerational conflict within Vietnamese families has been scarce. Such studies are necessary, for they would provide more insight into the complex process of acculturation and adjustment among different Vietnamese cohorts. Since the needs and vulnerability of first-generation Vietnamese students who began their schooling abroad differ significantly from those of the second-generation and beyond, future research could also focus on generational differences in school adaptation of Vietnamese youth.

Finally, longitudinal studies about the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder upon daily functioning in different generations of Vietnamese could provide valuable information for developing intervention programs to help these people as well as those who have undergone traumatic experiences (e.g., war veterans, jurors in criminal courts) cope successfully. Since current studies about the impact of stress on development and adjustment among children from refugee/immigrant families are very limited (Garcia Coll & Magnuson, 1997), research about Vietnamese children's and youth's reactions to stress and the relations between stress reaction and adjustment would further our understanding about both the positive and negative impacts of stress on human development.

The entrance of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants into the United States remains a relatively recent event in the increasing diversity of the American society. The formation of a Vietnamese-American identity is still continuing. As the Vietnamese population grows numerically and economically, it will inevitably change and increasingly play a role in the American future.

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A Week with the Philospher Kings*

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It may have been the best of times, or it may have been the worst of times, but it was certainly different from the present. The time was in the early 1970's when the funding of grant proposals appears to have been much easier to obtain than today, and the subject project was a grant received by the late Professor Alan Kahler in the Department of Agricultural Education at Iowa State University, the purpose of which was to prepare curriculum materials for secondary school agricultural education classes for the 21st century.

Project 2000 was a multi-year project nearing its completion, and a final report was being prepared for the funding agency (the Iowa State Department of Education), at which time it was pointed out to the project director that the report contained no identifiable philosophical base. It was at this point that I was invited to become a member of the project steering committee in order to assist in this matter. Since time was of the essence, I was asked to identify eminent philosophers of education to be invited to the campus to spend a week with us deliberating the problem. My recommendation included Theodore Brameld, Van Cleve Morris, and William Stanley, all of whom agreed to come to the campus and work with us.. Ralph Tyler, who had been a curriculum consultant throughout the project, was also included in the group.

During the week of deliberation, Earl Murphy, a doctoral student in my philosophy of education class, approached me on the possibility of arranging a symposium for faculty and students in the College of Education. Arrangements for the symposium were made, and each of the three visiting philosophers was invited to present a short address and entertain questions from the audience.

The purpose of this paper is to present a partially paraphrased summary of the remarks of these three guests made from a recently discovered audiotape of their presentations. It is hoped that this summary will provide a limited perspective on the status of the philosophy of education a quarter century ago, and an opportunity to compare and contrast contemporary views of the field with those of the recent past.

Van Cleve Morris, author of numerous books and articles dealing with existentialism and education, spoke first. He began with comments on the contemporary (1974) state of existentialism, and predicted that the movement would never flourish in the United States. Originating in Europe and developed in Denmark, France, and Germany, it was said to be too disturbing for most Americans. He cited Sartre's definition of hell as "other people," meaning that other people tend to turn us into objects, and for a person to be relegated to the status of object rather than subject is hell. As Americans, we tend to be dependent on the group for ethical decision making, while existentialism places the entire burden of ethical decision making on the individual. Such a dismal prospect led to numerous epithets such as "mystical defeatism" and "metaphysical pornography."

He continued by stating that while not flourishing as an identifiable point of view in American academic circles or in American life, existentialism has spawned an extension of itself known as phenomenology, which has been successful in helping us to understand what has been going on in our society in recent times. The term phenomenology comes from a Greek word meaning "that which presents itself," and is a study of neither the private inner self nor of the outside world, but rather of the nexus between the two. We can not conduct a scientific study of the private inner self because we have an N of 1, and science deals in numbers. The outside world can be studied, of course, but it is non-human and therefore of little interest. The accepted alternative therefore is to study some sort of middle ground or link between the two such as what is going on in our immediate psychological world. The closest analog is consciousness, which is defined as the occasion of a private perception that is suddenly discovered to be public. Examples cited of how phenomenology is helping us to understand what has been going on in the last 10 or 15 years and has provided a theoretical explanation of several movements in American social life were the Vietnam War, the Black experience, and the Women's movement.

The Vietnam war, according to classical military strategy made sense, but gradually it dawned on our consciousness that something was basically wrong in our involvement in that conflict. It was a private perception that gradually emerged and allowed us to push for disengagement. Beginning as a private perception, it gradually led to a powerfully articulated point of view.

The perception of the Black experience, which before Martin Luther King, Jr., was merely a dim image of what blacks had endured for three or four centuries in America. In the years after the efforts of King and others, we began to get a glimpse of what it means to be black. We are far short, and will never understand the inner feelings of what it is like to live with a black skin, but gradually we gained a closer perception of the phenomenology of the black population, which is dealing with a zone of consciousness that is not subject to public study, but which gradually emerges, leading to a sense of commonality and community about this new point of view.

Before Betty Friedan and the Women's Liberation Movement, few men had more than a dim idea of the female experience Gradually, however, we have been led into an understanding of the phenomenology of being a woman. With all of the hurts, repression, and joys of being female, men now see it as a separate kind of life---a private thing gradually being translated into a public point of view. This private phenomenology becomes a powerful political point of view, forming an understanding, not as an academic philosophy, but as a way of understanding contemporary social ferment.

Works by authors such as Charles Reich, Theodore Roszak, and Stanley Milgrim were cited as recommended reading. Particular emphasis was given to the latter author's treatment of our obedience to authority, especially when ordered by one in a white coat or a uniform. Those cited were examples of what he called a new brand of writing, not familiar sociology nor literature, but an attempt to probe the public side of our private consciousness, which he believed was a whole new area for philosophers to study.

William Stanley, the second speaker, described himself humorously as an exponent of experimentalism, the "Devil Science" that has led us to this state of submission to the white coat and uniform. His "not too subtle" point, of course, was that experimentalism is based on science and the scientific method as applied to all aspects of human endeavor. As developed by Dewey, it was to a considerable extent an American experience, and included an emphasis on evolution and science. It was a naturalistic point of view in which it was felt that all that humankind can know is what is discovered in experience. It had also a biological emphasis in its concern with how the human organism meets its special needs, and intelligence is the only reliable guide with which the human species can cope. Faith must be placed in intelligence. Experimentalism is concerned also with the group phenomenon, because humankind lives in groups. As developed by George H. Mead and others, selfhood and personality are not natural endowments, but are developed as a natural process through human interaction. We are born biological animals, but we become human beings in the process of interaction with our fellow human beings. We develop consciousness, selfhood, and personality with those around us in the context of a particular culture.

Experimentalism was further described as a notion of human beings living together, and through the process of trial and error, developing intelligence to guide our actions. In this process, the scientific method of testing conclusions by their consequences in experience is the method by which we learn how better to cope with problems that face us both as individuals and as groups. The essence of morality is to act on the basis of thought in terms of consequences to ourselves and others. This testing of ideas and acts in terms of consequences gives experimentalism the name of pragmatism. Consequences, however, have often been too narrowly interpreted as to mean merely consequences to oneself, but everybody affected by the action must be taken into account. We develop over time moral rules based on human experience. These are not absolutes, but they should be applied to each situation intelligently, and we should not ignore the human wisdom and experience that have grown into their development.

Experimentalism has had an enormous impact on much of the social sciences in America, a fact that is less recognized now than in earlier times, for much of the impact is indirect. It is the most influential philosophy in the way we talk about education today, but not in the way we act. Practically all the right theories of education have been the product of philosophy, from Plato through Herbart to the present.

What, he asked, has experimentalism stood for in education, and what have been its most serious problems? Many of its problems were due to its own fault and some were due to people who thought they knew what it was but misinterpreted its import. Some problems also were due to conflicts in our society that occurred around the time of Sputnik. In fact, the influence of experimentalism declined over the years to the extent of the demise of the Progressive Education Society, which occurred during Stanley's tenure as treasurer.

Growing in part out of the child study movement, the progressive insisted that the needs of the child should be the starting point of education, but the school should also be the custodian of the great fund of accumulated knowledge. Much of the current emphasis on the needs of the child as he perceives them was enunciated by people who never heard of Dewey, but who nevertheless wrote in that tradition. The error was that while beginning with the needs of the child, they did not go beyond that point. That concept was never a part of progressive thought.

The progressive movement was also based on activity, but many mistakes were made in that regard. It was based on activities in which youngsters had an opportunity to try out ideas and test them in terms of consequences. Youngsters were expected to participate in planning the activities in which they were engaged. (College students have frequently been amazed to find that progressive theory supported their desires for a voice in curriculum planning, except of course in extreme situations.)

Virtually all progressive leaders believed that schools should engage in inquiry into basic issues in society, including those of a controversial nature. Some thought that it was not in the spirit of inquiry, however, to reach any conclusions. Others thought (Stanley thinks wrongly) that through the examination of varying points of view, students should press toward the development of a tentative conclusion to be held until evidence shows that the first judgment was a mistake. If inquiry is pushed sufficiently, students would come to accept conclusions, as we did in conclusions regarding World War.

In conclusion, he stated that if Ted Brameld speaks on reconstructionism, the position on which he developed his truly great reputation, he will tell you that there is a world of difference between reconstructionism and experimentalism, but for minor differences, that is not true.

Theodore Brameld, the final speaker, began his address with a humorous retort to Stanley's description of reconstructionism as "a little footnote to progressivism." He continued by stating that the name reconstructionism had become an albatross around his neck, and that he did not like the "damned name." He continued in a negative vein by stating that reconstructionism was not a system or an organic point of view, and that it had many loose ends and unanswered questions. He continued by stating that reconstructionism would applaud many of the ideas expressed by the two previous speakers, that he was much indebted to Morris for his explanation of phenomenology, that reconstructionism was very closely related to progressivism, and admitted that as a philosophy it did not hang together neatly and that it borrows heavily from others. It was further described as a philosophy of desperation, crisis, and stress. We are close to human disaster, he asserted, with no assurance that human kind and civilization will survive for another quarter century. From this cynical point of view, it is easy to enter the ranks of renewal and survival of mankind.

If we accept the view that the world is in "one hell of a mess", this fact of crisis is an invitation to seize the opportunity to reconstruct society.

Human beings are not only evolutionary animals, but are re-creative beings capable of confronting crises and surviving if they are willing to use available resources toward very powerful collective action. We must find ways, he said, to galvanize and channel power within the human species, not only to save itself, but to renew itself. Reconstructionism, then, is a philosophy of radical change—the term radical was defined as a willingness to go to the root of problems and point in directions for change that have not as yet been achieved. He proudly claimed to be a radical, and hoped to remain so for the rest of his life.

As a philosophy of radical vision and direction, reconstructionism provides ways in which the mood of crisis can be translated into action. He did not believe that education alone can bring about change in the social order, but he believed that education can be (but not yet is) a powerful force for change, but only in concert with powerful forces such as politics. A philosophy of politics is as much a part of education as anything else. Teachers and all of us should be politically minded and educated. The idea that schools should be neutral has always been false and always will be.

We are already identified with forces that control us and that we control. If one wants to identify with reconstructionism, you must become politically conscious, dedicated, and affiliated with the radical forces of our time. Those radical forces that are now emerging, female, black, etc. are latently if not actually powerful; especially the Third World. It is a great hope of the last third of this century, that the two-thirds of the world's population represented by non-white skins, who are now disorganized and confused but have potential for the renewal of mankind. We must identify with forces of this Third World and help galvanize those potential forces to the point where they can control the world, but under democratic principles.

If we are to translate this mood of reconstructionism into a program of education and social action, we must challenge many of the illusions and myths that surround us like cocoons, in which we teachers are often unconscious if not deliberate participants. Schools all over the world are deceiving young people in inculcating the belief that nationalism is supreme. To what extent are alternatives to nationalism such as global power in which national power is subordinate to international power, seriously addressed? He charged that the United Nations is only a debating society and is already out of date. Until we translate the United Nations into a community of nations with power to enforce decisions, we will end by destroying each other.

His final emphasis was on world citizenship rather than citizens of a single country. The real test is whether or not you are willing to unwrap the cocoons of illusion in which we as teachers engage in a conspiracy to prevent children from discovering that nationalism is dangerous, frightening, and destructive, and that the only alternative left for us in the remainder of this century is to organize international power over national power. He concluded his address with an invitation to become fraternal brothers in a search for World order.

It is obvious that the speakers in this symposium were not teaching a class in the philosophy of education. It should be equally obvious, however, that they were expressing points of view that would likely have manifested themselves in the classes they taught as well as in their scholarly writing. It should be highly interesting and worthwhile for us to reflect a quarter of a century later on the influence that these stalwart scholars may have had on theory and practice in the philosophy of education.

NOTE

*The term "Philosopher Kings" was used by my wife, Dorothy, in referring to the special guests at an informal gathering of the project steering committee at our home toward the conclusion of the week's deliberations.

Presence as Pedagogical Possibility: An Educational Philosophy

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INTRODUCTION

This reflection is designed to provide a stimulus for dialogue. The intent is to encourage teachers to think about, respond to, and question a pedagogical methodology that seeks to emphasize the question mark (?) and de-emphasize the period (.) in classroom methodology and intellectual dialogue. Here Paulo Freire's admonition,"do not be too certain of your certainties," is applied to student *and* teacher alike. A pedagogical possibility is explored; one that courts intellectual dissent and emotional response. There is an attempt to orchestrate a classroom setting so that previously silent voices—particularly the socially, politically, or culturally silenced—will join the educational chorus. Every student is allowed, encouraged—and expected—to be dialogically *present* in the classroom. Without *presence* there is diminished self-identity and a negation of authentic dialogue. Without authentic dialogue there is diminished possibility of an *intentional* learning community that is *inclusive* of diverse voices. The meaning of *presence* has pedagogical possibilities.

THE MEANING OF PRESENCE

Definitions have a way of being less than definitive—except, perhaps, for the one who defines. Frequently, as the novelist, Toni Morrison, has reminded us, "definitions define the definer rather than the defined." This leads to an awareness that definitions may be the result of "perceptions" influenced by ideologies and worldviews. There are, of course, those words with "transfer-able" definitions; words that are able to permeate the boundaries of different academic disciplines and schools of speculative thought.

The word, *presence,* fits such a category of permeable definitional possibility. Varying uses of the word make possible expressions of both the mystically abstract and the existentially concrete. Theologians representing many faith traditions have wrestled with the theological implications and meanings of the word. *Presence* has been explored in various ways by humanistic psychologists and psychotherapists. Existentialist philosophers have connected *presence* to the meaning of personal authenticity, of identity, of freedom and responsibility, of the process of becoming. Sociologists have defined, and wrestled with, a "sociology of presence." Literary minds have found creative possibility in "presence, that vague but potent Wordsworthian word" which the poet himself termed the "poetic spirit of our human life."[1] The word is expressive enough to be "redefined"—or reinterpreted—for other purposes in other settings, including the classroom. Perhaps there is such a reality as "pedagogical presence."

But here a caveat is in order. William Hare has cautioned us to "be wary of succinct definitions, especially when dealing with a rich and fertile notion. It has been said that when one feels the need of a good definition, it is a good idea to lie down until the feeling passes."[2] And, we have been reminded by the Jewish theologian, Abraham Heschel, that "in English the phrase that a person has 'a presence' is hard to define."[3] In spite, however, of definitional difficulties, *presence* is a "rich and fertile notion" for teachers to reflect upon. Such reflection opens up opportunities for intellectual dialogue, creative pedagogical possibilities, and perhaps a little integrative give-and-take between academic disciplines.

PEDAGOGY OF PRESENCE

For a teacher to understand—and implement—the concept of a "pedagogy of presence" is to open up possibilities to teach in counterpoint to the empiricist, technocratic, behaviorist, mindset that dominates education today. It is to visualize a classroom in which the dominant metaphor is student-as-person (not student-as-product, consumer, human capital, or facts absorbing test-taker). In such a classroom, a methodological motto—borrowed from the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus—might well be, "teaching is not to fill a pail, but rather to light a flame."[4] To metaphorically "light a flame" requires a *presence*-generated connecting spark. The spark results from the intellectual friction of a mind-meeting-mind encounter between two autonomous individuals. It requires a meeting, but not a merging, of identities.

> It is precisely because I am aware of the other as distinct from me that I can consider it present to me . . . If that which is *present* and to whom it is present were to merge into one another, the relationship of *presence* would cease.[5]

It is only when the teacher recognizes the reality of diverse individual *identities*—the existential "I's"—that he/she can maximize the possibility for achieving a classroom learning *community*—a communal "we."

Jo Anne Pagano has noted that she has "learned to treat teaching with great respect; it is no innocent pasttime . . . at issue are fundamental questions of identity and identification."[6] These questions of identity are integral to the reality of *presence* in a classroom. *Presence* is a revelation—a revealing of "who I am." All too often such self-revealing is discouraged, or negated by a classroom power structure that preaches the gospel of an *intentional, inclusive* learning community, but fails to "walk the talk." The open expression of individual identity—necessary to a sense of *presence*—can be a challenge to teacher hegemony; and to the efficient, orderly, carefully planned dispensing of officially ordained knowledge. To invite student *presence* into the classroom is risky business. It is to say: "Be who you are. Express a sense of self. Ask questions; not just of content, but of meaning, purpose, instructional method, classroom philosophy. Be a vital part of a classroom dialectic. Bring the expressive, lived-reality of your existentially authentic cultural/political/economic self into this learning community."

In such a classroom dialogical encounters are encouraged, and there are violations of the traditional behavioristic boundaries defining an epistemology of "how we learn." Teacher authority and expertise are demystified. The student becomes a co-teacher/learner, an equal partner in the adventure of intellectual exploration. The practice of a "pedagogy of presence" requires a teacher who does not demand conditioned consistency, predictability, and inviolable, scripted lesson plans. Such a teacher

> will not remain safely behind the barriers of his own convictions and assurances but will venture forth . . It involves us in unforseen outcomes and unpremeditated conclusions . . . It gives us the capacity and readiness for exposure.[7]

This venturing teacher—the one who goes forth, who risks exposure and unplanned intellectual adventures—is the one who is *authentically present* in the classroom. Perhaps Soren Kierkegaard was correct:

> A person can distress the spirit by venturing too little . . . To venture is the foundation of inspiration . . . A bold venture is not a high-

> flown phase, not an exclamatory outburst, but arduous work. A bold venture, no matter how rash, is not a boisterous proclamation, but a quiet dedication.[8]

It is only by way of the "arduous work and quiet dedication" of an *authentic self* that a teacher can model the kind of "vital presence"[9] that encourages self-revelatory reciprocity on the part of the student. Such a teacher has—in the words of Paul Tillich—"the courage to be."—"the courage to be a part of the progress of the group to which he belongs."[10] The group in this case is, of course, the learning community in which teacher/student *mutual presence* is both a process *and* a goal.

> The presence established between myself and another self can be extended to include other persons, so that my awareness will move out from me, as a center of divergence, to the others, and back from the others to me as a force of convergence. This *mutual presence* will establish the community.[11]

It is a sense of *mutual presence*—an intellectual/emotional connecting of teacher and students—that allows a classroom of individuals to become an *inclusive* learning community. It is only when *presence* is shared that that there can be a communal "we" in "dialogical communion." Here the term, dialogical communion—as it relates to classroom sharing—is symbolic of bell hook's understanding of "the notion of community, which is like sharing and breaking bread together, of dialogue and mercy . . . with a community of faith, not necessarily a religious community, but a community of comrades."[12] Both the religious community and the educational classroom hold the possibility of this kind of dialogical, communal sharing resulting in a sense of comradeship; one involves a shared religious faith, and one involves a shared educational quest. In both cases a Kierkegaardian "leap of faith" is required to establish authentic communion/community. To be *present* is to open oneself to the community.

Martin Buber believed that such a "communion in education . . . means being opened up and drawn in."[13] To "open-up" is to speak-up, to communicate a personal reality, to be a *presence* in the classroom. To be "drawn-in" is to become part of the learning community, to contribute to its intellectual, emotional, social—even spiritual -health. It is to listen, to share, to be involved, to communicate. And, as Thomas Merton has reminded us: "the deepest level of communication is (in) communion . . . We discover a new unity . . . what we have to be is (who) we are."[14] It is, of course, "communication" that opens up the possibility for two or more individuals, being authentic in who they are, to find the "we-ness" of communion in a learning community. Rollo May has written that

> communication recovers the original "we-ness" of the human being on a new level. Authentic talk is organic—the speaker . . . speaks not as a disembodied voice but as one organic totality to another.[15]

It is through "organic" communication that *presence* is verified. *Presence* has a metaphysical quality in that it is the communication of individual reality. This communication requires participation, and "participation in the human conversation requires face-to-face relationships and considerable willingness to subject one's views to a cacophony of voices."[16] A classroom in which *presence* is sought and welcomed values a dialogical, dialectical cacophony of voices. Intellectual—even emotional—cacophony—open challenges, questions, strongly opposing views, dynamic interchanges—may shake up classroom decorum, but may also be prelude to intellectual reflection and growth. As John Sullivan has noted: "The existential conditions of the pursuit of truth are such that disagreement, rather than agreement, is generally regarded as the mark of health and competence."[17]

When we encourage *presence* in the classroom we welcome dialogical disagreement, and divergent voices will be heard; but the disagreements themselves will open doors to learning opportunities. Consider Martin Buber's advice that "the teacher must never forget that conflicts too, if only they are decided in a healthy atmosphere, have an educational value."[18] It is through conversational dialogue that differing views become educational opportunities, and it is through a "pedagogy of *presence*" that conversation becomes a teaching methodology. Vicki Bergkamp has written that

> the aim of conversation is not to reach a conclusion or agreement; the aim of conversation is the fair airing of views. Conversation is allowing each person and his/her opinions to be recognized . . . True conversation is dialectic; it is interchange, a complex set of interactions in which each person works with ideas and convictions and is changed through the interaction.[19]

Authentic conversation is not one-way; it is interactive, sharing, provocative. It facilitates intellectual and emotional encounter. It connects ideas and people. Authentic conversation in a classroom requires student/teacher *presence*. What I know, how I interpret my knowledge, and how I express it are authenticated by being filtered through a question, "who am I?"

> In dialogue the quality of the personal experience will be determined by the extent to which participants are encouraged to speak the

> words which express their deepest authentic understanding of the reality of the truth that they possess . . . Such a faithful approach can help transform *individual* participation into *personal* participation, and *collective* experience into *communal* experience.[20]

THE WE OF MUTUAL PRESENCE: AN INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY

In theological terminology the communal experience is the koinonia, a community of persons in a unique religious relationship to each other.21 There is a semantic connection here to the classroom learning community. In both cases the sought for goal is a community that has a unified centeredness—is more than the sum of its parts, but that at the same time maintains unique individual identities. In Soren Kierkegaard's words, "community is certainly more than a sum, yet is truly a sum of ones."[22]

Randolph Miller has defined such an environment: "The I-Thou relationship has been achieved, at least for the moment. Thus the class has become a unity, a group, without the loss of individuality."[23] Miller borrows here from Martin Buber's classic concept which distinguishes between an "I-it" and an "I-thou" relationship. Translated into a classroom situation, an I-it relationship is one in which the student is manipulated as an *object* of the teacher's technical skill and expertise. The teacher (the subject) gives, and the student (the object) receives. The relationship tends toward the impersonal.

In pedagogical counterpoint, an I-thou relationship involves an intellectual/dialogical encounter, not of subject with object but of subject with subject. The relationship is personal. Mutual presence is realized and maintained. Teacher/student presence is reciprocal. To be present to another—in Abraham Heschel's words—"is to reciprocate, to offer in return for what one receives;"[24] and Ralph Harper distinguishes between "several different ways of thinking about presenee . . . the most acceptable (being) intimacy between persons, the miracle of giving and receiving."[25] Such reciprocity—according to William Sadler—makes it possible "to create, recognize, and reaffirm the reality of mutual presence (in which) a person (will) understand himself and be understood in terms of interpenetrating relationships with others."[26] To achieve such an interpenetrating relationship requires that the teacher view the student as an active "subject/thou"—a *presence*—rather than as a passive "object/it." This is to understand Gabriel Marcel's recognition that "when we say that presence must not be thought of as an object, we mean the very act by which we incline ourselves toward a presence is essentially different than through which we grasp an object,"[27] To understand Marcel is to connect his awareness to Buber's definition of inclusion:

> In order to help the realization of the best potentialities of the pupil's life, the teacher must really mean him as the definite person he is in his potentiality and his actuality; more precisely, he must not know him merely as a sum of qualities, strivings, and inhibitions, he must be aware of him in his wholeness. But he can only do this if he meets him again and again as his partner in a bipolar situation . . . . he must practice the kind of realization which I call inclusion *(Umfassung)*.[28]

All too often educators view inclusion, or inclusiveness, through a lens that narrows the focus of what this bipolar partnership should mean. When the focus is narrowed, dialogue is circumscribed and is used only as a technique to point the way to preordained conclusions. Questions are designed to lead to previously defined "correct" answers. Inclusiveness comes to represent not a sharing of "otherness," but rather encouraging the less powerful "other" to *join* the more powerful. In such cases there is a diminishment of voices and identities. *Presence* is negated, and the call for inclusiveness is a "sounding gong and clashing symbol" signifying little. Such absorption of the less powerful into the "inclusiveness" of the more powerful denies the reality that:

> Inclusion is the extension of one's own concreteness, the fulfillment of the actual situation of life, the complete presence of the reality in which oneparticipates . . . This presence entails an ingathering of the other's presence . . . Then there is reality *between* them, there is mutuality.[29]

It is this ingathering mutuality of *presence* that makes possible the democratic learning community that is so much written about today. As Philip Wexler has noted: "Concentrated, mindful presence is protection against the attachment of energies to a mode of dependent submission to powerful others."[30] It takes a mutuality of teacher/student mindful presence to minimize a power/powerlessness continuum in a classroom.

In a democratic classroom it is the teacher who is responsible for "midwifeing" a mindful presence, for drawing-forth that which is within the student. The teacher represents the ministering hand. But it is the student who must provide the labor for the intellectual birth. Mixing metaphors, and paraphrasing a Taoist philosopher, "the teacher must open the door, but the student must choose to walk through it"[31] In either case, what is necessary for a mindful/mutual presence is the disposition that John Dewey identified as the open-mindedness of "intellectual hospitality."

> Openness of mind means accessibility of mind to any and every consideration that will throw light upon the situation that needs to be cleared up . . . Intellectual growth means constant expansion of hori-

> zons . . . an active disposition to welcome points of view hitherto alien: an active desire to entertain considerations which modify existing purposes. Retention of capacity to grow is the reward of such intellectual hospitality.[32]

Intellectual hospitality is a disposition available to both teacher and student. It is a prerequisite for—and makes possible—a "pedagogy of presence." It allows *both* the individual "I" *and* the communal "we" to exist simultaneously. When shared intellectual hospitality is achieved in the classroom a "we" is birthed into existence, but the "I" also remains "alive and well." There is—in the words of Albert Camus—"a 'we are' that paradoxically defines a new form of individualism . . . a dignity that I cannot allow either myself or others to debase."[33] Camus' "we are" concept captures the essence of the power of *presence*. "We are" signifies not the homogeneity of a metaphorical melting pot, but rather "a synthesis of thoroughly understood identities (a new form of individualism) which leads to actions that shape the good of a realistically diverse community."[34] The individual voice is not lost in a crowd, but is part of the ever-changing rhythm of an intellectual community.

CLASSROOM REALITIES: A CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT

The conclusion of this paper is a reflection upon an instructional philosophy in which an individually defined "pedagogy of *presence*" is a methodology of choice. The definition—and the methodology—however, are still in stages of refinement, and represent the kind of "in process" reflective thinking that has been spelled-out by John Dewey:

> Reflective thinking involves . . . willingness to endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance. Reflective thinking, in short, means judgment suspended during further inquiry; and suspense is likely to be somewhat painful . . . To maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and protracted inquiry—these are the essentials of thinking.[35]

To search out, and define, the foundational principles upon which a personal teaching methodology rests is a continuing process. It involves reflection on possibilities. It is a meditative, ruminative . . . even speculative process. There is no "now and forever" pedagogical, capital-T-Truth to be translated into an absolute, immutable "best practice" in the classroom. The continuing search is a Deweyan "protracted inquiry."

The search is teleological. The purpose is to find "the way"—or perhaps a way to a *real* learning community in which *presence* is revealed. Such a community provides an intellectual climate conducive for the learner—teacher and student—to seek better understanding of *both* the "self" and others through issue oriented dialogical conversation. This is a mind-meeting-mind process requiring *I-thou* relationships. The instructional methodology is one that *educes* what the learner brings to the discussion—what s/he knows/ believes and thinks/feels. But—importantly—there is another part of the educational equation. This is the *active/reflective listening* which is part of a classroom *presence;* it requires a willingness on the part of the learner/listener to *intentionally* cultivate the ability to actively HEAR (not just listen to) what the other person is saying. It requires *reflective* thinking to counterbalance *reactive* "top-of-the-head" responses when highly charged emotional content is at issue.

Education to be meaningful must be meaning-FULL. To deal dialogically (vs. ideologically) with meaningful issues a teacher must begin with an *assumption:* "meaning" is in the eye of the beholder. And it is often hard to "hear" when a personal meaning-FULL idea, belief, or "fact" is being challenged in open dialogue. Such a challenge adds emotional struggle to the intellectual struggle, and provides new learning opportunities. We also learn emotionally. Even the emotion of anger may lead to a significant learning experience. Reflecting upon the emotional response we have the opportunity to ask ourselves, "why?" Why do I believe/think/act/feel—react—the way I do? If we choose to be *present* in the classroom we will have cause to reflect on our own perceptions, presuppositions, presumptions—even prejudices—regarding specific issues and the ideas that define the issues.

Bringing *presence* into the classroom community allows each member to develop an evolving *awareness* of the "self" and the "other" (person/idea /value, etc.). Learning occurs as I grow in awareness that my perceptions of others, and of issues, are contextual—the result of *my* experiences, *my* emotional reactions, *my* worldview, *my* T(t)ruth. How I *hear* other people reflects the questions, concerns, priorities, intents, and goals of a unique self. But to be *educated* is to develop an increasing awareness of—and appreciation for—other unique people and ideas. I grow in self-knowledge as I am present to the other's *presence.* I can learn from the "other"—even when his/her ideas, views, and knowledge/truth are based on assumptions with which I cannot agree. *Presence* allows me to "attempt to 'experience' the other's ideology 'from within'; for an ideology is not merely something of the head, but also of the heart, the whole being."[36] Through the experience of mutual *presence,* there is a "mind/heart engagement," and a *"hearing/feeling"* of differing views. This experienced mutuality allows each of the intellectually/emotionally engaged participants to compare and connect personal beliefs and ideas to larger meanings and purposes that transcend personal disagreements.

Here is a theory/methodology that is based on the assumption that even adult students are intellectually and emotionally "in process" as learners. There is a methodological understanding that continual learning involves questioning the "assumptions" of those with whom we disagree, but not without also critically considering the "whys" of our own belief system. The method is one that is centered around open-ended possibilities and question marks (?) rather than periods (.) and definitive answers; process rather than product, concepts rather than transmitted facts, imaginative wrestling with truth(s) rather than dispensing a Truth.[37] It allows—no, encourages—the emotions to be part of the community-of- inquiry which is seeking to achieve an academic *koinonia* by way of a pedagogy of *presence.*

Such a community is made possible when:

1. Every "self" is affirmed and validated as a *thou* by way of a relational, interactive teaching methodology; and the student is treated not as a recipient (object) of transmitted knowledge, but as a knowledge interpreter and creator of understanding (subject).
2. Learning flows from a "pedagogical partnership" in which teacher and student share responsibility for the birth and development of a learning community based on a democratic process.
3. Individual differences are just not *tolerated,* but are *encouraged,* and are welcomed into the classroom dialogue.
4. The teacher balances the need for classroom structure and order with the need for student generated issues and for student challenges, questions, emotions, and "ways of knowing" related to "lived realities."
5. The teacher fosters an awareness and sensitivity to the numerous out-of-class influences—social, political, religious, cultural, economic—that have a bearing on academic content and student participation.
6. The teacher *models* a concern for the personhood (dignity) of each person in the class, and places a major emphasis *not* on helping the student "to do," but on encouraging the student "to be."

A FINAL THOUGHT

It is obvious that this is not a learning model for all situations. To invite *presence* into the classroom redefines pedagogical purpose. A pedagogy of *presence* will not satisfy the expectations of an institutional or personal educational philosophy that seeks convergent, measurable, objective, testable outcomes. It does not fit a behaviorist model of pedagogically conditioned consistency and predictability. It does not map-out a final knowledge destination. It involves risk-taking for the teacher who is adventurous enough to open the class to "knowledge as a field of contending interpretations,"[38] and to the sharing of hermeneutical possibilities with students.

To bring *presence* into the classroom is to negate the absolutism of set-in-stone lesson plans, teacher-proof materials, textbook authority, and teacher hegemony. It is to stimulate—and welcome—the questions, the challenges, the intellectual skepticism that—though psychologically discomforting and pedagogically uncertain for the teacher—may make possible the existential reality of one mind penetrating another. A classroom atmosphere impregnated by *presence* encourages "zones of uncertainty"[39] where student and teacher are challenged to critically interpret both the self and the other. It is within the "zones of uncertainty"—where knowledge/truth is ambiguous—that strongly expressed opposing views and dynamic interchanges may shake up classroom decorum, but may also be preludes to intellectual reflection.

This kind of classroom—open to unusual insights, new paths of awareness, and to the learning potential inherent in a cacophony of voices and divergent "ways of knowing"—requires a mutuality of *presence*. It requires the kind of mutuality that the physicist, David Bohm, has defined as a "participatory consciousness . . . (in which) we share our consciousness and . . . think together."[40]

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16. John Goodlad and Roger Soder, *Democracy, Education, and School* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996), 107.

17. John Sullivan, "The Idea of Religion." *The Great Ideas Today,* ed. Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1977), 206

A caveat may be added to Sullivan's statement. "The overall purpose of human communication is—or should be—reconciliation. It should ultimately serve to lower or remove walls and barriers of misunderstanding that unduly separate human beings one from another." M. Scott Peck, *The Different Drummer: Community Making and Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 259.

18. Buber, *Between Man and Man,* 107.

19. Vicki Bergkamp, "Laryngitis of the Soul," *Newman Review,* Spring, 2000, 6 and 12.

20. Thomas Del Prete, *Thomas Merton and the Education of the Whole Person* (Birmingham, Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1990), 155 and 164.

21. The physicist, David Bohm, relates ***koinonia*** to the definition "spirit of fellowship," which he says results in open, honest communication between colleagues. Bohm bases his concept of ***koinonia*** upon seven principles: establish dialogue, exchange ideas, don't argue, don't interrupt, listen carefully, clarify your thinking, and be honest. David Bohm, "Einstein's Teamwork Secret," *Training,* December, 1993.

22. Soren Kierkegaard, *Provocations,* 241.

23. Randolph Miller, "Theology in the Background," *Religious Education and Theology,* ed. Norma Thompson (Birmingham, Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1982), 34.

24. Abraham Heschel, found in John Miller, "Toward a Spiritual Curriculum," Holistic Education Review, Spring, 1992, 46.

25. Ralph Harper, *On Presence* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991), 4

Abraham Heschel states a similar sentiment: "To be a person is to reciprocate, to offer in return for what one receives . . . I become a person by knowing the meaning of receiving and giving. I become a person when I begin to reciprocate. Heschel, *Who Is Man,* 46.

26. William Sadler, *Existence and Love* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 197.

27. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960. Originally published in Great Britain, Harnell Press, 1950).

We may also take note of the recognition that

> I-it knowledge is indirect, mediated through an . . .
> object. An "it" is known by measurable parameters -

> its height, weight, color, and so on. We can give a good physical description of it. But "thou" is known directly . . . We know *about* an "it"—but we know, and are known by, a "thou." Albert E. McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 211.

28. Martin Buber, *I and Thou,* trans. Ronald G. Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958),132.

Buber's concept of a bipolar situation is similar to Ruth Anshen's "dialectic of polarity."

> "We need a calculus of potentiality . . . a dialectic of potentiality, one in which unity and diversity are redefined as necessary poles of the same essence . . . this is the crisis of consciousness . . . the new awakening. Ruth Anschen, intro., Jonas Salk, Man Unfolding (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), xii-xiii.

29. Buber, *Between Man and Man,* 97-98.

30. Wexler, *Holy Sparks,* 148.

31. This saying is borrowed from the Taoist philosophers who would today be in direct counterpoint to the educational philosophy that dominates American education.

32. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1966, copyright by Macmillan Company, 1916), 175.

33. Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 297.

34. Noted in the program for *The First Annual Conference on Inclusiveness,* Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas, April 7-9, 2000.

35. John Dewey, *How We Think* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, originally published by D.C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1910), 13.

36. Leonard Swindler, "The Dialogue Decalogue," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies,* 1984.

37. A Lebanese poet has written: "Say not 'I have found the truth,' but rather, 'I have found a truth.' " Kahlil Gibran, *The Prophet* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), 63.

38. Ira Shor, *Critical Teaching and Everyday Life* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 15.

39. Patrick Slattery, "Curricular Development in the Postmodern Era," *Harvard Educational Review,* Winter, 1995, 620.

40. David Bohm, *On Dialogue,* ed. Lee Nichol (New York: Routledge, 1996), 23, 15.

A Procedural Reconceptualization of Standardized Assessment: A Prolegomenon

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The utility of testing in schools rests upon several epistemic and axiomatic assumptions. First among these, that it is possible for one to know what someone else knows; second, that knowledge about what students know can be obtained via testing; third, that tests can be created to measure what students know; fourth, that measuring the amount, or degree, of knowledge in some quantifiable way is an important objective; and fifth, that knowledge about what students know should be obtained via testing.

Standardized testing represents inquiry inasmuch as testing endeavors to answer the question, "What do students know?" Furthermore, examination and analysis of test scores by teachers, parents, policy makers and others typically generates knowledge claims about student achievement, student progress, and student knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to clarify, and then question, the epistemic foundations of propositions that follow from standardized test scores.

First, a clarification of terms. *Standardized testing* is used to suggest any number of large-scale tests administered to students with the intention of measuring some psychological construct. The Stanford Achievement Test, Scholastic Achievement Test, American College Test, and Iowa Test of Basic Skills are familiar examples. These represent *norm-referenced* tests since student scores are determined by comparing the performance of an individual student against the performance of the entire collection of students who took the test. Less familiar examples of standardized tests would include the Georgia High School Graduation Test, the Arizona AIMS test, and any number of proposed standards-based subject tests. These represent *criterion-referenced* tests, since there is usually a minimum score that students are required to earn in order to demonstrate proficiency.[1] *Knowledge* derived from standardized test scores is stipulated to mean presumed true and valid statements that directly refer to or implicitly suggest awareness of what particular groups of students know. For example, it is held that the statement, "Stanford Achievement Test scores for students at George Washington Elementary School rose by 10% last year" suggests that the rise in scores indicates a commensurate increase in what students know pursuant to the objectives of the Stanford Achievement Test.

As will be demonstrated momentarily, the epistemic legitimacy of standardized tests as valid instruments for measuring student knowledge is easily rejected.[2] However, if we allow that, in general, knowledge may indeed be obtained from formal, systemic inquiry like standardized testing (resulting from the application of what Catherine Elgin calls pure epistemic procedures) we are forced to ask the question "Knowledge of what?" An answer is herein proposed.

CATHERINE ELGIN AND PURE PROCEDURAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Catherine Elgin extends the concept of proceduralism that John Rawls developed to understand justice in hopes of likewise clarifying differences between epistemologies.[3] Elgin notes that while there is some consensus among philosophers as to exactly what epistemology *is,* including its objectives and aims rendered broadly, there is not much agreement on how those objectives and aims are to be achieved. In particular, what counts as justification with respect to various epistemic claims is one area where dispute is familiar. Taken with Elgin's claim that epistemology is normative, her motives are clear: to introduce a means by which to comparatively evaluate what distinguishes that which qualifies as justification for one philosopher from that which qualifies as justification for another. She proposes classifying each epistemological stance according to the kinds of norms thus employed. These norms, for Elgin, define the procedures that shape various approaches to epistemology.

Following Rawls, Elgin identifies perfect procedural, imperfect procedural, and pure procedural epistemologies as distinct in terms of the kind and degree of justification that each demands. A *perfect procedural epistemology* carries the expectation that justification will be definite and sure to "guarantee the permanent acceptability of the judgment they vindicate."[4] One problem with such demands is that the resulting truths are, on Elgin's view, prone to being practically meaningless, lacking as they are, first, in any element of experience and, second, in any practical application.

Furthermore, while not all pure procedural truths are so void of meaning ("All bachelors are unmarried men" being one familiar example) Elgin contends that such statements represent the kinds of truths which have been historically recognized (and commensurately privileged) as incontrovertibly true. She notes that this might be a strength of perfect procedural epistemology, since it distinguishes knowledge from opinion and therefore provides a measure of security against counterexample. Elgin is nonetheless concerned that neither human cognition (that is, most of the actual thinking that people do) nor most of what common sense tells us that we know about the world, satisfies the demands placed upon them by pure procedural epistemology.

Imperfect procedural epistemology also defines objective criteria against which knowledge claims can be judged; however, it does not guarantee that the procedure will yield a result that meets these criteria. Imperfect procedures are therefore only successful part of the time. This does not diminish their value, Elgin claims, since such procedures are typically employed when there is no better procedure available. She illustrates this point by noting that induction, despite a clear objective (namely, truth) can produce arguments which appear prima facie solid but nevertheless yield false conclusions.[5] This compels something of a skeptical stance. Knowing that an imperfect procedure may mislead, Elgin demands that imperfect procedural epistemologists develop a means of evaluating and reevaluating claims that are accepted as knowledge. Indeed, this process of review is extended to the *methods of* inquiry as well as the knowledge claims that result *from* inquiry, so that newer methods that improve upon older ones can (and necessarily must) be identified and employed.

In contrast to both perfect and imperfect procedural epistemology, *pure procedural epistemology* counts as right whatever results from the procedure of inquiry. There is no objective criterion against which the outcome is compared, only an outcome that is accepted by virtue of having been produced by a pure procedure. Consider the NCAA Division I Championship basketball tournament held each spring. Sixty-four teams earn berths or are chosen to participate by a selection committee.[6] Once the field is set, the tournament continues until only one team remains. This team is then identified as the National Champion—that is, the team that won the championship tournament. This result is incontrovertible insofar as there is only one team who won the six consecutive games necessary to win the championship tournament. The pure procedure that is the tournament therefore yields an incontrovertible result. Note that it would not be permissible to claim that the winning team was the "best" team, since a) the tournament was not designed to identify the "best" team and b) "best" suggests an independent criterion against which to evaluate the outcome. Pure procedures neither recognize nor require objective criteria to evaluate the quality of the results of the procedure.

ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS

Recall again the example of the NCAA tournament, where the (pure) procedure is the tournament, and the knowledge produced via the procedure is knowledge of who the national champion is, insofar as "national champion" is understood to be different from "best". The procedure that produces this knowledge looks something like this:

1. Identify the 64 teams that are to be included in the tournament.
2. Establish the "brackets" that structure the sequence of games.
3. Play the games until a winner is determined.

There is a great deal about this procedure that critics would argue should be improved. For example, how are the 64 teams identified? Once identified, how are the teams seeded so that the sequence of the games is established? What about poor officiating, or unequal travel demands on teams? These questions are interesting but, since the outcome is intended by design to yield only a winner and not the "best team", the questions are moot.

Consider, then, the process of standardized testing in schools. If such testing is intended to produce knowledge about what students know, and if that knowledge is produced via a pure procedure, then that procedure should be identifiable. Roughly, that procedure is as follows:

1. A decision is made that a standardized test is appropriate for some situation or use.
2. Questions are designed for the test, perhaps in relation to some curriculum or set of curricular standards, and the test is constructed.
3. The test is administered. Importantly, students typically answer multiple-choice questions and are not required to justify their answers.
4. The test is scored.
5. Scores are reported to interested parties.

What does this procedure yield? From a pure-procedural viewpoint, merely scores. These scores can be compared, stated, examined, and analyzed, *but only as scores, since standardized tests cannot possibly produce knowledge about what students know.*

This point was made by Deron Boyles and its mention here is appropriate. Importantly, Boyles' analysis presumes that justification is a necessary condition for knowing, a presumption with which I am in complete agreement. Boyles then identifies policy makers as "meta-cognizers" (that is, claiming to "know" what students "know" as an essential component of holding teachers and schools accountable for educational success) but notes that, since the answers to multiple-choice standardized test questions require no justification on the part of students, policy makers are mistaken to conclude that students can serve as "reliable belief-making mechanisms" and, consequently, mistaken in claiming to know what students know. This is so because, again presuming that knowing requires justification, policy makers would be unable to justify their claims of student knowledge given the (unjustified) student responses upon which such claims would necessarily be based.[7]

I wish to assert specifically that *while there may exist some procedure that does yield knowledge about what students know, no existing standardized test does so.* Standardized tests at present merely yield scores, and it is a serious (although common) error to conflate knowledge of scores with knowledge of knowledge. Thus while it would be appropriate, and epistemically justifiable via the pure procedure that yields the score, to say "Students at Washington High School scored higher than students at Jefferson High School", the statement "Students at Washington High School know more than students at Jefferson High School" is epistemically groundless.[8]

This begs the question, "What do we know if we know test scores?" One obvious answer is, "merely a score" but, despite the attractive finality of this answer, permit me to argue differently. Considering again the example of the basketball tournament, recall that the objective of the tournament was not to yield the "best" team, but merely the winning team. In the same way, because standardized testing represents a pure epistemic procedure, then the "winners" of the game of education are thus revealed by such tests. Nothing more. In this way standardized tests cease to be the epistemic tools some might wish them to be, since they cannot yield any information about what students know. Instead, the knowledge derived from standardized test scores is knowledge about what I will call a comparative schooling index. Deciding exactly what the comparative schooling index measures is an important project not unlike the present conversation among cognitive psychologists as to the meaning of intelligence. Of obvious note is that a failure to understand what intelligence is has in no way prevented psychologists from continuing to measure it. Nonetheless, I am imagining that the *comparative schooling index* is a composite measure that includes socioeconomic status, quality of teaching, race, gender, dollars spent on education at particular schools, as well as some elements of cultural capital perhaps wrongly assumed to be knowledge, to name a few—in other words, a measure of the complex social, economic, and political factors that are manifest in standardized test scores.

Furthermore, in the same way that questions about the selection process of the 64-team NCAA tournament field, the quality of the officiating, the differences in travel schedules, etc. are moot in light of the demands of pure procedure, so too are similar demands moot in terms of the schooling index. That is, it is not necessary for the conditions under which schooling takes place to be everywhere the same, or equal, or fair, since the pure procedure of standardized testing neither requires nor demands such equivalence.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

What remains is to address several important questions that have emerged:

1. Is it any more epistemically defensible to assert that test scores represent a comparative schooling index than it was to assert that they represent measures of student knowledge? What would be required to demonstrate this?
2. Can the claim that standardized tests, presumably designed with the intention of measuring student knowledge and, in turn, providing policy makers with knowledge about what students know, actually measures something called the comparative schooling index itself withstand procedural scrutiny?
3. What is to prevent one from arguing that standardized testing is really an example of imperfect procedural epistemology, rather than pure procedural epistemology, as has been asserted in this paper? In other words, perhaps standardized testing is not a pure procedure—what then?

This last question appears to have an easy answer: since the answers that students give to multiple-choice questions require no justification whatsoever, they cannot yield knowledge. Claims that are thus made about student knowledge likewise cannot be justified except within the parameters established by the pure procedure of standardized testing.

However, I find this last question to be especially compelling inasmuch as it suggests a possible classification scheme for standardized tests, and possibly all forms of assessment in schools: perfect procedural assessment, imperfect procedural assessment, and pure procedural assessment. One can argue that the prevailing assumption among policy makers is that standardized tests are perfect procedural assessments. This paper argues against that assumption, asserting instead that standardized tests represent pure procedural assessment. It may be that imperfect procedural assessment is the not-yet-realized compromise that is both procedurally sound and epistemically justifiable. This possibility will be pursued in a subsequent paper.

These questions aside, the use of standardized testing compels fundamental epistemic questions that will be (and perhaps already have been) answered improperly and exclusively by noncritical technocrats unless the idea that standardized tests either a) measure knowledge or b) yield information about what students know is dismantled. Furthermore, this paper suggests that test scores, not defensible as measures of student knowledge and resulting from a pure procedure, might nonetheless be understood as conveying some knowledge about the world.

NOTES

1. Worthen, B., et. al. *Measurement and Assessment in Schools* (New York: Longman, 1999).

2. Boyles, D. 2000 'Students as knowers: an argument for justificatory social epistemology by way of blind realism', *Social Epistemology,* 14(1), 33-42.

3. Elgin, C. *Considered Judgment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice,* Revised Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

4. Ibid., 5.

5. Ibid., 11.

6. That the teams earn berths via regular-season conference championships or conference tournaments, or are selected by a committee on the basis of won-loss records, strength of schedule, etc., has no bearing on the championship tournament being a pure procedure.

7. See Boyles, D. 1997 'Reliabilism & the politics of accountability: The project of conceptual analysis and epistemology in interpreting school 'success'", *Journal of Philosophy and Social Science,* 22(1), 9-18, and Boyles, D. 2000 'Students as knowers: an argument for justificatory social epistemology by way of blind realism', *Social Epistemology,* 14(1), 33-42. Here reliable is understood in the epistemological sense, not the measurement sense.

8 I add as an aside that the decision to fire the principal and reassign all of the teachers at Jefferson High School on the basis of test scores under the assumption that poor teaching and/or leadership, in pursuit of students as knowers, resulted in low test scores, is likewise groundless since the test scores have nothing whatsoever to do with what students know.

Humanities without Apologies: Miller's Outlook on What We Teach

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> In general, there are affirmations for which one offers no apology. They are self-defining. To be right, or good, is all well enough in its place, but there is more to a person than that. The answer to dogma has usually been that it was 'false,' but even if it were, one could not live with the correction alone. One does well not always to appeal to an apology, not always to justify.
>
> I know that this is a risky business. To act without apology seems only impulsive or uncontrolled, or arbitrary, or in contempt of the opinions and feelings of mankind. And it can be. But an assertion which is also the condition of responsible consequences can't be avoided if one is to propose consequences, author them, and declare them to be the environment of a further command. . . . October, 31, 1962 [EM, p. 872]

John William Miller had a long and exemplary career as a teacher of philosophy at Williams College. He was also an original thinker in the American philosophical tradition, but one whose extensive writings were, for a long time, unpublished.[1] As a teacher, Miller believed that the humanities played a central and necessary role, not an ancillary role, in the general education of students in a culture. I want here to bring to life some of what he had to say concerning the humanities, because it speaks directly to our current situation. We humanists have in large measure become defensive and apologetic about our work and, frankly, about our lives. This makes us less effective than we might otherwise be and our ineffectiveness, from Miller's outlook, bears negative consequences for our culture as a whole. Without the humanities, Miller believed, a people risks losing not only its civility but its humanity.

Miller noticed that over the course of the twentieth century the humanities have lived a troubled life in American culture. They have lost status and have in many instances become apologetic, trying to justify themselves to persons both inside and outside of the academy. And he noticed this phenomenon long before it reached its present, more extreme form. In the early 1950s he maintained that the "status of the humanities in colleges seems to me unfavorable . . . we are an active and practical people, and our thoughts and art must make a new start in terms of steel mills and electric power" (EM, p. 771). Philosophy, for example, is often characterized as useless and without any means for effecting a good and successful life. Although this is not a radically new situation for philosophy, there seems to be in American culture no other means of redemption as there have been in other places and times. This unfavorable status of philosophy and the humanities is further suggested by the fact that several disciplines that have in the past been linked to the humanities have severed their fundamental ties. Whereas once "political scientists" were interested in world outlooks–Locke, Smith, Mill, Marx, Rousseau–they now settle for a steady diet of voting patterns and statistically-oriented models of decision theory. Similar trends toward a narrow focus on quantitative and empirical information pervade both economics and educational theory. Indeed, as Miller sees it, it is precisely the practical successes of the uses of "scientific" knowledge that have come to threaten the significance of the humanities:

> The humanities sometimes carry the flavor of subjectivism because they concern thoughts, feelings and acts rather than the objects and changes of impersonal nature or the equally non-psychological attributes of the supernatural. On the whole, the great success of natural science has left the humanities in an uncomfortable position, unsure of themselves as modes of knowledge. [Folder A, p. 1]

In their present condition, the humanities seem neither to generate authority nor to command respect. They are often treated as the accumulation and interpretation of trivial knowledge or as academic addenda left over from another time.

Insofar as humanists themselves adopt something like this view, they identify themselves as engaged in esoteric exercises. Knowing they are clever readers and interpreters, they withdraw from culture, creating a safe space in which to operate. The upshot of this sort of self-identification is a confirmation of the popular view that the humanities have become irrelevant and unnecessary. No one listens, no one cares. Humanists have become a kind of neo-Pythagorean cult, bound to alienate those who "get things done" in our culture. In such a condition it should come as no surprise that humanities majors in college are asked what they will "do" with their degrees.

In response to this situation, humanists and in some cases their antagonists have tried to redeem the humanities by making them relevant in a peculiar and unsatisfying way. In order to protect their private realm of scholarship, humanists have begun to earn their keep as mercenaries. This is hardly surprising since the future of the humanities does not appear to be especially attractive. Once persons understand that the humanities no longer have anything important to offer, they will see no basis for keeping them around. Philosophy and classics programs in American colleges and universities have indeed already been dealt with in this fashion. History and literature programs are less likely to be so easily removed, but they are certainly good candidates in many cases for cutbacks. Under these circumstances, becoming relevant and serving other programs seem to make sense.

The answer most of the humanities have adopted in response to this loss of status is simple. American culture since its inception has highly valued instrumental goods–things that effect particular aims. And as Miller noted: "There is a widely-held view that knowledge is instrumental. It is a means, a tool, a utility" (B 25, F 15, p. 8). Indeed, some pragmatic philosophers, including John Dewey, openly defend such an instrumentalist conception of knowing. Thus, humanists have come to ask themselves how they can contribute to specific personal and social aims. They ask, what are the humanities "good for"?

Although math, physics, and biology are not essentially instrumental, they have well survived being instrumentalized precisely because they offer direct avenues of application. They provided a groundwork for technological innovation across the board. It has seemed that if the humanities are to survive, they must mimic this sort of success. Thus, between 1850 and the present, together with the development of the social sciences, there have been numerous attempts to scientize philosophy and history, the most notable, perhaps, being positivism's attempt to eradicate the metaphysical from philosophy and the contingent from history. More recently, the attempts to scientize and instrumentalize the humanities have been less wholesale. The trend has been toward intelligent casuistry, where humanists try to say something useful--or to help others do so–about particular social or practical issues.

In philosophy, such instrumentalization has created an industry of applied ethics. Business ethics courses, for example, are routinely taught in philosophy programs. Although some attention is given to theoretical or philosophical ethics, this is usually done descriptively. The majority of such courses tone down the philosophical dimensions and employ case studies to model actual situations in the classroom.[2] Similar developments have occurred in bio-ethics, medical ethics, legal ethics, agricultural ethics, and so forth. English programs have likewise provided service courses in legal writing, business writing, and various other technical writings. The implication is that humanists can provide answers and/or training for certain kinds of questions and endeavors. Thus, for example, some students trained in medical ethics are qualified to serve on hospital advisory boards. In a somewhat cruder fashion, some have suggested that applied ethics programs are useful for those who cheat in college or who have other moral problems.

The point, however, is not to dispute the usefulness of "applied" humanities courses and programs. Some of them may indeed produce specific results someone hopes to achieve. Rather, Miller's suggestion is to ask if such courses and programs are indeed humanities programs and to ask if they do what the humanities do. Miller's response is negative. These programs are what most humanists think they are: attempts to survive in an instrumentally-minded culture that has forgotten what role the humanities can play in human experience and culture. Philosophers, historians, writers, and critics seem to sense that there is something not appropriate in these service programs–these are not the sorts of things that led them into the humanities initially. One difficulty is that the "applied" programs limit the scope of the humanities, bringing them to fix on particular events, issues, and techniques. From Miller's point of view, however, the humanities are precisely those disciplines that deal with breadth and scope. History, as Miller sees it, is not a collection of facts, but the telling of the stories of action, of human agency. "History," he maintains, "is more like a work of art than like a utility. It is illuminating but not useful" (EM, p. 682). And philosophy deals with "ideas of universal incidence," not with particulars. "The business of philosophy," Miller holds, "is with Universals and Constitutionals, not with particulars identified *within* a prior order . . ." (B 26, F 11, p. 4).

Insofar as humanists know that these instrumentalist redemptions of their disciplines are impostors, alienation sets in. In the current structure of secondary and higher education, the humanities are forced to take up this mercenary work to try to justify themselves. And, as we noted earlier, this alienation is often accompanied by the acceptance of a kind of esotericism among humanists. We have in this way created the present, and somewhat peculiar academic climate in which we live. Perhaps it is better identified, in a C. P. Snow-like way, as a dual culture divided into the humanities on one side and what is useful on the other. Bright humanists continue their endeavors but are effectively marginalized; indeed, as Miller often notes, they eventually become self-marginalizing. "People ask," Miller says, ""Why do you study Latin, mathematics, history, literature?' It is hard to answer the question. And if you cannot answer, you are viewed as adrift, and may wonder yourself" (EM, p. 492). Having nothing obvious to offer a culture of instrumentality, humanists do wonder and they carry out their work with little respect or authority.

Miller's response is the ongoing Socratic attempt to chide us into reconsidering what we, as humanists, are up to. The aim is not to find out how we are useful, but to find out what it is we do. Miller believes that living with "two cultures" is a fundamental mistake. He sees the sciences, mathematics, and the humanities as dialectically related in establishing the world in which we think and act. The "useful" needs an order—a world—in which at least utility is valued. The central irony for him seems to be that the recent attempts to make the humanities useful have had the effect of foreclosing on their genuine contribution to human existence: their ability to humanize. Indeed, Miller points out that the absence of the study of the humanities is often linked directly to slavery:

> If you ask "Why do you read?" no answer in specific terms is available. Others may even charge that time could be better employed, that one neglects domestic or other chores. Slaves were not allowed to learn reading. A threat to their status as personal nonentities was truly seen in such knowledge. Anyone whose acts are only instrumental is like a slave. In a "free" society, he is merely a masterless slave. [EM, p. 492]

The influence of Socrates and Thoreau is unmistakable here. For Miller, we lose our selves–become masterless slaves–when we instrumentalize and degrade the teaching of the humanities. "I claim," Miller wrote in a letter to his son Eugene, "that where an alleged act is a means, it does not disclose the agent, does not identify him for others or for himself" (EM, p.491). For Miller this is a pivotal concern. He calls upon tradition to reclaim the notion that the humanities are freeing and liberating–that they are indeed "liberal" arts. But Miller is not a neo-Pythagorean; he does not use tradition as a means to remain in the past. Instead, he brings the career of the liberal arts to bear on contemporary culture where not only has the notion of liberation been worn down, but where a subtle but pervasive and stubbornly resistant scientistic determinism has left the human agent out of account, even where such an agent seems to be the locus of moral concern. In short, as Miller sees it, we ironically try to face human problems with methods that inherently exclude the human from consideration. More bluntly stated, science neither addresses nor answers moral and aesthetic concerns, and these *are* primary concerns of human beings.

THE HUMANITIES AS HUMANIZING

In "The Scholar as Man of the World," Miller noted the confidence with which we can say that a scientist is a person of the world. Scientists, he says, "cultivate the formal order which invests the immediate and projects it into an articulate infinity. They are men of the world. They have a world" (PC, p. 182). Roughly speaking, scientists project and engage a systematic order of causes and effects in space and time. Miller maintains the Kantian insight, however, that this order is in part a function of human action. Matter, space, time, and cause "are all Actualities. They are properties of doing, of functioning, of *controlling,* not of perceiving or imagining" (EM, p. 34). Contemporary scientists generally do not consider a Kantian outlook. For this reason, Miller points out, "one cannot altogether exonerate natural scientists who sometimes give the impression that they are either servants of psychological impulses or else the contemplators of a region divorced from our self-maintenance" (PC, p. 182). Simply put, scientists usually either adopt a straightforward determinism or they opt for a two world theory in which they hold separate the natural world from their own actions and judgments. This way of looking at things has had important historical consequences.

To view nature as a receptacle in which "things happen" is automatically to exclude human agency and action. Persons, including the scientists who project such a world view, become objects within the processes occurring in the receptacle. Indeed, the social sciences in their quest to become more scientific over the past century have come to initiate this exclusionary outlook of the sciences. They artfully exclude the very item they wish to reveal to us: the human agent. As Miller suggests, the "advance of *nature* has engulfed *human* nature. Psychology has become a natural science, or at least aims to be so wherever it is most respectably taught" (EM, p. 100). The most overt version of this outlook appears in Skinnerian "behaviorism" where a person becomes an object that reacts to whatever else is present and proximate in the receptacle. But, even as behaviorism as a particular doctrine has been denied or downplayed by psychologists, sociologists, and educational theorists, its fundamental deterministic assumptions continue to underwrite many current practices in the social sciences.

Educational theorists, for example, even when their aim is to free students, continue to "study" them as reacting, not acting, objects. They treat them as "subjects" of "studies" in which statistical analyses are brought to bear on defining what a student is and what a student does. Consequently, as we will examine in more detail later, students become objects for manipulation. This tacitly maintained conception of students appears even in works whose intended purpose is to set students free. Judy Eby's "Reflective Thinking, Planning, and Evaluation for the Elementary School," a text for teaching teachers, is a case in point:

> Outwardly, the teacher displays enthusiasm by using a bright, lively voice; open, expansive gestures; and facial expressions that show interest and pleasure. Salespeople who use animated, enthusiastic behavior could sell beach umbrellas in the Yukon in January . . . . You can "sell" long division better with an enthusiastic voice. [Eby, p. 182]

Here students are treated as manipulable objects. Ironically, most current texts for the teaching of teachers treat teachers as such objects as well. Miller sees all of this as a natural result of our scientistic focus on nature: if we take "human nature" as analogous to nature, "consistency and analogy suggest that man, too, is an object of knowledge, and consequently controllable, as are all other facts of life" (EM, p. 249). It is the use of this analogy such that "incorrect beliefs" are treated as mental illness more than any particular political doctrine that make the former Soviet Union and Orwell's *1984* so frightening and objectionable. Students are treated as objects to be measured, but they are not treated as measurers, as themselves functioning agents who bring about a world.

The deep and socially significant irony of science's simultaneous technological liberation of persons and behaviorism's enslavement of persons is not lost on Miller. This is why he returns to a conception of the humanities as liberating and humanizing to confront the marginalized status in which they presently stand. As Miller notes, "Scarcely had freedom been won, scarcely had personality been liberated from the supernatural, when it fell prey to another and even more terrible antagonist, namely, the very system of rationally ordered nature which it had supposed to be its ally in the battle with arbitrary authority" (EM, p. 100). An enslaving supernaturalism was simply superseded by an enslaving naturalism and a dogmatic psychologism. The situation has become one in which one can choose one's own poison: "One can choose between the annihilation of the ego by mechanism or by the equally blind . . . pressures of irrational appetites" (EM, p. 102).

Despite his rejection of naturalism's determinism, Miller did not reject the work of the sciences. He clearly acknowledged the world-making capacities as well as the instrumental value of the sciences. Miller did not wish to fuel any ongoing battles between the sciences and the humanities. His aim, rather, was to reveal a particular degeneracy in *scientism:* its disqualification of action and agency. Thus, for example, physics "defines a region without blemish, a seamless garment of nature. It contains no error, no passion, no evil and no conflict" (PC, p. 78). This is an impersonal region whose "apparent irrelevance to action" has indeed "proved disturbing to humanists" (PC, p. 78). James Diefenbeck neatly summarizes Miller's worry:

> And it is only when men discover that this appeal to the static as an absolute definition of reason leaves no place for the very activity which originated this investigation that they begin to recognize that both the act, as a dimension of change in time, and history, as a mode of knowledge, are categorical and constituting forms of reality and of knowledge. [Fell, PJWM, p. 49]

Again, for Miller, science and nature are functions of human action–of measurement and categorial organization. Nature needs its dialectical complement: history. Miller defines history itself as a category–the place of the ongoing stories of action and agency, just as nature is the place of causal interaction among objects. We make a world: "The historical person leaves his mark in its vehicles of finitude, on institutions, states, science, and commerce" (B 2, F 4, p. 2). Consequently, both the sciences and the humanities are crucial to an educated person and thus to a free person; together they provide a world for the scholar or learner.

So the humanities have a twofold task in the present setting: first to reestablish that persons appear in the world as actors or agents and not just as determinate objects, and second to focus on their traditional task of humanizing students. Miller was heartened by the fact that the humanities have remained alive even in a culture that has seemed to misplace their purpose. "This," he says, "is the residual toughness of the humanities. With everything against them in theory they persist in practice. They bear up under the charge of subjectivism . . ." (Folder A, p. 12). And this residual toughness is itself a function of what Miller calls a "residual morality" : an appreciation of the humanities as non-instrumental brings us face to face with ourselves, with our own actions. As Miller puts it:

> There is an old but vague conviction of a difference between the actual and the instrumental . . . . It is a basic stubbornness that we will not make objects of ourselves nor allow others to do so. That is our residual morality. [EM, p. 25]

Thus, for Miller, the humanities are literally where we find ourselves. They are the disciplines that allow us to pursue the Socratic aim of knowing ourselves and other persons, not as objects, but as loci of action.

Miller takes up the first task directly. The human being is one of many "functioning objects"–"objects that are not objects of cognition but control cognition" (MW, p. 12). Our control of cognition is likewise a control in action, not an anarchy but a measured alliance with that which constrains us. To use of one of Miller's favorite examples, a yardstick is a functioning object that gives us some local control in acting. So it is that we appear as agents precisely when we are neither absurdly free nor over-determined by circumstance. According Miller, we define and declare our humanity in a middle ground:

> There are two conditions under which it is unnecessary to pay regard to a supposed other person: 1) egoism asserted without limitation and 2) limitation accepted without egoism. In neither case has the distinctive mark of the free man appeared. The former situation shows the outlaw; the latter a cypher. The free man embodies the play of these two tendencies. And it is in their play that personality is born. [EM, p. 106]

In our thinking, feeling, and acting we leave a trail across time: "Above all, what characterizes the free man is his capacity and determination to make history" (PC, pp. 103-104). The "Gettysburg Address" and Martin Luther King's "dream" speech are not to be understood by the behaviorist. They are history-making and reveal the presence of human acts. Again, history is the realm of action and agency: it "is the region of the will; it is made by men who speak for themselves from their souls" (Fell, Phil. 7, p. 4). Thus, the study of the humanities leads us to encounter ourselves through our actions, our feelings, and our thoughts. "The dimension of change in time," says Miller, "defines the studies called the humanities. Face to face with objects alone we are conscious but not self-conscious. To be self-conscious is to pay attention to one's own past, to one's deeds and thoughts, and especially to one's errors" (PH, p. 95). Like the American pragmatist Charles Peirce, Miller believes we reveal ourselves most potently when we encounter our own errors and experience our own frustrations and losses. "We have done things," he says, "we ought not to have done and in the past tense discover a present selfhood" (PH, p. 96).

If Miller is right, it should be no surprise that in the 20th century, where we have come to rely more and more on the tacit adoption of a mechanistic and psychologistic outlook and have come less and less to respect or find a place for the humanities, our lived world has seemed more and more barren. This barrenness has spawned a number of counter-culture movements seeking to recover the human in whatever ways possible. After the Second World War, for example, the existentialists proclaimed a raw freedom for humanity, though this freedom was set adrift in a world absurd and incomprehensible. A variety of later movements–the beats, the hippies, the punks, and the new age among them–sought to establish more upbeat, if still cynical, versions of human autonomy. From Miller's perspective these movements have generally gone too far in the direction of a kind of personal anarchy, losing their purchase on local control because they were unwilling to seek an alliance with the world's constraints. With his usual "bite" Miller wrote in 1973: "I think it would be blind and foolish to overlook current tendencies of an anarchistic sort, summed up in the term 'permissiveness.' This has many manifestations, including the 'intellectuals'" (EM, p. 434). Despite this, these movements clearly exemplify that residual morality of not allowing ourselves to be treated as objects. And from an historical point of view, one might argue as well that these movements have had something to do with the humanities' ability to weather the storms of a scientistic world.

The peculiar irony of our attempts to reinsert ourselves into a world from which we have excluded ourselves is brought home to us in cultural phenomena such as Monty Python's focus on "the meaning of life." Here the phrase most central to us is revealed as the locus of dark humor. The irony is likewise apparent in the work of Richard Rorty who, like Miller, focuses on the importance of history, but then, unlike Miller, adopts a "physicalist" account of humanity because he sees no better offer on the table. In our intellectual climate, the question of the meaning of life has become almost unreasonable and we seem reluctant to take it up directly. As the humanities have lost both standing and respect, the question has in fact become something of a joke. Yet we are unwilling, finally, to give up on the meaning of life. Despite understanding ourselves as objects to be ordered, fixed, and manipulated, we keep seeking ways to awaken the barren landscape of the mechanistic world and create a personscape in which we maintain some local control. We want to present ourselves on the scene, to, in Miller's words, put in an appearance. This is indeed the importance of teaching and learning for us. We assert our presence in our thinking, our control of the local, and in our errors and failures. They are our errors and failures. In asserting our presence, we indicate the importance of the humanities, not as tools for specific aims, but as the primary sources for knowing, understanding, and dealing with ourselves. As Miller suggests,

> the humanities have challenged complacency by demanding an acquaintance with personal dignity. This discipline does not so much reveal personality; it is rather its actuality. Human nature becomes human only as it looks upon itself. When it observes only objects, it loses its own distinctive attribute as self-critical. [EM, p. 106]

So, we are born as biological organisms in a natural environment to which we react. We *become* human by engaging in the humanities as creators and scholars; for Miller, "learning makes one a Person, not a 'good' person or a successful one . . ." (EM, p. 441). It is in learning that we find ourselves. The second task of the humanities–to free us and liberate us–is thus dialectically linked to the first: to be present we must be free. This is what it means to be humanizing. Seen in this light, the humanities are not an accidental and second-rate enterprise to be kept around only if one pleases; they stand in need of no apology, only of recognition. The humanities are not instrumental training grounds for particular occupations or aims, but neither are they irrelevant to our lives. This confusion–that what is non-instrumental must be irrelevant-- has been a central mistake of the twentieth century. For Miller, the humanities are precisely about risking our lives, about "playing for keeps" (Gahringer, 11/30/49). They are appropriately central to any general educational undertaking. They civilize, humanize, and liberate. This, after all, is what interests us. The curious example of Star Trek's Mr. Spock is instructive. Spock, a Vulcan, is supposedly strictly logical and devoid of feeling. But this is not what makes him appealing. His charisma lies in the human traits of decency, caring, and love that disclose themselves through his logicistic veneer; these traits exemplify his freedom and agency.

Following the lead of William James, Miller suggests that human freedom is not a matter of argument, but one of declaration and revelation. In acting, we declare our freedom; in studying history as the locus of action we have freedom revealed to us. As Socrates indicated, we establish our freedom and our humanity through self-knowledge. Gary Stahl aptly describes this moral feature of Miller's thought: "for Miller, to be a person is not to be the denotation of a noun but a present participle that makes self and world actual in time; here 'morally' is an adverb characterizing a particular form of self-revising process" (Stahl, p. 74). The humanities serve as an appropriate vehicle for both self-knowledge and freedom.

The freedom in which Miller is interested, and in which he thinks we are ultimately interested, is not an absolute negative freedom. This was the extreme toward which the late 20th century counter-cultures moved. It is rather a freedom defined by our ability to rule ourselves, to achieve what Miller called local control. "I would ask you," says Miller, "to consider how a person feels his own reality. Is it otherwise than in effectiveness, i.e., in the exercise of power? Impotence and freedom are mutually exclusive" (PC, p. 103). This, as he sees it, is the importance of the scientific and the mathematical; they yield a kind of control of the world. But what Miller wishes to add is that it is only in the revelations of the humanities–history, literature/arts, and philosophy–that we find this enabling freedom in its effects, accomplishments, and failures. And it is only through our acquaintance with the humanities that we empower ourselves for self-criticism and self-revision. "What shows men to be free," claims Miller, "is their capacity to recognize and revise the grounds of their choices and of their opinions" (PC, p. 73). This is the necessity of the humanities. Our humanity requires our freedom; our freedom requires an engagement with the experiences of human action through feeling, willing, and thinking. Here is where we humanists must act without apology, assert a responsibility for the consequences we generate, and declare our own revisions of our own history and culture.

NOTES

1. To date four volumes of Miller's work are in print: *The Paradox of Cause* (1978), *The Philosophy of History* (1981), *The Midworld of Symbols and Functioning Objects* (1982), and *In Defense of the Psychological* (1983), New York, W. W. Norton and Company.

2. Despite this emphasis on cases, I have heard those in business schools claim that philosophy business ethics courses were still not sufficiently practical.

Memorial Essay for the Late Professor Foster McMurray

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The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's late Professor Foster McMurray died at his home in Apple Valley, California on October 20, 2000, where he had lived with his wife since he retired. He was born in Philadelphia on August 10, 1914, graduated from Lancaster (Pennsylvania) High School in 1932, received a Bachelor's degree from Millersville State Teachers College in Pennsylvania in 1938, received a doctor's degree in philosophy of education from Teachers College Columbia University in 1949. He participated in the last discussion group that John Dewey conducted in 1949 during his retirement. It was a discussion of Dewey's last book Knowing and the Known which Dewey had co-authored with Arthur F. Bentley. In the 1940s Prof. McMurray taught briefly and the University of Texas and then joined the faculty at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1947 and completed his dissertation in 1949. He retired from the faculty of the University of Illinois in 1982 and was titled "Emeritus Professor of Philosophy." Prof. McMurray also served as a Visiting Professor at The University of California at Berkeley in 1957 and served as a Visiting Professor at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles in1960. As you will see in the list of his publications at the end of this article McMurray's unpublished book The Philosophy of Public Education has now been published on microfiche as an ERIC document. I am the person who submitted that document to ERIC.

Back in the late 1960s I was a student at Temple University. At Temple I took several courses in philosophy of education that were taught by faculty who had completed their doctoral programs at Illinois. When I began to express interest in doctoral study in philosophy of education the Temple faculty who I knew all spoke enthusiastically about Prof. McMurray who had been the youngest member of Illinois's Department of History and Philosophy of Education in the 1950s. The professors who I knew at Temple were all interested in the teaching of critical thinking and regarded the philosophy of John Dewey as central to the study of philosophy of education. I later became aware of Prof. McMurray's acquaintance with Dewey while Prof. McMurray was doing his doctoral study at Teachers College in the 1940s. When I became a doctoral student at Illinois I heard Prof. McMurray deliver excellent presentations on Dewey's and Jean Piaget's philosophies of education. The first time I chatted with him in his office he was pleased to find out that there was a student in his department who had a Bachelor's degree from a Pennsylvania state college. I took an excellent seminar with Prof. McMurray on "Educational Classics." In that course he encouraged rigorous reading of texts on education by Aristotle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Herbert Spencer, John Dewey, Abraham Maslow, and Jean Piaget. We also analyzed the text of a new book on the 19th Century German philosopher of education J. F. Herbart by Prof. Harold Dunkel of the University of Chicago. The discussions in that class were some of the best I had while a doctoral student. Prof. McMurray later served as a member of my dissertation committee. His comments on my writing and research were always helpful.

A member of the faculty at Temple University when I was a student there was Prof. James E. McClellan who is now a retired Professor of Philosophy at Texas A & M University. Prof. McClellan studied with Prof. McMurray at the University of Texas in the late 1940s and at Illinois in the early 1950s. Although McClellan was McMurray's student, they became friends because they were both veterans of World War II. In a recent e-mail message, McClellan told me that: "Both veterans, Foster and I soon became friends. I was a very junior commissioned officer with no combat experience, Foster a very senior non-com who had gone through the entire campaign from D-Day to VE-Day with an armored battalion, 'constant discomfort, alternating boredom and terror,' as he described it. … At Illinois our devoted friendship and close association continued but with a subtle difference. Whereas we'd been mostly fellow veterans in Austin, we were definitely mentor-mentee at Champaign-Urbana. When Foster had time to spend with me, it wasn't to go to beer halls but to those occasions where he could fulfill his mentorly duties, inducting me into the ways of the examined life, asking me to take responsibility for my taste through all the realms of art and science, exercising me in the discipline of cultural criticism. At Illinois in those days, the university made sure there was always ample culture to critique. Classical music, art exhibits, dance troupes, shows at the School of Architecture, lectures on everything from astronomy to zoology, philosophy of law, and poetry readings. We took in all we could." One of Prof. McMurray's first publications was an essay entitled "The Problems of Verification in Formal School Learning," which appeared in 1949 in Essays for John Dewey's Ninetieth Birthday, pp 47-58. The book was edited by Kenneth D. Benne and William O. Stanley and published in Urbana, Illinois by the College of Education at the University of Illinois.

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establish its legitimate domain and the range of its inquiries. The issue is a question of whether educational philosophy is to be conceived as a practical discipline, or as a theoretical discipline. The document continues by discussing other questions and problems in the philosophy of education. Following a preface and a bibliography of the author, the document is divided into the following chapters: (1) "Defining Philosophy of Education"; (2) "Non-partisan Educational Theory"; (3) "The Function of the Formal School"; (4) "Educational Aims"; (5) "Education as Cultivation of Mind"; (6) "Mind and Educational Process"; (7) "Equality, Status, and Society"; (8) "The Curriculum, Confidence, and Tension"; (9) "Experiencing Value"; and (10) "Reasons for Learning." (Contains 27 references.) (BT)Pub date01 Jan 2000 Pub typeVIEWPOINTS (Opinion Papers, Position Papers, Essays, etc.)Pages294PriceEDRS Price MF01/PC12 Plus PostageCountryU.S.; IllinoisNote(s)Paper & fiche. Clearingh #SO031271; ERIC_ISSUE: RIEDEC2000. Documents may be ordered from: ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS) ;7420 Fullerton Road, Suite 110 ;Springfield, VA 22153-2852 ; Call Toll Free (US and Canada): 1-800-443-3742 ; Call: 703-440-1400 ; email: service@edrs.com ; web: http://edrs.com. Microfiche: Price CodePaginationNo. of FichePriceMF 011—4801-5$1.51; Paper Copy/Hard Copy: PC 12 276—300$53.52

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A Philosophical Perspective on Debates about the Purpose of the Social Foundations Field

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Presented at MPES Annual Meeting, November 1998

In a valuable article (Teachers College Record, 1997) Nancy Beadle discusses some of the history of the field of social foundations of education and proposes "reframing" the purpose in terms of the idea of the teacher as "participant in " shared decision making". Beadle notes that the foundations field has regularly offered courses as part of professional training in education since the 1930's, that it has always been multi-disciplinary and concerned with the "moral, civic and social dimensions of … schooling as an institution: and that its courses have almost always discussed a range of issues including "the history and purpose of public schooling; the nature of teacher authority …, equity issues in educational policy; ideas of freedom, justice and the good society as they pertain to education … and contemporary educational issues and problems." She suggests that recent educational reforms, particularly in teacher education, provide foundations people with the opportunity, nay the necessity, of articulating their efforts with the new directions which teacher education sees itself as pursuing. Beadle notes that the breadth of the foundations material has always made it difficult to "capture rhetorically" what it is we do and what value it has for the preparation of teachers. In this paper I propose to put to the side Beadle's proposal about "reframing" the purpose of foundations studies in terms of participation in collective decision making. Rather, I want to focus on a different explanation of why it is difficult to elaborate the purpose of foundational studies in a way that it is compelling not only to our colleagues in colleges of education and the larger university but also to our fellow social foundations scholars and teachers. Beadle is right that the multi-disciplinary perspective, the focus on moral and political issues and the attention to contemporary issues provide us with a heady challenge. It is not, however, at this level of generality that the explanation for foundations' problem of self-definition arise. When we look more substantively at the origins of the field and at the succession of social political and educational theories that have obtained (sometimes brief) prominence in the writing and teaching of social foundations we are forced to the conclusion that we are inheritors of multiple,, conflicting and incompatible theories and approaches each of which mounts objections against its competitors but none of which has to surrender and admit that it is rationally indefensible. A brief review of some salient points in our history would have to touch on the Social Reconstructionist origins of foundations, on the period of separate disciplinary studies, on the rise of foundations, on the period of separate disciplinary studies, on the rise of functionalism, on the analytic period in philosophy of education, on the policy emphasis of the 1970's on neo-Marxism, deconstructionism, multiculturalism and critical theory.

I will approach this topic by examining three recent texts that are widely used in beginning courses in the foundations field. These are Joel Spring's The American School (3d. edition), Steven E. Tozer et al.'s School and Society: Historical And Contemporary Perspectives and a newcomer by Wayne Urban and Jennings Wagoner Jr. entitled American Education: A History. All of these are to differing degrees, excellent texts, their authors are accomplished historians and they admirably struggle with multiple constraints in producing works that have informed thousands of educators about the history of education and debates about education and educational policy. I will not quibble about, though I may note, what these authors choose to include or exclude and I will limit my attempts to second guess their expertise as professional historians. Rather I will involve myself in elaborating the deeper commitments to which these authors are beholden both in terms of what they say and do in their texts. Study of these texts will reveal that they are proponents of different and incompatible approaches which employ different fundamental concepts, ask different questions and attach differential meanings and/or weight to considerations such as individual rights, equality or the greatest good. In doing this I want to distinguish my approach from one that it superficially resembles. My object is not to expose what is frequently called the authors' "ideology" and to use the supposed wrongness of that ideology for rejecting their works. The "cherchez la ideologie" approach is in fact illustrative of the very problem to which I am pointing. It is the very incompatibility of "ideologies", the inability to rationally overcome one's opponents that characterized debates about the purposes of the foundations of education. When "choosing sides" is all that is available, it is hard to see how rational agreement can be reached on how to re-frame the foundations project.

Discussion of our texts will have to wait, however, upon a brief review of the origins of the foundations field. All of our authors agree in finding the origins of the foundations project in the writing and activism of the Social Reconstructionists and most particularly the late George Counts of Teachers College. Each of the authors devote a short section to the "educational radicalism" that was sparked in the heart of the Great Depression and their attitude toward the " founding father" is usually respectful, occasionally reverent. What were counts and the Social Reconstructionists about? According to Spring (p. 295)

He proposed that teachers assume leadership of the reconstruction of society because their primary allegiance was to children, not to private economic interests. In count's vision, teachers would lead children down the path of social reconstruction by openly admitting that all teaching was indoctrination. Once this was out in the open, the teacher could rationally select which principles would be indoctrinated into the child.

And if we ask which principles would inform the social reconstructionist program, Urban and Wagoner tell us that it meant "a commitment to equitable social, political and economic policies", more pointedly to what Counts sometimes called "collectivism". In the context of adumbrating their own purpose for their text, Tozer et. al. make clear (though in a guarded way" their connection to the origins of the foundations field.

To summarize...teachers need to recognize that problems in classroom learning are embedded in the broader social contexts. Perceptions of gender differences, racial and ethnic attitudes, school organization and culture, social class differences and prevailing ideologies are but some of the factors that teachers need to study...Failure to understand these factors invariably impairs their ability to interpret school and classroom events and consequently to construct meaningful solutions to perennial problems.

As Lawrence Cremin tells us, the origins of an institution or practice commonly leave a visible stamp upon its developing history, and we should not be surprised to find that this is also the case in the foundations field. Counts and his Columbia colleagues were writing not only in the context of the Great Depression but also in a period during which talk about progressive reform of school and society was very much alive. The title of Counts's famous lecture "Dare the Schools Build A New Social Order?" gives voice to these reformist aspirations and makes it clear that educational reform while worthy in itself was seen by him to be a penultimate objective second to the democratic reform of society. This ambition for teachers lies at the heart of the origins of the reconstructionist program. We shall see how parts of it are abandoned, dismantled and changed in the authors we are to study.

From the beginning, however, Counts proposals were challenged. The more obvious challenges: that Counts' hopes for teachers to be a revolutionary vanguard depended upon his ignoring what was known about the social backgrounds and attitudes of teachers; that teachers' unions were not likely co-revolutionaries and that his ideas were at least tinged with socialism need not detain us here. More interesting for our focus was the problem about indoctrination that John Dewey and others raised. In response to Counts proposal that educators indoctrinate for democracy and/or collectivism, Dewey responded that democracy was inconsistent with indoctrination. Counts held that some social principles were rationally and morally superior to others, but this not mean that everyone or especially the young would arrive at them in a process of open debate. Indeed, given Americans' commitment to individualism and the exigencies of the Great Depression, Counts had good reason to think that his version of equality would not be widely embraced. Part of Dewey's response was that how we arrive at a belief is at often at least as important as what we believe. Indoctrination would develop habits of intellectual servility and untoward respect for authoritarian pronouncements which habits, thought Dewey, would ill-serve us in building and sustaining a democratic society. My point is not to discover who was right in this debate, in fact both had something valuable to say. There are two points to be made here. The first is that Dewey and Counts shared the view that rational individuals would agree or ultimately agree about the principles for just and democratic social and educational arrangements (indeed there was some substantive agreement that they need to be collective). The second point is that despite this agreement an important part of the reconstructionist program, viz., the indoctrination of collectivism, was challenged from the very start.

Joel Spring: The American School

Textbooks are teaching materials and Spring explicitly makes a connection between his views on classroom teaching and the way in which he thinks history of education should be written. His purpose in writing the text, Spring tells us, is to get students to think about the history of education as part of a broader study of "ideological management" (p.1). This leads to study who controls the distribution of knowledge and skill in a given society. The importance of this is that "knowledge is power" so that control or influence over the content and methods of education effects and affects the power relations of society (p.2). In American society, says Spring, there is no czar of education who dictates what the distribution of knowledge will be, but many groups contend to influence the content and methods of education. This struggle is not an equal one however. In America some groups such as business, industry, and the federal government exert considerably more influence and control over education than ordinary citizens or racial or ethnic minorities. Spring clearly believes (though I do not find it explicitly stated in this work) that a democratic society is committed to the equitable distribution of power and hence of knowledge and if the distribution of knowledge arises in ways that are not compatible with democratic morality, then that distribution is of knowledge is unjust. Spring's teaching technique, designed to get his reader to think about knowledge, power ande democracy is to introduce to his reader at various points, conflicting interpretations so that they make up their own minds in dialogue with the text. Readers, for example, will approach the text with vague ideas and emotions about the origins and purposes of public education. Encounters with interpretations that challenge these ideas, however, will "force" students to rethink their ideas.

While these conflicting interpretations do appear at points in the book, there are large sections where Spring is not simply presenting ideas for the judgment of the reader but proffering his own views and interpretations. This is most evident in the chapters and /or sections on educational efforts toward Native Americans, African Americans and Latino-Americans. The story that is told here is of the unequal distribution of knowledge and hence power, of the struggles of these groups to achieve education and of the very mixed history of their success. In discussing education directed by the federal government toward Native Americans and Puerto Ricans Spring introduces the concept of "deculturalization" which involves the elimination or prevention of a people from passing on their culture to the young. When Native American youth were sent to boarding schools and taught in English and when English only was the policy in Puerto Rico's schools, when celebration of traditional holidays was forbedden and the American flag was flown these were all attempts to prevent the passing on of traditional cultures which were then to be supplanted by American culture and language.

De-culturalization or something quite like it is also indicted in Spring's discussion of the common school movement. The movement was designed, he indicates to ensure "that one set of cultural values remained dominant, as large groups of immigrants with differing religious and cultural values entered American life" (p.93). The centralization and bureaucratization of the schools at this time, as opposed to traditions of "democratic localism" ensured that "the dominant values of the school system would be Protestant and middle class". (ibid.)

Spring takes this theme of de-culturalization further in other sections to include the Americanization of immigrants and even the Lyndon Johnson era. Johnson's war on poverty is redescribed as a war on the culture of the people who have the misfortune to be poor. Walter Heller's plan "outlines a total package designed to uproot and destroy the environment of culture and poverty: (p. 386) and

...The approach of the 1960's was essentially to wage war on a culture. Within the theoretical framework of the War on Poverty, the social and economic system that had created poverty and allowed it to continue was not considered the problem; the problem was the culture of the poor. Indeed the overall strategy was to integrate the poor into the existing social and economic system. Very simply, this can be called blaming the victim ... They [the poor] not the economic system that had produced poverty- were expected to change (pp. 388-89)

My point about this and similar sections in Spring is not to place a disagreement. It is rather to note that here except for a two paragraph reference to the fact that Diane Ravitch disagrees with this interpretation, it can hardly be said that conflicting interpretations are present at all.

No different, in Spring's opinion, was Sesame Street. He thinks of the highly regarded television program as an ally of the War on Poverty. Arguing against the originators view of their program Spring alleges that it presents middle class comportment and culture as a model to the lower classes. Sesame Street's depiction of integrated harmonious neighborhoods and smiling bus drivers is he claims a distortion of reality. Even, Gerald Lesser, one of the program's originators admitted that some said that Sesame Street taught "minority-group children to accept quietly middle-class America's corrupt demands to subjugate themselves." (p. 338)

To what extent can we observe a significant continuity between the Social Reconstructionist program and this text authored some sixty years later? Spring resonates well with Counts in highlighting an unequal and inequitable distribution of education and hence power. The economic system of advanced capitalism is a culprit for both authors. Important parts, however, of the Counts program are noticeably absent or so weakened as to be invisible. Teachers are not invited to indoctrinate their students, and Spring is loathe to think of himself as an imposer of views, he sees himself as presenting interpretations that conflict both with one another and with the ideas teachers are likely to bring to the text. But his views are not to be imposed, they only form the occasion for a dialogue. For Spring, centralization and bureaucratization, particularly in the hands of the federal government both support upper class dominance and work against the preservation of cultures other than the dominant one. This is contrary to Counts for whom big government in itself is not to be feared, but big government which is beholden to a dominant business-industrial class. We can say that for Spring freedom from government control and from cultural imposition are weighted at least as highly as economic equality, the attack on the War of Poverty being a case in point. Noticeably weakened in Spring's text is the Counts' attempt to enlist teachers to change the society. Such ideas are at most hinted at. The purpose of the text is to arrive at a better understanding of American society (p. 3). As almost an afterthought we are told that "A comprehension of history is also essential to making critical decisions about the future" (ibid.)

Wayne Urban and Jennings Wagoner Jr. American Education: A History

Although many of the topics and literature discussed overlap with those addressed by Spring, the U & W text for social foundations courses has, as we shall se, a different feel to it. In the apparently obligatory preface about the value of history and the history of education the authors inform us that they seek to avoid the errors of the highly partisan histories that are abundant in the field. Some historians trend to see American education as a series of successes and triumphs while others see it a containing nothing but mistakes and oppression. "We find such orientations to be reductionist and worrisome" (p. xv). As U & W see it, deciding between different interpretations is not simply a matter of getting more facts or seeing some facts more clearly. Conflicting interpretations are inevitable, they feel, and when properly approached enriching. "We hold that there is no single interpretation of facts, no single story, to which all need give assent. Every history represents an attempt to "make sense" of the past from the perspective of the present." (p. xx) U & W present us with a chronological history and attempt "…to present us with a history of men and women who tried to understand and order and improve their lives and their world as best they could given their perception of the facts and fears and hopes that characterized their world" (p.xxi).

To a considerable extent U & W honor their commitment to present the facts and competing interpretations of them and to show the history of education as resulting from the efforts of groups and individuals to better their world given their constraints. Three of their twelve chapters, however, are concerned with the building of the American educational system, 1865-1929. U & W begin by indicating that they concur with many historians that the period under discussion is the time of modernization, and that "modernization is a governing explanatory concept in this and the next two chapters" (p. 158). Modernization theory in history along with its constant companion functionalist sociology are well known though controversial explanatory schemes that have been at the center of academic debates in history of education as well as other fields. At a minimum modernization theory posits a contrast between traditional and modern societies (though some versions have intermediate stages). Industrialization is seen as what transforms a society from traditional to modern and the model for understanding a modern society is based on an analogy with biological organisms. Theorists like Parsons and Merton suggest that we view the various institutions of society such as its economy, political system, marriage system and educational arrangements as parts of a whole working more or less harmoniously for the survival of the organism which is society. Unlike biological organism, societies change and technological advance drives these changes. Education is seen as providing manpower for the economic system, changes in the educational system will mirror the need for new intellectual skills and personality traits as these become required by the work place. Modernization theory, however, is more than a description of modern society, it is to a considerable extent a celebration of it. The meritocratic structure of modern societies inclines modern societies to be more just, humane, egalitarian, democratic and efficient than their traditional predecessors. The very processes of centralization and bureaucratization seen in Spring to restrict local freedom and cultural autonomy are seen by advocates of modernization theory as expanding opportunity and broadening life change.

Now this theory is not fully adumbrated in U & W. Nonetheless they acknowledge its centrality and one can see that it and its most important contentions are operative in their discussion of the growth and maturation of the educational system. In truth U & W's discussion of the building of the educational system strives to be balanced, it presents flaws, oversights and limitations along with advances and achievements. Government involvement in education through compulsory education laws and the Morrill Act opened up opportunities for people, but the "one best system" that Tyack describes over-emphasized order and regimentation and the opportunities of the educational system were far from equal for all and for some not at all. Centralization and the new school managers removed the schools from the old ward politics but reduced teacher autonomy and gave control to the business and industrial classes as well as the class of new "professional managers". The new high school with its differentiated curriculum provided vocational training that was desired by the working class while at the same time denying broader opportunity. In their final judgment, with all their qualifications, U & W pass judgment on the mature system of the late 1920's. They do so partially through a discussion of the urban education system of Detroit, Michigan, which they admit was probably more successful that most. Despite the "shadow" of the shabby treatment of African-Americans and other minorities "... one is still left with a 1920's legacy of a modernized [my emphasis] public school that could enumerate many accomplishments ... most visible in the nation's largest cities."

There is one other point where I find lacking the authors' professed balance and that is in the final chapter where among the developments of the 1980's and 1990's U & W review the immense growth of home schooling. The growth spurt of home schooling they attribute to the Christian right and its uncompromising demand that their children be educated in a Christian atmosphere. U & W comment:

> Their [the parents] certainty that they know what is best for their children motivated them to remove the children form an extrafamilial...setting, public or private. This parental fear of outside contact with people who look at the world through different eyes is cause for deep concern about the fate of their children. (p.322)

While such a passionate judgment fairly cries out for a rejoinder, my point is that the overwhelming majority of home schoolers can not afford private schools; what they reject and what U & W know they reject is public education. Our society may be in danger, they think, if public education is no longer capable of sustaining the secular world view which is necessary for progress and goes hand in hand with modernization. The idea that parents do know what is best for their children which U & W find surprising and even abhorrent is a cousin of the idea of democratic localism which opposed the building of the educational system and worried about degreed experts who know better than parents how the parents' children should be raised. Apparently home-schooling has pressed the right button to reveal that U & W are not forever neutral and are deeply if qualifiedly committed to the general direction in which American society and American schooling have developed.

In this respect they can be seen to have all but abandoned the major tenets of the social reconstructionist school. Rather than being fundamentally unjust and oppressive American society is for all its faults basically sound and the schools with all their mixed record have been a crucial factor for progress. Reform aplenty, think U & W, may be needed, but not the structural reforms Counts and colleagues envision. Perhaps the reform they envision as necessary will come in the form of policy which tinkers with but does not destroy the achievements of the system, a new and improved, and yes, softer and gentler, social engineering. In any event, from U & W's perspective, who's to say that Counts' interpretation of American history is an better than other less critical ones? Endless debates for the last twenty years between revisionist and functionalist historians of education are testimony that questions of historical interpretation like questions of social theory can not be rationally or empirically resolved. Relativism, not only of the cultural but of the cognitive variety needs to be acknowledged. George counts might believe that he was telling the only true story about American education, but people coming to maturity in the 1960's know better than to have such confidence in their own or anyone else's interpretations. Better, after all, think U & W, to do one's job, to man one's station. And U & W, like the rest of us, are inheritors of multiple influences, traditions and social theories. While they cannot see the point of what they are doing in terms that derive from Social Reconstructionism they can find a point in what they are doing that derives from the guild of professional historians. Within the social foundations field there was indeed a time when this conception animated the writing and teaching of historians of education. This period in fact corresponded with the period of dominance of analytic philosophy in the philosophy of education where both philosophers and historians saw themselves as removed from ideological struggle and involved in the "scientific" pursuit of objective truth.

There is a social and institutional history of the social foundations field and its purposes and an intellectual or philosophical history of the foundations field. In the social and institutional history we look to changes in the internal and external factors that impinge upon departments and professors of social foundations and show how various emphases in the foundations field occupy a position of dominance without, however, fully banishing or destroying their opposition. During the analytic period of philosophy of education, for example, the social reform ideals of Counts, Dewey and others are marginalized but survive both in some thinkers and in subterranean ways within the philosophical analysis of educational concepts such as teaching and indoctrination. The intellectual or philosophical history chronicles and judges the arguments and reasons that move professors and departments to alter their understanding of what they and their field are doing. While the succeeding re-definitions can score points against their competitors, none is actually without resources to respond. At a highly general level of description agreement can be found, this is seen in reflecting that all of Spring, Urban and Wagoner and Tozer et. al. could agree with Beadle's general description of what foundations is about. Description at this level, however, is insufficient to distinguish the participants in the ongoing argument about what the telos of social foundations is. In terms of a concrete vision of what social foundations is about we have to begin with social reconstruction and the social reform program of Counts along with the Dewey-Counts debate about indoctrination and its inclination to rank equality above freedom. Over the years every part of this initial program is subjected to criticism. Some, like Spring, will rank freedom or cultural autonomy higher than equality. Other like urban and Wagoner will not agree with the substantive judgment that all things considered American society is unjust and need radical surgery, which is of course, just what reconstruction is. We thus find within the social foundations field writers and teachers who share almost none of the original impetus for the field and also those who lack important elements of it. Social reconstructionism however, is not without its responses and even its advocates in the neo-reconstructionist form advocated by Tozer et al. Nothing rationally forces them to agree with Spring that individual rights and freedom rank higher than equality, they can with equanimity endorse Bigelow's invasion of children's privacy. They can admit, as Counts and Dewey did, that democratizing one's classroom is only a small step toward the reform of the injustice of the larger society but insist that a new non-union organization of teachers can lead through modest steps such as democratic school governance and reflective praxis to long run changes to the reform of society.

When Spring all but abandons the social reform program of social foundations, he may be criticized for holding radical views that he acknowledges cannot become social realities. From this perspective he appears guilty of what Roger Kimball and Christopher Lasch call "radical posturing", making pronouncements and endorsing ideals that have no possibility of being imbedded in actual institutions and practices. Sprint, however, is not without a response. As he argues at the end of TAS, given the centralized system which we have created, multiple groups and interests will contest to control the distribution of knowledge in our society, some of them progressive and some not. In the reality of life of the system, everybody needs to be willing to compromise, to get some but not all of what he wants. He makes his peace with the system as follows:

> Some of the educational initiatives of the 1980's were characterized by a singleness of purpose. Whether coming from the conservative Christians, free marketers...or advocates of multicultural education, reformers exhibited an...certainty ...None of these groups saw any merit in a moderate or compromise solution...where they might have to give a little in order to achieve a portion...of their objective. If this type of thinking were to gain more of a foothold in educational affairs, the prospects of a strong public education system are diminished. The complex history of the public schools...shows that...they have served a multiplicity of purposes and agendas...the public school, if it is to survive, will have to find a way to be responsive to more than one group...Achieving such a result is not an easy task, yet it is the task of citizens, teachers and the school administrators in our time. (p. 350)

Nor is there any way of rationally compelling Urban and Wagoner to abandon their functionalist/modernization framework. This should be clear from the history of the inconclusive debates between neo-Marxists and functionalists in the 1970's. Bowles and Gintis and Feinberg and Soltis after them remarked that the functionalists and new-Marxists do not necessarily disagree about the major facts, but their evaluation of those facts proceeds form very different ideals of society, justice, equality and democracy. Even given the battery of critiques of modernization and functionalism, the assaults on meritocracy as either ideal or reality, on human capital theory, on the upgrading of skills thesis, functionalists like Lawrence Cremin, Diane Ravitch and Urban and Wagoner after them can simply weigh the criticisms on balance as not sufficient to over-ride the extensions of opportunity both real and potential found and to be found in the past and future history of American education. They can say with Arthur Schlesigner that the promises of full political, economic and social participation in America have sometimes been kept belatedly and sometimes not yet but the record does not reveal that they remained or will remain empty and false promises.

If Urban and Wagoner do not endorse the social reform activism of the social reconstructionists and conceive themselves as responsible practitioners of the craft of professional history, they may fairly be asked what is the good of that craft or practice? In order to answer that question they need to say more about the goods internal to the practice of historical scholarship and to embed the practice in a larger narrative showing how university scholarship contributes to a vision of the good for society and for man. Functionalism can do this but not in a way that compels assent from either Spring or the neo-reconstructionists.

My conclusion is that in this ongoing debate about the purposes and proper conduct of social foundations there can be no winner. We are in fact the inheritors of multiple traditions about who we are and what we are about. It is possible to explain how time-bound exigencies raise one or another 'framing' of our purposes to temporary dominance, but the philosophical history of the social foundations field does not reveal any ultimate winners. The debates between advocates of the competing conceptions are inconclusive and given the competing conceptions of justice, and the lack of agreed weighting to be given to considerations such as freedom and equality they are likely to be interminable. This means that whatever practical savvy attaches to Ms. Beadle's proposals to re-frame the purpose of social foundation for "rhetorical" reasons, that we are very unlikely to achieve rational consensus on the meaning and value of our collective and individual efforts. That this is probably true about the purposes of colleges of education and universities generally is small consolation, but not the topic for this writing.

Popular Culture and the Philosophy of John Dewey

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I. WHO WAS JOHN DEWEY?

John Dewey was a philosopher and cultural critic of some renown, who lived through an enormous and rich span of early contemporary history—the years 1859-1952. The leading British philosopher at the time, Bertrand Russell, aptly called him the "leading living philosopher of America" (Russell 1961, 774). Dewey grew up and with America. He taught public school in Pennsylvania and Vermont, received his doctorate from Hopkins and taught at the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, and for twenty-six years at Columbia University. Known widely as the "father" of modern education, Dewey promoted and participated in many of our current critical institutions including the American Association of University Professors (which he founded), the American Philosophical Association, the Teacher's Union, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Dedicated to a "pragmatic" marriage of critical thought, public speaking and action, Dewey pioneered new movements in education and defended many public figures including Russell when the City University of New York refused to hire him due to his philosophical views. All the while, Dewey shares a quintessentially American philosophical perspective with several classical and contemporary thinkers called Pragmatism.

II. WHAT IS PRAGMATISM?

We often think of Pragmatism, or Deweyan pragmatism at least, as the philosophy dedicated to the principle "whatever works rules." Yet the "cash-value" conception such a principle implies is inadequate. It is inadequate because we can only begin to think of the plethora of things that work and ways of working. Intellectual fallibility gives all good moral philosophy a pause, not least of all pragmatism. The values we pursue are the "I know not what, yet." In this spirit, pragmatism might well be said to pursue a method rather than an end, to prefer the scientist's descriptive detachment to the moralizers prescriptive attachment and to favor whatever gives the 'right' results for the organism given its problematic situation.

Hence, we may better describe and critique pragmatism negatively, in terms of what it is not, and procedurally in terms of what it does, instead of positively in terms of the goal(s) for which it aims. Pragmatism has no faith in logically prior objects whether "cats," "television sets," or "quarks"; it does not hold the one complete and accurate picture of the world and the human theoretical space within it; it does not apply steady, direct, and individual "universal" principle to individual problem. In short, it is not like most of the philosophies before it. It is, instead, often quite fuzzy, provisional, indirect, experimentative, and social as befits the select group of Americans who bore it. Deweyan pragmatism pursues no final ends only "ends in view." It extols no individuals without society and culture, but tries to discover them situated within society and culture. It appeals to no universal, timeless, absolute, or *apriori* truths, but only to contingent, provisional, empirical or experimental, but nonetheless objective, truths. Pragmatism is the philosophy of experienced reality, by experienced reality and for experienced reality. "Practice is primary in philosophy," urges Dewey. Our highest metaphysical abstractions are useless, ergo groundless, if they do not, somehow, find their way back to nourishing the fertile loam of social reality from which they sprang.

All the while pragmatism sees the "live creature" as having a single but not solitary objective: to transact[1] symbiotically between itself and the rest of nature through its peculiar mode of existence: experience or culture (Dewey EN, 1-36; AE, 3-19; see also Heidegger 1962, 78-90 [2]).

III. What is Popular Culture (according to pragmatism)?

The term "popular" in "Popular Culture" seems derogatory, as if there where an "A" and a "B" culture, as there are "A" and "B" movies. However, I believe the term, literally, only means "new" with a connotation of "mass-approved." Naturally, much of what is "new" or "mass-approved" pales before the "tried and true." Some of what is "new" and "mass-approved" improves what it supplants. This is just to say that popular culture persists at the finely protruded edge of the cutting room—the *avante guarde*, separating the wheat more or less efficiently from the chaff. It excites us for all its revolutionary newness and all its pregnancy of promise and it cloys our palate with its sensationalism.

For example, I know some may find it difficult to describe a scantily clad seventeen year old Brittany Spears as "promising," and few want to see her pregnant (yet). But, metaphorically speaking, she is both pregnant and promising to a million screaming teenagers who (in their minds) can't be wrong. Meanwhile M.C. Hammer becomes a famous example of how to dance oneself into oblivion. The point is that Dewey would reject a theoretical split between popular and nonpopular culture as between private and public, aesthetic experience and ordinary life, art and everyday objects, individual and society, and creation and appreciation (Stuhr 2000, 441), but he wasn't oblivious to good and bad. Perhaps Dewey would prefer a distinction between live and dead culture. For, he would be the first to denounce cultural products he thought harmed his own core values, particularly his primary value, that of human intellectual and moral growth within a community or democracy.

IV. WHAT DID DEWEY HAVE TO SAY ABOUT CULTURE?

Growth, or new and added experience, forms the leitmotiv of Dewey's critique of culture. It founds the four main areas of his critique: education, politics, individualization, and art. In each of these areas, Dewey develops a radical conception from a standard insight. Educationally the standard insight is that the world's future depends on its young. Dewey remarks that it also depends on adults of all ages acquiring and maintaining conditions of "plasticity"—that is, habits of learning, of learning to learn (DE 54). Politically, it is obvious that human cultural freedom depends largely on kinds of political institutions. Dewey replies that free political institutions depend on cultural practices, "of the arts, fine and technological; of friendship and family life; of business and finance; of the attitudes and dispositions created in the give and take of ordinary day to day associations" (FC 13). Again, surely, each individual considers her interests and aggrandizements to be especially important if not primary amongst possible interests. But, according to Dewey, the individual good develops out of the social good, "the power of the few is, with respect to genuine individuality, specious" (ION 51). We need to realize the "harmonious relationship between…real self interest and the social good" (EOD 242, quoted in Westbrook 41). Finally, everyone agrees that art expresses a society's collective values serving as "insignia of taste and certificates of special culture" (AE 9). Dewey's insight is that art forms a sort of conceptual or transactional battery without which organisms (most particularly the human organism) can't survive: "Only when an organism shares in the ordered relations of its environment does it secure the stability essential to living. And when the participation comes after a phase of disruption and conflict, it bears within itself the germs of consummation akin to the esthetic" (AE 15).

V. MY ARGUMENT

This essay will say just a word about each of these areas in relation to popular culture. We should grant that these four areas interconnect almost seamlessly. For example, I had thought of leaving out art and simply focusing on Dewey's views of education, politics, and individualization. The social and political preconditions for the human animal to work her cultural magic interest me most. What does art have to do with that? Especially given the popular view that a discussion of art should multiply endless examples and authorities? Yet, I came to realize that leaving art out would be decidedly unDeweyan. Leaving art out would give too much to the view that art can or should really be left out of a discussion of popular culture. According to Dewey, we cannot leave art out because he means by art simply experience with quality and cultural immediacy with power in a given social life. There can be no cultural magic without artistic magic.

However, despite this interconnectedness, I will give some discrete form to the argumentative part of this essay. I first focus on the conditions of true growth within education which I think have very much to do with what forms of popular culture to bring in and what to bar from the classroom. The question of what to bring in and what to bar can only be decided with cultural norms that have very much to do with a country's politics. Here, Dewey offers us freedom and democracy as, somehow, the primitive conditions of really being an individual within a community. Democracy, he argues, should be every country's politics.

But, I tend to cavil, if not disagree. I, then, level the traditional Platonic charge of tyranny of the majority against Dewey, and see whether his view about what seems to be a kind of democratic human nature stands up. I think it does but the argument shows that Dewey retains an element of faith in democracy that he would otherwise be at pains to disavow. We can alleviate but not dismiss Dewey's resort to faith or optimism by reflecting on a Kantian tradition. Specifically, I think he needs the "do not treat others as means" formulation of the categorical imperative at the very same time that he must reject the whole "act only on what you can will to be a universal law" formulation. If I had to wrap it all up in a sentence, I would say: Dewey replaces the Kantian categories with the world of culture, or society, popular or otherwise. Or, so I will attempt to show.

A. EDUCATION

In one respect, beginning an essay concerning popular culture on the rather dull subject of education seems strange. I speak of the popular belief amongst harried professors and students that popular culture is what "cool" students do after school and "good" professors prevent from happening during.

In a more important respect, it does not take kids killing kids on the playgrounds of America, or suicides over poor test scores, to make us realize that western society, and kids themselves, bear a an intense, vested, interest in a certain model of education. That kids (and many adults) protest too much against it shows that education has become our number one passion. Like any overwhelming passion, modern education also betrays our own essential insecurities. On this model education is a means to be an end: it will get you a job and make you somebody. And, what could be more "popular" than that? However, in the game of getting jobs and being somebody, as we all know, there are no ends, only better, worse, and sometimes revolutions.

In this respect, Dewey warns society not to separate or categorize types or kinds of experience into popular and unpopular classes, and not to hegemonize any particular end such as getting a paper diploma. That "Crue is cool"[3] but not in school only shows the stultified and decaying nature of modern educational practice *vis. a vis.* contemporary social life. The zeal that students have for jumping through hoops, regardless of where they will land, only shows how little they are actually learning and, rather, how much they ~~are~~ caring, instead, for appearances. Dewey saw education "naturalistically" as a necessity for all living beings from the amoebae on up. "Life," a "self renewing process through action upon the environment," "denote[s] the whole range of experience, individual and racial" (DE 2). Meanwhile education is the "means of this social continuity of life" (DE 3).

Most people think of education as a kind of indoctrinating activity, and there is no doubt that in a complex civil society where the mimicry of play no longer suffices for enculturation, that education is a kind of indoctrination. However, education consists in much more than a continuous data stream from older to younger. First, education "happens" any place where there is experience, or communication from the environment or others. "Nor, [secondly], is the one who communicates left unaffected." The educative process forces the educator as much as the artist to focus his or her energies into seeing their interpretation, as it were, in the eyes of the one communicated to. This is to say that art subjects the creator to his "media" as sure as any audience. In this sense we should follow Nietzsche's advice and be careful when staring into the abyss, lest it stare back into us.

This concept of reciprocity tempts us to apply our scruples negatively to all kinds of contemporary "artistic" phenomenon from toilet seats and overturned crucifixes as art works to the misogynistic and homophobic rap lyrics of Eminem. We would like a Deweyan critique to decry what we do not like. Yet, we must first figure out how we can be sure that what we do not like is not part of the reconstruction. For all we know our own efforts could support the persistent and dogmatic problem.

That dogmatic problem, Dewey notes, often persists in schools. However, "schools" are only "one means [of education], and, compared to other agencies, a relatively superficial means. Only as we have grasped the necessity of more fundamental and persistent modes of tuition can we make sure of placing the scholastic methods in their true context" (DE 5). On the one hand, education has as much to learn from culture, which can enliven experience enough to obtain the name of "popular," in both style and substance. Popular culture as a mode of education holds out the promise of showing us where the more common "instantiated" educational processes and establishments have become stultified and unmoving. "Only when it [communication, experience] becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine way does it lose its educative power" (DE 7).

On the other hand, the problem or difficulty in the question of "what" actually should be taught and what selected as "good" from popular culture remains. For, the educationally good is not *whatever* "floats" your student's "boat." Nor does sheer amount of experience amount to quality of experience. Dewey clues us in that the proper kind of experience must be "educative"—that is, conditioned to the problems and challenges an individual or organism faces in an environment. I tend to think that we can never answer "what" should be taught by education, or "which" aspects of popular culture we should select for examination with anything better than the answer "whatever seem most useful for our projects." Hence, whatever is useful will bear the mark of whatever a given society will tolerate as useful. And if the useful bears the mark of society's toleration, we must then look to what might truly constitute a society capable of authority in such matters.

On the other hand, Dewey thought that certain large ideals such as freedom and curiosity would pertain and count as criteria for evaluating experience and for answering such questions as "what should be taught." He also thought that these values could only be values in a state that was appropriately democratic. I turn to these considerations next.

B. POLITICS

So, how do freedom and curiosity pertain and count as criteria for evaluating experience? To answer this we must, surely, look to what Dewey saw as the role of the political body. It is evident that Dewey thought living together enjoined certain responsibilities, and living together in larger and more complex societies even more so. However, Dewey's injunctions seem to go well beyond discussions of what rights we must lay down as our part of the social contract (Hobbes). They go even beyond present day discussions of the responsibilities of businesses, which exist as persons "in contemplation of the law."

Dewey required a lot more of a member of the body politic than his acquiescence:

> To set up as protector of a shrinking classicism requires only the accidents of a learned education, the possession of leisure and a reasonably apt memory for some phrases, and a facile pen for others. To transmute a society built on an industry which is not yet humanized into a society which wields its knowledge and its industrial power on behalf of a democratic culture requires the courage of an inspired imagination (Dewey MW 10: 198, quoted in Stuhr 2000, 440).

The problem is that most of us fail to live up to such duties, even in our day. Instead, we rest on our laurels. Failing to respond to cultural change, we invent a host of arbitrary dichotomies between public and private, individual and society in order to prop up a tired host of specialized disciplines dedicated to internal admiration and external segregation. How difficult it is to hear nature's clarion cry of "grow, change, and adapt!" with the intelligence Dewey called for.

However, Dewey says we shouldn't blame ourselves entirely—that we have been subject to a kind of mass confusion—a tower of Babel. It is well known that modern society has created a welter of "signs and symbols" spewing forth in mass profusion from the internet, the mail, the television, the telephone, and not least of all politician's speeches. What can a poor inquirer to do amidst this barrage? How do we cut through the confusion? Dewey's solution may seem a bit strange, hackneyed or even New Agey. Yet, in the end, something like it seems the only plausible alternative. We must "get back to nature"—that is, back to certain natural conditions that form the preconditions of human growth, inquiry, and interaction. We find these conditions not in the forest, the cave, or the modern commune, but in paying serious attention to democracy's and community's real meaning. Through our dedication to these twin ideals we search for the "Great Community": "the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests" (PAIP 146). Such attention to the important dissolves our communication problems.

Personally, I find Dewey's conception of the 'Great Community' overly optimistic. I think we will always find ways to fail to communicate. However, Dewey may, surely, be right that the search for the great community may always afford better communication. So, it seems worth pursuing on those grounds, at least. However, there is another more important objection to Dewey's project—that is, that it is too liberal or "Kantian." I mean by "Kantian" a form of *aprioristic* argument for *sin qua nons* of human experience, or in Dewey's case human flourishing, meant to provide us with ideals and corresponding duties to achieve them. Dewey seems to answer that a poor inquirer cuts through the confusion by simply furthering the conditions and institutions that favor inquiry. Physician, heal thyself. Dewey lets an incredible sense of faith or optimism loose upon the attainment of social ends. Of course, Kant thought human nature more limited or depraved than Dewey, so he, ultimately, supplicated the divine or, at least, the "transcendental." Absent the divine and the transcendental, Dewey substitutes "society" and social ends. I find the change of Gods no less suspect and shocking.

To see why, let us briefly visit the other, more conservative, side. Today libertarians and such liberals battle it out over the doctrine of state's rights, as seen for example in the Florida election debacle. The Supreme Court inclined to let Florida handle its own election issues up until the last moment when no time for a decision remained.[4] As in the film *Erin Brokovich,* the public also importunes business to be more responsible. There is a strong impulse just to go behind the back of democracy to attain these ends. A long tradition from Plato, DeToqueville, to the framers of the Constitution, although they decried Machiavellian subterfuge, worried that democracy unrestrained merely paved the way for majority tyranny. For Plato, democracy is hardly a natural condition at all. Plato "placed the actual forms of constitution of Greek city-states upon a moral scale, so that even if we cannot have the ideal, we know that timocracy (traditional Sparta) is best, oligarchy (Corinth) and democracy (Athens) worse, and tyranny (Syracuse) worst of all" (MacIntyre 1996, 46).

Like Plato, Dewey thinks that politics should provide the conditions for fully functioning human nature to attain its highest ends. Individual personality types are very important in each author's works, so much so that Dewey would go so far as to maintain that a type of character corresponds to a type of constitution. That's what it means for a political constitution to create a type of character by enculturating citizens into its framework of habits. Both men similarly believed that the ideal state was an "ideal" in the Greek sense of "final end" which is never actually attained but to which all things aim.[5] Simultaneously community and democracy become for Dewey both the end of human action and the means of attaining it. Dewey believed that "the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy" (PAIP 146). Why, then, did Plato insist that timocracy was best and democracy next to worst? And, why should we side, instead, with Dewey?

Of course Plato had the death of Socrates, the ostracism of Themistocles, and the invasion of Sicily (which sparked the end of the Athenian empire) to consider. We have public vilifications and ostracisms no less notorious in our age. Yet, Dewey seems to think he has escaped Plato's problem altogether. He writes: "democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself"(PAIP 148). Democracy "is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (DE 101). There are no other serious contenders. Community is democracy as actually instantiated "free from disturbing elements." In a community there is "conjoint activity" which everyone "appreciates."

Dewey dismisses Plato too handily. The problem with Plato, writes Dewey, was that his vision of individual human endowments was largely limited by his (undemocratic) society. "Plato never got any conception of the infinite plurality of activities which may characterize an individual and social group and consequently limited his view to a limited number of classes of capacities and of social arrangements" (DE 102). No doubt Dewey's charge is compelling: individuals can be a lot more complex and creatively endowed than the silver, bronze and gold souls suggested by Plato's noble lie. Yet, the admission does not immediately help Dewey's position. More abilities and interests mean more abilities and interests quashed by the clashing interests of the majority.

Dewey also argues that Plato organizes society around "knowledge of the ends of existence." Since, for Plato, reality itself was unchangeable, without flux, he sought to "construct a state in which change would have no place" (DE 105). The requisite knowledge to do so, though obviously lacking in the *hoi polloi* was present, at least in outline, to the philosopher King. Of course, without such given "ends of existence," no "true," external, basis for organizing and stratifying society prevailed. But, why should we need to tell the truth? Dewey does appear to miss Plato's (and Neitzsche's) emphasis on untruth.

Surely, Plato's "noble lie," was "noble" because it represented an ineluctable, merely human, attempt at the actual divine truth. We must, perforce, fall short of knowledge of the actual forms. However, one can ask, as does Nietzsche, why not untruth all together? Or, perhaps, we can still have worse, but yet serviceable approximations? Why not *force* people into line, surely it cures them of the endless wondering and wandering in their lives?

Such suggestions provoke and appall democratic and egalitarian ears. But, seriously, we must respond to them. And, again, it seems that Dewey offers us nothing more than a certain kind of "faith" in the democratic process (Westbrook 1991, xii).[8] For, he seems to contradict himself when he argues that on a pragmatic level "the practical consequence of giving the few wise and good power …is that they cease to remain wise and good" (Dewey EOD 242, quoted in Westbrook 42). I find this answer curious because, on the assumption of absolute power (or, alternatively the absence of a fixed nature of reality or "ends"), what is wise and good is just what the powerful decide to do. The answer must involve being able to define "wise and good" without relying on fixed ends or realities. And, Dewey isn't quite clear on how to do that.

Again, I see Dewey's plausible response as derived from Enlightenment Kantianism that treats everyone as an end and not merely as a means. An individual wills this version of the "categorical imperative" because she can expect to be treated no better than she treats others (the golden rule). Dewey certainly could use the golden rule, and ultimately, I think he does (he certainly was one of a very few of the early readers of Kant in this country). His route to Kantianism just appears to us circuitous because he does not want to talk of "categorical" anythings. Yet, individuals and their "rights" are crucial to Dewey's understanding of democracy. Dewey writes "In the degree in which society has become democratic, social organization means utilization of the specific and variable qualities of individuals, not stratification by classes" (DE 105).

Dewey compares favorably with Kant in other ways. Each apparently believe that, like Christ, the God of love, community requires our hearts and physical enactments and not simply our minds. Kant calls this respect for the good will, rather than "inclination." For Dewey, the democratic "ideal" requires reciprocity of interest and sometimes sublimation of personal interest:

> The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of

> class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity (DE 101).

Further, Kant thought that dedication to community might require us to reanalyze self and self-interest on the basis of what seem like *apriori* conditions for human experience. Dewey seems to require similar *apriori* conditions for human flourishing, agreeing with Kant in spirit if not in letter. No doubt we should be prepared to sacrifice certain self interests perceived on the basis of other unworkable models,[7] interests such as those we have when we think we object to the tyranny of the majority.

Hence, Dewey provides a curious, though not ineffective, argument. He means to say that it only appears that the individual may object to the community will. But, objection to community or democracy must base itself in a mistaken model of community or democracy. Dewey ultimately dissolves the individual into her social roots. He writes that it only looked as if the entire enlightenment heritage was trying to abstract itself into pure reason: "Men were not actually engaged in the absurdity of striving to be free from connection with nature and one another. They were striving for greater freedom *in* nature and society" (DE 343). What, then, becomes of the individual in Dewey's strange kingdom of ends?

C. The Individual

Dewey seems to say that Plato had the psychology wrong: it simply is the case that "To learn to be human is to develop through the give and take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community" (PAIP 154). This makes the soul neither tripartite nor "divine" with reason chastening spirit and appetite. It is probably wrong, here, even to speak of an individual soul, Dewey's account only provides the "sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community." Dewey prioritizes the community because it constructs individuals socially. He makes of human beings congeries of habits; and, habits "the mainstream of human action, ...are formed for the most part under the influence of the customs of a group" (PAIP 159). He answers that there is no tyranny of the majority to speak of, only community life as usual.

Dewey's faith in democracy compares quite well with the optimism shared by critics of Cartesian hyperbolic doubt. They say of Cartesian hyperbolic doubt, that you can't doubt "everything." You must make an assumption (unwarranted on the conditions of doubting everything) before you can even launch the project. In Dewey's case, the assumption that you must make against democracy is just the sort of assumption that you cannot make against democracy. You must assume that there is some non-community, non-democratic conception from which to challenge democracy. But, none exists. Objections such as "tyranny of the majority" prove as fanciful as objections such as "I could be dreaming." Dewey attempts to put "democrascepticism" in the dustbin alongside Cartesian.

Yet, we may still want to resist. And, the famous examples of resistance in our culture, instructively, outnumber the examples of nonresistance. Who wants to hear about situation normal? I think, for example, of Madonna's rather "sexy" videos, the "art" of Marcel Duchamp, the novels of Bataille, or strangely enough, even the novels of Ayn Rand. Amongst this litany, what makes one a revolutionary and another a mere whiner?

I bring up Rand, because people often think that rebellion somehow persists on a liberal edge, but she is a good example how equally persists on the conservative. Rebellion persists on any edge. Rand, as you may know, championed such *avante guarde* values as honesty, integrity, limited government, and laissez-faire capitalism. She is, in many ways, the anti-Dewey. Yet, all the same, although Dewey often talks about the individual in the abstract, he means to talk about you and me in particular regardless of our allegiances. For you and me, there is no escape from the inner wars we face as culture continues to inundate our senses and demand from us. There is a sense in which if you simply refuse to read the lurid novels or watch the risqué videos you simply change the level at which you want to judge things lurid or risqué. Foucault pointed this out about sex. He felt that if conditions of excitement, essentially taboo conditions, do not exist, we would be forced to create them. The old saw that men once became excited at the sight of women's ankles attests for this. However, the point is that the problem of good or bad, hence of revolutionary or whiner, will persist whether in Afghanistan or in the Netherlands. To say which society is more "justified" Afghan or Dutch is a separate question. You might say that the individualization of its members poses the quintessential problem for any social or value system.

In Dewey's time others also rejected his characterization of us as mere "social" animals. In his famous "power" criticisms of Dewey, Russell quotes Santayana: "In Dewey, as in current science and ethics, there is a pervasive quasi-Hegelian tendency to dissolve the individual into his social functions, as well as everything substantial and actual into something relative and transitory" (Russell 1961, pg). Surely, Russell wants a sense of the individual and much else wrestled from the grasp of Dewey's "Hegelian bacillus." It is unfortunate that much of Russellian "analytic" philosophy became tethered to "truth conditions" and "atomic givens" as well as atomized individuals. Dewey is quite right to dismiss the current concept of an individual with "privileged" access to her own mental states that calls itself to day the "philosophy of mind":

> The conception of mind as a purely isolated possession of the self is at the very antipodes of the truth. The self *achieves* mind in the degree in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life about him; the self is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account (DE 344).

In opposition to Russell and his "analytic" philosophy (and its descendents) Dewey wants to argue a very strong notion of the individual as socialized in practice. At the very same time, he seems to want to have his cake and eat it to. Dewey himself retains a very strong notion of the individual. After all, he "would not be an individual unless there was something incommensurable about him" (DE 142).

But, which is it? Dewey seems to say, paradoxically, that what is distinctive about an individual are her group connections, her culture! An individual becomes an individual as far as she is a part of a group. At the same time, he castigates particular forms or kinds of such group associations, particularly that most familiar to us—American culture.

> The United States has steadily moved from an earlier pioneer individualism to a condition of dominant corporateness. ...Associations tightly or loosely organized more and more define the opportunities, the choices and the actions of individuals (ION 36).

So, the individual is almost entirely, but not absolutely a product of her culture, (associations, upbringing) and some cultures are better than others. All well and good. But, which cultures and why? There seems to be no criterial answer. No answer that stands out as "the" answer for all times and places. One might say that this is where reason leaves off and practicality and historicity take over. *The "best" culture (and by all means getting to it is a gradual affair) is the one which best handles itself given its own practices, pronounced ideals, natural conditions and calamities and so on. Or, at least it is the culture that we can argue best handles itself based on scientific scrutiny.*

So, in this argumentative, philosophical, intersubjective morass what is the poor developing individual to do? No one is born sufficiently philosophical even to attempt to formulate answers. How does an individual ever get to be philosophical? Although he bases his answer on what he sees as scientific method, Dewey suggests only two possible expedients: first, provide a theoretical description about how young children and adults actually develop; second, provide some philosophical therapy for the rest of us. He essentially points out that any time you think you are bucking or flailing in your culture you are not alone. If you think you are alone, it is only because you fail to see the bucking and flailing part of culture you represent. There is no strong, absolute, or "criterial" answer as to matters of individual development, any commandments written in stone by another hand, because the problematic situations keep on changing. There are only the answers that serve to widen or enliven experience. Our role is to muddle along as best we can.

Dewey is curiously sanguine that whatever enlivens or widens experience in a developmental sense, hence what resolves a "problematic situation" or "works," is, by definition, moral. We, given the situations we face, define what is moral for those contexts. The change "that would issue from carrying over experimental method from physics to man concerns the import of standard, principle, rules" (QFC 256). Of course standard, principle, and rule in science are not just anything one can dream up, but they are essentially "instrumental" that is valid and useful only for particular ends in view, and not in some absolute, contextless sense. Once the transition or "carrying over" from scientific method to ethics is effected, scarcely more can be said:

> The nature in detail of the revolution that would be wrought by carrying into the region of values the principle now embodied in scientific practice cannot be told; to attempt it would be to violate the fundamental idea that we know only after we have acted and in consequences of the outcome of action (QFC 256).

IV. ART, AND CONCLUSION

In his discussion of art, Dewey says a few words about the mis-separation of so called "art works" from their everyday roles:

> In common conception, the work of art is often identified with the building, book, painting or statue, in its existence apart from human experience....The actual work of art is what the product does with and in experience...the human conditions under which it was brought into being and...the human consequences it engenders in actual life experience (AE 3).

So, too, I began my discussion. I suggested that there is no theoretical split or dichotomy between popular and nonpopular culture as there is none between private and public, individual and society and so on. On this much, Dewey and I agree.

Dewey, however, continues his discussion with his concept of the "live animal," not with the individual or the culture fully formed as was Athena from the head of Zeus, but with something seemingly more simple and innocuous. Yet, I am skeptical that any discussion, however, detailed and interesting of the human biological pedigree is going to answer the central questions: what should I learn? Why democracy rather than tyranny? How can the individual rebel? What is good or bad, in art, society, culture and so forth? I began instead by suggesting four highly interrelated areas essential to what I call Dewey's "critique of culture." In a sense, then, I began the other way round. I think the temptation, otherwise, is to fall prey to a kind of genetic fallacy: that fallacy that says that because you grew up that way, you must still be that way.

For example Dewey writes of essentially three things in his discussion of art: the live creature, its environment, and its experience. He seems almost immediately forced to argue that some of the experience undergone by the live creature is "good," and some "bad." When experience is good it is the "the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication" (AE 22). When experience is bad, it is because we have stultified it:

> Since sense organs with their connected motor apparatus are the means of this participation [in the environment], any and every derogation of them, whether practical or theoretical, is at once effect and cause of a narrowed and dull life experience. Oppositions of mind and body, soul and matter, spirit and flesh all have their origin, fundamentally, in fear of what life may bring forth (AE, 22).

Experience connects with art because "art" or the aesthetic experience is a heightened kind of experience given the situation.

It is mere ignorance that leads to then to the supposition that connection of art and esthetic perception with experience signifies a lowering of their significance and dignity. Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened vitality. …Because experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ (AE 19).

Hence, Dewey seems to favor *carpe diem* as a natural condition of organic existence. Experience is best taken in large unimpeded draughts, the more the merrier, and democracy and all the rest is the best way of satisfying our unquenchable thirst for ever greater expansion and growth.

Of course, Dewey does not mean by growth the unrestrained, haphazard enlargement of a cancer, yet he seems unable to specify or apply the restraints. Perhaps Dewey's era was too restrained, yet there are many reasons to think that an era can suffer from too much of a good thing. Instead the precondition of joy may well be the fear or the apprehension that Dewey says stultifies experience.

This argument seems to commit the genetic fallacy because it wants to economize on a natural line from animal or organic existence to cultivated human existence. Dewey seems to conclude: as with our forbears, so should it be with us. Yet at the same time Dewey warns us about the depredations to which our own flesh is heir: "what is distinctive in man makes it possible for him to sink below the level of the beasts" (AE 22). He also regales the heights to which we may soar:

> It [man's distinctiveness] also makes it possible for him to carry to new and unprecedented heights that unity of sense and impulse, of brain and eye and ear, that is exemplified in animal life, saturating it with the conscious meanings derived from communication and deliberate expression (AE 22-23).

The problems are twofold. First, there is no reason to assume that we must or should be like our forbears just because they are our forbears. Second, all of the interesting issues are about what we should do when we soar higher than the beasts or delve below them.

Dewey is trying to tread a middle ground. He is skeptical of what he calls the subjectivist and the rationalist traditions. "Subjectivism" says that we individually determine the value or (sometimes) the existence of objects. Dewey calls it a "retraction into self...the heart of all egoisms," an escape from reality with its social conditions and responsibilities (QFC 256). Rationalism is the belief in standards of absolute truth or immutable being, as in Plato. Dewey thinks the rationalist standards inapplicable: "the scientist finds no help in determining the probable truth of some proposed theory by comparing it with a standard of absolute and immutable being" (QFC 251).

What I have argued is that Dewey's faith in democracy and community is rationalistic in the sense that they provide the absolute and immutable sin qua non of ever expanding human experience, hence of human fulfillment. I have used the term "Kantian" because Kant thought he knew the categories that are necessary for experience in the same way that Dewey thought he knew the political categories necessary for human fulfillment. They also seem to provide similar *"aprioristic"* arguments.

First, when we looked at Dewey's view of education, I asked the question: "what should be taught?" The answer seems to be either missing or "whatever accords with the values of democracy and free inquiry and stimulates more of these." But, I remain skeptical that this solution is capable of practical application. Should we teach everything and see what happens?

Second, when I looked at politics, I asked why not falsehood or "noble lies?" Why not force? Dewey's answer seems, similarly, elliptical or dogmatic. He says at one point "the practical consequence of giving the few wise and good power …is that they cease to be wise and good" (Dewey EOD 242, quoted in Westbrook 42). Otherwise, Dewey argues that Plato's state was too "rationalistic" without explaining why his is not.

Finally, with regard to the individual, I asked at what point does the individual become capable of free and autonomous decision-making? The best I can find is Dewey deflating the individual to her social roots. In one way this is correct. The individual has no "private" language; in fact, all of her thoughts, except maybe a few about her own death, concern objects publicly supplied and available. All the same, what makes her uniquely her, and gives her freedom of choice? As Dewey says, there must be something, else she would not be an individual (DE 142). I still wonder what it is.

Lastly, the central problems with art seem to be what makes 'x' art and what makes it good or bad. As we have seen, Dewey ties art directly to experience: art is a *kind* of experience. The good is enlivens further experience; the bad, stultifies it. Yet, potentially anything is capable of giving us the heightened experience known as the aesthetic.

In art, I think we have Dewey's "final answer." Whatever an agent values in the given circumstances and contexts will be the ever changing thing that is to be taught, preserved in democracy, characterized as individuator of the agent, and held up for public inspection as art. The only true measure is the test. It is time for the empirical studies. You will know it when you see it. Of course, the experimental context and circumstances, the problematic situation, will always make it so just not anything goes.

For ultimately, in a certain sense I agree that the questions what should be taught, why not force, what develops an individual, and what should attain the status of art are all "illusory." They are "illusory" in the sense that all but the second cannot be answered without actually being in the situation in which teaching occurs, in which the individual develops and art becomes art. The second is illusory in the sense that it cannot be answered because it is not a real question. Democracy proscribes the preconditions for asking "why not force" or anything else. The first three are incapable of *"aprioristic"* answer (answer prior to experience), the latter is an *"aprioristic"* answer (an answer regardless of experience). To argue for force, as to argue for "essences" or for a canon of teachable material is to beg the question of the experiment, to fudge the data when we should be simply interested in seeing what happens. Yet, an experiment needs preconditions to be intelligible or rational. Dewey saw this. That is why he argued for democracy even if the way he argued for it isn't yet enough.

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NOTES

1. Dewey uses the term "interact" or "transact" as both a continuous biological and sociological metaphor. On the level of animal interactions he writes: "Life goes on in an environment; not merely *in* it but because of it, through interaction with it. No creature lives merely under its skin; its subcutaneous organs are means of connection with what lies beyond its bodily frame, and to which, in order to live, it must adjust itself, by accommodation and defense but also by conquest. At every moment the living creature is exposed to dangers from its surroundings, and at every moment, it must draw upon something in its surroundings to satisfy its needs" (AAE 13). At the human, or educational level he writes: "The concept of situation

and interaction are inseparable from each other. An experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic or even, the subject talked about being also part of the situation; or the toys with which he is playing; the book he is reading (in which his environing conditions at the time may be England…[etc.]); or the materials of an experiment he is performing. The environment, in other words, is whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience that is had. Even when a person builds a castle in the air, he is interacting with objects which he constructs in fancy." (EAE 43-44). It can be seen that there is a "naturalistic" continuity between mere animal experience and human experience. Sean O'Dwyer put transaction this way: "Knowledge is an active affair engaging us with things in our environment; we work upon them, manipulate them with linguistic and physical tools, undergo reactions and consequences, comprehend their relations and produce objects of knowledge as a result. Now a transactional approach to this would acknowledge the mutually transformative inter-relationship between knowers and the events or states of affairs that inquiry is conducted into." Russell famously criticizes Dewey for being more "biological" than "mathematical" that is, giving too much power or force to knower and not to known (1961, 775).

2. Dewey differs from Heidegger and much of "Continental" philosophy for much the same reason he disagrees with Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics (in TQC). He disagrees in the former case with "archetypes" such as "form" or the "forms" or "matter" and with the latter's insistence on the primacy of in something called "Being." A transcendental structure "Being" is the actor in the world; human beings, "dasein" ("Being-there"), are modes or particularly situated positions (ways) of Being. Dewey apparently insists that all "Being" or beings must be experienceable. In fact, famously Dewey goes further by giving the "postulate of radical empiricism": "things are what they are experienced as being" (Dewey MW 158). This is, in effect, to deny any transcendental structures and to insist that what exists is what is experienced as existing. The question arises whether anything may exist unexperienced. A negative answer suggests a fundamental synechism (plenum or continuity) comparable with Peirce's. A positive answer seems self-refuting because then the supposedly non-experienced thing is experienced as "that which serves as an example of the unexperienced."

3. Unless I am mistaken the group "Motley Crue" are the originators of the "popular" song "Be Cruel to Your School."

4. Another example of "states rights" recently in the media concerns the courts interpretation of the eleventh amendment. The conservative members of the court consistently read the amendment to say that an individual cannot sue her own state under the Americans with Disability Act, despite the references in the amendment to other states.

5. Classically, that all things aim toward the good as a final end, is the high mark of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. Aristotle, like Dewey, bases much of his analysis of both good living and good character on acquiring the appropriate habits for citizenship. Aristotle differs from Dewey in thinking that certain "intellectual" virtues could be taught only to a certain elite class of citizens (or where accessible by a special mental faculty called "nous"). However, in their analysis of the virtues of character, Dewey and Aristotle agree substantially.

6. Westbrook writes: Some of his [Dewey's] more important convictions seem to me to be the products of acts of faith exercises of a "will to believe" in the face of inconclusive evidence which calls for psychological argument." Despite his wish to "psychologize," Westbrook provides an insightful defense of Dewey against such "democratic realists" as Henry Maine 39-51. See Maine 1976. As an example of Dewey's faith in democracy see also *Individualism Old and New* (1929). Dewey writes: "Because there is no magic in democracy to confer immediately the power of critical discrimination upon the masses who have been outside any intellectual movement, and who have taken their morals and their religion from an external authority above

them an authority which science is destroying it does not follow that the ineptitude of the many is the creation of democracy" (28-29). Of course we cannot lay "the ineptitude of the many" on democracy's doorstep. Still, the many are "inept," and some say always will be. They say that far from curing ineptitude, democracy gives it license. Dewey seems to think that, properly understood and instantiated, democracy will cure ineptitude. I admit that I am with Dewey's critics on this, though I would like to be with Dewey.

7. Dewey differs from Kant, here, in that the latter believes in a necessary "moral law" which he derives deductively from categories established prior to experience and which exist "as a jewel" independently of human flourishing or happiness. Although the moral law is instantiated in human action, Kant, with his Lutheran/Augustinian heritage stressing original sin and the limitations of reason, seems not to care whether the moral law ultimately favors our actual self interest and, rather, sees it in contradistinction to our apparent self interests (inclinations). Dewey retains Aristotle's practical quest for the conditions of human happiness on earth. This he flavors greatly with Darwinian and psychological considerations of what is required for the human animal to adapt itself to its environmental conditions and vice versa. In this way he adds significantly to Aristotle's list of goods necessary for a happy life.

8. Russell continues: "Dr. Dewey's world, it seems to me, is one in which human beings occupy the imagination; the cosmos of astronomy, though of course acknowledged to exist, is at most times ignored. His philosophy is a power philosophy, though not like Nietzsche's a philosophy of individual power; it is the power of the community that is felt to be valuable. It is this element of social power that seems to me to make the philosophy of instrumentalism attractive to those who are more impressed by our new control over natural forces than by the limitations to which that control is still subject."

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Appendix B: MPES Proceedings (Etc.): Index: 1977 to 1997-98.

YEAR	PROGRAM CHAIR	EDITORS	PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS	ERIC DOC. NUMBER
1977	Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J.	Robert Craig & Frederick C.Neff	none	ED 345 986
1978	unknown	James Merritt	Arthur Brown	ED 356 992
1979	David Angus	Michael C. Smith & Adrian Dupuis	none	ED 345 983
1980	Philip L. Smith	Philip L. Smith	Adrian Dupuis	ED 345 984
1981	unknown	none	none	none
1982	Alexander Makedon	Michael C. Smith & J. Williams	George Kizer	ED 241 407
1983	Alexander Makedon	Michael C. Smith	none	ED 345 985
1984	unknown	none	Philip L. Smith*	none
1985-86	David B. Annis	Philip L. Smith	Lawrence J. Dennis	ED 356 993
1987-88	Peter Collins	Lawrence J. Dennis	David B. Annis	ED 319 670
1989-90	Michael A. Oliker	David B. Annis & Michael A. Oliker	Ronald M. Swartz	ED 345 987
1989-90: Supplement	Michael A. Oliker	Michael A. Oliker	not in supplement	ED 371 973; Supplement: "Additional Dialogue"
1991-92	David B. Owen	David B. Owen & Ronald M. Swartz	George W. Stickel	ED 364 493
1993-94	George W. Stickel & Janis Fine	George W. Stickel & David B. Owen	David B. Owen	ED 413 277
1995-96	Charlesetta M. Ellis	Michael A. Oliker, Charlesetta M. Ellis, Gerald L. Gutek, Walter P. Krolikowski, and Kate Campion.	Robert Craig	ED 413 282
1997-98	Michael A. Oliker	Michael A. Oliker, David Blacker, Craig Cunningham, Walter P. Krolikowski, Thomas I. Stark, and Molly O'Halloran.	Jerome A. Popp	ED 440 004
1999-2000	Michael A. Oliker	Michael A. Oliker, Charlesetta M. Ellis, Jon Fennell, Percy Moore, Madonna Murphy, and Molly O'Halloran.	Don G. Smith	IN PREPARATION

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*1984 Presidential Address by Philip L. Smith: "Liberty and the Lust for Power: Searching for Excellence in a World of Expertise." *Journal Of Social Philosophy* 17, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 28-34.

1963 Presidential Address by Joe R. Burnett. "Conant on the Philosophy of Education." *Educational Theory* 14, no. 1 (January 1964): 24-30.

ERIC Document No.: ED 442 681 AUTHOR: McMurray, Foster TITLE: Philosophy of Public Education PUBLICATION_DATE: 2000. (Published by ERIC for MPES!)

ED 368 628. Makedon, Alexander. Humans in the World: Introduction to the Educational Theory of Radical Perspectivism. 1992

ED 361 214. Makedon, Alexander. Reinterpreting Dewey: Some Thoughts on His Views of Play and Science in Education. 1991

ED 360 226. Santoro, Lawrence. From Puggy to Larry: Poetry from "Gathering Light." 1992

ED 360 225. Oliker, Michael A. B. Othanel Smith, Douglas McGregor, and the Philosophical Analysis of the Discourse of Institutional Democracy in Education: An Essay with Bibliographies. 1993

ED 349 252. Leone, Robert A. American Education in Fluxion and the Possibility of a Teaching Profession. 1991

ED 339 628. Makedon, Alexander. Playful Gaming. 1980

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Appendix C

1999 Annual Conference

Host: School of Education: Margaret Fong, Dean.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1999

11: 30 a.m.: Opening Session: Aesthetics, Communication, & Education
Chair: Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois U.
"Toward a Conception of the Aesthetic," Louis F. Miron, U. of California, Irvine.
"Cyberspace and the Eclipse of the State." Leslie R. Ballard, Baylor U.
"Tragedy, Security, Liberty." Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago.

1:35 p.m.: Moral Education
Chair: Thomas E. Wren, Loyola U. Chicago
"Where are the Teachers of Virtue?" James D. Wallace, U. of Illinois at Urbana.
"Tacit Knowledge and Moral Education." Ronald Zigler, Pennsylvania State U. at Abington.

1:35 p.m.: Family, Community, and Education
Chair: Ronald Swartz, Oakland U.
"Home is Where One Starts From." Walter P. Krolikowski, SJ, Loyola U Chicago.
"Multiage Classroom: A Deweyan Community." Huey-li Li & Barbara Jurkovic, U. of Akron.

2:50 p.m.: Education and Literature
Chair: Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago.
"Reader Response and its Discontents." Allan Johnston, Oakton Community College.
"Dewey Played on the Bongo Drums of Education." Morna McDermott, U. of Virginia
"Exploring the Existentialists' Point of View via the Writings of Richard Wright." Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State U.

2:50 p.m.: Science and Education
Chair: Alexander Makedon, Chicago State U.
"Educational Implications of the 20th Century Dialogue about the Scientific Method." Ronald Swartz, Oakland University.
"Science and Education: A Pragmatic Proposal." Jack Bowen, Long Beach State U.
"Technology, Community, & Marginalized Youth." Darren Pascavage, Georgia State University.

4:20 p.m. MPES & MWCIES Joint Session: The Ethics of Access I: Issues Surrounding K-12 Education
Speakers: Mobin Shorish, U of Illinois, Urbana, Brad Levinson, Indiana U., Ana Patricia Elvir, Indiana U., Wei Rose Zhang, Eastern Illinois U.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1999

9 a.m.: Psychology and Education
Chair: Charlesetta Ellis, Chicago Statee U.
"J. F. Herbart & Moral Education." Madonna Murphy, U. of St. Francis.
"Learning & Reciprocity." JoAnn Carson, Southwest Texas State U.

9 A.M.: SOCIETY AND EDUCATION
Chair: B. Douglas Anderson, U. of Illinois, Springfield.
"Court Defined Philosophy." Jennifer Borek, St. Joseph's College, New York.
"Multiculturalism." Robert P. Craig, U. of Houston.

10:20 A.M.: POLITICS AND EDUCATION
Chair: Jon M. Fennell, Naperville, Illinois.
"Can Democratic Education Still Inspire?", David Blacker, U. of Delaware.
"Tension Between Justice & Freedom." Clarence Joldersma, Calvin College.

10:20 A.M.: PHILOSPHY AND FILM
Chair: Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois U.
"Roger Corman's Poe Films as 'Film Noir.'" Gene D. Phillips, SJ , Loyola U. Chicago
"Making Manifest: Viewing Wittgenstein's Philosophy." Tracy Bowell, U. of Waikato, New Zealand.

1:15 P.M.: PHILOSPHY AND TEACH EDUCATION
Chair: Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University
"The Irrelevance of 'Irrelevance:' The Real Reason People Ignore Philosophy of Education." Nicholas C. Burbules, U. of Illinois, at Urbana
"In the Tradition of Pestalozzi's 'Evening Hour.'" James Merritt, Northern Illinois U.
"Cultivating Philosophical Skills & Virtues." Nathan Nobis, U. of Rochester.

1:15 P.M.: POPULAR CULTURE AND EDUCATION
S.I.G.: THE GEORGE REEVES SOCIETY.
Chair: Michael A. Oliker, Loyola U. Chicago.
"The Dream of Superman." Ralph Schiller, Chicago, Illinois.
"John Dewey & Popular Culture." Lisa Satanovsky, Washington U.
"Reality Bytes: Recurring Images of Reality in Film." Ruth Givens, Wheaton College

3:15 P.M.: MPES & MWCIES JOINT SESSION: THE ETHICS OF ACCESS ISSUES SURROUNDING HIGHER AND ADULT EDUCATION
Speakers: Walter Feinberg, U. of Illinois - Urbana; Walter P. Krolikowski,SJ, Loyola U. Chicago; Sergei Shirobokov, Loyola U & Omsk Pedagogical U., Russia.

DEWEY AND HISTORY AND PHILOSPHY OF EDUCATION
Chair: Richard C. Pipan, Oakland U.
"Who is the Teacher?: Some Instructive Mistakes about Dewey and Multiculturalism." Peter J. Goldstone, Temple U.
"John Dewey & Traditional Education." Wei Rose Zhang, Eastern Illinois U.

3:15 P.M.: AESTHETICS
Chair: Thomas I. Stark, Professor Emeritus, Harold Washington College.
"Dewey: Art, Experience, & Context." Joseph Swenson, Baylor U.
"Heidegger and Applied Aesthetics." William E. Engel, Humanist Enterprises, Nashville, Tennessee

Appendix D

2000 Annual Conference

Host: School of Education: Margaret Fong, Dean.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2000

9:00 a.m.: Education in Fictional Texts
Chair: John M. Wozniak, Loyola U. Dean Emeritus.
"The Education of Stephen Dedalus." Allan Johnston, Oakton Community College
"The Text of Naturak Morals: Emile." Guillemette Johnston, DePaul University

9:00 a.m.: Dilemmas of Educational Reform
Chair: Stephen Haymes, DePaul University.
"The Fragility of Teaching." Linda O'Neill, Aurora University.
"Doxic Assumptions, Eurocentrism, and the Afrocentric Educational Idea." Clyde Winters, Loyola University Chicago.

10:20 a.m.: John Dewey's Philosphy of Education
Chair: Richard Pipan, Oakland University.
"Dewey: The Aesthetics of Pedagogy." (GRADUATE STUDENT AWARD WINNER!)
Stephen Barnes, Southern Illinois U.: Carbondale.
"Community Virtue, Social Justice, and Education." James Scott Johnston, U. of Illinois: Urbana.

10:20 a.m.: Women and Philosphy of Education
Chair: Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago.
"Flora J. Cooke: A Communitarian." Gail L. Kroepel, DeVry Institute of Technology.
"Hannah Arendt on the Problem of Thoughtlessness and the Perplexities of Thinking." Natasha Levinson, Kent State University.

1:15 p.m.: Philsophy of Learning
Chair: Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University.
"The Freedom to Learn. (W.E.B. DuBois)" Percy L. Moore, Wayne State University.
"Curricular Theorizing for Democratic Learning: Multiple and Contending Viewpoints." Jolanda Westerhof-Shultz, Grand Valley State U.

1:15 p.m.: Philsophy of Health Education
Chair: Ronald Swartz, Oakland University
"New Tools for the Old Black Bag: Augmenting the Medical Education Paradigm." Peter Minich, M.D., Loyola University Medical Center, & Paul Ford, Vanderbilt University Medical Center
"The Reconstruction of Cultural Experience in Dewey and Winnicott: Notes for Further Investigation." Julie Webber, Purdue University.

3:00 p.m.: Moral and Religious Education
Chair: Peter Goldstone, Temple University.
"Off with Masks: A. MacIntyre on Morality." Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola University Chicago.

"An Epistemological Argument for the Inclusion of Religion in Public Schools." Suzanne Rosenblith, U. of Wisconsin-Madison.

3:00 P.M.: JOHN DEWEY AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Chair: Thomas I. Stark, Harold Washington College: Emeritus.
"Dewey's Principles of Educative Experience." Amy C. McAninch, U. of Missouri at Kansas City.
"Deweying It Together." Carol Olsen & Angela Kaufman, Columbia College

6:30 P.M.: PRESIDENTIAL BANQUET AND ADDRESS
"Separating School and State: An Analytical Polemic."
MPES President Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois U.
Co-Chairs: Jon M. Fennell, Independent Scholar; Michael A. Oliker, Executive Director, MPES.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 2000

9:00 A.M.: PHILOSPHY OF EDUCATION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
Chair: Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University
"J. A. Comenius: Moral Education Through Age Appropriate Virtue Formation." Madonna M. Murphy, University of St.Francis.
"A Correspondence Course in Education and Distance." Steven Schroeder, Roosevelt University.

9:00 A.M.: PHILSOPHY OF DANGER IN EDUCATION
Chair: Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago
"Responses to School Violence." Ian M. Harris, University of Wisconsin Milwaukee.
"The Aesthetics of Dangerous Style: Curriculum & Culture." Morna McDermott, Western Michigan University

10:20 A.M.: SYMBOLIC ASPECTS OF EDUCATION
Chair: Madonna Murphy, St. Francis University
"Pragmatic Mnemonics and Moral Education." Bill Engel, Humanist Enterprises.
*"Fairy Tale as Literature."*Guillemette Johnston, DePaul University.

10:20 A.M.: JUSTICE, EDUCATION, AND THE AMERICAN DISABILITIES ACT
Chair: Thomas E. Wren, Loyola University Chicago.
Robert Ladenson, Illinois Institute of Technology. Anita Silvers, San Francisco State University.

1:10 P.M.: LITERATURE AND JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY
Chair: Michael A. Oliker, Midwest PES
"Teaching and Experiencing Hardy's Tess of the D'Urbervilles: *A Deweyan Approach."* Arthur Efron, State University of New York at Buffalo.
"Expression, Imagination, and Organic Unity." David A. Granger, SUNY College at Geneseo

2:30 P.M.: ASIAN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSPHY
Chair: John Wozniak, Loyola U. Chicago Dean Emeritus
"Why Art Education Mattered: Ernest F. Fennollosa's Philosophy of Art Education and Its Impact on Meji Japan." Yutaka Ito, Rutgers University.
"Ogbu's Cultural Ecology Theory and the Case of Vietnamese Students." Dang-Giao T. Nguyen, Susie D. Lamborn, & Hanh Q. Trinh, University of Wisconsin Milwaukee.

2:30 P.M.: Existentialism and Twentiety Century Educational Philosphy
Chair: Van Cleve Morris, University of Illinois at Chicago Dean Emeritus.
"A Week with the Philosopher-Kings." George Kizer, Iowa State University Emeritus. (Paper to be read by Michael A. Oliker, Midwest PES)
"The Modern Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre." Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University.

3:50 P.M.: Philosophy of Educational Inquiry
Chair: Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University.
"Presence as Pedagogical Possibility." Don Hufford, Newman University.
"The Procedural Reconception of Standardized Assessment." Darren Pascavage, Georgia State University.

3:50 P.M.: Humanities Education
Chair: Michael A. Oliker, MPES Executive Director
"Humanities Without Apologies." Douglas R. Anderson, Pennsylvania State University.
"Realism and Rationality: Searle's Case Against the Postmodernist's Academic Subculture." Art Bollman & Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University.